exigent circumstances exception in Texas

2012See Gutierrez, 221 S.W.3d at 686-87 (holding that "full-blown" search of house not authorized by exigency created when police observed drugs while retrieving stolen laptop from defendant's home, noting that the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement "does not grant the police the unfettered discretion to take any course of action, however disproportionate it may be to the perceived exigency").

2012See Gutierrez, 221 S.W.3d at 686-87 (holding that “full-blown” search of house not authorized by exigency created when police observed drugs while retrieving stolen laptop from defendant’s home, noting that the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement “does not grant the police the unfettered discretion to take any course of action, however disproportionate it may be to the perceived exigency”).

2023The exigent-circumstances exception applies when “the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” 18 The exception enables law enforcement officers to handle emergencies—situations presenting a “compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant.” 19 Under this exception, law enforcement may be justified in conducting a warrantless search “to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence.” 20 Whether law enforcement faced an emergency that justified acting without

2023The exigent-circumstances exception applies when “the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” 18 The exception enables law enforcement officers to handle emergencies—situations presenting a “compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant.” 19 Under this exception, law enforcement may be justified in conducting a warrantless search “to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence.” 20 Whether law enforcement faced an emergency that justified acting without

2016While the exigent circumstances doctrine applies to the police in their crime-fighting role, the emergency doctrine applies when a state actor is acting to “protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury.” Laney v. State, 117 S.W.3d 854, 861 (Tex. Crim.

2015As this Court has long held, a reviewing court uses an objective standard of reasonableness in determining whether a warrantless search is justified.76 It applied that test when addressing the emergency doctrine, and the emergency doctrine is “considered synonymous with the exigent circumstances doctrine.”77 The exigent circumstances doctrine applies when police act in a “crime-fighting” role, whereas the emergency doctrine occurs when police act in their limited caretaking role to protect and preserve 74 Oliver, slip op. at 4, 7 n. 5. 75 Id. at 5-7. 76 See Brimage, 918 S.W.2d at 501 (citing G

2023The exigent-circumstances exception applies when “the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” 18 The exception enables law enforcement officers to handle emergencies—situations presenting a “compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant.” 19 Under this exception, law enforcement may be justified in conducting a warrantless search “to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence.” 20 Whether law enforcement faced an emergency that justified acting without

2023Relying on Turrubiate, the court of appeals required a showing of some affirmative conduct by Appellant indicating a danger of imminent destruction of the Snapchat videos. 32 Finding that the record did not “contain any evidence showing that Appellant, by his affirmative conduct, was actively deleting evidence on his phone[,]” the court of appeals concluded that the warrantless seizure did not fall within the exigent-circumstances exception. 33 However, we agree with the dissent below that, in the context of a warrantless search or seizure pursuant 30 Id. at 701 ; see also Riley, 573 U.S. at 4

2015App. 2003) (citing Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 218 (1981) (noting that “‘hot pursuit’ cases fall within the exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement”)); see also Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 , 752–53 (1984) (noting that “an important factor to be considered when determining whether any exigency exists is the gravity of the underlying offense for which the arrest is being made,” that most courts “have refused to permit warrantless home arrests for nonfelonious crimes,” and that “it is difficult to conceive of a warrantless home arrest that would not be unreaso

2003"The exigent circumstances doctrine applies when the police are acting in their `crime-fighting' role." Naumann, supra, at 331; see Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748-50 , 104 S.Ct. 2091 , 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984).

2016App. 1991)). 18 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770 . 10 necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened ‘the destruction of evidence.’”19 In Schmerber, a DWI case, the Supreme Court concluded that there were exigent circumstances sufficient to justify a warrantless blood draw “where time had to be taken to bring the accused to a hospital and to investigate the scene of the accident.”20 “Whether law enforcement faced an emergency that justifies acting without a warrant calls for a case-by-case determination based on the totality of circumstances.”21 “An exigent circumstances analysis

2015Supreme Court Authority on Blood Draws In Schmerber v. California, the United States Supreme Court upheld a warrantless blood draw in a DUI case under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. 384 U.S. 757, 770 , 86 S. Ct. 1826, 1836 (1966).

2023Igboji — 8 The Appeal On appeal, Appellant’s sole argument was that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the evidence obtained following the warrantless seizure of his cell phone. 2 The court of appeals agreed, concluding that Detective Ramirez's warrantless seizure of Appellant's phone did not fall within the exigent-circumstances exception. 3 In reaching this conclusion, the court of appeals cited our opinion in Turrubiate v. State for the proposition that the exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement requires “proof of imminent destruction based on affirm

2023Relying on Turrubiate, the court of appeals required a showing of some affirmative conduct by Appellant indicating a danger of imminent destruction of the Snapchat videos. 32 Finding that the record did not “contain any evidence showing that Appellant, by his affirmative conduct, was actively deleting evidence on his phone[,]” the court of appeals concluded that the warrantless seizure did not fall within the exigent-circumstances exception. 33 However, we agree with the dissent below that, in the context of a warrantless search or seizure pursuant 30 Id. at 701 ; see also Riley, 573 U.S. at 4

2015We agree with Dounds v. State that “in order to establish a plausible justification for an exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, the State had the burden to show facts and circumstances beyond the passage of time and the resulting dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream.” 434 S.W.3d 842, 851 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. granted).

2015That factor “will no doubt vary depending upon the circumstances in the case.” Id. “[I]n order to establish a plausible justification for an exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, the State ha[s] the burden to show facts and circumstances beyond the passage of time and the resulting dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream.” Douds, 434 S.W.3d at 851 . –20– The trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law in this case do not specifically address preservation of “the opportunity to obtain reliable evidence.” See McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1568 .

2013“Where there are exigent circumstances in which police action literally must be ‘now or never’ to preserve the evidence of the crime, it is reasonable to permit action without prior judicial evaluation.” Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 505 (1973).

2012The United States Supreme Court recognized this in Roaden v. Kentucky, wherein it reasoned, “Where there are exigent circumstances in which police action literally must be ‘now or never’ to preserve the evidence of the crime, it is reasonable to permit action without prior judicial evaluation.” 413 U.S. 496, 505 , 93 S.Ct. 2796, 2802 , 37 L.Ed.2d 757 (1973) (emphasis added).

2015App. 2003) (explaining the emergency doctrine is considered synonymous with the exigent circumstances doctrine) (citing Brimage, 918 S.W.2d at 500 ; Colburn v. State, 966 S.W.2d 511, 519 (Tex. Crim.

2015App. 2003) (explaining the emergency doctrine is considered synonymous with the exigent circumstances doctrine) (citing Brimage, 918 S.W.2d at 500 ; Colburn v. State, 966 S.W.2d 511, 519 (Tex. Crim.

2009To assess whether a warrantless search is justified under the exigent circumstances exception, we apply an objective standard of reasonableness to “the sum of all the information known to the officer at the time of entry.” Parker v. State, 206 S.W.3d 593, 600 (Tex. Crim.

2009To assess whether a warrantless search is justified under the exigent circumstances exception, we apply an objective standard of reasonableness to “the sum of all the information known to the officer at the time of entry.” Packer v. State, 206 S.W.3d 593, 600 (Tex.Crim.App.2006).

2006See Bray , 597 S.W.2d at 768-69 .

2000See Bray v. State, 597 S.W.2d 763, 765 (Tex.Crim.App.1980); Pine v. State, 889 S.W.2d 625, 631 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.], 1994, pet. ref'd).

2004The State’s position is that exigent circumstances to enter the premises existed and if not, relying on Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 , 104 S.Ct. 3380, 3386 , 82 L.Ed.2d 599, 609 (1984), it argues the evidence was seized pursuant to a valid search warrant. 4 To justify a warrantless search, the State must show the existence of probable cause at the time of the search and the existence of exigent circumstances that made procuring a warrant impracticable.

2004The State’s position is that exigent circumstances to enter the premises existed and if not, relying on Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 , 104 S.Ct. 3380, 3386 , 82 L.Ed.2d 599, 609 (1984), it argues the evidence was seized pursuant to a valid search warrant. 4 To justify a warrantless search, the State must show the existence of probable cause at the time of the search and the existence of exigent circumstances that made procuring a warrant impracticable.

2015As this Court has long held, a reviewing court uses an objective standard of reasonableness in determining whether a warrantless search is justified.76 It applied that test when addressing the emergency doctrine, and the emergency doctrine is “considered synonymous with the exigent circumstances doctrine.”77 The exigent circumstances doctrine applies when police act in a “crime-fighting” role, whereas the emergency doctrine occurs when police act in their limited caretaking role to protect and preserve 74 Oliver, slip op. at 4, 7 n. 5. 75 Id. at 5-7. 76 See Brimage, 918 S.W.2d at 501 (citing G

2015App. 2003) (explaining the emergency doctrine is considered synonymous with the exigent circumstances doctrine) (citing Brimage, 918 S.W.2d at 500 ; Colburn v. State, 966 S.W.2d 511, 519 (Tex. Crim.

2015See Weems, recognition of the [*5] substantial privacy interests at 434 S.W.3d at 666 . stake and the applicability of the traditional Fourth Amendment framework that requires either a warrant or As the State did not show that the warrantless blood an applicable exception--apply with equal force to this draw was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, case." Villarreal, 2014 Tex. Crim.

2015See Weems, 434 S.W.3d at 666 .

2007Stewart v. State , 681 S.W.2d 774, 777 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, pet. ref'd).

2006See Stewart, 681 S.W.2d at 777 .

2016App. 2003) (citing Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 , 98 S.Ct. 2408 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978)).

2008SHEPHERD - 4 Unlike the exigent-circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, the emergency doctrine does not apply when the police are carrying out their “crime-fighting” role by conducting a search based on probable cause to gather evidence of a crime.5 Rather, the doctrine allows the police to engage in conduct that would otherwise violate the Fourth Amendment if they are acting on a reasonable belief that doing so is immediately necessary “to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury.”6 To determine whether this objective standard of reasonableness is met, w

2021See Shepherd v. State, 273 S.W.3d 681, 684 (Tex. Crim.

2018Shepherd v. State, 273 S.W.3d 681, 684 (Tex. Crim.

2015This unprecedented totality-of-the-exceptions approach adds zeros to create one, ignoring that the exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement “have been jealously and carefully drawn.” Hudson v. State, 588 S.W.2d 348, 351 (Tex. Crim.

2014This unprecedented totality-of-the-exceptions approach adds zeros to create one, ignoring that the exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement “have been jealously and carefully drawn.” Hudson v. State, 588 S.W.2d 348, 351 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) (quoting Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 , 78 S.Ct. 1253 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1514 (1958)).

2017Cole, 490 S.W.3d at 923 (citing Stuart, 547 U.S. at 404 ).

2016First, in Weems v. State, a driving-while-intoxicated case, the defendant was in an 19 Id. (quoting Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964)). 20 Id. at 770-71. 21 Cole, 490 S.W.3d at 923 (citing McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1559 ). 22 Id. (citing Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006)). 23 McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1568 ; Cole, 490 S.W.3d at 923 . 11 automobile accident and proceeded to flee from the scene of the crash.24 Eventually, Weems was found by a sheriff’s deputy hiding underneath a parked car.25 Because Weems appeared to be injured, EMS transported him to a hospital.26 The

2016Each of the exceptions to the Fourth Amendment that the State 4 We also note that the trial court when explaining its ruling relied only on the implied consent statute and never suggested its decision was based on the exigent circumstance or any other exception to the Fourth Amendment. 10 urges in this case have been expressly rejected by Villarreal.5 Only the exigent circumstances exception was not at issue in Villarreal. 475 S.W.3d at 797 .

2015Each of the exceptions to the Fourth Amendment that the State urges in this case were expressly rejected by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Villarreal.4 Only the exigent circumstances exception was not at issue in Villarreal, 2014 WL 6734178 *9 .

2021Weems, 493 S.W.3d at 578 .

2019“Findings of this nature clearly and properly inform[] 7 the trial judge’s determination of whether there was time to secure a warrant under an exigent- circumstances analysis.” Id. (citing Weems, 493 S.W.3d at 580-82 ; Cole, 490 S.W.3d at 924-26 ).

2023The exigent-circumstances exception applies when “the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” 18 The exception enables law enforcement officers to handle emergencies—situations presenting a “compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant.” 19 Under this exception, law enforcement may be justified in conducting a warrantless search “to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence.” 20 Whether law enforcement faced an emergency that justified acting without

2023The exigent-circumstances exception applies when “the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” 18 The exception enables law enforcement officers to handle emergencies—situations presenting a “compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant.” 19 Under this exception, law enforcement may be justified in conducting a warrantless search “to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence.” 20 Whether law enforcement faced an emergency that justified acting without

2022App. 1997). 13 Welsh, 466 U.S. at 744 . 14 Id. at 753 . unconvincing in Welsh was the lack of immediate or continuous pursuit from the crime scene.15 In Stanton v. Sims, the Supreme Court emphasized that Welsh had rejected the application of hot pursuit for this very reason.16 The Court acknowledged the statements in Welsh about minor crimes but said, “[W]e did not lay down a categorical rule for all cases involving minor offenses, saying only that a warrant is ‘usually’ required.”17 The Court repeated that Welsh was not a “hot pursuit” case and further explained that “despite our emphasis in

2022App. 1997). 13 Welsh, 466 U.S. at 744 . 14 Id. at 753 . unconvincing in Welsh was the lack of immediate or continuous pursuit from the crime scene.15 In Stanton v. Sims, the Supreme Court emphasized that Welsh had rejected the application of hot pursuit for this very reason.16 The Court acknowledged the statements in Welsh about minor crimes but said, “[W]e did not lay down a categorical rule for all cases involving minor offenses, saying only that a warrant is ‘usually’ required.”17 The Court repeated that Welsh was not a “hot pursuit” case and further explained that “despite our emphasis in

2021We treat all references to chapter 724 of the penal code rather than the transportation code in this record as inadvertent errors. 3 We note here that the hearing on Ruiz’s motion took place in August 2013, which was six years prior to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Mitchell v. Wisconsin, ___ U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 2525 , 204 L.Ed.2d 1040 (2019), in which the Supreme Court held that the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment almost always permits a blood test without a warrant where the driver was suspected of drunk driving and unconscious.

2021In Mitchell, the Supreme Court held that “in a narrow but important category of cases: those in which the driver is unconscious and therefore cannot be given a breath test,” “the exigent-circumstances rule almost always permits a blood test without a warrant.” Id.

2020App. 2003) (emphasis added); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). 10 Chimel, 395 U.S. 762–63. 11 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 (1973). 12 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 335 (2009) (quoting Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763 ). 13 United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977). 5 Accordingly, the exigency requirement is a necessary element of the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement and should not be confused with the exigent circumstances exception.

2015However, “unlike the search incident to arrest exception, the exigent circumstances exception requires a court to examine whether an emergency justified a warrantless search in each particular case,” Id.

2018See Casey, 215 S.W.3d at 879 ; Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673 . 4 The emergency doctrine applies when police act in their caretaking functions of protecting or preserving life or avoiding serious injury, which is unlike the exigent circumstances doctrine.

2016However, the focus of the exigent- circumstances analysis is not on the delay attendant to an investigation but on “the delay necessary 19 McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1561 . 20 Id. 21 See Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 672-73 (Tex. Crim.

2016For these reasons, the exigent circumstances exception did not apply and the police officer should have obtained a warrant; Id.

2015LEXIS 8508, 2014 WL 3843756, at *3 (Tex. App.--San The exigent circumstances exception applies "when Antonio Aug. 6, 2014, pet. filed) [*11] ; Forsyth v. State, the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law 438 S.W.3d 216, 223 (Tex. App.--Eastland 2014, pet. enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search is filed); Sutherland v. State, 436 S.W.3d 28, 41 (Tex. App.- objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." -Amarillo 2014, pet. filed); Weems v. State, 434 S.W.3d McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1558 (quoting Kentucky v. King, 655, 665 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 2014, pet. granted); U.

2015App. 2003) (citing Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 218 (1981) (noting that “‘hot pursuit’ cases fall within the exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement”)); see also Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 , 752–53 (1984) (noting that “an important factor to be considered when determining whether any exigency exists is the gravity of the underlying offense for which the arrest is being made,” that most courts “have refused to permit warrantless home arrests for nonfelonious crimes,” and that “it is difficult to conceive of a warrantless home arrest that would not be unreaso

2003The Supreme Court “ha[s] long recognized that ... ‘hot pursuit’ eases fall within the exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement.” Steagald v. U.S., 451 U.S. 204, 218 , 101 S.Ct. 1642 , 68 L.Ed.2d 88 (1981).