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6 Hawaii opinions name it 1 courts 1981–2002 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Hawaii courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Lloydgreen2 sentences1983State v. Dorson, 62 Haw. 377, 384 , 615 P.2d 740, 746 (1980); State v. Dias; 62 Haw. at 56, 609 P.2d at 640 (1980); State v. Lloyd, 61 Haw. 505, 512 , 606 P.2d 913, 918 (1980). 1983State v. Dorson, 62 Haw. 377, 384 , 615 P.2d 740, 746 (1980); State v. Dias; 62 Haw. at 56, 609 P.2d at 640 (1980); State v. Lloyd, 61 Haw. 505, 512 , 606 P.2d 913, 918 (1980). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Elliottgreen2 sentences1982While “the term ‘exigent circumstances’ is incapable of precise definition,” State v. Elliott, 61 Haw. 492, 495-96 , 605 P.2d 930, 933 (1980), “[generally speaking . . . [it] may be said to exist when the demands of the occasion reasonably call for an immediate police response.” State v. Lloyd, 61 Haw. 505, 512 , 606 P.2d 913, 918 (1980). 1982While “the term ‘exigent circumstances’ is incapable of precise definition,” State v. Elliott, 61 Haw. 492, 495-96 , 605 P.2d 930, 933 (1980), “[generally speaking . . . [it] may be said to exist when the demands of the occasion reasonably call for an immediate police response.” State v. Lloyd, 61 Haw. 505, 512 , 606 P.2d 913, 918 (1980). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Quesnelgreen2 sentences2002See Quesnel , 79 Hawai`i at 192, 900 P.2d at 189 . 2002See Quesnel, 79 Hawai'i at 192 , 900 P.2d at 189 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Garciagreen2 sentences2002See Garcia , 77 Hawai`i at 467, 887 P.2d at 677 (holding that article I, § 7 of the Hawai`i Constitution's mandate that search be reasonable requires officers to afford the occupants of the premises a reasonable time to respond to their announcement). 2002See Garcia, 77 Hawai'i at 467 , 887 P.2d at 677 (holding that article I, § 7 of the Hawaii Constitution’s mandate that search be reasonable requires officers to afford the occupants of the premises a reasonable time to respond to their announcement). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Balberdigreen2 sentences2002Here the police officers had a warrant; the exigent circumstances rule in that situation is applied for the purpose of excusing officers' adherence to the announcements required before entry, see State v. Balberdi, 90 Hawai`i 16, 21, 975 P.2d 773, 778 (App.1999), and the constitutional mandate that they afford an occupant a reasonable time to respond to a demand for entry. 2002Here the police officers had a warrant; the exigent circumstances rule in that situation is applied for the purpose of excusing officers’ adherence to the announcements required before entry, see State v. Balberdi, 90 Hawai'i 16, 21 , 975 P.2d 773, 778 (App.1999), and the constitutional mandate that they afford an occupant a reasonable time to respond to a demand for entry. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Dorsongreen2 sentences1983State v. Dorson, 62 Haw. 377, 384 , 615 P.2d 740, 746 (1980); State v. Dias; 62 Haw. at 56, 609 P.2d at 640 (1980); State v. Lloyd, 61 Haw. 505, 512 , 606 P.2d 913, 918 (1980). 1983State v. Dorson, 62 Haw. 377, 384 , 615 P.2d 740, 746 (1980); State v. Dias; 62 Haw. at 56, 609 P.2d at 640 (1980); State v. Lloyd, 61 Haw. 505, 512 , 606 P.2d 913, 918 (1980). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Diasgreen2 sentences1983State v. Dorson, 62 Haw. 377, 384 , 615 P.2d 740, 746 (1980); State v. Dias, 62 Haw. at 56, 609 P.2d at 640 (1980); State v. Lloyd, 61 Haw. 505, 512 , 606 P.2d 913, 918 (1980). 1983State v. Dorson, 62 Haw. 377, 384 , 615 P.2d 740, 746 (1980); State v. Dias; 62 Haw. at 56, 609 P.2d at 640 (1980); State v. Lloyd, 61 Haw. 505, 512 , 606 P.2d 913, 918 (1980). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Richard Alan Cepulonis, United States of America v. Francis David Lovellgreen1 sentence1981United States v. Gaultney, 581 F.2d 1137, 1139 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907 , 100 S.Ct. 1833 , 64 L.Ed.2d 259 (1980); United States v. Cepulonis, 530 F.2d 238, 241 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 922 , 96 S.Ct. 2630 , 49 L.Ed.2d 376 (1976). [1] The court of appeals in United States v. Cohn, supra , upheld a warrantless search of an automobile as reasonable under the exigent circumstances exception, on the grounds that (1) the car had been seen at the home of a known drug trafficker, and was subject to being moved again without warning; (2) part of a brick of marijuana was prot | 1 | 1 |
Coolidge v. New Hampshiregreen2 sentences1981See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); State v. Agnasan, 62 Haw. 252 , 614 P.2d 393 (1980); State v. Elliott, 61 Haw. 492 , 605 P.2d 930 (1980). 1981In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, the Supreme Court held the automobile exception to be “simply irrelevant” to the facts before it, emphasizing (1) the suspect in the case knew beforehand that he was under investigation for a crime and had ample opportunity to destroy evidence; (2) during the arrest, the suspect had no access to the automobile; (3) the vehicle was not parked in such a place or manner as to attract undue attention; (4) the search did not involve contraband, stolen goods or weapons; and (5) there were no known confederates likely to remove the evidence. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Hoyt Albert Gaultney and Francis Gilmeregreen1 sentence1981United States v. Gaultney, 581 F.2d 1137, 1139 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907 , 100 S.Ct. 1833 , 64 L.Ed.2d 259 (1980); United States v. Cepulonis, 530 F.2d 238, 241 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 922 , 96 S.Ct. 2630 , 49 L.Ed.2d 376 (1976). [1] The court of appeals in United States v. Cohn, supra , upheld a warrantless search of an automobile as reasonable under the exigent circumstances exception, on the grounds that (1) the car had been seen at the home of a known drug trafficker, and was subject to being moved again without warning; (2) part of a brick of marijuana was prot | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Hawaii. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Rodrigues
green
2 sentences2002The majority opinion does not adopt the prosecution's position that the exigent circumstances circumstance *203 should apply in this case, apparently because to apply it, as the defense contends, would be a significant departure from the precedent of State v. Rodrigues, 67 Haw. 496 , 692 P.2d 1156 (1985), where it was held that a claim of exigent circumstances not raised below by the prosecution in a suppression case is waived. [5] Nevertheless, despite the lack of any basis in the record, the majority holds out the possibility that, absent waiver, the doctrine of exigent circumstances may app 2002The majority opinion does not adopt the prosecution's position that the exigent circumstances circumstance *203 should apply in this case, apparently because to apply it, as the defense contends, would be a significant departure from the precedent of State v. Rodrigues, 67 Haw. 496 , 692 P.2d 1156 (1985), where it was held that a claim of exigent circumstances not raised below by the prosecution in a suppression case is waived. [5] Nevertheless, despite the lack of any basis in the record, the majority holds out the possibility that, absent waiver, the doctrine of exigent circumstances may app | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Cupp v. Murphy
green
2 sentences2002Although the police in Schmerber performed the blood extraction incident to the driver’s arrest, the United States Supreme Court clarified in Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759 , 105 S.Ct. 1611 , 84 L.Ed.2d 662 (1985), that Schmerber “fell within the exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement[.]” Earlier, Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296 , 93 S.Ct. 2000 , 36 L.Ed.2d 900 (1973), established as a federal constitutional matter that warrantless seizures of evidence justified by exigent circumstances did not have be accompanied by an arrest. 2002Although the police in Schmerber performed the blood extraction incident to the driver’s arrest, the United States Supreme Court clarified in Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759 , 105 S.Ct. 1611 , 84 L.Ed.2d 662 (1985), that Schmerber “fell within the exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement[.]” Earlier, Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296 , 93 S.Ct. 2000 , 36 L.Ed.2d 900 (1973), established as a federal constitutional matter that warrantless seizures of evidence justified by exigent circumstances did not have be accompanied by an arrest. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Winston v. Lee
green
2 sentences2002Although the police in Schmerber performed the blood extraction incident to the driver’s arrest, the United States Supreme Court clarified in Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759 , 105 S.Ct. 1611 , 84 L.Ed.2d 662 (1985), that Schmerber “fell within the exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement[.]” Earlier, Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296 , 93 S.Ct. 2000 , 36 L.Ed.2d 900 (1973), established as a federal constitutional matter that warrantless seizures of evidence justified by exigent circumstances did not have be accompanied by an arrest. 2002Although the police in Schmerber performed the blood extraction incident to the driver’s arrest, the United States Supreme Court clarified in Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759 , 105 S.Ct. 1611 , 84 L.Ed.2d 662 (1985), that Schmerber “fell within the exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement[.]” Earlier, Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296 , 93 S.Ct. 2000 , 36 L.Ed.2d 900 (1973), established as a federal constitutional matter that warrantless seizures of evidence justified by exigent circumstances did not have be accompanied by an arrest. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
State v. Clark
green
2 sentences1985Clark, 65 Haw. at 494 , 654 P.2d at 360 . 1985Clark, 65 Haw. at 494 , 654 P.2d at 360 . | 1 | 1985–1985 |
State v. Agnasan
green
2 sentences1981See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); State v. Agnasan, 62 Haw. 252 , 614 P.2d 393 (1980); State v. Elliott, 61 Haw. 492 , 605 P.2d 930 (1980). 1981See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); State v. Agnasan, 62 Haw. 252 , 614 P.2d 393 (1980); State v. Elliott, 61 Haw. 492 , 605 P.2d 930 (1980). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Carroll v. United States
green
2 sentences1981This exceptionl first articulated in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), evolved from the recognition that the automobile's inherent mobility and exposure increased the risk that an implicated vehicle and its contents may flee the jurisdiction before a warrant to secure the automobile or to seize its contents could be obtained. 1981This exception, first articulated in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), evolved from the recognition that the automobile’s inherent mobility and exposure increased the risk that an implicated vehicle and its contents may flee the jurisdiction before a warrant to secure the automobile or to seize its contents could be obtained. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
United States v. Jack Cohn
green
2 sentences1981United States v. Gaultney, 581 F.2d 1137, 1139 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907 , 100 S.Ct. 1833 , 64 L.Ed.2d 259 (1980); United States v. Cepulonis, 530 F.2d 238, 241 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 922 , 96 S.Ct. 2630 , 49 L.Ed.2d 376 (1976). [1] The court of appeals in United States v. Cohn, supra , upheld a warrantless search of an automobile as reasonable under the exigent circumstances exception, on the grounds that (1) the car had been seen at the home of a known drug trafficker, and was subject to being moved again without warning; (2) part of a brick of marijuana was prot 1981The. court of appeals in United States v. Cohn, supra, upheld a warrantless search of an automobile as reasonable under the exigent circumstances exception, on the grounds that (1) the car had been seen at the home of a known drug trafficker, and was subject to being moved again without warning; (2) part of a brick of marijuana was protruding from the car’s front seat; and (3) a very strong odor of marijuana was coming out of a half-opened window on the passenger’s side of the car. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
United States v. John James Connolly, United States of America v. William Carl Jeppesen
green
2 sentences1981The exigent circumstances exception, as applied to this particular factual pattern, continues to maintain its justification on the presence of truly exigent circumstances caused by the fleeting nature of the target, which I find from the record were absent in the present case. *1116 The majority invokes the language of United States v. Connolly, 479 F.2d 930 (9th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 897 , 94 S.Ct. 248 , 38 L.Ed.2d 139 , to set the present standard that must be met in order for a case to fall under the exigent circumstances exception as applied to automobiles. 1981The majority invokes the language of United States v. Connolly, 479 F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 897 , to set the present standard that must be met in order for a case to fall under the exigent circumstances exception as applied to automobiles. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Chambers v. Maroney
green
2 sentences1981See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 , 90 S.Ct. 1975 , 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970); State v. Agnasan, 62 Haw. 252 , 614 P.2d 393 (1980); State v. Elliott, 61 Haw. 492 , 605 P.2d 930 (1980). 1981See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); State v. Agnasan, 62 Haw. 252 , 614 P.2d 393 (1980); State v. Elliott, 61 Haw. 492 , 605 P.2d 930 (1980). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Wilson v. United States
green
2 sentences1981The exigent circumstances exception, as applied to this particular factual pattern, continues to maintain its justification on the presence of truly exigent circumstances caused by the fleeting nature of the target, which I find from the record were absent in the present case. *1116 The majority invokes the language of United States v. Connolly, 479 F.2d 930 (9th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 897 , 94 S.Ct. 248 , 38 L.Ed.2d 139 , to set the present standard that must be met in order for a case to fall under the exigent circumstances exception as applied to automobiles. 1981The majority invokes the language of United States v. Connolly, 479 F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 897 , to set the present standard that must be met in order for a case to fall under the exigent circumstances exception as applied to automobiles. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Whitney v. Brann
green
1 sentence1981United States v. Gaultney, 581 F.2d 1137, 1139 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907 , 100 S.Ct. 1833 , 64 L.Ed.2d 259 (1980); United States v. Cepulonis, 530 F.2d 238, 241 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 922 , 96 S.Ct. 2630 , 49 L.Ed.2d 376 (1976). [1] The court of appeals in United States v. Cohn, supra , upheld a warrantless search of an automobile as reasonable under the exigent circumstances exception, on the grounds that (1) the car had been seen at the home of a known drug trafficker, and was subject to being moved again without warning; (2) part of a brick of marijuana was prot | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Fleming v. Gunn
neutral
1 sentence1981United States v. Gaultney, 581 F.2d 1137, 1139 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907 , 100 S.Ct. 1833 , 64 L.Ed.2d 259 (1980); United States v. Cepulonis, 530 F.2d 238, 241 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 922 , 96 S.Ct. 2630 , 49 L.Ed.2d 376 (1976). [1] The court of appeals in United States v. Cohn, supra , upheld a warrantless search of an automobile as reasonable under the exigent circumstances exception, on the grounds that (1) the car had been seen at the home of a known drug trafficker, and was subject to being moved again without warning; (2) part of a brick of marijuana was prot | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Agins v. City of Tiburon
green
1 sentence1981United States v. Gaultney, 581 F.2d 1137, 1139 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907 , 100 S.Ct. 1833 , 64 L.Ed.2d 259 (1980); United States v. Cepulonis, 530 F.2d 238, 241 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 922 , 96 S.Ct. 2630 , 49 L.Ed.2d 376 (1976). [1] The court of appeals in United States v. Cohn, supra , upheld a warrantless search of an automobile as reasonable under the exigent circumstances exception, on the grounds that (1) the car had been seen at the home of a known drug trafficker, and was subject to being moved again without warning; (2) part of a brick of marijuana was prot | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division
green
1 sentence1981United States v. Gaultney, 581 F.2d 1137, 1139 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907 , 100 S.Ct. 1833 , 64 L.Ed.2d 259 (1980); United States v. Cepulonis, 530 F.2d 238, 241 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 922 , 96 S.Ct. 2630 , 49 L.Ed.2d 376 (1976). [1] The court of appeals in United States v. Cohn, supra , upheld a warrantless search of an automobile as reasonable under the exigent circumstances exception, on the grounds that (1) the car had been seen at the home of a known drug trafficker, and was subject to being moved again without warning; (2) part of a brick of marijuana was prot | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August
green
1 sentence1981United States v. Gaultney, 581 F.2d 1137, 1139 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907 , 100 S.Ct. 1833 , 64 L.Ed.2d 259 (1980); United States v. Cepulonis, 530 F.2d 238, 241 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 922 , 96 S.Ct. 2630 , 49 L.Ed.2d 376 (1976). [1] The court of appeals in United States v. Cohn, supra , upheld a warrantless search of an automobile as reasonable under the exigent circumstances exception, on the grounds that (1) the car had been seen at the home of a known drug trafficker, and was subject to being moved again without warning; (2) part of a brick of marijuana was prot | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.