exigent circumstances exception in Maryland

2026The exigent circumstances exception is narrow, Williams, 372 Md. at 402 , and the burden of proving exigent circumstances rests on the State, Stackhouse v. State, 298 Md. 203, 217 (1983).

2026The exigent circumstances exception is narrow, Williams, 372 Md. at 402 , and the burden of proving exigent circumstances rests on the State.

1973The exigent circumstances exception was first articulated in 1967 in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294 , 87 S. Ct. 1642 , 18 L.Ed.2d 782 .

1973The exigent circumstances exception was first articulated in 1967 in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294 , 87 S. Ct. 1642 , 18 L.Ed.2d 782 .

2026Viewing the facts as they appeared at the time and in the light most favorable to the State as the prevailing party, see Williamson v. State, 413 Md. 521 , 531–32 (2010), we find no error in the circuit court’s conclusion that the use of real-time CSLI from the appellant’s service provider and a cell-site simulator was justified under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement.

2013Id.

2013The search of the cell phone was therefore also permissible pursuant to the exigent circumstances exception.”); People v. Diaz, 51 Cal.4th 84 , 119 Cal.Rptr.3d 105 , 244 P.3d 501, 506 (2011) ("Because the cell phone was immediately associated with defendant's person, [the arresting officer] was 'entitled to inspect’ its contents without a warrant.”) (quoting Robinson, 414 U.S. at 236 , 94 S.Ct. 467 ). .

2013The search of the cell phone was therefore also permissible pursuant to the exigent circumstances exception.”); People v. Diaz, 51 Cal.4th 84 , 119 Cal.Rptr.3d 105 , 244 P.3d 501, 506 (2011) ("Because the cell phone was immediately associated with defendant's person, [the arresting officer] was 'entitled to inspect’ its contents without a warrant.”) (quoting Robinson, 414 U.S. at 236 , 94 S.Ct. 467 ). .

2013Appellant’s argument rests primarily on Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949 (2009).

2012The leading exception to the warrant requirement for home invasions to execute a search or seizure is the presence of “exigent circumstances.” See Payton, 445 U.S. at 590 , 100 S.Ct. 1371 (“Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.”). 10 The exigent circumstances exception “is to be construed narrowly,” Stackhouse v. State, 298 Md. 203, 215-16 , 468 A.2d 333 (1983), and the Court has stated that “[t]he meaning of exigency implies urgency, immediacy, and compelling need.” Id. at 212 , 468 A.2d 333 .

2012The leading exception to the warrant requirement for home invasions to execute a search or seizure is the presence of “exigent circumstances.” See Payton, 445 U.S. at 590 , 100 S.Ct. 1371 (“Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.”). 10 The exigent circumstances exception “is to be construed narrowly,” Stackhouse v. State, 298 Md. 203, 215-16 , 468 A.2d 333 (1983), and the Court has stated that “[t]he meaning of exigency implies urgency, immediacy, and compelling need.” Id. at 212 , 468 A.2d 333 .

2012L. & Criminology 433, 446 (1999) (citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 , 370 n. 5, 96 S.Ct. 3092 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976)). “[Wjhile related to” the exigent circumstances exception and sometimes “used interchangeably” with that exception, it has been stated that the community caretaking doctrine should be considered a “separate exception!],” State v. Kaltner, 420 N.J.Super. 524, 540 , 22 A.3d 77 (2011) (citation omitted), and as “a species apart” from the exigent circumstances exception used in analyzing an occurrence involving ordinary law enforcement activities.

2012L. & Criminology 433, 446 (1999) (citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 , 370 n. 5, 96 S.Ct. 3092 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976)). “[Wjhile related to” the exigent circumstances exception and sometimes “used interchangeably” with that exception, it has been stated that the community caretaking doctrine should be considered a “separate exception!],” State v. Kaltner, 420 N.J.Super. 524, 540 , 22 A.3d 77 (2011) (citation omitted), and as “a species apart” from the exigent circumstances exception used in analyzing an occurrence involving ordinary law enforcement activities.

2012Analytically, “the opportunity of the police to have obtained a warrant prior to invading the residence to make the warrantless arrest, is a highly relevant factor” that is “critical[.]” Smith v. State, 12 Md.App. 450, 464, 531 A.2d 302 (1987) (Where police had two hours between having probable cause to arrest and a warrantless arrest in the home, there were no exigent circumstances). “[T]hat the suspect is reasonably believed to be armed” is another “consideration [which] bears materially on the justification for a warrantless entry,” because “[d]elay in arrest of an armed felon may well incr

2012L. & Criminology 433, 446 (1999) (citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 , 370 n. 5, 96 S.Ct. 3092 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976)). “[Wjhile related to” the exigent circumstances exception and sometimes “used interchangeably” with that exception, it has been stated that the community caretaking doctrine should be considered a “separate exception!],” State v. Kaltner, 420 N.J.Super. 524, 540 , 22 A.3d 77 (2011) (citation omitted), and as “a species apart” from the exigent circumstances exception used in analyzing an occurrence involving ordinary law enforcement activities.

2012L. & Criminology 433, 446 (1999) (citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 , 370 n. 5, 96 S.Ct. 3092 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976)). “[Wjhile related to” the exigent circumstances exception and sometimes “used interchangeably” with that exception, it has been stated that the community caretaking doctrine should be considered a “separate exception!],” State v. Kaltner, 420 N.J.Super. 524, 540 , 22 A.3d 77 (2011) (citation omitted), and as “a species apart” from the exigent circumstances exception used in analyzing an occurrence involving ordinary law enforcement activities.

2012In Wengert, the Court of Appeals observed that [t]he Supreme Court has recognized that a warrantless search and seizure does not violate the Fourth Amendment when law enforcement officers are faced with exigent circumstances such that there is a “compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant.” Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 , 98 S.Ct. 1942, 1949 , 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978) (burning building).

2012In Wengert, the Court of Appeals observed that [t]he Supreme Court has recognized that a warrantless search and seizure does not violate the Fourth Amendment when law enforcement officers are faced with exigent circumstances such that there is a “compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant.” Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 , 98 S.Ct. 1942, 1949 , 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978) (burning building).

2011“Exigent circumstances” are those in which “the police are confronted with an emergency—circumstances so imminent that they present an urgent and compelling need for police action.” Paulino v. State, 399 Md. 341, 351 , 924 A.2d 308 (citation omitted), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1071 , 128 S.Ct. 709 , 169 L.Ed.2d 571 (2007).

2011“Exigent circumstances” are those in which “the police are confronted with an emergency—circumstances so imminent that they present an urgent and compelling need for police action.” Paulino v. State, 399 Md. 341, 351 , 924 A.2d 308 (citation omitted), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1071 , 128 S.Ct. 709 , 169 L.Ed.2d 571 (2007).

2010After determining that the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant clause did not apply, Ibarra, 147 P.3d at 849 , the Court distinguished the odor of ether from the odor of marijuana or other contraband. [T]he odor of marijuana, an illegal substance, can provide probable cause standing alone....

2010After determining that the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant clause did not apply, Ibarra, 147 P.3d at 849 , the Court distinguished the odor of ether from the odor of marijuana or other contraband. [T]he odor of marijuana, an illegal substance, can provide probable cause standing alone....

2007The Supreme Court has explained that, under the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment, “[w]herever a man may be, he is entitled to know that he will remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 374 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). 3 The hearing court in this case concluded that the officers’ search of Calvin fell within the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, and said, in its memorandum of opinion: The Court finds that there was probable cause for Officers King and Underwood to believe that the Respondent was i

2007The Supreme Court has explained that, under the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment, “[w]herever a man may be, he is entitled to know that he will remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 374 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). 3 The hearing court in this case concluded that the officers’ search of Calvin fell within the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, and said, in its memorandum of opinion: The Court finds that there was probable cause for Officers King and Underwood to believe that the Respondent was i

2007Gorman, supra, 168 Md.App. at 422 , 897 A.2d 242 .

2007Gorman, supra, 168 Md.App. at 422 , 897 A.2d 242 .

1994Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 , 110 S.Ct. 2301 , 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990); Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 464-73 , 91 S.Ct. at 2037-42 , 29 L.Ed.2d at 581-87 .

1994Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 , 110 S.Ct. 2301 , 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990); Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 464-73 , 91 S.Ct. at 2037-42 , 29 L.Ed.2d at 581-87 .