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35 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1975–2022 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Corneaugreen2 sentences2001It is also the same definition set forth by this Court in State v. Corneau, 109 N.M. 81, 89 , 781 P.2d 1159, 1167 (Ct.App. 1989), defining exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless search of an apartment. {14} In Gomez, our Supreme Court therefore extended to persons in automobiles the same search and seizure protections under Article II, Section 10, of the New Mexico Constitution that apply to dwellings with regard to the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. 2001It is also the same definition set forth by this Court in State v. Corneau, 109 N.M. 81, 89 , 781 P.2d 1159, 1167 (Ct.App. 1989), defining exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless search of an apartment. {14} In Gomez, our Supreme Court therefore extended to persons in automobiles the same search and seizure protections under Article II, Section 10, of the New Mexico Constitution that apply to dwellings with regard to the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. | 5 | 5 |
State v. Gomezgreen2 sentences2009See Gomez, 16 1997-NMSC-006, ¶¶ 8, 41-42 ; cf. Bomboy, 2008-NMSC-029, ¶ 2 (concluding that the 17 warrantless seizure of contraband evidence in plain view inside an automobile is 18 justified by the exigent circumstances exception). 2007The Test for Exigent Circumstances {18} To prove that a search is justified under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, there must exist “an emergency situation requiring swift action to prevent imminent danger to life or serious damage to property, or to forestall the imminent escape of a suspect or destruction of evidence.” State v. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶39 , 122 N.M. 777 , 932 P.2d 1 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[A] warrantless search of an automobile and its contents requires a particularized showing of exigent circumstances.” Id. | 4 | 7 |
State v. Rowellgreen2 sentences2016See State v. Leticia T., 2014-NMSC-020, ¶ 12 , 329 P.3d 636 (“A warrantless entry into a vehicle under the exigent circumstances exception requires probable cause plus exigent circumstances.”); State v. Rowell, 2008-NMSC-041, ¶¶ 26, 31 , 144 N.M. 371 , 188 P.3d 95 (recognizing that warrants are favored and a warrant is required to enter the vehicle unless a recognized exception to the warrant requirement can be proven); State v. Garcia, 2005-NMSC-017, ¶ 29 , 138 N.M. 1 , 116 P.3d 72 (“However, even with an object in plain view, an officer may not enter the car and seize the object, without eit 2016See State v. Leticia T., 2014-NMSC-020, ¶ 12 , 329 P.3d 636 (“A warrantless entry into a vehicle under the exigent circumstances exception requires probable cause plus exigent circumstances.”); State v. Rowell, 2008-NMSC-041, ¶¶ 26, 31 , 144 N.M. 371 , 188 P.3d 95 (recognizing that warrants are favored and a warrant is required to enter the vehicle unless a recognized exception to the warrant requirement can be proven); State v. Garcia, 2005-NMSC-017, ¶ 29 , 138 N.M. 1 , 116 P.3d 72 (“However, even with an object in plain view, an officer may not enter the car and seize the object, without eit | 3 | 5 |
State v. Bomboygreen2 sentences2009Cf. 12 Bomboy, 2008-NMSC-029, ¶ 17 (recognizing that “if following a lawful stop on a 13 roadway, an item in an automobile is in plain view and the officer has probable cause 14 to believe the item is evidence of a crime, the officer may seize the item,” as such 15 action is consistent with the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant 16 requirement) (emphasis added); State v. Rowell, 2008-NMSC-041, ¶¶ 33-34 , 144 17 N.M. 371 , 188 P.3d 95 (holding that the exigencies of the circumstances justified the 18 warrantless weapons search of the defendant’s vehicle when the handcuffed and 19 ar 2009See Gomez, 16 1997-NMSC-006, ¶¶ 8, 41-42 ; cf. Bomboy, 2008-NMSC-029, ¶ 2 (concluding that the 17 warrantless seizure of contraband evidence in plain view inside an automobile is 18 justified by the exigent circumstances exception). | 2 | 4 |
State v. Ruffinogreen2 sentences2014See State v. Ruffino, 1980NMSC-072, ¶ 3, 94 N.M. 500 , 612 P.2d 1311 . 2014See State v. Ruffino, 1980NMSC-072, ¶ 3, 94 N.M. 500 , 612 P.2d 1311 . | 2 | 3 |
Birchfield v. N. Dakota. William Robert Bernardgreen2 sentences2017Nothing prevents the police from seeking a warrant for a blood test when there is sufficient time to do so in the particular circumstances or from relying on the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement when there is not. 136 S.Ct. at 2184 (citation omitted). 2017Nothing prevents the police from seeking a warrant for a blood test when there is sufficient time to do so in the particular circumstances or from relying on the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement when there is not. 136 S. Ct. at 2184 (citation omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Missouri v. McNeelygreen2 sentences2017See Schmerber v. California , 384 U.S. 757 , 771-72, 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (concluding under the circumstances of that case that a warrantless blood alcohol test (BAT) was justified under the exigent circumstances exception and therefore not an unreasonable search); see also McNeely , 133 S.Ct. at 1557 (clarifying Schmerber and holding that the exigency exception for warrantless blood testing must be applied on a case-by-case basis, reasoning that the natural metabolism and thus dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not, by itself, justify a per se rule); cf. Neville , 2017See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771-72 (1966) (concluding under the circumstances of that case that a warrantless blood alcohol test (BAT) was justified under the exigent circumstances exception and therefore not an unreasonable search); see also McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1557 (clarifying Schmerber and holding that the exigency exception for warrantless blood testing must be applied on a case- by-case basis, reasoning that the natural metabolism and thus dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not, by itself, justify a per se rule); cf. Neville, 459 U.S. at 559 (answering in the | 2 | 2 |
Schmerber v. Californiagreen2 sentences2017See Schmerber v. California , 384 U.S. 757 , 771-72, 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (concluding under the circumstances of that case that a warrantless blood alcohol test (BAT) was justified under the exigent circumstances exception and therefore not an unreasonable search); see also McNeely , 133 S.Ct. at 1557 (clarifying Schmerber and holding that the exigency exception for warrantless blood testing must be applied on a case-by-case basis, reasoning that the natural metabolism and thus dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not, by itself, justify a per se rule); cf. Neville , 2017See Schmerber v. California , 384 U.S. 757 , 771-72, 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (concluding under the circumstances of that case that a warrantless blood alcohol test (BAT) was justified under the exigent circumstances exception and therefore not an unreasonable search); see also McNeely , 133 S.Ct. at 1557 (clarifying Schmerber and holding that the exigency exception for warrantless blood testing must be applied on a case-by-case basis, reasoning that the natural metabolism and thus dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not, by itself, justify a per se rule); cf. Neville , | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Johnsonyellow2 sentences2017Thus, the United States Supreme Court appears to have foreclosed any argument that a warrantless blood test for a drug other than alcohol, such as marijuana, can be justified under the search incident to arrest exception. {30} The State argues that Birchfield 's holding should not be applied retroactively, but the rule is to the contrary. "[A] new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final [.]" Griffith v. Kentucky , 479 U.S. 314 , 328, 107 S.Ct. 708 , 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987) (eliminating 2017Thus, the United States Supreme Court appears to have foreclosed any argument that a warrantless blood test for a drug other than alcohol, such as marijuana, can be justified under the search incident to arrest exception. {30} The State argues that Birchfield 's holding should not be applied retroactively, but the rule is to the contrary. "[A] new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final [.]" Griffith v. Kentucky , 479 U.S. 314 , 328, 107 S.Ct. 708 , 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987) (eliminating | 2 | 2 |
State v. Weidnergreen2 sentences2014See State v. Weidner, 2007-NMCA-063, ¶ 6 , 141 N.M. 582 , 158 P.3d 1025 . “[T]he State bears the burden of proving reasonableness.” Rowell, 2008-NMSC-041, ¶ 10 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). {12} A warrantless entry into a vehicle under the exigent circumstances exception requires probable cause plus exigent circumstances. 2014See State v. Weidner, 2007-NMCA-063, ¶ 6 , 141 N.M. 582 , 158 P.3d 1025 . “[T]he State bears the burden of proving reasonableness.” Rowell, 2008-NMSC-041, ¶ 10 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). {12} A warrantless entry into a vehicle under the exigent circumstances exception requires probable cause plus exigent circumstances. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2013See id. ¶¶ 9, 11 (holding that a ten-to-twenty-second wait was sufficient to support an inference that admission was being denied based on the fact that “a small space” was involved, the police heard movement inside, and the defendant made no verbal response); State v. Johnson, 2006-NMSC-049, ¶¶ 12-17 , 140 N.M. 653 , 146 P.3d 298 (holding that a ten-second wait was reasonable to infer constructive refusal based on the small size of the hotel room and the fact that the defendant did not respond in any way); see also Gonzales, 2010-NMCA-023, ¶¶ 3, 16 (holding that an eight-second wait was too s 2013See id. ¶¶ 9, 11 (holding that a ten-to-twenty-second wait was sufficient to support an inference that admission was being denied based on the fact that “a small space” was involved, the police heard movement inside, and the defendant made no verbal response); State v. Johnson, 2006-NMSC-049, ¶¶ 12-17 , 140 N.M. 653 , 146 P.3d 298 (holding that a ten-second wait was reasonable to infer constructive refusal based on the small size of the hotel room and the fact that the defendant did not respond in any way); see also Gonzales, 2010-NMCA-023, ¶¶ 3, 16 (holding that an eight-second wait was too s | 2 | 2 |
State v. Ryongreen2 sentences2007See Ryon, 2005-NMSC-005 , ¶ 26 n. 4, 137 N.M. 174 , 108 P.3d 1032 (explaining that both the emergency assistance doctrine and the exigent circumstances exception “require a compelling and immediate need for police to take swift action to prevent imminent danger to life or serious injury which exceeds an individual’s privacy expectation in the home”). 2007See Ryon, 2005-NMSC-005 , ¶ 26 n. 4, 137 N.M. 174 , 108 P.3d 1032 (explaining that both the emergency assistance doctrine and the exigent circumstances exception “require a compelling and immediate need for police to take swift action to prevent imminent danger to life or serious injury which exceeds an individual’s privacy expectation in the home”). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Arredondogreen2 sentences2007“We believe that a limited vehicle search for weapons when an officer reasonably believes he may be in danger comports with Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution provided that it is based upon a particularized showing of exigent circumstances, rather than purely on the theoretical basis that harm could occur.” State v. Arredondo, 1997-NMCA-081, ¶ 17 , 123 N.M. 628 , 944 P.2d 276 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), overruled on other grounds by State v. Steinzig, 1999-NMCA-107 , 127 N.M. 752 , 987 P.2d 409 . 2007“We believe that a limited vehicle search for weapons when an officer reasonably believes he may be in danger comports with Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution provided that it is based upon a particularized showing of exigent circumstances, rather than purely on the theoretical basis that harm could occur.” State v. Arredondo, 1997-NMCA-081, ¶ 17 , 123 N.M. 628 , 944 P.2d 276 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), overruled on other grounds by State v. Steinzig, 1999-NMCA-107 , 127 N.M. 752 , 987 P.2d 409 . | 2 | 2 |
State v. Trudellegreen2 sentences2022“Whether the district court correctly determined that an exigency existed is a mixed question of fact and law that we review de novo.” Id. {9} The district court found that (1) the officer “could smell the strong odor of burning marijuana coming from the residence”; (2) when asked, “Defendant stated that he was 1After denying Defendant’s motion, the district court invited Defendant to file a renewed motion to suppress to develop testimony about the subjective intent of the officers for the primary purpose of the search under the emergency aid doctrine to Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexic 2022“A warrantless entry into a residence under the exigent circumstances rule requires probable cause plus exigent circumstances.” Trudelle, 2007-NMCA-066, ¶ 28 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). | 1 | 2 |
State v. McCumbergreen2 sentences2017Thus, the United States Supreme Court appears to have foreclosed any argument that a warrantless blood test for a drug other than alcohol, such as marijuana, can be justified under the search incident to arrest exception. {30} The State argues that Birchfield 's holding should not be applied retroactively, but the rule is to the contrary. "[A] new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final [.]" Griffith v. Kentucky , 479 U.S. 314 , 328, 107 S.Ct. 708 , 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987) (eliminating 2017Thus, the United States Supreme Court appears to have foreclosed any argument that a warrantless blood test for a drug other than alcohol, such as marijuana, can be justified under the search incident to arrest exception. {30} The State argues that Birchfield 's holding should not be applied retroactively, but the rule is to the contrary. "[A] new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final [.]" Griffith v. Kentucky , 479 U.S. 314 , 328, 107 S.Ct. 708 , 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987) (eliminating | 1 | 2 |
Griffith v. Kentuckygreen2 sentences2017Thus, the United States Supreme Court appears to have foreclosed any argument that a warrantless blood test for a drug other than alcohol, such as marijuana, can be justified under the search incident to arrest exception. {30} The State argues that Birchfield 's holding should not be applied retroactively, but the rule is to the contrary. "[A] new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final [.]" Griffith v. Kentucky , 479 U.S. 314 , 328, 107 S.Ct. 708 , 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987) (eliminating 2017Thus, the United States Supreme Court appears to have foreclosed any argument that a warrantless blood test for a drug other than alcohol, such as marijuana, can be justified under the search incident to arrest exception. {30} The State argues that Birchfield 's holding should not be applied retroactively, but the rule is to the contrary. "[A] new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final [.]" Griffith v. Kentucky , 479 U.S. 314 , 328, 107 S.Ct. 708 , 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987) (eliminating | 1 | 2 |
South Dakota v. Nevillegreen2 sentences2017See Schmerber v. California , 384 U.S. 757 , 771-72, 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (concluding under the circumstances of that case that a warrantless blood alcohol test (BAT) was justified under the exigent circumstances exception and therefore not an unreasonable search); see also McNeely , 133 S.Ct. at 1557 (clarifying Schmerber and holding that the exigency exception for warrantless blood testing must be applied on a case-by-case basis, reasoning that the natural metabolism and thus dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not, by itself, justify a per se rule); cf. Neville , 2017See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771-72 (1966) (concluding under the circumstances of that case that a warrantless blood alcohol test (BAT) was justified under the exigent circumstances exception and therefore not an unreasonable search); see also McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1557 (clarifying Schmerber and holding that the exigency exception for warrantless blood testing must be applied on a case- by-case basis, reasoning that the natural metabolism and thus dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not, by itself, justify a per se rule); cf. Neville, 459 U.S. at 559 (answering in the | 1 | 2 |
City of Santa Fe v. Martinezgreen2 sentences2016See 14 Martinez, 2010-NMSC-033, ¶ 14 (clarifying that “law enforcement officers 15 conducting DWI investigations . . . [would] be subjected to the constitutional 16 probable cause inquiry of felony warrantless arrests”); Rowell, 2008-NMSC-041 , ¶¶ 17 26, 31; Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶¶ 36-40 . 2016See Martinez, 2010-NMSC-033, ¶ 14 (clarifying that “law enforcement officers conducting DWI investigations . . . [would] be subjected to the constitutional probable cause inquiry of felony warrantless arrests”); Rowell, 2008-NMSC-041, ¶¶ 26, 31 ; Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶¶ 36-40 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Leticia T.green2 sentences2016See State v. Leticia 3 T., 2014-NMSC-020, ¶ 12 , 329 P.3d 636 (“A warrantless entry into a vehicle under 4 the exigent circumstances exception requires probable cause plus exigent 5 circumstances.”); State v. Rowell, 2008-NMSC-041, ¶¶ 26, 31 , 144 N.M. 371 , 188 6 P.3d 95 (recognizing that warrants are favored and a warrant is required to enter the 7 vehicle unless a recognized exception to the warrant requirement can be proven); 8 State v. Garcia, 2005-NMSC-017, ¶ 29 , 138 N.M. 1 , 116 P.3d 72 (“However, even 9 with an object in plain view, an officer may not enter the car and seize the objec 2016See State v. Leticia T., 2014-NMSC-020, ¶ 12 , 329 P.3d 636 (“A warrantless entry into a vehicle under the exigent circumstances exception requires probable cause plus exigent circumstances.”); State v. Rowell, 2008-NMSC-041, ¶¶ 26, 31 , 144 N.M. 371 , 188 P.3d 95 (recognizing that warrants are favored and a warrant is required to enter the vehicle unless a recognized exception to the warrant requirement can be proven); State v. Garcia, 2005-NMSC-017, ¶ 29 , 138 N.M. 1 , 116 P.3d 72 (“However, even with an object in plain view, an officer may not enter the car and seize the object, without eit | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Ochoagreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Banksgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Gonzalesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hudson v. Michigangreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Cohengreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Lopezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sheryl J. Howard v. Jan Dickerson, and Charles Milton, Keith Purduegreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Johnsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Raygreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Davisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Abdi A. Sheik-Abdi v. Martin E. McClellangreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Copelandgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Ashegreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Levone Ray Maden John Paul Wilbon Geneva Gallegos, Also Known as Leann Raelgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Nance
green
2 sentences2013State v. Nance, 2011-NMCA-048, ¶ 12 , 149 N.M. 644 , 253 P.3d 934 , cert. denied, 2011-NMCERT-004 , 150 N.M. 648 , 364 P.3d 1171 . 2013State v. Nance, 2011-NMCA-048, ¶ 12 , 149 N.M. 644 , 253 P.3d 934 , cert. denied, 2011-NMCERT-004 , 150 N.M. 648 , 364 P.3d 1171 . | 2 | 2012–2013 |
State v. Nance
neutral
2 sentences2013State v. Nance, 2011-NMCA-048, ¶ 12 , 149 N.M. 644 , 253 P.3d 934 , cert. denied, 2011-NMCERT-004 , 150 N.M. 648 , 364 P.3d 1171 . 2012State v. Nance, 2011-NMCA-048, ¶ 12 , 149 N.M. 644 , 253 P.3d 934 , cert. denied, 2011-NMCERT-004 , 150 N.M. 648 , 364 P.3d 1171 . | 2 | 2012–2013 |
Welsh v. Wisconsin
green
2 sentences2011DWI Is Not a Minor Offense {13} In coming to its conclusion that there were no exigent circumstances and thus a warrant was required, the district court relied primarily on Howard, 34 F.3d at 982 (articulating that the warrantless arrest in a person’s home for a minor traffic violation was an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Anendment), and Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753 , 104 S.Ct. 2091 (stating that the exigent circumstances exception in the context of a home entry “should rarely be sanctioned when there is probable cause to believe that only a minor offense ... has been committed”). {14} In Ho 2011DWI Is Not a Minor Offense {13} In coming to its conclusion that there were no exigent circumstances and thus a warrant was required, the district court relied primarily on Howard, 34 F.3d at 982 (articulating that the warrantless arrest in a person’s home for a minor traffic violation was an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Anendment), and Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753 , 104 S.Ct. 2091 (stating that the exigent circumstances exception in the context of a home entry “should rarely be sanctioned when there is probable cause to believe that only a minor offense ... has been committed”). {14} In Ho | 2 | 1998–2011 |
State v. Trudelle
green
2 sentences2010Id. ¶ 12. {16} Similarly, in State v. Trudelle, 2007-NMCA-066, ¶¶ 31-32 , 142 N.M. 18 , 162 P.3d 173 , we held that exigent circumstances did not justify the search of a home where the only articulable fact used to justify the search was a chemical odor coming from the home. 2010“A warrantless entry into a residence under the exigent circumstances rule requires probable cause plus exigent circumstances.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). | 2 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Valdez
green
2 sentences2007Exigent Circumstances {28} “A warrantless entry into a residence under the exigent circumstances rule requires probable cause plus exigent circumstances.” Valdez, 111 N.M. at 441 , 806 P.2d at 581 . 2007Exigent Circumstances {28} “A warrantless entry into a residence under the exigent circumstances rule requires probable cause plus exigent circumstances.” Valdez, 111 N.M. at 441 , 806 P.2d at 581 . | 2 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Steinzig
green
2 sentences2007“We believe that a limited vehicle search for weapons when an officer reasonably believes he may be in danger comports with Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution provided that it is based upon a particularized showing of exigent circumstances, rather than purely on the theoretical basis that harm could occur.” State v. Arredondo, 1997-NMCA-081, ¶ 17 , 123 N.M. 628 , 944 P.2d 276 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), overruled on other grounds by State v. Steinzig, 1999-NMCA-107 , 127 N.M. 752 , 987 P.2d 409 . 2007“We believe that a limited vehicle search for weapons when an officer reasonably believes he may be in danger comports with Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution provided that it is based upon a particularized showing of exigent circumstances, rather than purely on the theoretical basis that harm could occur.” State v. Arredondo, 1997-NMCA-081, ¶ 17 , 123 N.M. 628 , 944 P.2d 276 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), overruled on other grounds by State v. Steinzig, 1999-NMCA-107 , 127 N.M. 752 , 987 P.2d 409 . | 2 | 2007–2007 |
Mitchell v. Wisconsin
green
2 sentences2022Id. at 2534 . 2022Id. {4} The Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the warrantless blood draw under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Marshall v. Columbia Lea Regional Hospital
green
1 sentence2018First, McNeely did not establish a new right of which Defendant may not have been aware, thus arguably making it unfair to make him stand suit and potentially hold 23 1 importantly, the law, specifically and under facts similar to those present here, was 2 clearly established as of at least 2003, when Marshall I—an on-point Tenth Circuit 3 case—was decided, and certainly no later than 2007, when Marshall v. Columbia 4 Regional Hospital (Marshall II), 474 F.3d 733 (10th Cir. 2007), was decided and 5 expressly held the specific right here at issue to be clearly established. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Garcia
green
2 sentences2016See State v. Leticia T., 2014-NMSC-020, ¶ 12 , 329 P.3d 636 (“A warrantless entry into a vehicle under the exigent circumstances exception requires probable cause plus exigent circumstances.”); State v. Rowell, 2008-NMSC-041, ¶¶ 26, 31 , 144 N.M. 371 , 188 P.3d 95 (recognizing that warrants are favored and a warrant is required to enter the vehicle unless a recognized exception to the warrant requirement can be proven); State v. Garcia, 2005-NMSC-017, ¶ 29 , 138 N.M. 1 , 116 P.3d 72 (“However, even with an object in plain view, an officer may not enter the car and seize the object, without eit 2016See State v. Leticia T., 2014-NMSC-020, ¶ 12 , 329 P.3d 636 (“A warrantless entry into a vehicle under the exigent circumstances exception requires probable cause plus exigent circumstances.”); State v. Rowell, 2008-NMSC-041, ¶¶ 26, 31 , 144 N.M. 371 , 188 P.3d 95 (recognizing that warrants are favored and a warrant is required to enter the vehicle unless a recognized exception to the warrant requirement can be proven); State v. Garcia, 2005-NMSC-017, ¶ 29 , 138 N.M. 1 , 116 P.3d 72 (“However, even with an object in plain view, an officer may not enter the car and seize the object, without eit | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Campos v. State
green
2 sentences2015The officers then entered the room without consent. [RP 72] The district 3 court determined that the concern for safety of the female in the room justified the 4 warrantless entry under the exigent circumstances exception. [RP 72] 5 {4} Exigent circumstances have been defined as “an emergency situation requiring 6 swift action to prevent imminent danger to life or serious damage to property, or to 7 forestall the imminent escape of a suspect or destruction of evidence.” Campos v. 8 State, 1994-NMSC-012 , ¶ 11, 117 N.M. 155 , 870 P.2d 117 (internal quotation marks 9 and citation omitted); see C 2015The officers then entered the room without consent. [RP 72] The district 3 court determined that the concern for safety of the female in the room justified the 4 warrantless entry under the exigent circumstances exception. [RP 72] 5 {4} Exigent circumstances have been defined as “an emergency situation requiring 6 swift action to prevent imminent danger to life or serious damage to property, or to 7 forestall the imminent escape of a suspect or destruction of evidence.” Campos v. 8 State, 1994-NMSC-012 , ¶ 11, 117 N.M. 155 , 870 P.2d 117 (internal quotation marks 9 and citation omitted); see C | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Chavez v. Board of County Commissioners
green
2 sentences2015Comm'rs, 2001-NMCA-065, ¶ 17 , 10 130 N.M. 753 , 31 P.3d 1027 (observing that law enforcement officers may not make 11 a warrantless entry into a residence unless “exigent circumstances have been shown 12 indicating that immediate action is necessary to prevent imminent danger to life or 13 serious damage to property, to forestall the imminent escape of a suspect, or to prevent 14 the destruction of evidence” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 2015Comm'rs, 2001-NMCA-065, ¶ 17 , 10 130 N.M. 753 , 31 P.3d 1027 (observing that law enforcement officers may not make 11 a warrantless entry into a residence unless “exigent circumstances have been shown 12 indicating that immediate action is necessary to prevent imminent danger to life or 13 serious damage to property, to forestall the imminent escape of a suspect, or to prevent 14 the destruction of evidence” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. Moore green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Acequia Madre v. Meyer neutral | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| United States v. Sharpe green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| State v. TYWAYNE H. green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| United States v. Francisco Sangineto-Miranda, (87-5667) Luray Betts, (87-5668) Enrique Vargas, (87-5711) & Benjamin Nelson, (87-5712) green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| State v. Attaway green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| State v. Calloway green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| State v. Attaway green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| United States v. Paul Vernon Case, Gilbert Steele Sagaser and Frances Delores Sagaser green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| United States v. Barrow green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.