explained factors in Virginia

2025This Court explained that a violation of the statute “involves the act of possessing child pornography—not the act of acquiring it.” Papol v. Commonwealth, 63 Va. App. 150, 153 (2014); cf. Chapman v. Commonwealth, 56 Va. App. 725, 732 (2010) (“[T]he permissible unit of prosecution for the sale of obscene items under Code § 18.2-374 was the number of each such item sold, this Court held in Mason that ‘the permissible prosecution for possession of child pornography under [the statute] corresponds to the number of individual items of sexually explicit visual material.” (second alteration in origi

2025Consequently, it followed that the “unit of prosecution” is “the number of individual items of 3 “[U]npublished opinions are not binding but can be ‘considered for their persuasive value.’” Harvey v. Commonwealth, 76 Va. App. 436 , 466 n.6 (2023) (quoting Otey v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 346 , 350 n.3 (2023)); see also Rule 5A:1(f). - 11 - sexually explicit visual material possessed by the defendant.” Papol, 63 Va. App. at 153 (quoting Chapman, 56 Va. App. at 732 ).

2025This Court explained that a violation of the statute “involves the act of possessing child pornography—not the act of acquiring it.” Papol v. Commonwealth, 63 Va. App. 150, 153 (2014); cf. Chapman v. Commonwealth, 56 Va. App. 725, 732 (2010) (“[T]he permissible unit of prosecution for the sale of obscene items under Code § 18.2-374 was the number of each such item sold, this Court held in Mason that ‘the permissible prosecution for possession of child pornography under [the statute] corresponds to the number of individual items of sexually explicit visual material.” (second alteration in origi

2025This Court explained that a violation of the statute “involves the act of possessing child pornography—not the act of acquiring it.” Papol v. Commonwealth, 63 Va. App. 150, 153 (2014); cf. Chapman v. Commonwealth, 56 Va. App. 725, 732 (2010) (“[T]he permissible unit of prosecution for the sale of obscene items under Code § 18.2-374 was the number of each such item sold, this Court held in Mason that ‘the permissible prosecution for possession of child pornography under [the statute] corresponds to the number of individual items of sexually explicit visual material.” (second alteration in origi

2025Consequently, it followed that the “unit of prosecution” is “the number of individual items of 3 “[U]npublished opinions are not binding but can be ‘considered for their persuasive value.’” Harvey v. Commonwealth, 76 Va. App. 436 , 466 n.6 (2023) (quoting Otey v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 346 , 350 n.3 (2023)); see also Rule 5A:1(f). - 11 - sexually explicit visual material possessed by the defendant.” Papol, 63 Va. App. at 153 (quoting Chapman, 56 Va. App. at 732 ).

2023That principle requires us to “discard the evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and regard as true all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences that may be drawn therefrom.” Kelly v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 250, 254 (2003) (en banc) (quoting Watkins v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 335, 348 (1998)). -2- you do that?” The court explained that defense counsel’s question “relates to the statement[:] if a person comes forward and makes these allegations, they must be telling the truth[,]” and told the juror, “The whole point of this is

2023That principle requires us to “discard the evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and regard as true all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences that may be drawn therefrom.” Kelly v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 250, 254 (2003) (en banc) (quoting Watkins v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 335, 348 (1998)). -2- you do that?” The court explained that defense counsel’s question “relates to the statement[:] if a person comes forward and makes these allegations, they must be telling the truth[,]” and told the juror, “The whole point of this is

2010The court questioned: “But on June 28th -- Your argument would be that June 28th stands alone for probable cause?” The Commonwealth responded: “True.” Later, the court explained to defense counsel that “the Commonwealth’s position is that they don’t care if nothing happened before [June] 28th, that . . . there’s enough on [June] 28th standing alone to support probable cause for the arrest on that date.” Defense counsel then stated he would “move on to the 28th.” As parties may concede facts, Logan v. Commonwealth, 47 Va. App. 168, 172 , 622 S.E.2d 771, 773 (2005) (en banc), we consider evidenc

2010The court questioned: “But on June 28th -- Your argument would be that June 28th stands alone for probable cause?” The Commonwealth responded: “True.” Later, the court explained to defense counsel that “the Commonwealth’s position is that they don’t care if nothing happened before [June] 28th, that . . . there’s enough on [June] 28th standing alone to support probable cause for the arrest on that date.” Defense counsel then stated he would “move on to the 28th.” As parties may concede facts, Logan v. Commonwealth, 47 Va. App. 168, 172 , 622 S.E.2d 771, 773 (2005) (en banc), we consider evidenc

2006Id. at 264-65.

2004ANALYSIS Appellant contends he should be convicted of only one count of embezzlement under the single larceny doctrine since he wrote the 142 checks under a “single impulse.” We disagree. 3 In Richardson v. Commonwealth, 25 Va.App. 491, 497 , 489 S.E.2d 697, 700 (1997) (en banc), we held, “[u]nless the evidence proves that two or more separate and discrete thefts occurred at separate times which were not part of the same larcenous impulse, then thefts from the same room are but a single larceny.” This Court explained the factors to consider in Acey v. Commonwealth, 29 Va.App. 240, 247 , 511 S.

2004ANALYSIS Appellant contends he should be convicted of only one count of embezzlement under the single larceny doctrine since he wrote the 142 checks under a “single impulse.” We disagree. 3 In Richardson v. Commonwealth, 25 Va.App. 491, 497 , 489 S.E.2d 697, 700 (1997) (en banc), we held, “[u]nless the evidence proves that two or more separate and discrete thefts occurred at separate times which were not part of the same larcenous impulse, then thefts from the same room are but a single larceny.” This Court explained the factors to consider in Acey v. Commonwealth, 29 Va.App. 240, 247 , 511 S.

2004ANALYSIS Appellant contends he should be convicted of only one count of embezzlement under the single larceny doctrine since he wrote the 142 checks under a “single impulse.” We disagree. 3 In Richardson v. Commonwealth, 25 Va.App. 491, 497 , 489 S.E.2d 697, 700 (1997) (en banc), we held, “[u]nless the evidence proves that two or more separate and discrete thefts occurred at separate times which were not part of the same larcenous impulse, then thefts from the same room are but a single larceny.” This Court explained the factors to consider in Acey v. Commonwealth, 29 Va.App. 240, 247 , 511 S.

2004ANALYSIS Appellant contends he should be convicted of only one count of embezzlement under the single larceny doctrine since he wrote the 142 checks under a “single impulse.” We disagree. 3 In Richardson v. Commonwealth, 25 Va.App. 491, 497 , 489 S.E.2d 697, 700 (1997) (en banc), we held, “[u]nless the evidence proves that two or more separate and discrete thefts occurred at separate times which were not part of the same larcenous impulse, then thefts from the same room are but a single larceny.” This Court explained the factors to consider in Acey v. Commonwealth, 29 Va.App. 240, 247 , 511 S.

2004ANALYSIS Appellant contends he should be convicted of only one count of embezzlement under the single larceny doctrine since he wrote the 142 checks under a “single impulse.” We disagree. 3 In Richardson v. Commonwealth, 25 Va.App. 491, 497 , 489 S.E.2d 697, 700 (1997) (en banc), we held, “[u]nless the evidence proves that two or more separate and discrete thefts occurred at separate times which were not part of the same larcenous impulse, then thefts from the same room are but a single larceny.” This Court explained the factors to consider in Acey v. Commonwealth, 29 Va.App. 240, 247 , 511 S.

2004ANALYSIS Appellant contends he should be convicted of only one count of embezzlement under the single larceny doctrine since he wrote the 142 checks under a “single impulse.” We disagree. 3 In Richardson v. Commonwealth, 25 Va.App. 491, 497 , 489 S.E.2d 697, 700 (1997) (en banc), we held, “[u]nless the evidence proves that two or more separate and discrete thefts occurred at separate times which were not part of the same larcenous impulse, then thefts from the same room are but a single larceny.” This Court explained the factors to consider in Acey v. Commonwealth, 29 Va.App. 240, 247 , 511 S.

2003Co. v. Douthat, Code § 8.01-382 “draws an important distinction between prejudgment and postjudgment interest.” 248 Va. 627, 631 , 449 S.E.2d 799, 801 (1994).

2003Co. v. Douthat, Code § 8.01-382 “draws an important distinction between prejudgment and postjudgment interest.” 248 Va. 627, 631 , 449 S.E.2d 799, 801 (1994).

1996The Court explained this rule in Maroulis v. Elliott, 207 Va. 503, 511 (1967), this way: where separate and independent acts of negligence of two parties are the direct cause of a single injury to a third person and it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury, either or both are responsible for the whole injury.

1991Commonwealth v. Millsaps, 232 Va. 502, 509-510 , 352 S.E.2d 311, 315 (1987) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

1991Commonwealth v. Millsaps, 232 Va. 502, 509-510 , 352 S.E.2d 311, 315 (1987) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).