exigent circumstances exception in Colorado

1990We have limited application of the exigent circumstances exception to “those situations involving a bona fide pursuit of a fleeing suspect, the risk of immediate destruction of evidence, or a colorable claim of emergency threatening the life or safety of another.” Malczewski, 744 P.2d at 66 ; accord McCall v. People, 623 P.2d 397, 402 (Colo.1981).

1983The emergency doctrine is a variant of the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement and will be invoked where facts exist which support a “colorable claim of emergency threatening the life or safety of another.” People v. Clements, 661 P.2d 267, 271 (Colo.1983) (quoting McCall v. People, 623 P.2d 397, 402 (Colo.1981)); see also People v. Amato, 193 Colo. 57 , 562 P.2d 422 (1977).

2026But sometimes “[t]he ‘emergency doctrine’ exception to the warrant requirement is but a specific example of the exigent circumstances doctrine.” Id. (quoting People v. Thompson, 770 P.2d 1282, 1285 (Colo. 1989)).

2024Even if Shukurov ’s consent was so limited, once the officers were inside, exigent circumstances 11 justified their broader search of the home to ensure the safety of the victim and the children. ¶ 27 Under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, “ [a] prompt and limited warrantless search of a scene at which violence has occurred may . . . be necessary to determine if there are any injured parties.” People v. Thompson , 770 P.2d 1282, 1285 (Colo. 1989).

2003However, unlike the exigent circumstances exception, the emergency aid exception requires the prosecution to prove the existence of "an immediate crisis and the probability that [police] assistance will be helpful." Amato, 193 Colo. at 60 , 562 P.2d at 424 .

2003However, unlike the exigent circumstances exception, the emergency aid exception requires the prosecution to prove the existence of "an immediate crisis and the probability that [police] assistance will be helpful." Amato, 193 Colo. at 60 , 562 P.2d at 424 .

2018Nor do I believe that this court should speculate as to such facts, particularly given that the People had the burden of proving the applicability of the exigent circumstances exception in this case. ¶56 Nor am I persuaded by the majority’s reliance on People v. Aarness, 150 P.3d 1271, 1274 (Colo. 2006), and People v. Smith, 13 P.3d 300 , 303–04 (Colo. 2000).

2018Nor do I believe that this court should speculate as to such facts, particularly given that the People had the burden of proving the applicability of the exigent circumstances exception in this case. ¶56 Nor am I persuaded by the majority's reliance on People v. Aarness , 150 P.3d 1271 , 1274 (Colo. 2006), and People v. Smith , 13 P.3d 300 , 303-04 (Colo. 2000).

2018“As with other exceptions to the warrant requirement, the exigent circumstances exception may 6 combine with the plain view doctrine to justify a warrantless search and seizure.” People v. Kluhsman, 980 P.2d 529, 535 (Colo. 1999).

2018"As with other exceptions to the warrant requirement, the exigent circumstances exception may combine with the plain view doctrine to justify a warrantless search and seizure." People v. Kluhsman , 980 P.2d 529 , 535 (Colo. 1999).

2013This "variant of the exigent circumstances exception requires a showing of an immediate crisis inside the home and the probability that police assistance will be helpful in alleviating that eri-sis." Winpigler, 8 P.3d at 446 (citing People v. Malezewski, 744 P.2d 62, 66 (Colo.1987)).

1990We have limited application of the exigent circumstances exception to “those situations involving a bona fide pursuit of a fleeing suspect, the risk of immediate destruction of evidence, or a colorable claim of emergency threatening the life or safety of another.” Malczewski, 744 P.2d at 66 ; accord McCall v. People, 623 P.2d 397, 402 (Colo.1981).

2002Winpigler, 8 P.3d at 443-44 ; Kluhsman, 930 P.2d at 534; Higbee 802 P.2d at 1088 .

1999See Kluhsman, 980 P.2d at 534 ; People v. Higbee, 802 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Colo.1990).

2001See People v. Clements, 661 P.2d 267, 271 (Colo.1983)("We have held that a bona fide public emergency is a variant of the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. ... [The possibility of danger to police guarding the contraband while the warrant is being obtained" is one factor relevant to this exception). .

1984A public emergency “is a variant of the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement.” People v. Clements, supra. And, the emergency doctrine applies “if there exists a factual situation which supports a ‘colorable claim of emergency threatening the life or safety of another.’ ” People v. Clements, supra. Here, the officers discovered a door one foot ajar on a cold November evening after the hour of midnight in a burglary-prone neighborhood.

1990We have established as the standard for determining the existence of an immediate crisis that at the time of the search, information known to the police gave rise to “a colorable claim of emergency threatening the life or safety of another.” Malczewski, 744 P.2d at 66 ; accord Thompson, 770 P.2d at 1285 ; Hogan, 649 P.2d at 331 .

1989See People v. Turner, 660 P.2d 1284, 1287-88 (Colo.1983); People v. Hogan, 649 P.2d 326, 331 (Colo.1982); McCall v. People, 623 P.2d 397, 402 (Colo. 1981).

1989Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390-91 , 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2412-13 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978); People v. Hogan, 649 P.2d 326, 330 (Colo.1982).

1989Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390-91 , 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2412-13 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978); People v. Hogan, 649 P.2d 326, 330 (Colo.1982).

1989See People v. Turner, 660 P.2d 1284, 1287-88 (Colo.1983); People v. Hogan, 649 P.2d 326, 331 (Colo.1982); McCall v. People, 623 P.2d 397, 402 (Colo. 1981).

1988Id.; People v. Turner, 660 P.2d 1284, 1287 (Colo.1983).

2015People v. Allison , 86 P.3d 421, 426 (Colo. 2004); People v. Hebert , 46 P.3d 473, 478 (Colo. 2002). ¶29       In this case, the evidence at the suppression hearing did not support a finding of consent. 2 However, we conclude, although for different reasons than those identified by the trial court, that the warrantless entry was justified under the exigent circumstances exception.

2015People v. Allison , 86 P.3d 421, 426 (Colo. 2004); People v. Hebert , 46 P.3d 473, 478 (Colo. 2002). ¶29       In this case, the evidence at the suppression hearing did not support a finding of consent. 2 However, we conclude, although for different reasons than those identified by the trial court, that the warrantless entry was justified under the exigent circumstances exception.

2015See Kentucky v. King , ___ U.S. ___, ___, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1857 (2011) (noting that issues regarding exigent circumstances based on the destruction of evidence occur most frequently in drug cases because drugs may be easily destroyed by flushing them down a toilet or rinsing them down a drain). ¶34       Destruction of all of the bottles and cups would have been a challenging feat in a short period of time.

2015See Kentucky v. King , ___ U.S. ___, ___, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1857 (2011) (noting that issues regarding exigent circumstances based on the destruction of evidence occur most frequently in drug cases because drugs may be easily destroyed by flushing them down a toilet or rinsing them down a drain). ¶34       Destruction of all of the bottles and cups would have been a challenging feat in a short period of time.

2015See Crawford , 891 P.2d at 259 (it is not necessary that every item of evidence be easily destroyed for the exigent circumstances exception to apply); see also Howes , 66 F. Supp. 2d at 215 (“[A]n objectively reasonable officer in the circumstances faced by [the officers] could have concluded that, once [the officers] knocked on the front door and spoke to several partygoers, [some of the partygoers] would have attempted to destroy or at least conceal evidence of the teenagers’ drinking had the officers waited patiently to obtain a warrant.”); Blackburn , 960 A.2d at 1150 (potential tha

2015See Crawford , 891 P.2d at 259 (it is not necessary that every item of evidence be easily destroyed for the exigent circumstances exception to apply); see also Howes , 66 F. Supp. 2d at 215 (“[A]n objectively reasonable officer in the circumstances faced by [the officers] could have concluded that, once [the officers] knocked on the front door and spoke to several partygoers, [some of the partygoers] would have attempted to destroy or at least conceal evidence of the teenagers’ drinking had the officers waited patiently to obtain a warrant.”); Blackburn , 960 A.2d at 1150 (potential tha

2015They had received reports by a named individual — a neighbor — that underage drinking was happening at defendant’s residence. 4 See People v. Crippen , 223 P.3d 114, 117 (Colo. 2010) (noting that veracity of average citizens who report crime is less problematic than veracity of criminal informants).

2015They had received reports by a named individual — a neighbor — that underage drinking was happening at defendant’s residence. 4 See People v. Crippen , 223 P.3d 114, 117 (Colo. 2010) (noting that veracity of average citizens who report crime is less problematic than veracity of criminal informants).

2015People v. Allison , 86 P.3d 421, 426 (Colo. 2004); People v. Hebert , 46 P.3d 473, 478 (Colo. 2002). ¶29       In this case, the evidence at the suppression hearing did not support a finding of consent. 2 However, we conclude, although for different reasons than those identified by the trial court, that the warrantless entry was justified under the exigent circumstances exception.

2015People v. Allison , 86 P.3d 421, 426 (Colo. 2004); People v. Hebert , 46 P.3d 473, 478 (Colo. 2002). ¶29       In this case, the evidence at the suppression hearing did not support a finding of consent. 2 However, we conclude, although for different reasons than those identified by the trial court, that the warrantless entry was justified under the exigent circumstances exception.

2015See Crawford , 891 P.2d at 259 (it is not necessary that every item of evidence be easily destroyed for the exigent circumstances exception to apply); see also Howes , 66 F. Supp. 2d at 215 (“[A]n objectively reasonable officer in the circumstances faced by [the officers] could have concluded that, once [the officers] knocked on the front door and spoke to several partygoers, [some of the partygoers] would have attempted to destroy or at least conceal evidence of the teenagers’ drinking had the officers waited patiently to obtain a warrant.”); Blackburn , 960 A.2d at 1150 (potential tha

2015See Crawford , 891 P.2d at 259 (it is not necessary that every item of evidence be easily destroyed for the exigent circumstances exception to apply); see also Howes , 66 F. Supp. 2d at 215 (“[A]n objectively reasonable officer in the circumstances faced by [the officers] could have concluded that, once [the officers] knocked on the front door and spoke to several partygoers, [some of the partygoers] would have attempted to destroy or at least conceal evidence of the teenagers’ drinking had the officers waited patiently to obtain a warrant.”); Blackburn , 960 A.2d at 1150 (potential tha

2015See Crawford , 891 P.2d at 259 (it is not necessary that every item of evidence be easily destroyed for the exigent circumstances exception to apply); see also Howes , 66 F. Supp. 2d at 215 (“[A]n objectively reasonable officer in the circumstances faced by [the officers] could have concluded that, once [the officers] knocked on the front door and spoke to several partygoers, [some of the partygoers] would have attempted to destroy or at least conceal evidence of the teenagers’ drinking had the officers waited patiently to obtain a warrant.”); Blackburn , 960 A.2d at 1150 (potential tha

2015See Crawford , 891 P.2d at 259 (it is not necessary that every item of evidence be easily destroyed for the exigent circumstances exception to apply); see also Howes , 66 F. Supp. 2d at 215 (“[A]n objectively reasonable officer in the circumstances faced by [the officers] could have concluded that, once [the officers] knocked on the front door and spoke to several partygoers, [some of the partygoers] would have attempted to destroy or at least conceal evidence of the teenagers’ drinking had the officers waited patiently to obtain a warrant.”); Blackburn , 960 A.2d at 1150 (potential tha

1982We recently summarized the type of emergencies encompassed by the exigent circumstances exception in McCall v. People, Colo., 623 P.2d 397 (1981): "Exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless arrest generally have been limited to those situations involving a bona fide pursuit of a fleeing suspect, e.g., Warden v. Hayden [ 387 U.S. 294 , 87 S.Ct. 1642 , 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967)]; United States v. Scott, 520 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1056 , 96 S.Ct. 788 , 46 L.Ed.2d 645 (1976), or the risk of immediate destruction of evidence, e.g., United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 ,

1982We recently summarized the type of emergencies encompassed by the exigent circumstances exception in McCall v. People, Colo., 623 P.2d 397 (1981): “Exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless arrest generally have been limited to those situations involving a bona fide pursuit of a fleeing suspect, e.g., Warden v. Hayden [ 387 U.S. 294 , 87 S.Ct. 1642 , 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967) ]; United States v. Scott, 520 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1056 , 96 S.Ct. 788 , 46 L.Ed.2d 645 (1976), or the risk of immediate destruction of evidence, e.g., United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 ,

2018The parties disagree, however, on whether the People met their burden of demonstrating both that the exigent circumstances exception justified the warrantless search of Pappan's residence, and that the plain view exception justified the warrantless seizure of the two laser-sight rifles. ¶10 We have repeatedly acknowledged that there is an exception to the warrant requirement "when exigent circumstances exist that necessitate immediate police action." Id. ; see also Brunsting , ¶ 25, 307 P.3d at 1079 (when exigent circumstances are present, "the public's interest in a timely police response ...

2018In Brunsting , we held that "officer safety concerns fall within the exigent circumstances exception when (1) the officers have an objectively reasonable basis to believe there is an immediate need to protect the lives or safety of themselves or others, and (2) the manner and scope of the search is reasonable." Brunsting , ¶ 32, 307 P.3d at 1081 .

2018Nor do I believe that this court should speculate as to such facts, particularly given that the People had the burden of proving the applicability of the exigent circumstances exception in this case. ¶56 Nor am I persuaded by the majority’s reliance on People v. Aarness, 150 P.3d 1271, 1274 (Colo. 2006), and People v. Smith, 13 P.3d 300 , 303–04 (Colo. 2000).

2018Nor do I believe that this court should speculate as to such facts, particularly given that the People had the burden of proving the applicability of the exigent circumstances exception in this case. ¶56 Nor am I persuaded by the majority's reliance on People v. Aarness , 150 P.3d 1271 , 1274 (Colo. 2006), and People v. Smith , 13 P.3d 300 , 303-04 (Colo. 2000).

1982We recently summarized the type of emergencies encompassed by the exigent circumstances exception in McCall v. People, Colo., 623 P.2d 397 (1981): "Exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless arrest generally have been limited to those situations involving a bona fide pursuit of a fleeing suspect, e.g., Warden v. Hayden [ 387 U.S. 294 , 87 S.Ct. 1642 , 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967)]; United States v. Scott, 520 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1056 , 96 S.Ct. 788 , 46 L.Ed.2d 645 (1976), or the risk of immediate destruction of evidence, e.g., United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 ,

1982We recently summarized the type of emergencies encompassed by the exigent circumstances exception in McCall v. People, Colo., 623 P.2d 397 (1981): "Exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless arrest generally have been limited to those situations involving a bona fide pursuit of a fleeing suspect, e.g., Warden v. Hayden [ 387 U.S. 294 , 87 S.Ct. 1642 , 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967)]; United States v. Scott, 520 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1056 , 96 S.Ct. 788 , 46 L.Ed.2d 645 (1976), or the risk of immediate destruction of evidence, e.g., United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 ,

2026See id.