exigent circumstances doctrine in South Carolina

2021See State v. Herring, 387 S.C. 201, 210 , 692 S.E.2d 490, 494 (2009) ("[T]he ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 'reasonableness' . . . ."); id. ("A fairly perceived need to act on the spot may justify entry and search under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement."); id. ("Protecting the safety of police officers has also been held an exigent circumstance."); State v. Dobbins, 420 S.C. 583, 591 , 803 S.E.2d 876, 880 (Ct. App. 2017) ("In the Fourth Amendment context, a court is concerned with determining whether a reasonable officer would be moved to take acti

2021See State v. Herring, 387 S.C. 201, 210 , 692 S.E.2d 490, 494 (2009) ("[T]he ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 'reasonableness' . . . ."); id. ("A fairly perceived need to act on the spot may justify entry and search under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement."); id. ("Protecting the safety of police officers has also been held an exigent circumstance."); State v. Dobbins, 420 S.C. 583, 591 , 803 S.E.2d 876, 880 (Ct. App. 2017) ("In the Fourth Amendment context, a court is concerned with determining whether a reasonable officer would be moved to take acti

2015“The exigent circumstances doctrine provides an exception to the Fourth Amendment[’]s protection against warrantless searches, but only where, from an objective standard, a compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant exists.” State v. Abdullah, 357 S.C. 344, 351 , 592 S.E.2d 344, 348 (Ct.App.2004); see State v. Brown, 289 S.C. 581, 587 , 347 S.E.2d 882, 886 (1986) (acknowledging the exigent circumstances doctrine as an exception to the warrant requirement).

2015“The exigent circumstances doctrine provides an exception to the Fourth Amendment[’]s protection against warrantless searches, but only where, from an objective standard, a compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant exists.” State v. Abdullah, 357 S.C. 344, 351 , 592 S.E.2d 344, 348 (Ct.App.2004); see State v. Brown, 289 S.C. 581, 587 , 347 S.E.2d 882, 886 (1986) (acknowledging the exigent circumstances doctrine as an exception to the warrant requirement).

2020Rather, the McNeely concurring opinion states "the Court should be able to offer guidance on how police should handle cases like the one before us," and advocates for deference to the officer's judgment, stating, "If an officer could reasonably conclude that there is not [time to secure a warrant before blood can be drawn], the exigent circumstances exception applies by its terms, and the blood may be drawn without a warrant." 569 U.S. at 166-67 , 133 S. Ct. at 1569 , 185 L.

2020Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 156 (2013) (holding whether the warrantless blood testing of a suspected drunk driver qualifies as an exigent circumstance involves a "case-by-case analysis under the totality of the circumstances"); Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. ___ , 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016) (holding a warrantless breath test, but not a blood test, is valid as a lawful search incident to arrest); Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 588 U.S. ___ , 139 S. Ct. 2525 , 2530–32 (2019) (adopting a general rule that law enforcement may obtain a blood test without a warrant from an unconscious motorist unde

2019"The exigent circumstances doctrine provides an exception to the Fourth Amendment[']s protection against warrantless searches, but only where, from an objective standard, a compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant exists." Counts , 413 S.C. at 163 , 776 S.E.2d at 65 (quoting State v. Abdullah , 357 S.C. 344 , 351, 592 S.E.2d 344 , 348 (Ct. App. 2004) ).

2019"The exigent circumstances doctrine provides an exception to the Fourth Amendment[']s protection against warrantless searches, but only where, from an objective standard, a compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant exists." Counts , 413 S.C. at 163 , 776 S.E.2d at 65 (quoting State v. Abdullah , 357 S.C. 344 , 351, 592 S.E.2d 344 , 348 (Ct. App. 2004) ).

2016“A warrantless search is justified under the exigent circumstances doctrine to prevent a suspect from fleeing or where there is a risk of danger to police or others inside or outside a dwelling.” Id. at 210 , 692 S.E.2d at 495 ; see id. at 210 , 692 S.E.2d at 494 (“The likelihood a suspect will imminently flee is ... an exigency warranting ... an intrusion.”); Wright, 391 S.C. at 445 , 706 S.E.2d at 328 (finding “[e]xigent circumstances developed when the suspects started fleeing”); Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100-01 , 110 S.Ct. 1684 , 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990) (finding exigent circumstances

2016“A warrantless search is justified under the exigent circumstances doctrine to prevent a suspect from fleeing or where there is a risk of danger to police or others inside or outside a dwelling.” Id. at 210 , 692 S.E.2d at 495 ; see id. at 210 , 692 S.E.2d at 494 (“The likelihood a suspect will imminently flee is ... an exigency warranting ... an intrusion.”); Wright, 391 S.C. at 445 , 706 S.E.2d at 328 (finding “[e]xigent circumstances developed when the suspects started fleeing”); Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100-01 , 110 S.Ct. 1684 , 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990) (finding exigent circumstances

2016“A warrantless search is justified under the exigent circumstances doctrine to prevent a suspect from fleeing or where there is a risk of danger to police or others inside or outside a dwelling.” Id. at 210 , 692 S.E.2d at 495 ; see id. at 210 , 692 S.E.2d at 494 (“The likelihood a suspect will imminently flee is ... an exigency warranting ... an intrusion.”); Wright, 391 S.C. at 445 , 706 S.E.2d at 328 (finding “[e]xigent circumstances developed when the suspects started fleeing”); Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100-01 , 110 S.Ct. 1684 , 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990) (finding exigent circumstances

2016“A warrantless search is justified under the exigent circumstances doctrine to prevent a suspect from fleeing or where there is a risk of danger to police or others inside or outside a dwelling.” Id. at 210 , 692 S.E.2d at 495 ; see id. at 210 , 692 S.E.2d at 494 (“The likelihood a suspect will imminently flee is ... an exigency warranting ... an intrusion.”); Wright, 391 S.C. at 445 , 706 S.E.2d at 328 (finding “[e]xigent circumstances developed when the suspects started fleeing”); Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100-01 , 110 S.Ct. 1684 , 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990) (finding exigent circumstances

2019The exigent circumstances exception " 'applies when the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.' " McNeely , 569 U.S. at 148 -49 , 133 S. Ct. at 1558 , 185 L.Ed. 2d at 704 (quoting Kentucky v. King , 563 U.S. 452 , 460, 131 S. Ct. 1849 , 1856, 179 L.Ed. 2d 865 , 874-75 (2011) ).

2019The exigent circumstances exception " 'applies when the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.' " McNeely , 569 U.S. at 148 -49 , 133 S. Ct. at 1558 , 185 L.Ed. 2d at 704 (quoting Kentucky v. King , 563 U.S. 452 , 460, 131 S. Ct. 1849 , 1856, 179 L.Ed. 2d 865 , 874-75 (2011) ).

2015“In such circumstances, a protective sweep of the premises may be permitted.” Id. (citing Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 337 , 110 S.Ct. 1093 , 108 L.Ed.2d 276 (1990)).

2015“In such circumstances, a protective sweep of the premises may be permitted.” Id. (citing Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 337 , 110 S.Ct. 1093 , 108 L.Ed.2d 276 (1990)).

2022See, e.g., United States v. Chavez, 894 F.3d 593, 608 (4th Cir. 2018) (considering a pre-Carpenter warrantless gathering of historical CSLI and finding "when investigators 'act with an objectively "reasonable good-faith belief" that their conduct is lawful,' the exclusionary rule will not apply").

2021See State v. Herring, 387 S.C. 201, 210 , 692 S.E.2d 490, 494 (2009) ("[T]he ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 'reasonableness' . . . ."); id. ("A fairly perceived need to act on the spot may justify entry and search under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement."); id. ("Protecting the safety of police officers has also been held an exigent circumstance."); State v. Dobbins, 420 S.C. 583, 591 , 803 S.E.2d 876, 880 (Ct. App. 2017) ("In the Fourth Amendment context, a court is concerned with determining whether a reasonable officer would be moved to take acti

2021See State v. Herring, 387 S.C. 201, 210 , 692 S.E.2d 490, 494 (2009) ("[T]he ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 'reasonableness' . . . ."); id. ("A fairly perceived need to act on the spot may justify entry and search under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement."); id. ("Protecting the safety of police officers has also been held an exigent circumstance."); State v. Dobbins, 420 S.C. 583, 591 , 803 S.E.2d 876, 880 (Ct. App. 2017) ("In the Fourth Amendment context, a court is concerned with determining whether a reasonable officer would be moved to take acti

2021See State v. Herring, 387 S.C. 201, 210 , 692 S.E.2d 490, 494 (2009) ("[T]he ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 'reasonableness' . . . ."); id. ("A fairly perceived need to act on the spot may justify entry and search under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement."); id. ("Protecting the safety of police officers has also been held an exigent circumstance."); State v. Dobbins, 420 S.C. 583, 591 , 803 S.E.2d 876, 880 (Ct. App. 2017) ("In the Fourth Amendment context, a court is concerned with determining whether a reasonable officer would be moved to take acti

2021See State v. Herring, 387 S.C. 201, 210 , 692 S.E.2d 490, 494 (2009) ("[T]he ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 'reasonableness' . . . ."); id. ("A fairly perceived need to act on the spot may justify entry and search under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement."); id. ("Protecting the safety of police officers has also been held an exigent circumstance."); State v. Dobbins, 420 S.C. 583, 591 , 803 S.E.2d 876, 880 (Ct. App. 2017) ("In the Fourth Amendment context, a court is concerned with determining whether a reasonable officer would be moved to take acti

2021See State v. Herring, 387 S.C. 201, 210 , 692 S.E.2d 490, 494 (2009) ("[T]he ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 'reasonableness' . . . ."); id. ("A fairly perceived need to act on the spot may justify entry and search under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement."); id. ("Protecting the safety of police officers has also been held an exigent circumstance."); State v. Dobbins, 420 S.C. 583, 591 , 803 S.E.2d 876, 880 (Ct. App. 2017) ("In the Fourth Amendment context, a court is concerned with determining whether a reasonable officer would be moved to take acti

2021See State v. Herring, 387 S.C. 201, 210 , 692 S.E.2d 490, 494 (2009) ("[T]he ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 'reasonableness' . . . ."); id. ("A fairly perceived need to act on the spot may justify entry and search under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement."); id. ("Protecting the safety of police officers has also been held an exigent circumstance."); State v. Dobbins, 420 S.C. 583, 591 , 803 S.E.2d 876, 880 (Ct. App. 2017) ("In the Fourth Amendment context, a court is concerned with determining whether a reasonable officer would be moved to take acti

2020"The South Carolina Constitution, with an express right to privacy provision included in the article prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures, favors an interpretation offering a higher level of privacy protection than the Fourth Amendment." State v. Forrester, 343 S.C. 637, 645 , 541 S.E.2d 837, 841 (2001). stage as to whether the exigent circumstances exception does or does not apply in this case.

2020"The South Carolina Constitution, with an express right to privacy provision included in the article prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures, favors an interpretation offering a higher level of privacy protection than the Fourth Amendment." State v. Forrester, 343 S.C. 637, 645 , 541 S.E.2d 837, 841 (2001). stage as to whether the exigent circumstances exception does or does not apply in this case.

2011See State v. Beckham, 334 S.C. 302, 317 , 513 S.E.2d 606, 613 (1999) (recognizing the plain view doctrine as an exception to the warrant requirement); State v. Brown, 289 S.C. 581, 587 , 347 S.E.2d 882, 886 (1986) (recognizing the exigent circumstances doctrine as an exception to the warrant requirement).

2011See State v. Beckham, 334 S.C. 302, 317 , 513 S.E.2d 606, 613 (1999) (recognizing the plain view doctrine as an exception to the warrant requirement); State v. Brown, 289 S.C. 581, 587 , 347 S.E.2d 882, 886 (1986) (recognizing the exigent circumstances doctrine as an exception to the warrant requirement).