exigent circumstances exception in Iowa

2022The Lange Court noted that the exigent-circumstances exception was designed for 19 situations presenting a “compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant.” Id. at 2017 (quoting Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 149 (2013)).

2022The Lange Court noted that the exigent-circumstances exception was designed for 19 situations presenting a “compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant.” Id. at 2017 (quoting Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 149 (2013)).

2015“The exigent- circumstances exception includes a situation in which there is a probability that, unless immediately seized, evidence will be concealed or destroyed.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

2013The exigent-circumstances exception includes a situation in which there is a “probability that, unless immediately seized, evidence will be concealed or destroyed.” Id.

2024“The inherent mobility of motor vehicles satisfies the exigent-circumstances requirement” such that, as to our state constitution, the Iowa Supreme Court declined to require a “case-by-case exigency determination.” Id. at 145 .

2024The court acknowledged that it “may revisit this issue at a future time when 5 inherent mobility of motor vehicles satisfies the exigent-circumstances requirement.” Storm, 898 N.W.2d at 145 .

2016See generally State v. Kern, 831 N.W.2d 149, 174 (Iowa 2013) (“The exigent-circumstances exception includes a situation in which there is a ‘probability that, unless immediately seized, evidence will be concealed or destroyed.’ The exigent-circumstances exception is important to narcotics investigations because drugs are ‘easily destroyed.’” (citations omitted)).

2015See Kern, 831 N.W.2d at 174 (“The exigent-circumstances exception is important to narcotics investigations because drugs are easily destroyed.”).

1984We have adopted the United States Supreme Court statement that the exigent circumstances requirement is satisfied “when the car is movable, the occupants are alerted, and the car’s contents may never be found again if a warrant must be obtained.” Id. (quoting Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 , 90 S.Ct. 1975, 1981 , 26 L.Ed.2d 419, 428 (1970)).

1984We have adopted the United States Supreme Court statement that the exigent circumstances requirement is satisfied “when the car is movable, the occupants are alerted, and the car’s contents may never be found again if a warrant must be obtained.” Id. (quoting Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 , 90 S.Ct. 1975, 1981 , 26 L.Ed.2d 419, 428 (1970)).

2025“The inherent mobility of motor vehicles satisfies the exigent-circumstances requirement.” Id. (quoting Holderness, 301 N.W.2d at 736 ).

2025“The inherent mobility of motor vehicles satisfies the exigent-circumstances requirement.” Id. (quoting Holderness, 301 N.W.2d at 736 ).

2022The Welsh Court declared that “application of the exigent- circumstances exception in the context of a home entry should rarely be sanctioned when there is probable cause to believe that only a minor offense . . . has been committed.” Id.

2022The Welsh Court declared that “application of the exigent- circumstances exception in the context of a home entry should rarely be sanctioned when there is probable cause to believe that only a minor offense . . . has been committed.” Id.

2013While walking out to the car arguably raises some suspicion that destruction of evidence was imminent, and the United States Supreme Court has supported fairly conjectural applications of the exigent-circumstances exception before, see Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330-31 , 121 S.Ct. 946, 949-50 , 148 L.Ed.2d 838, 847 (2001), the instant case is distinguishable on two critical grounds.

2013While walking out to the car arguably raises some suspicion that destruction of evidence was imminent, and the United States Supreme Court has supported fairly conjectural applications of the exigent-circumstances exception before, see Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330-31 , 121 S.Ct. 946, 949-50 , 148 L.Ed.2d 838, 847 (2001), the instant case is distinguishable on two critical grounds.

2021Id.; see also Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 , 86 S. Ct. 1826, 1834 (1966). 28 But instead of holding simply that exigent circumstances exist to conduct a blood draw of an unconscious driver suspected of alcohol intoxication only if law enforcement’s to-do list contains some other pressing tasks (as the plurality in Mitchell held), I would adopt the reasoning of Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion that exigent circumstances exist in these situations regardless of whatever other work police officers might have on their plates.

2021Id.; see also Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 , 86 S. Ct. 1826, 1834 (1966). 28 But instead of holding simply that exigent circumstances exist to conduct a blood draw of an unconscious driver suspected of alcohol intoxication only if law enforcement’s to-do list contains some other pressing tasks (as the plurality in Mitchell held), I would adopt the reasoning of Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion that exigent circumstances exist in these situations regardless of whatever other work police officers might have on their plates.

2017Id. at 15 .

2017Id. at 15 .

2016The court concluded that “[t]o allow 105 uncounseled lineups between warrantless arrests and preliminary arraignment would only encourage abuse of the exigent circumstances exception and [undercut] our strong policy requiring warrants whenever feasible.” Id. at 354 .

2016The court concluded that' “[t]o allow uncounseled lineups between warrantless arrests and preliminary arraignment would only encourage abuse of the exigent circumstances exception and [undercut] our strong policy requiring warrants whenever feasible.” Id. at 354.

2021The exigent-circumstances exception applies where “ ‘the exigencies of the situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the 48 Fourth Amendment.” Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 , 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011) (alteration in original) (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 , 98 S. Ct. 2408, 2414 (1978)).

2021The exigent-circumstances exception applies where “ ‘the exigencies of the situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the 48 Fourth Amendment.” Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 , 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011) (alteration in original) (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 , 98 S. Ct. 2408, 2414 (1978)).

2014The application of the exigent circumstances exception in relation to the smell of raw marijuana was discussed in Watts, 801 N.W.2d at 850-52 .

2014The Iowa Supreme Court determined the search of the apartment was not valid under the exigent circumstances exception because Watts was detained outside the apartment, the officers had no information anyone else was in the apartment, and therefore, the record did not support an inference drugs were likely to be destroyed.3 Id. at 851 .

2023See Caniglia, 141 S. Ct. at 1599 .

2023See id.; id. at 1600 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); id. at 1601–02 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 1602–03 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 17 in a window “acting excited” and gesturing.

2021The exigent-circumstances exception has been applied where police need to provide help to a “seriously injured” occupant of a house or there is an imminent threat of such injury to that person, Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 , 126 S. Ct. 1943, 1947 (2006), when officers are in “hot pursuit” of a fleeing suspect, United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 , 42– 43, 96 S. Ct. 2406 , 2409–10 (1976), and to enter a burning building to put out a fire, Tyler, 436 U.S. at 509 , 98 S. Ct. at 1950 .

2021The exigent-circumstances exception has been applied where police need to provide help to a “seriously injured” occupant of a house or there is an imminent threat of such injury to that person, Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 , 126 S. Ct. 1943, 1947 (2006), when officers are in “hot pursuit” of a fleeing suspect, United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 , 42– 43, 96 S. Ct. 2406 , 2409–10 (1976), and to enter a burning building to put out a fire, Tyler, 436 U.S. at 509 , 98 S. Ct. at 1950 .

2021In order to invoke the exigent- circumstances exception, the state must show a “compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant.” Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 , 98 S. Ct. 1942, 1949 (1978).

2021In order to invoke the exigent- circumstances exception, the state must show a “compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant.” Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 , 98 S. Ct. 1942, 1949 (1978).

2021The exigent-circumstances exception applies where “ ‘the exigencies of the situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the 48 Fourth Amendment.” Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 , 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011) (alteration in original) (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 , 98 S. Ct. 2408, 2414 (1978)).

2021The exigent-circumstances exception applies where “ ‘the exigencies of the situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the 48 Fourth Amendment.” Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 , 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011) (alteration in original) (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 , 98 S. Ct. 2408, 2414 (1978)).

2018State v. Pettijohn, 899 N.W.2d 1, 17 (Iowa 2017).

2018State v. Snow , 337 Or. 219 , 94 P.3d 872 , 874 (2004) (en banc).

2018State v. Snow , 337 Or. 219 , 94 P.3d 872 , 874 (2004) (en banc).

2015Naujoks, 637 N.W.2d at 110 . 7 See State v. Predka, 555 N.W.2d 202, 207 (Iowa 1996); State v. Holderness, 301 N.W.2d 733, 737 (Iowa 1981); see also Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970); State v. Gillespie, 619 N.W.2d 345, 351 (Iowa 2000); Edgington, 487 N.W.2d at 678 ; State v. Olsen, 293 N.W.2d 216, 218 (Iowa 1980).4 If any evidence the deputy may have found had not been immediately seized, it could have been easily concealed, destroyed, or otherwise disposed of.

2015Naujoks, 637 N.W.2d at 110 . 7 See State v. Predka, 555 N.W.2d 202, 207 (Iowa 1996); State v. Holderness, 301 N.W.2d 733, 737 (Iowa 1981); see also Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970); State v. Gillespie, 619 N.W.2d 345, 351 (Iowa 2000); Edgington, 487 N.W.2d at 678 ; State v. Olsen, 293 N.W.2d 216, 218 (Iowa 1980).4 If any evidence the deputy may have found had not been immediately seized, it could have been easily concealed, destroyed, or otherwise disposed of.

2015Naujoks, 637 N.W.2d at 110 . 7 See State v. Predka, 555 N.W.2d 202, 207 (Iowa 1996); State v. Holderness, 301 N.W.2d 733, 737 (Iowa 1981); see also Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970); State v. Gillespie, 619 N.W.2d 345, 351 (Iowa 2000); Edgington, 487 N.W.2d at 678 ; State v. Olsen, 293 N.W.2d 216, 218 (Iowa 1980).4 If any evidence the deputy may have found had not been immediately seized, it could have been easily concealed, destroyed, or otherwise disposed of.

2015Id. at 2494 (noting an exception may apply where exigent circumstances make the needs of law 5 enforcement so compelling a warrantless search of a cell phone is objectively reasonable).

2014See State v. Legg, 633 N.W.2d 763, 773 (Iowa 2001) (finding the exigent circumstances exception applied when the underlying offense was punishable by up to one year in jail).

2014See State v. Legg, 633 N.W.2d 763, 773 (Iowa 2001) (finding the exigent circumstances exception applied when the underlying offense was punishable by up to one year in jail).