explained rule in New Mexico

2020With respect to potential violations of a law, rule, or regulation, the court explained that the test is whether there is “[a] reasonable belief that a violation . . . is imminent.” Id. at 677 .

2020Stated differently, there must be a reasonable basis to believe that “ ‘potential wrongdoing [is] real and immediate.’ ” Id. at 678 (quoting Ward, 67 M.S.P.R. at 488-89).

2015In Gallegos v. Franklin, this Court explained that a hearing is necessary because “[t]he entry of a default judgment against a defendant is not considered an admission by [the] defendant of the amount of unliquidated damages claimed by [the] plaintiff.” 1976-NMCA-019 , ¶ 40, 89 N.M. 118 , 547 P.2d 1160 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2015In Gallegos v. Franklin, this Court explained that a hearing is necessary because “[t]he entry of a default judgment against a defendant is not considered an admission by [the] defendant of the amount of unliquidated damages claimed by [the] plaintiff.” 1976-NMCA-019 , ¶ 40, 89 N.M. 118 , 547 P.2d 1160 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2011The State points to State v. Graham, 2005-NMSC-004, ¶10 , 137 N.M. 197 , 109 P.3d 285 , a ease in which the Court determined that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to support an inference that the defendant had left marijuana in the living room and a marijuana bud in the baby crib, both of which were accessible to the children.

2011The State points to State v. Graham, 2005-NMSC-004, ¶10 , 137 N.M. 197 , 109 P.3d 285 , a ease in which the Court determined that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to support an inference that the defendant had left marijuana in the living room and a marijuana bud in the baby crib, both of which were accessible to the children.

2011The Court explained that this standard — whether the defendant’s conduct created a substantial and foreseeable risk of harm — “more closely aligns with the legislative purpose that animates the child endangerment statute — to punish conduct that creates a truly significant risk of serious harm to children.” Id. {18} In this case, the State did not rely on Defendant’s actual conduct, but rather on the possibility of his future conduct — conduct that did not occur because the police intervened.

2003It is a provision for substitute production or constructive production to arrive at a status of production as distinguished from actual production.” Id.

1991The Court explained the rule “means that if Congress does not fix the punishment for a federal offense clearly and without ambiguity, doubt will be resolved against turning a single transaction into multiple offenses.” Id.

1981In Hunt v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 448 P.2d 1018 (Okl.1968), the court explained that the analysis of proximate cause must be such as to establish it as the efficient cause which sets in motion the chain of circumstances leading to the injury; and if the negligence alleged merely furnishes a condition by which the injury was possible but a second independent act caused the injury, then the existence of the condition cannot be the proximate cause of the injury.

1981We have recently ruled, in Sweenhart v. Co.-Con, Inc., 95 N.M. 773 , 626 P.2d 310 (1981), that even though a prima facie showing of plaintiff’s negligence has been made, summary judgment is improper if the issue of proximate cause remains.

1981We have recently ruled, in Sweenhart v. Co.-Con, Inc., 95 N.M. 773 , 626 P.2d 310 (1981), that even though a prima facie showing of plaintiff’s negligence has been made, summary judgment is improper if the issue of proximate cause remains.