explained rule in Florida

2015The Court explained that this rule does not require the states to guarantee eventu *76 al freedom to juveniles convicted of nonho-micide crimes, but rather it merely requires the states to give such offenders “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” Id. at 75, 130 S.Ct. 2011 .

2015The Court explained that this rule does not require the states to guarantee eventual freedom to juveniles convicted of nonhomicide crimes, but rather it merely requires the states to give such offenders “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” Id. at 75 .

1996This Court explained the doctrine of administrative finality in Peoples Gas System, Inc. v. Mason, 187 So.2d 335 (Fla.1966): [O]rders of administrative agencies must eventually pass out of the agency's control and become final and no longer subject to *1179 modification.

1996This Court explained the doctrine of administrative finality in Peoples Gas System, Inc. v. Mason, 187 So.2d 335 (Fla.1966): [Ojrders of administrative agencies must eventually pass out of the agency’s control and become final and no longer subject to modification.

2025In a third decision, Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985), the Court renounced Howey as applied to “stocks.” In so doing, the Court explained that the test “was designed to determine whether a particular instrument is an ‘investment contract,’ not whether it fits within any of the examples listed in the statutory definition of ‘security.’” Id. at 691 .

2025In a third decision, Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985), the Court renounced Howey as applied to “stocks.” In so doing, the Court explained that the test “was designed to determine whether a particular instrument is an ‘investment contract,’ not whether it fits within any of the examples listed in the statutory definition of ‘security.’” Id. at 691 .

2022In doing so, this Court explained that the rule was previously adopted without “the benefit of an adversarial proceeding directed to the issue presented in [Boyd]” and that, because the matter at issue was substantive, the rule nevertheless “[did] not absolutely control which of the two statutory provisions applie[d].” Id.

2019Id. at 361 .

2017This Court explained these factors in Ross: [I]t must be evident that, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would feel a restraint of his or her freedom of movement, fairly characterized, so that the suspect would not feel free to leave or to terminate the encounter with police. 45 So.3d at 415 .

2017This Court explained these factors in Ross: [I]t must be evident that, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would feel a restraint of his or her freedom of movement, fairly characterized, so that the suspect would not feel free to leave or to terminate the encounter with police. 45 So. 3d at 415 .

2017Id. at 599 , 2017 WL 1506854 at *7 .

2017Id. at 599 , 2017 WL 1506854 at *7 .

2017Id. at 317-18 .

2017Id. at 317-18 .

2016As noted above, the Court explained the test as requiring in its first prong that “a sale of tangible goods has a sufficient nexus to the State in which the sale is consummated to be treated as a local transaction taxable by that- State.” Id. at 184 , 115 S.Ct. 1331 .

2016As noted above, the Court explained the test as requiring in its first prong that “a sale of tangible goods has a sufficient nexus to the State in which the sale is consummated to be treated as a local transaction taxable by that- State.” Id. at 184 , 115 S.Ct. 1331 .

2015To support this argument, Appellants cite cases dealing with street and road easements created by subdivision plats, such as Paine v. Consumers’ Forwarding & Storage Co., 71 F. 626 (6th Cir.1895), in which the court explained the principle as follows: The existence of “strips or gores” of land along the margin of nonnavigable lakes, to which the title may be held in abeyance for indefinite periods of time, is as great' an evil as are “strips and gores” of land along highways or running streams.

2015In Henry v. State, the Florida Supreme Court extended the rule adopted in Graham to term-of-years sentences that amount to life in prison, holding that: Graham prohibits the state trial courts from sentencing juvenile nonhomicide offenders to prison terms that ensure these offenders will be imprisoned without obtaining a meaningful opportunity to obtain future early release during their natural lives based on their demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation. -So.3d-, 2015 WL 1239696 , 40 Fla. L.

2013Confusion can be reduced by recognition that liability under this doctrine is imposed independent of other theories of vicarious responsibility in tort law. 112 So.2d at 836. 3 Susco was followed by Meister, wherein the court explained the doctrine as follows: This form of vicarious liability is not based on respondent superior or an agency conception, but on the practical fact that the owner of an instrumentality which [has] the capability of causing death or destruction should in justice answer for misuse of this instrumentality by anyone operating it with his knowledge and consent. 462 So.2

2013In Jackson v. State, 983 So.2d 562 (Fla.2008), the court explained that the rule was intended to permit correction of errors in the order itself: The rule was intended to permit preservation of errors in orders entered as a result of the sentencing process — in other words, errors in cost and restitution orders, probation or community control orders, or in the sentence itself.

2013Ill, § 20, Fla. Const. In interpreting the identical standards in article III, section 21, 2 during its initial 2012 review of the legislative apportionment plan, this Court explained that the requirement that “[n]o apportionment plan or district shall be drawn with the intent to favor or disfavor a political party or an incumbent” is “a top priority to which the Legislature must conform during the redistricting process.” Apportionment I, 83 So.3d at 615 .

2013This Court stated that “by its express terms, Florida’s constitutional provision prohibits intent, not effect, and applies to both the apportionment plan as a whole and to each district individually.” Id. at 617 .

2013Health Trust v. Menendez, 584 So.2d 567 (Fla.1991). 1 The Court explained that the exception clause “clearly provides that the periods of time provided in chapter 95 do not apply if a different period is provided elsewhere in the statutes .... [T]he language of [the clause] is plain: If a different statute prescribes a different time, then the periods of time in chapter 95 have no applicability.” Id. at 569 .

2013Health Trust v. Menendez, 584 So.2d 567 (Fla.1991). 1 The Court explained that the exception clause “clearly provides that the periods of time provided in chapter 95 do not apply if a different period is provided elsewhere in the statutes .... [T]he language of [the clause] is plain: If a different statute prescribes a different time, then the periods of time in chapter 95 have no applicability.” Id. at 569 .

2011Id. at 574 .

2010Id. at 259 . *325 Second-degree murder as a lesser included offense is one step removed from first-degree murder, and manslaughter as a lesser included offense is two steps removed from first-degree murder.