71 Washington opinions name it 3 courts 1973–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Terrovonagreen2 sentences2010We decline to apply the exigent circumstances exception to these facts, but this does not mean that another exception would not be available in similar circumstances. [1] State v. Terrovona, 105 Wash.2d 632 , 716 P.2d 295 (1986). [2] We stated that "concerns for the safety of officers and potential destructibility of evidence" "outweigh privacy interests" in the contexts of searches incident to arrest and potential destructibility of evidence, but "the concerns are not the same when officers approach a parked, immobile, unoccupied, secured vehicle. 2010We decline to apply the exigent circumstances exception to these facts, but this does not mean that another exception would not be available in similar circumstances. [1] State v. Terrovona, 105 Wash.2d 632 , 716 P.2d 295 (1986). [2] We stated that "concerns for the safety of officers and potential destructibility of evidence" "outweigh privacy interests" in the contexts of searches incident to arrest and potential destructibility of evidence, but "the concerns are not the same when officers approach a parked, immobile, unoccupied, secured vehicle. | 3 | 4 |
United States v. Rabinowitzred2 sentences2016Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2179 ; see also State v. Byrd, 178 Wn.2d 611, 623 , 310 P.3d 793 (2013) ("Searches of the arrestee's person incident to arrest extend only to articles 'in such immediate physical relation to the one arrested as to be in a fair sense a projection of his person."' (quoting United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 78 , 70S. 2016Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2179 ; see also State v. Byrd, 178 Wn.2d 611, 623 , 310 P.3d 793 (2013) (“Searches of the arrestee’s person incident to arrest extend only to articles ‘in such immediate physical relation to the one arrested as to be in a fair sense a projection of his person.’ ” (quoting United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 78 , 70 S. Ct. 430 , 94 L. | 3 | 3 |
State v. Byrdgreen2 sentences2016Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2179 ; see also State v. Byrd, 178 Wn.2d 611, 623 , 310 P.3d 793 (2013) ("Searches of the arrestee's person incident to arrest extend only to articles 'in such immediate physical relation to the one arrested as to be in a fair sense a projection of his person."' (quoting United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 78 , 70S. 2016Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2179 ; see also State v. Byrd, 178 Wn.2d 611, 623 , 310 P.3d 793 (2013) ("Searches of the arrestee's person incident to arrest extend only to articles 'in such immediate physical relation to the one arrested as to be in a fair sense a projection of his person."' (quoting United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 78 , 70S. | 3 | 3 |
State v. Younggreen2 sentences2011See State v. Young, 28 Wash.App. 412, 417-18 , 624 P.2d 725 (1981) (holding that to justify the warrantless seizure of tools in open view inside a vehicle, the police must have had probable cause to believe the tools were instrumentalities of a crime and be faced with exigent circumstances which make it impracticable to obtain a warrant). 2011See State v. Young, 28 Wash.App. 412, 417-18 , 624 P.2d 725 (1981) (holding that to justify the warrantless seizure of tools in open view inside a vehicle, the police must have had probable cause to believe the tools were instrumentalities of a crime and be faced with exigent circumstances which make it impracticable to obtain a warrant). | 3 | 3 |
State v. Ringerred2 sentences2012Ringer, 100 Wn.2d at 700-01 . 2011Id. at 701 , 674 P.2d 1240 . ¶ 38 It is true, as the majority notes, that in State v. Stroud, 106 Wash.2d 144 , 720 P.2d 436 (1986), overruled by State v. Valdez, 167 Wash.2d 761, 777 , 224 P.3d 751 (2009), this court allowed automobile searches incident to *93 arrest without regard to the arrestee's actual proximity to the vehicle in question. | 2 | 8 |
State v. Valdezgreen2 sentences2011Id. at 701 , 674 P.2d 1240 . ¶ 38 It is true, as the majority notes, that in State v. Stroud, 106 Wash.2d 144 , 720 P.2d 436 (1986), overruled by State v. Valdez, 167 Wash.2d 761, 777 , 224 P.3d 751 (2009), this court allowed automobile searches incident to *93 arrest without regard to the arrestee's actual proximity to the vehicle in question. 2011See Buelna Valdez, 167 Wash.2d at 777, 224 P.3d 751 ; Patton, 167 Wash.2d at 394-95 , 219 P.3d 651 . | 2 | 4 |
State v. Leuppgreen2 sentences2000Unlike the exigent circumstances exception, "the emergency [aid] doctrine does not involve officers investigating a crime but arises from a police officer's community caretaking responsibility to come to the aid of persons believed to be in danger of death or physical harm." State v. Leupp, 96 Wash.App. 324, 330 , 980 P.2d 765 (1999) (Division II). [40] See, e.g., State v. Villarreal, 97 Wash.App. 636, 643-44 , 984 P.2d 1064 (1999) (Division III) (community caretaking function exception applied to stop and identification inquiry of defendant found urinating in public). [41] State v. Hutchison, 2000Unlike the exigent circumstances exception, “the emergency [aid] doctrine does not involve officers investigating a crime but arises from a police officer’s community caretaking responsibility to come to the aid of persons believed to be in danger of death or physical harm.” State v. Leupp, 96 Wn. | 2 | 4 |
State v. Bairdgreen2 sentences2019See Baird, 187 Wn.2d at 220-21 (natural dissipation of alcohol in blood or breath may support finding of exigent circumstances, but “exigency” must be determined on case-by-case basis). 2019See Baird, 187 Wn.2d at 220-21 (natural dissipation of alcohol in blood or breath may support finding of exigent circumstances, but “exigency” must be determined on case-by-case basis). | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Pattongreen | 2 | 2 |
State v. Slatterygreen2 sentences2010See Slattery, 56 Wn. 2010See Slattery, 56 Wash.App. at 823 , 787 P.2d 932 (listing exceptions separately). | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Ladsongreen | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Ramirezgreen | 2 | 2 |
State v. Smithgreen2 sentences2015“The rationale behind the exigent circumstances exception ‘is to permit a warrantless search where the circumstances are such that obtaining a warrant . . . would compromise officer safety, facilitate escape or permit the destruction of evidence.’ ” Smith, 165 Wn.2d at 517 (quoting State v. Audley, 77 Wn. 2015"The rationale behind the exigent circumstances exception 'is to permit a warrantless search where the circumstances are such that obtaining a warrant ... would compromise officer safety, facilitate escape or permit the destruction of evidence.'" Smith, 165 Wn.2d at 517 (quoting State v. Audley, 77 Wn. | 1 | 16 |
State v. Tibblesgreen2 sentences2022App. 210, 216 , 279 P.3d 917 (2012). 12 “The exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement applies where ‘obtaining a warrant is not practical because the delay inherent in securing a warrant would compromise officer safety, facilitate escape[,] or permit the destruction of evidence.’” Tibbles, 169 Wn.2d at 370 (internal quotation marks omitted). - 16 - No. 82897-5-I/17 For both entities, Ghodsee contends the statute is inapplicable because the allegedly negligent acts were unrelated to the “decision of whether to . . . detain” Ghodsee as the superior court had already made that d 2018We agree with both arguments. 15 No. 75072-1-1/16 As a general rule, a warrantless seizure is a per se violation of article 1, section 7 of the Washington Constitution.'" There are a few "carefully drawn exceptions to the warrant requirement" including exigent circumstances.42 "The exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement applies where 'obtaining a warrant is not practical because the delay inherent in securing a warrant would compromise officer safety, facilitate escape or permit the destruction of evidence."43 The supreme court has identified five circumstances from federal | 1 | 7 |
State v. Stroudred2 sentences2011Id. at 701 , 674 P.2d 1240 . ¶ 38 It is true, as the majority notes, that in State v. Stroud, 106 Wash.2d 144 , 720 P.2d 436 (1986), overruled by State v. Valdez, 167 Wash.2d 761, 777 , 224 P.3d 751 (2009), this court allowed automobile searches incident to *93 arrest without regard to the arrestee's actual proximity to the vehicle in question. 2011Id. at 701 , 674 P.2d 1240 . ¶ 38 It is true, as the majority notes, that in State v. Stroud, 106 Wash.2d 144 , 720 P.2d 436 (1986), overruled by State v. Valdez, 167 Wash.2d 761, 777 , 224 P.3d 751 (2009), this court allowed automobile searches incident to *93 arrest without regard to the arrestee's actual proximity to the vehicle in question. | 1 | 7 |
State v. Cardenasgreen2 sentences2015"The rationale behind the exigent circumstances exception 'is to permit a warrantless search where the circumstances are such that obtaining a warrant is not practical because the delay inherent in securing a warrant would compromise officer safety, facilitate escape or permit the destruction of evidence.'" State v. Smith, 165 Wn.2d 511, 517 , 199 P.3d 386 (2009) (quoting State v. Cardenas, 146 Wn.2d 400, 405 , 47 P.3d 1156 (2002)). 2010The State makes no such argument here, and nothing in our opinion in O'Neill precludes the State from relying on the exigent circumstances exception in lieu of the search incident to arrest exception. [3] Six nonexclusive factors may aid in determining the existence of exigent circumstances: "(1) the gravity or violent nature of the offense with which the suspect is to be charged; (2) whether the suspect is reasonably believed to be armed; (3) whether there is reasonably trustworthy information that the suspect is guilty; (4) there is strong reason to believe that the suspect is on the premise | 1 | 5 |
Birchfield v. N. Dakota. William Robert Bernardgreen2 sentences2018See Martines, 184 Wn.2d at 93-94 . 12 No. 49174-5-II Second, Inman relies on Birchfield v. North Dakota, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2160 , 195 L. 2018See Martines, 184 Wn.2d at 93-94 . 12 No. 49174-5-II Second, Inman relies on Birchfield v. North Dakota, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2160 , 195 L. | 1 | 4 |
State v. Pattongreen2 sentences2011See Buelna Valdez, 167 Wash.2d at 777, 224 P.3d 751 ; Patton, 167 Wash.2d at 394-95 , 219 P.3d 651 . 2011See Buelna Valdez, 167 Wash.2d at 777, 224 P.3d 751 ; Patton, 167 Wash.2d at 394-95 , 219 P.3d 651 . | 1 | 3 |
| State v. Martinesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Costichgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Costichgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Colegreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Grandegreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Grandegreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Ladsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Pattongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hawkins v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Groomgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Groomgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Menzgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Campbellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Howard Kenneth Bulman, Jr., L. C. Jones, A/K/A \L. C. Smith\"green | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Marvin Martin Younggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Stroudred2 sentences2011Id. at 701 , 674 P.2d 1240 . ¶ 38 It is true, as the majority notes, that in State v. Stroud, 106 Wash.2d 144 , 720 P.2d 436 (1986), overruled by State v. Valdez, 167 Wash.2d 761, 777 , 224 P.3d 751 (2009), this court allowed automobile searches incident to *93 arrest without regard to the arrestee's actual proximity to the vehicle in question. 2011Id. at 701 , 674 P.2d 1240 . ¶ 38 It is true, as the majority notes, that in State v. Stroud, 106 Wash.2d 144 , 720 P.2d 436 (1986), overruled by State v. Valdez, 167 Wash.2d 761, 777 , 224 P.3d 751 (2009), this court allowed automobile searches incident to *93 arrest without regard to the arrestee's actual proximity to the vehicle in question. | 2 | 7 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Audley
green
2 sentences2015“The rationale behind the exigent circumstances exception ‘is to permit a warrantless search where the circumstances are such that obtaining a warrant . . . would compromise officer safety, facilitate escape or permit the destruction of evidence.’ ” Smith, 165 Wn.2d at 517 (quoting State v. Audley, 77 Wn. 2015"The rationale behind the exigent circumstances exception 'is to permit a warrantless search where the circumstances are such that obtaining a warrant ... would compromise officer safety, facilitate escape or permit the destruction of evidence.'" Smith, 165 Wn.2d at 517 (quoting State v. Audley, 77 Wn. | 15 | 2002–2020 |
State v. Smith
green
2 sentences2015"The rationale behind the exigent circumstances exception 'is to permit a warrantless search where the circumstances are such that obtaining a warrant is not practical because the delay inherent in securing a warrant would compromise officer safety, facilitate escape or permit the destruction ofevidence.'" State v. Smith, 165Wn.2d 511, 517, 199 P.3d 386 (2009) (quoting State v. Audlev, 77 Wn. 2015"The rationale behind the exigent circumstances exception 'is to permit a warrantless search where the circumstances are such that obtaining a warrant is not practical because the delay inherent in securing a warrant would compromise officer safety, facilitate escape or permit the destruction of evidence.'" State v. Smith, 165 Wn.2d 511, 517 , 199 P.3d 386 (2009) (quoting State v. Cardenas, 146 Wn.2d 400, 405 , 47 P.3d 1156 (2002)). | 10 | 2010–2020 |
Missouri v. McNeely
green
2 sentences2016Quoting from Missouri v. McNeely, _US_, 133 S Ct 1552 , 185 L Ed 2d 696 (2013), we noted that, “[i]n Missouri v. McNeely, ***, the Court considered how to apply the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement in DUII cases. 2016Quoting from Missouri v. McNeely, _US_, 133 S Ct 1552 , 185 L Ed 2d 696 (2013), we noted that, “[i]n Missouri v. McNeely, ***, the Court considered how to apply the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement in DUII cases. | 8 | 2015–2019 |
State v. Tibbles
green
2 sentences2018We agree with both arguments. 15 No. 75072-1-1/16 As a general rule, a warrantless seizure is a per se violation of article 1, section 7 of the Washington Constitution.'" There are a few "carefully drawn exceptions to the warrant requirement" including exigent circumstances.42 "The exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement applies where 'obtaining a warrant is not practical because the delay inherent in securing a warrant would compromise officer safety, facilitate escape or permit the destruction of evidence."43 The supreme court has identified five circumstances from federal 2011As the Tibbles court stated: "To find exigent circumstances based on these bare facts would set the stage for the exigent circumstances exception to swallow the general warrant requirement." Tibbles, 169 Wash.2d at 372 , 236 P.3d 885 . ¶ 23 In sum, we hold that under Patton and Buelna Valdez, article I, section 7 limits a search incident to arrest to situations where threats to officer safety or the preservation of evidence prevent the arresting officer from delaying the search to obtain a warrant. | 5 | 2011–2021 |
State v. Counts
green
2 sentences2014State v. Smith, 165 Wn.2d 511, 517 , 199 P.3d 386 (2009) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Counts, 99 Wn.2d 54, 60 , 659 P.2d 1087 (1983)). ¶37 The State bears the burden of proving that the exigent circumstances exception applies. 2014State v. Smith, 165 Wn.2d 511, 517 , 199 P.3d 386 (2009) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Counts, 99 Wn.2d 54, 60 , 659 P.2d 1087 (1983)). ¶37 The State bears the burden of proving that the exigent circumstances exception applies. | 4 | 2010–2018 |
State v. Bessette
neutral
2 sentences2009"The idea underlying the exigent circumstances exception to the requirement of a search warrant is that police do not have adequate time to get a warrant." Bessette, 105 Wash.App. at 798 , 21 P.3d 318 . 2009“The idea underlying the exigent circumstances exception to the requirement of a search warrant is that police do not have adequate time to get a warrant.” Bessette, 105 Wn. | 4 | 2006–2009 |
State v. Cardenas
green
2 sentences2010The State makes no such argument here, and nothing in our opinion in O'Neill precludes the State from relying on the exigent circumstances exception in lieu of the search incident to arrest exception. [3] Six nonexclusive factors may aid in determining the existence of exigent circumstances: "(1) the gravity or violent nature of the offense with which the suspect is to be charged; (2) whether the suspect is reasonably believed to be armed; (3) whether there is reasonably trustworthy information that the suspect is guilty; (4) there is strong reason to believe that the suspect is on the premise 2009The rationale behind the exigent circumstances exception "is to permit a warrantless search where the circumstances are such that obtaining a warrant is not practical because the delay inherent in securing a warrant would compromise officer safety, facilitate escape or permit the destruction of evidence." State v. Audley, 77 Wash.App. 897, 907 , 894 P.2d 1359 (1995), quoted in Cardenas, 146 Wash.2d at 417 , 47 P.3d 127 (Alexander, C.J., dissenting). | 3 | 2009–2010 |
State v. Bessette
green
2 sentences2009"The idea underlying the exigent circumstances exception to the requirement of a search warrant is that police do not have adequate time to get a warrant." Bessette, 105 Wash.App. at 798 , 21 P.3d 318 . 2006Wolters also asserts that the State presented no evidence that Kingsley was legitimately concerned that Wolters might escape. ¶ 12 "The idea underlying the exigent circumstances exception to the requirement of a search warrant is that police do not have adequate time to get a warrant." State v. Bessette, 105 Wash.App. 793, 798 , 21 P.3d 318 (2001). | 3 | 2006–2009 |
Welsh v. Wisconsin
green
2 sentences1991Ed. 2d 732 , 104 S. Ct. 2091 (1984), in which the Court stated that "application of the exigent-circumstances exception in the context of a home entry should rarely be sanctioned when there is probable cause to *397 believe that only a minor offense" has been committed. 1989However, in Welsh , Justice Brennan did state that "application of the exigent-circumstances exception in the context of a home entry should rarely be sanctioned when there is probable cause to believe that only a minor offense . . . has been committed." Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753 . | 3 | 1987–1991 |
Tamisha Pearson v. City Of Seattle
green
2 sentences2018Pearson, 192 Wn. 2018In Pearson, this court determined that the natural rate of dissipation of THC in Tamisha Pearson's bloodstream did not justify a warrantless blood draw under the exigent circumstances exception." This court held that the City failed to show that waiting for a warrant would result in losing evidence of the defendant's intoxication, and it "failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that obtaining a warrant would have significantly delayed collecting a blood sample."65 62 Report of Proceedings Vol. 1 (February 17, 2016) at 191-92. 63 192 Wn. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Riley v. Cal. United States
green
2 sentences2015While recognizing that the exigent circumstances exception will be available in some cases, the Court observed that the exception “requires a court to examine whether an emergency justified a warrantless search in each particular case.” Id. at 2494 (citing Missouri v. McNeely,_U.S._, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1559 , 185 L. 2015While recognizing that the exigent circumstances exception will be available in some cases, the Court observed that the exception "requires a court to examine whether an emergency justified a warrantless search in each particular case." Id. at 2494 (citing Missouri v. McNeely, _ U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1559 , 185 L. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Valdez
green
2 sentences2011Id. at 701 , 674 P.2d 1240 . ¶ 38 It is true, as the majority notes, that in State v. Stroud, 106 Wash.2d 144 , 720 P.2d 436 (1986), overruled by State v. Valdez, 167 Wash.2d 761, 777 , 224 P.3d 751 (2009), this court allowed automobile searches incident to *93 arrest without regard to the arrestee's actual proximity to the vehicle in question. 2011Id. at 701 . ¶38 It is true, as the majority notes, that in State v. Stroud, 106 Wn.2d 144 , 720 P.2d 436 (1986), overruled by State v. Valdez, 167 Wn.2d 761, 777 , 224 P.3d 751 (2009), this court allowed automobile searches incident to arrest without regard to the arrestee’s actual proximity to the vehicle in question. | 2 | 2011–2011 |
| cluster 389501 green | 2 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Patterson
green
2 sentences2010The underlying theme of the exigent circumstances exception remains "[n]ecessity, a societal need to search without a warrant." Id. at 735 , 774 P.2d 10 . 2010The underlying theme of the exigent circumstances exception remains "[n]ecessity, a societal need to search without a warrant." Id. at 735 , 774 P.2d 10 . | 2 | 2010–2010 |
| State v. Hinshaw neutral | 2 | 2010–2010 |
Thurston County v. Cooper Point Ass'n
green
2 sentences2010The State makes no such argument here, and nothing in our opinion in O'Neill precludes the State from relying on the exigent circumstances exception in lieu of the search incident to arrest exception. [3] Six nonexclusive factors may aid in determining the existence of exigent circumstances: "(1) the gravity or violent nature of the offense with which the suspect is to be charged; (2) whether the suspect is reasonably believed to be armed; (3) whether there is reasonably trustworthy information that the suspect is guilty; (4) there is strong reason to believe that the suspect is on the premise 2010Six nonexclusive factors may aid in determining the existence of exigent circumstances: “(1) the gravity or violent nature of the offense with which the suspect is to be charged; (2) whether the suspect is reasonably believed to be armed; (3) whether there is reasonably trustworthy information that the suspect is guilty; (4) there is strong reason to believe that the suspect is on the premises; (5) a likelihood that the suspect will escape if not swiftly apprehended; and (6) the entry [can be] made peaceably.” Smith, 165 Wn.2d at 518 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Cardenas, 146 Wn. | 2 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Hinshaw
green
2 sentences2010State v. Hinshaw, 149 Wn. 2010State v. Hinshaw, 149 Wash.App. 747, 754 , 205 P.3d 178 (2009). | 2 | 2010–2010 |
| State v. Loewen green | 2 | 1990–2009 |
| City of Seattle v. Altschuler green | 2 | 2006–2006 |
| Carroll v. United States green | 2 | 1973–1981 |
| State v. Salinas green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| State v. Duncan green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Garvin green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Garvin green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Duncan green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Gauthier green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Tabler v. Industrial Com'n of Arizona green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. Muir green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| State v. Kinzy green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| State v. Kinzy green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Cady v. Dombrowski green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Baxter v. State green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| State v. Ryland green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| United States v. Robert Portsche Ward green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| City of Kodiak v. Samaniego green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| State v. Schroeder neutral | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| State v. Hendrickson green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| State v. Hendrickson green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| State v. Hutchison green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| State v. Villarreal green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.