exigent circumstances exception in Montana

2024Comm’rs, 2013 MT 172, ¶ 20 , 370 Mont. 469 , 304 P.3d 720 (adopting Ninth Circuit test for pre-filing orders against vexatious litigants); State v. Case, 2024 MT 165, ¶ 33 , 417 Mont. 354 , 553 P.3d 985 (explaining how the first two prongs of our community caretaker test mirror the Ninth Circuit’s exigent circumstances standard for warrantless entry).

2024Comm’rs, 2013 MT 172, ¶ 20 , 370 Mont. 469 , 304 P.3d 720 (adopting Ninth Circuit test for pre-filing orders against vexatious litigants); State v. Case, 2024 MT 165, ¶ 33 , 417 Mont. 354 , 553 P.3d 985 (explaining how the first two prongs of our community caretaker test mirror the Ninth Circuit’s exigent circumstances standard for warrantless entry).

2024Comm’rs, 2013 MT 172, ¶ 20 , 370 Mont. 469 , 304 P.3d 720 (adopting Ninth Circuit test for pre-filing orders against vexatious litigants); State v. Case, 2024 MT 165, ¶ 33 , 417 Mont. 354 , 553 P.3d 985 (explaining how the first two prongs of our community caretaker test mirror the Ninth Circuit’s exigent circumstances standard for warrantless entry).

2024Comm’rs, 2013 MT 172, ¶ 20 , 370 Mont. 469 , 304 P.3d 720 (adopting Ninth Circuit test for pre-filing orders against vexatious litigants); State v. Case, 2024 MT 165, ¶ 33 , 417 Mont. 354 , 553 P.3d 985 (explaining how the first two prongs of our community caretaker test mirror the Ninth Circuit’s exigent circumstances standard for warrantless entry).

2024Contrary to the Dissent’s assertion, Dissent, ¶ 56, our caselaw does not yet have a “framework” for law enforcement to address situations like this, where probable cause that a crime has occurred simply does not exist despite a “need to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury.” Caniglia, 593 U.S. at 198 , 141 S. Ct. at 1599 .

2024Contrary to the Dissent’s assertion, Dissent, ¶ 56, our caselaw does not yet have a “framework” for law enforcement to address situations like this, where probable cause that a crime has occurred simply does not exist despite a “need to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury.” Caniglia, 593 U.S. at 198 , 141 S. Ct. at 1599 .

2019Anyan , ¶¶ 32-33 (citing Arkansas , 514 U.S. at 934 , 936 , 115 S. Ct. at 1918 , 1919 ); see also Anyan ¶¶ 34-60 (reviewing various exigent circumstances that would justify a no-knock entry).

2019Anyan , ¶¶ 32-33 (citing Arkansas , 514 U.S. at 934 , 936 , 115 S. Ct. at 1918 , 1919 ); see also Anyan ¶¶ 34-60 (reviewing various exigent circumstances that would justify a no-knock entry).

2012A medical emergency exception to the warrant requirement is not recognized within our constitutional jurisprudence, but we find the reasoning expressed in these cases to be instructive in applying our community caretaker doctrine in this case. ¶14 In Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392-93 , 98 S. Ct. 2408 (1978), the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that when police officers reasonably believe that a person is in need of immediate aid, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit them from warrantless searches or entries because the “‘need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justifi

2012A medical emergency exception to the warrant requirement is not recognized within our constitutional jurisprudence, but we find the reasoning expressed in these cases to be instructive in applying our community caretaker doctrine in this case. ¶14 In Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392-93 , 98 S. Ct. 2408 (1978), the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that when police officers reasonably believe that a person is in need of immediate aid, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit them from warrantless searches or entries because the “‘need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justifi

2009Finally, since Deputy Cameron was lawfully in the residence pursuant to the exigent circumstances exception, his observation of the marijuana residue and paraphernalia was also lawful and admissible under the plain view doctrine, which “allows peace officers, under certain circumstances, to seize evidence in plain view without a warrant.” State v. Lewis, 2007 MT 295, ¶ 22 , 340 Mont. 10 , 171 P.3d 731 .

2009Finally, since Deputy Cameron was lawfully in the residence pursuant to the exigent circumstances exception, his observation of the marijuana residue and paraphernalia was also lawful and admissible under the plain view doctrine, which “allows peace officers, under certain circumstances, to seize evidence in plain view without a warrant.” State v. Lewis, 2007 MT 295, ¶ 22 , 340 Mont. 10 , 171 P.3d 731 .

2004Thornton, 676 N.E.2d at 1029 . ¶29 Further, the Court of Appeals of Texas, in Pine v. State (1994), 889 S.W.2d 625 , cert. denied, Pine v. Texas (1995), 516 U.S. 914 , 116 S.Ct. 300 , 133 L.Ed.2d 206 , affirmed, based on the exigent circumstances exception, the denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress the *496 evidence seized during a warrantless search of his property.

2004Thornton, 676 N.E.2d at 1029 . ¶29 Further, the Court of Appeals of Texas, in Pine v. State (1994), 889 S.W.2d 625 , cert. denied, Pine v. Texas (1995), 516 U.S. 914 , 116 S.Ct. 300 , 133 L.Ed.2d 206 , affirmed, based on the exigent circumstances exception, the denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress the *496 evidence seized during a warrantless search of his property.

2004Thornton, 676 N.E.2d at 1029 . ¶29 Further, the Court of Appeals of Texas, in Pine v. State (1994), 889 S.W.2d 625 , cert. denied, Pine v. Texas (1995), 516 U.S. 914 , 116 S.Ct. 300 , 133 L.Ed.2d 206 , affirmed, based on the exigent circumstances exception, the denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress the *496 evidence seized during a warrantless search of his property.

2004Tuck, 477 A.2d at 1119 . ¶22 In Tuck , a humane society cruelty investigator and two officers visited the defendant’s pet store in response to a citizen’s complaint.

2004However, several other states have addressed the issue, including the District of Columbia, Wisconsin, Illinois, and Texas. ¶21 The defendant in Tuck v. United States (1984), 477 A.2d 1115 , moved to suppress the evidence seized during a warrantless search of his business.

2004Thornton, 676 N.E.2d at 1029 . ¶29 Further, the Court of Appeals of Texas, in Pine v. State (1994), 889 S.W.2d 625 , cert. denied, Pine v. Texas (1995), 516 U.S. 914 , 116 S.Ct. 300 , 133 L.Ed.2d 206 , affirmed, based on the exigent circumstances exception, the denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress the *496 evidence seized during a warrantless search of his property.

2004Bauer, 379 N.W.2d at 899 . ¶26 Relying on Tuck and Bauer , the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Thornton (1997), 676 N.E.2d 1024 , also applied the exigent circumstances exception in a situation involving a threat to animal life by targeting the reasonableness of the officers’ actions. ¶27 In Thornton , the police responded to a report that a dog had been barking for several days inside an apartment.

2004Bauer, 379 N.W.2d at 899 . ¶26 Relying on Tuck and Bauer , the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Thornton (1997), 676 N.E.2d 1024 , also applied the exigent circumstances exception in a situation involving a threat to animal life by targeting the reasonableness of the officers’ actions. ¶27 In Thornton , the police responded to a report that a dog had been barking for several days inside an apartment.

2004Pine, 889 S.W.2d at 632 . ¶30 In Pine , an officer entered upon the defendant’s property to investigate a complaint of cruelty to animals.

2004Thornton, 676 N.E.2d at 1029 . ¶29 Further, the Court of Appeals of Texas, in Pine v. State (1994), 889 S.W.2d 625 , cert. denied, Pine v. Texas (1995), 516 U.S. 914 , 116 S.Ct. 300 , 133 L.Ed.2d 206 , affirmed, based on the exigent circumstances exception, the denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress the *496 evidence seized during a warrantless search of his property.

2001As a comparison between Elison and Carney reveals, the Montana right to privacy, when applied to search and seizure cases, may well result in this Court’s departure from U.S. Supreme Court rulings.) ¶46 Other Montana cases requiring a showing of exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search include Dolan, 283 Mont. 245 , 940 P.2d 436 (drawing of blood from defendant without warrant was unlawful search and seizure); Wakeford , ¶ 25 (warrantless entry into defendant’s motel room was justified under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement); State v. Keating, 1998 MT

2001As a comparison between Elison and Carney reveals, the Montana right to privacy, when applied to search and seizure cases, may well result in this Court’s departure from U.S. Supreme Court rulings.) ¶46 Other Montana cases requiring a showing of exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search include Dolan, 283 Mont. 245 , 940 P.2d 436 (drawing of blood from defendant without warrant was unlawful search and seizure); Wakeford , ¶ 25 (warrantless entry into defendant’s motel room was justified under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement); State v. Keating, 1998 MT

1999State v. Wakeford, 1998 MT 16, ¶ 21 , 287 Mont. 220, ¶ 21 , 953 P.2d 1065, ¶ 21 . ¶13 In order to justify a warrantless entry under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement argued before the District Court, both exigent circumstances and probable cause must be established.

1999State v. Wakeford, 1998 MT 16, ¶ 21 , 287 Mont. 220, ¶ 21 , 953 P.2d 1065, ¶ 21 . ¶13 In order to justify a warrantless entry under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement argued before the District Court, both exigent circumstances and probable cause must be established.

1998Ed. 2d 486, 498 . ¶24 Exigent circumstances are “those circumstances that would cause a reasonable person to believe that entry (or other relevant prompt action) was necessary to prevent physical harm to the officers or other persons, the destruction of relevant evidence, the escape of the suspect, or some other consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law enforcement efforts.” United States v. McConnery (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc), 728 F.2d 1195 , 1199 cert. denied (1984), 469 U.S. 824 , 105 S. Ct. 101 , 83 L.

1998Ed. 2d 486, 498 . ¶24 Exigent circumstances are “those circumstances that would cause a reasonable person to believe that entry (or other relevant prompt action) was necessary to prevent physical harm to the officers or other persons, the destruction of relevant evidence, the escape of the suspect, or some other consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law enforcement efforts.” United States v. McConnery (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc), 728 F.2d 1195 , 1199 cert. denied (1984), 469 U.S. 824 , 105 S. Ct. 101 , 83 L.

1997The requirement of probable cause is satisfied “if the facts and circumstances within the officer’s personal knowledge, or upon information imparted to him by a reliable source, are sufficient to warrant a reasonable person to believe that the suspect has committed an offense.” State v. Lee (1988), 232 Mont. 105, 109 , 754 P.2d 512, 515 .

1997The requirement of probable cause is satisfied “if the facts and circumstances within the officer’s personal knowledge, or upon information imparted to him by a reliable source, are sufficient to warrant a reasonable person to believe that the suspect has committed an offense.” State v. Lee (1988), 232 Mont. 105, 109 , 754 P.2d 512, 515 .

1997In addition, the court concluded that the medical information available to Officer Monzon upon his arrival at the hospital, combined with the statements made to Officer Reddick at the accident scene to the effect that Dolan had smelled of alcohol, was “collectively sufficient to warrant a conclusion that probable cause existed to believe a crime had been committed and to further conclude that preservation of the evidence under the circumstances *253 warranted a warrantless seizure of [Dolan’s] blood sample under the exigent circumstances exception to the search warrant requirement.” It is well

1997In addition, the court concluded that the medical information available to Officer Monzon upon his arrival at the hospital, combined with the statements made to Officer Reddick at the accident scene to the effect that Dolan had smelled of alcohol, was “collectively sufficient to warrant a conclusion that probable cause existed to believe a crime had been committed and to further conclude that preservation of the evidence under the circumstances *253 warranted a warrantless seizure of [Dolan’s] blood sample under the exigent circumstances exception to the search warrant requirement.” It is well

1997In addition, the court concluded that the medical information available to Officer Monzon upon his arrival at the hospital, combined with the statements made to Officer Reddick at the accident scene to the effect that Dolan had smelled of alcohol, was “collectively sufficient to warrant a conclusion that probable cause existed to believe a crime had been committed and to further conclude that preservation of the evidence under the circumstances *253 warranted a warrantless seizure of [Dolan’s] blood sample under the exigent circumstances exception to the search warrant requirement.” It is well