57 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1970–2026 13 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. DeLucagreen2 sentences2024Consequently, the application of the exigent-circumstances exception demands a "fact-sensitive, objective analysis." DeLuca, 168 N.J. at 632 . 2024Generally, when the State invokes the exigent- circumstances exception to justify a warrantless search [or seizure], it must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the search was premised on probable cause and (2) law enforcement acted in an objectively reasonable manner to meet an exigency that did not permit time to secure a warrant. [Manning, 240 N.J. at 333.] A-1860-21 19 In Johnson, the Court identified factors to consider when determining whether law enforcement faced exigent circumstances, including "the urgency of the situation, the time it will take to secure a warrant, the | 6 | 7 |
State v. Boltegreen2 sentences2022Bolte, 115 N.J. at 597-98 ; see also J.A., 233 N.J. at 449 (noting the United States Supreme “Court’s longstanding recognition that ‘“hot pursuit” cases fall within the exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement’” (quoting Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 218 (1981)). 2020Consideration of the exigent circumstances exception "demands a fact-sensitive, objective analysis." Id. at 292 (quoting State v. Deluca, 168 N.J. 626, 632 (2001)). [S]ome factors to be considered in determining whether law enforcement officials faced such circumstances are the urgency of the situation, the time it will take to secure a warrant, the seriousness of the crime under investigation, and the threat that evidence will be destroyed or lost or that the physical well-being of people will be endangered unless immediate action is taken. [State v. Johnson, 193 N.J. 528 , 552–53 (2008) (cit | 3 | 8 |
State v. Hutchinsgreen2 sentences1990Only recently, our Supreme Court in State v. Hutchins, 116 N.J. 457 , 561 A. 2d 1142 (1989) and State v. Lewis, 116 N.J. 477 , 561 A. 2d 1153 (1989), had occasion to consider the parameters of the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirements *568 as they apply to a private home. 1990Only recently, our Supreme Court in State v. Hutchins, 116 N.J. 457 , 561 A. 2d 1142 (1989) and State v. Lewis, 116 N.J. 477 , 561 A. 2d 1153 (1989), had occasion to consider the parameters of the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirements *568 as they apply to a private home. | 3 | 5 |
State v. William L. Witt(074468)green2 sentences2024In Witt, our Supreme Court abandoned the exigent-circumstances standard for warrantless searches of automobiles set forth in State v. Cooke, 163 N.J. 657 (2000), and State v. Pena-Flores, 198 N.J. 6 (2009), in favor of returning to the exigency test established in State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211 (1981). 223 N.J. at 450 . 2022In Witt, our Supreme Court addressed whether the exigent circumstances test for a warrantless search of an automobile "is unsound in principle and A-1443-20 17 unworkable in practice." 223 N.J. at 414 . | 2 | 6 |
Missouri v. McNeelygreen2 sentences2014Ed. 2d at 705-06 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).] The Court described the analysis in Schmerber as "fit[ting] comfortably within our case law applying the exigent circumstances exception." Id. at ____, 133 S. Ct. at 1560 , 185 L. 2014Ed. 2d at 705-06 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).] The Court described the analysis in Schmerber as "fit[ting] comfortably within our case law applying the exigent circumstances exception." Id. at ____, 133 S. Ct. at 1560 , 185 L. | 2 | 3 |
State v. Smithgreen2 sentences2024Generally, when the State invokes the exigent- circumstances exception to justify a warrantless search [or seizure], it must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the search was premised on probable cause and (2) law enforcement acted in an objectively reasonable manner to meet an exigency that did not permit time to secure a warrant. [Manning, 240 N.J. at 333.] A-1860-21 19 In Johnson, the Court identified factors to consider when determining whether law enforcement faced exigent circumstances, including "the urgency of the situation, the time it will take to secure a warrant, the 1989We upheld the search on the ground that the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement applied because the officers had probable cause to believe that the defendant had purchased narcotics and was in possession of them at the time of the stop, and a search warrant might have been obtained only by "risking a probability of the disappearance of defendant and destruction of the object of the search...." State v. Smith, supra, 129 N.J. | 2 | 3 |
In re Interest of J.A.green2 sentences2022Bolte, 115 N.J. at 597-98 ; see also J.A., 233 N.J. at 449 (noting the United States Supreme “Court’s longstanding recognition that ‘“hot pursuit” cases fall within the exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement’” (quoting Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 218 (1981)). 2022“Because the ‘hot pursuit’ doctrine is a subset of the exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, the touchstones that would justify a warrantless entry remain the possible destruction of evidence and the threat of violence by the suspect.” J.A., 233 N.J. at 449 (citations omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Steagald v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2022Bolte, 115 N.J. at 597-98 ; see also J.A., 233 N.J. at 449 (noting the United States Supreme “Court’s longstanding recognition that ‘“hot pursuit” cases fall within the exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement’” (quoting Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 218 (1981)). 2018Regarding the weight assigned to the respective considerations, we have recognized that "[p]olice safety and the preservation of evidence remain the preeminent determinants of exigency." Dunlap , 185 N.J. at 551 , 888 A.2d 1278 . **449 "The 'hot pursuit' of a defendant who poses a threat to public safety may in certain contexts constitute an exigent circumstance sufficient to support a warrantless home entry ...." Bolte , 115 N.J. at 598 , 560 A.2d 644 ; see also Steagald v. United States , 451 U.S. 204 , 218, 101 S.Ct. 1642 , 68 L.Ed.2d 38 (1981) (noting the Court's longstanding recognition t | 2 | 2 |
Brooks v. Town of Ashlandgreen2 sentences2017See, e.g., State v. Bolte, 115 N.J. 579, 585-86 , 560 A.2d 644 (recognizing that combination of probable cause and exigency “may excuse police from compliance with the warrant requirement”), ce rt. denied, 493 U.S. 936 , 110 S.Ct. 330 , 107 L.Ed.2d 320 (1989). 2017See, e.g., State v. Bolte, 115 N.J. 579, 585-86 (recognizing that combination of probable cause and exigency “may excuse police from compliance with the warrant requirement”), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 936 , 110 S. Ct. 330 , 107 L. | 2 | 2 |
Parten v. Ford Motor Co.green2 sentences2017See, e.g., State v. Bolte, 115 N.J. 579, 585-86 , 560 A.2d 644 (recognizing that combination of probable cause and exigency “may excuse police from compliance with the warrant requirement”), ce rt. denied, 493 U.S. 936 , 110 S.Ct. 330 , 107 L.Ed.2d 320 (1989). 2017See, e.g., State v. Bolte, 115 N.J. 579, 585-86 (recognizing that combination of probable cause and exigency “may excuse police from compliance with the warrant requirement”), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 936 , 110 S. Ct. 330 , 107 L. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Scottgreen2 sentences2001See State v. Scott, 231 N.J.Super. 258, 274-75 , 555 A.2d 667 (App.Div.1989) (Ashbey, J., concurring and dissenting), rev’d, 118 N.J. 406 , 571 A.2d 1304 (1990); United States v. Barone, 330 F.2d 543, 545 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1004 , 84 S.Ct. 1940 , 12 L.Ed.2d 1053 (1964). 2001See State v. Scott, 231 N.J.Super. 258, 274-75 , 555 A.2d 667 (App.Div.1989) (Ashbey, J., concurring and dissenting), rev’d, 118 N.J. 406 , 571 A.2d 1304 (1990); United States v. Barone, 330 F.2d 543, 545 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1004 , 84 S.Ct. 1940 , 12 L.Ed.2d 1053 (1964). | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Salvatore J. Baronegreen2 sentences2001See State v. Scott, 231 N.J.Super. 258, 274-75 , 555 A.2d 667 (App.Div.1989) (Ashbey, J., concurring and dissenting), rev’d, 118 N.J. 406 , 571 A.2d 1304 (1990); United States v. Barone, 330 F.2d 543, 545 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1004 , 84 S.Ct. 1940 , 12 L.Ed.2d 1053 (1964). 2001See State v. Scott, 231 N.J.Super. 258, 274-75 , 555 A. 2d 667 (App.Div.1989) (Ashbey, J., concurring and dissenting), rev'd, 118 N.J. 406 , 571 A. 2d 1304 (1990); United States v. Barone, 330 F. 2d 543, 545 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1004 , 84 S.Ct. 1940 , 12 L.Ed. 2d 1053 (1964). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Scottgreen2 sentences2001See State v. Scott, 231 N.J.Super. 258, 274-75 , 555 A.2d 667 (App.Div.1989) (Ashbey, J., concurring and dissenting), rev’d, 118 N.J. 406 , 571 A.2d 1304 (1990); United States v. Barone, 330 F.2d 543, 545 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1004 , 84 S.Ct. 1940 , 12 L.Ed.2d 1053 (1964). 2001See State v. Scott, 231 N.J.Super. 258, 274-75 , 555 A.2d 667 (App.Div.1989) (Ashbey, J., concurring and dissenting), rev’d, 118 N.J. 406 , 571 A.2d 1304 (1990); United States v. Barone, 330 F.2d 543, 545 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1004 , 84 S.Ct. 1940 , 12 L.Ed.2d 1053 (1964). | 2 | 2 |
Johnson v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1999Finally, on this issue, we take note of what the United States Supreme Court said about the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement: "There are exceptional circumstances in which, on balancing the need for effective law enforcement against the right of privacy, it may be contended that a magistrate's warrant for search may be dispensed with." Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 , 68 S.Ct. 367, 369 , 92 L.Ed. 436, 440-41 (1948). 1999Finally, on this issue, we take note of what the United States Supreme Court said about the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement: "There are exceptional circumstances in which, on balancing the need for effective law enforcement against the right of privacy, it may be contended that a magistrate's warrant for search may be dispensed with." Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 , 68 S.Ct. 367, 369 , 92 L.Ed. 436, 440-41 (1948). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Valenciagreen2 sentences1994United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43 , 96 S.Ct. 2406, 2409 , 49 L.Ed. 2d 300, 305 (1976) (the potential destruction of evidence); State v. Bruzzese, supra, 94 N.J. at 218 , 463 A. 2d 320 ; State v. Valencia, 93 N.J. 126, 136 , 459 A. 2d 1149 (1983) ("To sustain a warrantless search, the State must ordinarily demonstrate that exigent circumstances prevented obtaining a written warrant and that probable cause for the search existed.") The State claims that the outstanding warrant against Collier, along with the flight of Collier and defendant into a known drug location, met the exigent c 1994United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43 , 96 S.Ct. 2406, 2409 , 49 L.Ed. 2d 300, 305 (1976) (the potential destruction of evidence); State v. Bruzzese, supra, 94 N.J. at 218 , 463 A. 2d 320 ; State v. Valencia, 93 N.J. 126, 136 , 459 A. 2d 1149 (1983) ("To sustain a warrantless search, the State must ordinarily demonstrate that exigent circumstances prevented obtaining a written warrant and that probable cause for the search existed.") The State claims that the outstanding warrant against Collier, along with the flight of Collier and defendant into a known drug location, met the exigent c | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Naturilegreen | 2 | 2 |
State v. Edmondsgreen2 sentences2025Edmonds, 211 N.J. at 130, 141 . 2019One principal exception to the warrant requirement, as applied to the search of a home, is the exigent circumstances doctrine. “[I]f police officers ‘possess an objectively reasonable basis to believe’ that prompt action is needed to meet an imminent danger, then neither the Fourth Amendment nor Article I, Paragraph 7 demand that the officers ‘delay potential lifesaving measures while critical and precious time is expended 16 obtaining a warrant.’” Edmonds, 211 N.J. at 133 (quoting Frankel, 179 N.J. at 599 ). | 1 | 4 |
Schmerber v. Californiagreen2 sentences2025At the time of the trial court's written opinion on March 6, 2015, New Jersey followed Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966), which held the exigent circumstances exception permits the compelled taking of blood when elapsed time would lead to a dissipation of BAC. 2015In the context of the exigent-circumstances exception, the United States Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a warrantless blood draw from a suspected drunk driver in its 1966 decision in Schmerber, supra, 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed. 2d 908 . | 1 | 4 |
State v. Pena-Floresred2 sentences2024In Witt, our Supreme Court abandoned the exigent-circumstances standard for warrantless searches of automobiles set forth in State v. Cooke, 163 N.J. 657 (2000), and State v. Pena-Flores, 198 N.J. 6 (2009), in favor of returning to the exigency test established in State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211 (1981). 223 N.J. at 450 . 2020State v. Pena-Flores, 198 N.J. 6, 28 (2009).3 The exception is justified by: "(1) the ready mobility of the vehicle and the inherent potential for loss or destruction of evidence before a warrant is obtained; and (2) the decreased expectation of privacy in motor vehicles, which are subject to extensive government regulation." Id. at 20 . 3 In 2015, the Supreme Court abandoned the exigent circumstances standard because it was "unsound in principle and unworkable in practice . . . ." State v. Witt, 223 N.J. 409, 447 (2015). | 1 | 3 |
State v. Cassidygreen2 sentences2015One such exception to the warrant requirement is the exigent-circumstances doctrine, State v. Cassidy, 179 N.J. 150, 160 , 843 A.2d 1132 (2004), and another is the emergency-aid doctrine, Frankel, supra, 179 N.J. at 598, 847 A.2d 561 . 2015One such exception to the warrant requirement is the exigent-circumstances doctrine, State v. Cassidy, 179 N.J. 150, 160 , 843 A.2d 1132 (2004), and another is the emergency-aid doctrine, Frankel, supra, 179 N.J. at 598, 847 A.2d 561 . | 1 | 3 |
Vale v. Louisianagreen2 sentences1989Nor were they about to be removed from the jurisdiction. [Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34-35 [ 90 S.Ct. 1969, 1971-72 ] 26 L.Ed.2d 409, 413-14 (1970) (citations omitted).] We also noted in Hutchins that numerous federal courts have applied the exigent-circumstances exception in the context of warrantless home entries in drug cases. 1989Nor were they about to be removed from the jurisdiction. [Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34-35 [ 90 S.Ct. 1969, 1971-72 ] 26 L.Ed.2d 409, 413-14 (1970) (citations omitted).] We also noted in Hutchins that numerous federal courts have applied the exigent-circumstances exception in the context of warrantless home entries in drug cases. | 1 | 3 |
State v. Nishinagreen2 sentences2021The application of exigent circumstances "demands a fact-sensitive, objective analysis." State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 517 (2003); see also State v. DeLuca, 168 N.J. 626, 632 (2001) (finding that application of the exigent- circumstances exception demands a fact sensitive, objective analysis); Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 , 402 (2014) (finding that the exigent circumstances analysis is necessarily case-by-case and fact sensitive). 2021The application of exigent circumstances "demands a fact-sensitive, objective analysis." State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 517 (2003); see also State v. DeLuca, 168 N.J. 626, 632 (2001) (finding that application of the exigent- circumstances exception demands a fact sensitive, objective analysis); Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 , 402 (2014) (finding that the exigent circumstances analysis is necessarily case-by-case and fact sensitive). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Bruzzesegreen2 sentences2021Consequently, the application of the exigent circumstances exception demands a "fact-sensitive, objective analysis." Johnson, 193 N.J. at 552 (citing State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210, 219 (1983)). 1994United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43 , 96 S.Ct. 2406, 2409 , 49 L.Ed. 2d 300, 305 (1976) (the potential destruction of evidence); State v. Bruzzese, supra, 94 N.J. at 218 , 463 A. 2d 320 ; State v. Valencia, 93 N.J. 126, 136 , 459 A. 2d 1149 (1983) ("To sustain a warrantless search, the State must ordinarily demonstrate that exigent circumstances prevented obtaining a written warrant and that probable cause for the search existed.") The State claims that the outstanding warrant against Collier, along with the flight of Collier and defendant into a known drug location, met the exigent c | 1 | 2 |
State v. Frankelgreen2 sentences2019One principal exception to the warrant requirement, as applied to the search of a home, is the exigent circumstances doctrine. “[I]f police officers ‘possess an objectively reasonable basis to believe’ that prompt action is needed to meet an imminent danger, then neither the Fourth Amendment nor Article I, Paragraph 7 demand that the officers ‘delay potential lifesaving measures while critical and precious time is expended 16 obtaining a warrant.’” Edmonds, 211 N.J. at 133 (quoting Frankel, 179 N.J. at 599 ). 2015One such exception to the warrant requirement is the exigent-circumstances doctrine, State v. Cassidy, 179 N.J. 150, 160 , 843 A.2d 1132 (2004), and another is the emergency-aid doctrine, Frankel, supra, 179 N.J. at 598, 847 A.2d 561 . | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Santanagreen2 sentences1994United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43 , 96 S.Ct. 2406, 2409 , 49 L.Ed. 2d 300, 305 (1976) (the potential destruction of evidence); State v. Bruzzese, supra, 94 N.J. at 218 , 463 A. 2d 320 ; State v. Valencia, 93 N.J. 126, 136 , 459 A. 2d 1149 (1983) ("To sustain a warrantless search, the State must ordinarily demonstrate that exigent circumstances prevented obtaining a written warrant and that probable cause for the search existed.") The State claims that the outstanding warrant against Collier, along with the flight of Collier and defendant into a known drug location, met the exigent c 1994United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43 , 96 S.Ct. 2406, 2409 , 49 L.Ed. 2d 300, 305 (1976) (the potential destruction of evidence); State v. Bruzzese, supra, 94 N.J. at 218 , 463 A. 2d 320 ; State v. Valencia, 93 N.J. 126, 136 , 459 A. 2d 1149 (1983) ("To sustain a warrantless search, the State must ordinarily demonstrate that exigent circumstances prevented obtaining a written warrant and that probable cause for the search existed.") The State claims that the outstanding warrant against Collier, along with the flight of Collier and defendant into a known drug location, met the exigent c | 1 | 2 |
| Michigan v. Tylergreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Zalcberggreen | 1 | 1 |
| McDonald v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Wilsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Laboogreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Timothy Adkins (073803)green | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Alvarezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Browngreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Antoine D. Watts(074556)green | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Myersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Illinois v. McArthurgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Tischiogreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Speidgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Coffin v. Jacksongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Mottagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2024Generally, when the State invokes the exigent- circumstances exception to justify a warrantless search [or seizure], it must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the search was premised on probable cause and (2) law enforcement acted in an objectively reasonable manner to meet an exigency that did not permit time to secure a warrant. [Manning, 240 N.J. at 333.] A-1860-21 19 In Johnson, the Court identified factors to consider when determining whether law enforcement faced exigent circumstances, including "the urgency of the situation, the time it will take to secure a warrant, the 2021Consequently, the application of the exigent circumstances exception demands a "fact-sensitive, objective analysis." Johnson, 193 N.J. at 552 (citing State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210, 219 (1983)). | 5 | 2015–2024 |
State v. Walker
green
2 sentences2022Instead, the court applied the doctrine of exigent circumstances, citing State v. Walker, 213 N.J. 281 (2013), to support denial of the motion. 2017To satisfy the exigent circumstances exception, the State must establish that the “exigent circumstances were not police-created.” Walker, supra, 213 N.J. at 295 , 62 A.3d 897 . | 3 | 2017–2022 |
State v. Alston
green
2 sentences2024In Witt, our Supreme Court abandoned the exigent-circumstances standard for warrantless searches of automobiles set forth in State v. Cooke, 163 N.J. 657 (2000), and State v. Pena-Flores, 198 N.J. 6 (2009), in favor of returning to the exigency test established in State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211 (1981). 223 N.J. at 450 . 2015Citing Article I, Paragraph 7 of New Jersey’s State Constitution, the Court returns to the standard articulated in State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211 (1981), for warrantless searches of automobiles based on probable cause: The automobile exception authorizes the warrantless search of an automobile only when the police have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of an offense and the circumstances giving rise to probable cause are unforeseeable and spontaneous. 1. | 2 | 2015–2024 |
Welsh v. Wisconsin
green
2 sentences1989The Court noted: Moreover, although no exigency is created simply because there is probable cause to believe that a serious crime has been committed, see Payton, application of the exigent-circumstances exception in the context of a home entry should rarely be sanctioned when there is probable cause to believe that only a minor offense, such as the kind at issue in this case, has been committed. [Id. at 753, 104 S.Ct. at 2099 , 80 L.Ed.2d at 745 .] The State’s concession before the Appellate Division that Officer Liss lacked probable cause, when he entered the house, to believe that Bolte was 1989The Court itself has acknowledged that it has "[left] to the lower courts the initial application of the exigent circumstances exception." Welsh v. Wisconsin, supra, 466 U.S. at 749 , 104 S.Ct. at 2097 , 80 L.Ed.2d at 743 . 5 Although the court in Warden did not then refer to it as such, the Supreme Court subsequently in Santana considered Warden a “hot pursuit" case. | 2 | 1989–2018 |
In the Matter of Brady
green
2 sentences2015Pena-Flores, supra, 198 N.J. at 30 , 965 A.2d 114 (quoting State v. Johnson, 193 N.J. 528 , 556 n. 7, 940 A.2d 1185 (2008)). 2009To inform the exigent-circumstances analysis in an automobile-stop case, which it applied in Pena-Flores and Fuller, the majority set forth a number of factors to be considered, such as the time of day; the location of the stop; the nature of the neighborhood; the unfolding of the events establishing probable cause; the ratio of officers to suspects; the existence of confederates who know the location of the car and could remove it or its contents; whether the arrest was observed by passersby who could tamper with the car or its contents; whether it would be safe to leave the car unguarded and | 2 | 2009–2015 |
Johnson v. New York
green
2 sentences2001See State v. Scott, 231 N.J.Super. 258, 274-75 , 555 A.2d 667 (App.Div.1989) (Ashbey, J., concurring and dissenting), rev’d, 118 N.J. 406 , 571 A.2d 1304 (1990); United States v. Barone, 330 F.2d 543, 545 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1004 , 84 S.Ct. 1940 , 12 L.Ed.2d 1053 (1964). 2001See State v. Scott, 231 N.J.Super. 258, 274-75 , 555 A. 2d 667 (App.Div.1989) (Ashbey, J., concurring and dissenting), rev'd, 118 N.J. 406 , 571 A. 2d 1304 (1990); United States v. Barone, 330 F. 2d 543, 545 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1004 , 84 S.Ct. 1940 , 12 L.Ed. 2d 1053 (1964). | 2 | 2001–2001 |
| State v. Lewis green | 2 | 1990–1992 |
| Harold B. Dorman v. United States green | 2 | 1989–1989 |
| Carroll v. United States green | 2 | 1978–1988 |
| State v. Cooke red | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| United States v. Edwards green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| State v. Gary Lunsford (075691) green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| State v. Dunlap green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Penalber green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Josey green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| In re Beckerman green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. DeLane green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Onque green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State of New Jersey v. Robert L. Evans green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Robertson v. Jones green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Americana Corp. v. State Highway & Transportation Commissioner green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Georgetown University v. Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown University Law Center green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State of New Jersey v. William L. Witt green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Kramer v. Hopper green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Johnson v. United States green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Gamble v. Hess green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Flippo v. West Virginia green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| State v. Wright green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Clarke v. Dave's Long Bar, Inc. neutral | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| State v. Bolte green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| State v. Miller green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| State v. Hannah green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Payton v. New York green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.