exigent circumstances exception (Indiana) · Go Syfert
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exigent circumstances exception in Indiana

28 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2025 4 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (24)

CaseFollowedCited
Kentucky v. Kinggreen
scotus · 2011 · cited in 6 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2012–2023
2 sentences

2013Only the exigent circumstances exception might apply on the facts presented. 6 In such cases, the “exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a war-rantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” King, 131 S.Ct. at 1856 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted) (citation omitted).

2013Thus, on these facts, the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement cannot apply to the warrantless entry of Lagrone’s home. 7 See King, 131 S.Ct. at 1858 .

56
United States v. Robert Dale Hollowaygreen
ca11 · 2002 · cited in 4 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2004–2017
2 sentences

2017Holloway argues that the exigent circumstances exception did not apply here because Detective Andry and the other officers did not have probable cause to believe there was a methamphetamine lab in his car. 5 As Holloway argues, we have previously noted that “ ‘while exigent circumstances justify dispensing with a search warrant, they do not eliminate the need for probable cause.’ ” Montgomery v. State, 904 N.E.2d 374, 378 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Cudworth v. State, 818 N.E.2d 133, 140 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied), trans. denied. “ ‘[I]n an emergency, the probable cause element may

2007See Cudworth, v. State, 818 N.E.2d 133, 140 (Ind.Ct.App.2004) (quoting United States v. Holloway, 290 F.3d 1331, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1161 , 123 S.Ct. 966 , 154 L.Ed.2d 897 ) ("[I]n validating a war-rantless search based on the existence of an *475 emergency, as with any other situation falling within the exigent circumstances exception, the Government must demonstrate both exigency and probable cause.”).

44
Missouri v. McNeelygreen
scotus · 2013 · cited in 4 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2013–2023
2 sentences

2023In determining whether the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement applies, courts review the totality of the circumstances to determine whether police “faced an emergency that justified acting without a warrant.” Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 149 (2013).

2023We are unpersuaded. [33] The exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement requires circumstances presenting a “compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant.” Id. at 149 (quoting Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978)).

34
Cudworth v. Stategreen
indctapp · 2004 · cited in 3 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2005–2017
2 sentences

2017Holloway argues that the exigent circumstances exception did not apply here because Detective Andry and the other officers did not have probable cause to believe there was a methamphetamine lab in his car. 5 As Holloway argues, we have previously noted that “ ‘while exigent circumstances justify dispensing with a search warrant, they do not eliminate the need for probable cause.’ ” Montgomery v. State, 904 N.E.2d 374, 378 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Cudworth v. State, 818 N.E.2d 133, 140 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied), trans. denied. “ ‘[I]n an emergency, the probable cause element may

2017Holloway argues that the exigent circumstances exception did not apply here because Detective Andry and the other officers did not have probable cause to believe there was a methamphetamine lab in his car. 5 As Holloway argues, we have previously noted that “ ‘while exigent circumstances justify dispensing with a search warrant, they do not eliminate the need for probable cause.’ ” Montgomery v. State, 904 N.E.2d 374, 378 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Cudworth v. State, 818 N.E.2d 133, 140 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied), trans. denied. “ ‘[I]n an emergency, the probable cause element may

33
Holder v. Stategreen
ind · 2006 · cited in 4 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2012–2024
2 sentences

2024Under the exigent circumstances doctrine, a search warrant is not required “when exigent circumstances make law enforcement needs so compelling that a warrantless search or seizure is objectively reasonable.” Ramirez v. State, 174 N.E.3d 181 , 190 (Ind. 2021); see Holder v. State, 847 N.E.2d 930, 938 (Ind. 2006) (“Possible imminent destruction of evidence is one exigent circumstance that may justify a warrantless entry into a home if the fear on the part of the police that the evidence was immediately about to be destroyed is objectively reasonable.”).

2013A warrant is unnecessary when the “‘exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.’” Id. at 936– 37 (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 , 393–94 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 5 Under the exigent circumstances exception, police may enter a residence without a warrant if the situation suggests a reasonable belief that someone inside the residence is in need of aid.

24
Welsh v. Wisconsingreen
scotus · 1984 · cited in 2 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2014–2023
2 sentences

2023The United States Supreme Court has therefore cautioned that “application of the exigent-circumstances exception in the context of a home entry should rarely be sanctioned when there is probable cause to believe that only a minor offense . . . has been committed.” Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753 (1984). [35] So far, however, the United States Supreme Court has not directly addressed whether the smell of marijuana alone can justify a warrantless home entry based on concerns that evidence within would be destroyed before a warrant could be obtained.

2014See, e.g., Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 740-41 , 104 S.Ct. 2091 , 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) (noting that “no exigency is created simply because there is probable cause that a serious crime has been committed [and] application of the exigent-circumstances exception in the context of a home entry should rarely be sanctioned when there is probable cause [for] only a minor offense”).

22
Smock v. Stategreen
indctapp · 2002 · cited in 2 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2012–2013
2 sentences

2013Smock v. State, 766 N.E.2d 401, 404 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (citing Vitek v. State, 750 N.E.2d 346, 349 (Ind. 2001)).

2012Id. (citing Smock v. State, 766 N.E.2d 401, 404 (Ind.Ct.App.2002)).

22
Sanders v. United Statesgreen
scotus · 2003 · cited in 3 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2004–2007
2 sentences

2007See Cudworth, v. State, 818 N.E.2d 133, 140 (Ind.Ct.App.2004) (quoting United States v. Holloway, 290 F.3d 1331, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1161 , 123 S.Ct. 966 , 154 L.Ed.2d 897 ) ("[I]n validating a war-rantless search based on the existence of an *475 emergency, as with any other situation falling within the exigent circumstances exception, the Government must demonstrate both exigency and probable cause.”).

2005"In validating a warrantless search based on the existence of an emergency, as with any other situation falling within the exigent circumstances exception, the Government must demonstrate both exigency and probable cause." Id. (citing United States v. Holloway, 290 F.3d 1331, 1337 (11th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1161 , 123 S.Ct. 966 , 154 L.Ed.2d 897 (2003)).

13
Hasan v. Department of Laborgreen
scotus · 2003 · cited in 3 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2004–2007
2 sentences

2007See Cudworth, v. State, 818 N.E.2d 133, 140 (Ind.Ct.App.2004) (quoting United States v. Holloway, 290 F.3d 1331, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1161 , 123 S.Ct. 966 , 154 L.Ed.2d 897 ) ("[I]n validating a war-rantless search based on the existence of an *475 emergency, as with any other situation falling within the exigent circumstances exception, the Government must demonstrate both exigency and probable cause.”).

2005"In validating a warrantless search based on the existence of an emergency, as with any other situation falling within the exigent circumstances exception, the Government must demonstrate both exigency and probable cause." Id. (citing United States v. Holloway, 290 F.3d 1331, 1337 (11th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1161 , 123 S.Ct. 966 , 154 L.Ed.2d 897 (2003)).

13
Michigan v. Tylergreen
scotus · 1978 · cited in 2 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2020–2023
2 sentences

2023We are unpersuaded. [33] The exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement requires circumstances presenting a “compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant.” Id. at 149 (quoting Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978)).

2020McNeely, 569 U.S. at 150 ; Tyler, 436 U.S. at 15 I do not believe Brewer’s consent was voluntary because it was not independent of the illegal entry.

12
Michigan v. Fishergreen
scotus · 2009 · cited in 2 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
2 sentences

2016Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 49 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). [10] The evidence presented in this case amply supports the trial court’s finding that the warrantless entry into Martin’s home was supported by exigent circumstances.

2016Fisher, 558 U.S. at 49 , 130 S.Ct. 546 .

12
cluster 512577green
ca1 · 1988 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023
1 sentence

2023The purpose of this exception to the warrant requirement is to avoid a scenario where an officer’s “delay [in] acting to obtain a warrant would, in all likelihood, permanently frustrate an important police objective, such as to prevent the destruction of evidence relating to criminal Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-107 | July 21, 2023 Page 5 of 9 activity or to secure an arrest before a suspect can commit further serious harm.” United States v. Rengifo, 858 F.2d 800, 805 (1st Cir. 1988), abrogated on other grounds by Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 464 (2011). [12] There was no em

11
Minnesota v. Olsongreen
scotus · 1990 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020
1 sentence

2020Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990).

11
Timmie Bradley v. State of Indianagreen
ind · 2016 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
1 sentence

2019Bradley v. State, 54 N.E.3d 996, 999 (Ind. 2016).

11
Montgomery v. Stategreen
indctapp · 2009 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
1 sentence

2017Holloway argues that the exigent circumstances exception did not apply here because Detective Andry and the other officers did not have probable cause to believe there was a methamphetamine lab in his car. 5 As Holloway argues, we have previously noted that “ ‘while exigent circumstances justify dispensing with a search warrant, they do not eliminate the need for probable cause.’ ” Montgomery v. State, 904 N.E.2d 374, 378 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Cudworth v. State, 818 N.E.2d 133, 140 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied), trans. denied. “ ‘[I]n an emergency, the probable cause element may

11
Krise v. Stategreen
ind · 2001 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
1 sentence

2016Krise v. State, 746 N.E.2d 957, 961 (Ind.2001).

11
Robin Harper v. State of Indianagreen
indctapp · 2014 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
1 sentence

2016See Harper v. State, 3 N.E.3d 1080, 1083 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (stating “[t]he warrantless arrest of a person in his or her home requires both probable cause and exigent circumstances . . . that make it impracticable to obtain a warrant first”) (citations omitted). [20] Jackson was not inside the home when the officers arrived, and the officers did not need to enter the home to protect her.

11
VanWinkle v. Stategreen
indctapp · 2002 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
2 sentences

2015See also Holder, 847 N.E.2d at 939 (holding that warrantless entry into a home was justified by exigent circumstances where extremely strong odor of ether was detected coming from the home, officers suspected methamphetamine manufacture based on defendant’s omissions, officer knew of dangers of manufacturing process, and home was occupied by persons including a child); VanWinkle v. State, 764 N.E.2d 258, 266 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (upholding the warrantless entry into a defendant’s home after callers reported a strong ether odor emanating from the house, police smelled the odor and observed evid

2015See VanWinkle, 764 N.E.2d at 267 (finding that the warrantless entry into a residence was reasonable under Article 1, Section 11 “because, had the officers taken the time to get a search warrant at that point, the people remaining in the residence could have been injured by the volatile manufacturing process, could have Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 82A01-141-CR-474 | September 23, 2015 Page 14 of 30 destroyed evidence, and/or could have attempted to inflict harm upon the officers or others.”). [27] The limited warrantless entry of Green’s apartment was justifiable under th

11
Pamela J. Hensley v. State of Indianagreen
indctapp · 2012 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
2 sentences

2014“A probationer’s home, like anyone else’s, is protected by the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that searches be reasonable.” Hensley v. State, 962 N.E.2d 1284, 1288 (Ind.Ct.App.2012) (citations and quotations omitted).

2014“A probationer’s home, like anyone else’s, is protected by the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that searches be reasonable.” Hensley v. State, 962 N.E.2d 1284, 1288 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citations and quotations omitted).

11
Vitek v. Stategreen
ind · 2001 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
1 sentence

2013Smock v. State, 766 N.E.2d 401, 404 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (citing Vitek v. State, 750 N.E.2d 346, 349 (Ind. 2001)).

11
Frensemeier v. Stategreen
indctapp · 2006 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009
2 sentences

2009See, eg., Frensemeier v. State, 849 N.E.2d 157, 161 (Ind.Ct.App.2006) ("One well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement is when police have probable cause for the search and exigent circumstances exist rendering obtaining a warrant impractical.

2009See, e.g., Frensemeier v. State, 849 N.E.2d 157, 161 (Ind.Ct.App.2006) ("One well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement is when police have probable cause for the search and exigent circumstances exist rendering obtaining a warrant impractical.

11
Willis v. Stategreen
indctapp · 2002 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2005–2005
1 sentence

2005See, eg., Moran, 644 N.E2d at 5389 (noting that the "reasonableness standard explains the requirement that, absent exi *220 gent cireumstances, the police must 'knock and announce' before conducting a search[.]"); Willis v. State, 780 N.E.2d 423, 428 (Ind.Ct.App.2002).

11
United States v. Clarence Richardson, Jr.green
ca7 · 2000 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2004–2004
1 sentence

2004"However, a police officer's subjective belief that exigent cireumstances exist is insufficient to make a warrantless search." United States v. Richardson, 208 F.3d 626, 629 (7th Cir.2000).

11
Murphy v. Stategreen
ind · 1986 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 1995–1995
2 sentences

1995"One exception [to the warrant requirement] allows a warrantless search of a vehicle under exigent circumstances when the officer has probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains the fruits or instrumentalities of crime.” Murphy v. State (1986), Ind., 499 N.E.2d 1077, 1081 (citations omitted).

1995"One exception [to the warrant requirement] allows a warrantless search of a vehicle under exigent circumstances when the officer has probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains the fruits or instrumentalities of crime." Murphy v. State (1986), Ind., 499 N.E.2d 1077, 1081 (citations omitted).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (5)

CaseCitedYears
Mincey v. Arizona green
scotus · 1978
2 sentences

2013A warrant is unnecessary when the “‘exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.’” Id. at 936– 37 (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 , 393–94 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 5 Under the exigent circumstances exception, police may enter a residence without a warrant if the situation suggests a reasonable belief that someone inside the residence is in need of aid.

2004Under the exigent circumstances exception, police may enter a residence without a warrant "when they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid." Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 , 98 S.Ct. 2408 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978).

22004–2013
Mitchell v. Wisconsin green
scotus · 2019
2 sentences

2025Mitchell, 588 U.S. at 847 , 139 S. Ct. at 2533 . [25] In Mitchell, which involved a blood draw of an unconscious person that did not follow any accident, Justice Alito wrote for a plurality. 13 Law enforcement received a report that Gerald Mitchell appeared to be “very drunk, had climbed 13 Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Breyer, and Justice Kavanaugh joined Justice Alito’s opinion.

2025Mitchell, 588 U.S. at 847 , 139 S. Ct. at 2533 . [25] In Mitchell, which involved a blood draw of an unconscious person that did not follow any accident, Justice Alito wrote for a plurality. 13 Law enforcement received a report that Gerald Mitchell appeared to be “very drunk, had climbed 13 Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Breyer, and Justice Kavanaugh joined Justice Alito’s opinion.

12025–2025
Richard v. State green
indctapp · 1985
1 sentence

1991Cf. Richard v. State (1985), Ind. App., 482 N.E.2d 282 (warrantless search improper); Short v. State (1982), Ind., 448 N.E.2d 298 (warrantless search proper).

11991–1991
Cuppett v. State green
ind · 1983
1 sentence

1991Cf. Richard v. State (1985), Ind. App., 482 N.E.2d 282 (warrantless search improper); Short v. State (1982), Ind., 448 N.E.2d 298 (warrantless search proper).

11991–1991
Sayre v. State green
indctapp · 1984
2 sentences

1985Both on direct and cross-examination the only testimony pertaining to exigent circumstances was the mention, without further explanation or comment, that some of the defendants hurriedly left the scene of the shooting in a motor vehicle and hid their weapons. 1 The recent case of Sayre v. State, (1984) Ind.App., 471 N.E.2d 708 summa rized the exigent circumstances exception necessary for a warrantless search.

1985Both on direct and cross-examination the only testimony pertaining to exigent circumstances was the mention, without further explanation or comment, that some of the defendants hurriedly left the scene of the shooting in a motor vehicle and hid their weapons. [1] The recent case of Sayre v. State, (1984) Ind.App., 471 N.E.2d 708 summarized the exigent circumstances exception necessary for a warrantless search.

11985–1985

Statutes the citing opinions construe

IN § Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1 (4) IN § Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

TX 133 (1975–2025) PA 115 (1974–2026) OH 106 (1978–2025) CA 82 (1977–2026) WA 71 (1973–2022) NJ 57 (1970–2026) WI 54 (1982–2026) IL 50 (1977–2025) IA 46 (1977–2025) MI 45 (1981–2025) OR 41 (1972–2021) CO 41 (1977–2026) FL 40 (1981–2024) NM 35 (1975–2022) VA 34 (1992–2026) ID 33 (1978–2026) MN 31 (1984–2025) NY 31 (1973–2024) TN 28 (1996–2020) IN 28 (1985–2025) SC 24 (1986–2023) MO 23 (1985–2019) CT 23 (1978–2023) ME 22 (1974–2024) UT 19 (1991–2025) ND 18 (1984–2019) LA 18 (1981–2026) DC 17 (1976–2018) GA 17 (1975–2026) KS 16 (1990–2022) MD 15 (1973–2026) MA 15 (1975–2025) NH 14 (1974–2018) AZ 13 (1984–2018) AL 13 (1976–2015) NC 13 (1983–2024) MT 13 (1996–2024) DE 11 (1974–2026) SD 11 (1978–2021) RI 10 (1983–2025) WV 9 (1985–2023) KY 9 (1979–2025) AR 7 (1992–2005) NV 7 (1989–2025) HI 6 (1981–2002) AK 5 (1993–2009) VT 5 (1982–2023) MS 4 (1997–2017) VI 2 (1984–2012) WY 2 (1987–2017) NE 2 (2015–2024)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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