exigent circumstances exception in Illinois

2008In the case at bar, the majority determines that the circumstances in this case constitute “hot pursuit” and then concludes that the exigent-circumstances requirement for an officer’s warrantless, nonconsensual entry into private premises (Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583-90 , 63 L.

2008In the case at bar, the majority determines that the circumstances in this case constitute “hot pursuit” and then concludes that the exigent-circumstances requirement for an officer’s warrantless, nonconsensual entry into private premises (Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583-90 , 63 L.

2021Three years later in Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. ___ , ___, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2180 (2016), the Supreme Court reiterated that the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement “always requires case-by-case determinations.” ¶ 43 Defendant argued in the appellate court that section 11-501.2(c)(2) was unconstitutional both facially and as applied.

2019Three years later in Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. ___ , ___, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2180 (2016), the Supreme Court reiterated that the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement “always requires case-by-case determinations.” ¶ 43 Defendant argued in the appellate court that section 11-501.2(c)(2) was unconstitutional both facially and as applied.

1994(See People v. Foskey (1990), 136 Ill. 2d 66, 74-76 , 554 N.E.2d 192, 196-97 (discussing the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement).) In fact, the officers’ only excuse for not obtaining an arrest warrant was the lateness of the hour.

1994(See People v. Foskey (1990), 136 Ill. 2d 66, 74-76 , 554 N.E.2d 192, 196-97 (discussing the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement).) In fact, the officers’ only excuse for not obtaining an arrest warrant was the lateness of the hour.

2010The State contends that Willer’s entry into defendant’s apartment was justified under the doctrine of “hot pursuit.” In addition to the exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment discussed above, police also may enter a private residence without a warrant to effectuate the arrest of a fleeing suspect of whom the police are in “hot pursuit.” United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43 , 49 L.

2010The State contends that Willer’s entry into defendant’s apartment was justified under the doctrine of “hot pursuit.” In addition to the exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment discussed above, police also may enter a private residence without a warrant to effectuate the arrest of a fleeing suspect of whom the police are in “hot pursuit.” United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43 , 49 L.

2021Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973) (“a search authorized by consent is wholly valid” even absent warrant); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 , 358 n.22 (1967) (“A search to which an individual consents meets Fourth Amendment requirements ***.”); Bull, 185 Ill. 2d at 197 (“One such exception [to warrant requirement] is a search conducted pursuant to consent.”); People v. Anthony, 198 Ill. 2d 194, 202 (2001) (“a search conducted with a defendant’s voluntary consent but without a warrant does not violate the fourth amendment”). ¶ 41 As with the exigent-circumstances exception,

2021Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973) (“a search authorized by consent is wholly valid” even absent warrant); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 , 358 n.22 (1967) (“A search to which an individual consents meets Fourth Amendment requirements ***.”); Bull, 185 Ill. 2d at 197 (“One such exception [to warrant requirement] is a search conducted pursuant to consent.”); People v. Anthony, 198 Ill. 2d 194, 202 (2001) (“a search conducted with a defendant’s voluntary consent but without a warrant does not violate the fourth amendment”). ¶ 41 As with the exigent-circumstances exception,

2021Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973) (“a search authorized by consent is wholly valid” even absent warrant); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 , 358 n.22 (1967) (“A search to which an individual consents meets Fourth Amendment requirements ***.”); Bull, 185 Ill. 2d at 197 (“One such exception [to warrant requirement] is a search conducted pursuant to consent.”); People v. Anthony, 198 Ill. 2d 194, 202 (2001) (“a search conducted with a defendant’s voluntary consent but without a warrant does not violate the fourth amendment”). ¶ 41 As with the exigent-circumstances exception,

2021Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973) (“a search authorized by consent is wholly valid” even absent warrant); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 , 358 n.22 (1967) (“A search to which an individual consents meets Fourth Amendment requirements ***.”); Bull, 185 Ill. 2d at 197 (“One such exception [to the warrant requirement] is a search conducted pursuant to consent.”); People v. Anthony, 198 Ill. 2d 194 , -7- 202 (2001) (“a search conducted with a defendant’s voluntary consent but without a warrant does not violate the fourth amendment”). ¶ 41 As with the exigent-circumstances ex

2021Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973) (“a search authorized by consent is wholly valid” even absent warrant); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 , 358 n.22 (1967) (“A search to which an individual consents meets Fourth Amendment requirements ***.”); Bull, 185 Ill. 2d at 197 (“One such exception [to warrant requirement] is a search conducted pursuant to consent.”); People v. Anthony, 198 Ill. 2d 194, 202 (2001) (“a search conducted with a defendant’s voluntary consent but without a warrant does not violate the fourth amendment”). ¶ 41 As with the exigent-circumstances exception,

2021Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973) (“a search authorized by consent is wholly valid” even absent warrant); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 , 358 n.22 (1967) (“A search to which an individual consents meets Fourth Amendment requirements ***.”); Bull, 185 Ill. 2d at 197 (“One such exception [to the warrant requirement] is a search conducted pursuant to consent.”); People v. Anthony, 198 Ill. 2d 194 , -7- 202 (2001) (“a search conducted with a defendant’s voluntary consent but without a warrant does not violate the fourth amendment”). ¶ 41 As with the exigent-circumstances ex

2021Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973) (“a search authorized by consent is wholly valid” even absent warrant); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 , 358 n.22 (1967) (“A search to which an individual consents meets Fourth Amendment requirements ***.”); Bull, 185 Ill. 2d at 197 (“One such exception [to warrant requirement] is a search conducted pursuant to consent.”); People v. Anthony, 198 Ill. 2d 194, 202 (2001) (“a search conducted with a defendant’s voluntary consent but without a warrant does not violate the fourth amendment”). ¶ 41 As with the exigent-circumstances exception,

2021Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973) (“a search authorized by consent is wholly valid” even absent warrant); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 , 358 n.22 (1967) (“A search to which an individual consents meets Fourth Amendment requirements ***.”); Bull, 185 Ill. 2d at 197 (“One such exception [to the warrant requirement] is a search conducted pursuant to consent.”); People v. Anthony, 198 Ill. 2d 194 , -7- 202 (2001) (“a search conducted with a defendant’s voluntary consent but without a warrant does not violate the fourth amendment”). ¶ 41 As with the exigent-circumstances ex

2021Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973) (“a search authorized by consent is wholly valid” even absent warrant); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 , 358 n.22 (1967) (“A search to which an individual consents meets Fourth Amendment requirements ***.”); Bull, 185 Ill. 2d at 197 (“One such exception [to warrant requirement] is a search conducted pursuant to consent.”); People v. Anthony, 198 Ill. 2d 194, 202 (2001) (“a search conducted with a defendant’s voluntary consent but without a warrant does not violate the fourth amendment”). ¶ 41 As with the exigent-circumstances exception,

2021Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973) (“a search authorized by consent is wholly valid” even absent warrant); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 , 358 n.22 (1967) (“A search to which an individual consents meets Fourth Amendment requirements ***.”); Bull, 185 Ill. 2d at 197 (“One such exception [to warrant requirement] is a search conducted pursuant to consent.”); People v. Anthony, 198 Ill. 2d 194, 202 (2001) (“a search conducted with a defendant’s voluntary consent but without a warrant does not violate the fourth amendment”). ¶ 41 As with the exigent-circumstances exception,

2009See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 449 F.3d 741, 748 (6th Cir. 2006) (“This and other circuits have held that an officer may lawfully enter a residence without a warrant under the exigent circumstances exception when the officer reasonably believes a burglary is in progress”); In re Sealed Case 96—3167, 153 F.3d 759, 766 (D.C.

2009See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 449 F.3d 741, 748 (6th Cir.2006) ("This and other circuits have held that an officer may lawfully enter a residence without a warrant under the exigent circumstances exception when the officer reasonably believes a burglary is in progress"); In re Sealed Case 96-3167, 153 F.3d 759, 766 (D.C.Cir.1998) ("probable cause to believe a burglary is in progress constitutes exigent circumstances sufficient to permit warrantless entry" and citing cases holding same); United States v. Reed, 141 F.3d 644, 649 (6th Cir.1998) ("One exception [to the warrant requirement] al

2009See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 449 F.3d 741, 748 (6th Cir. 2006) (“This and other circuits have held that an officer may lawfully enter a residence without a warrant under the exigent circumstances exception when the officer reasonably believes a burglary is in progress”); In re Sealed Case 96—3167, 153 F.3d 759, 766 (D.C.

2009See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 449 F.3d 741, 748 (6th Cir.2006) ("This and other circuits have held that an officer may lawfully enter a residence without a warrant under the exigent circumstances exception when the officer reasonably believes a burglary is in progress"); In re Sealed Case 96-3167, 153 F.3d 759, 766 (D.C.Cir.1998) ("probable cause to believe a burglary is in progress constitutes exigent circumstances sufficient to permit warrantless entry" and citing cases holding same); United States v. Reed, 141 F.3d 644, 649 (6th Cir.1998) ("One exception [to the warrant requirement] al

2004In People v. Eichelberger, 91 Ill. 2d 359, 369 , 438 N.E.2d 140, 144 (1982), the Illinois Supreme Court held that a police officer may arrest a person without a warrant when the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person the officer seeks to arrest is committing or has committed a felony in the presence of the officer.

2004In People v. Eichelberger, 91 Ill. 2d 359, 369 , 438 N.E.2d 140, 144 (1982), the Illinois Supreme Court held that a police officer may arrest a person without a warrant when the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person the officer seeks to arrest is committing or has committed a felony in the presence of the officer.

1999See Gendron, 18 F.3d at 965 ; Garcia, 882 F.2d at 702-03 ; Martini, 265 Ill.

1999See Gendron , 18 F.3d at 965 ; Garcia , 882 F.2d at 702-03 ; Martini , 265 Ill.

2008In the case at bar, the majority determines that the circumstances in this case constitute "hot pursuit" and then concludes that the exigent-circumstances requirement for an officer's warrantless, nonconsensual entry into private premises ( Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583-90 , 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1378-82 , 63 L.Ed.2d 639, 649-53 (1980)) was satisfied. 229 Ill.2d at 571 , 323 Ill.Dec. at 374 , 893 N.E.2d at 646 ("[Dawdy's] warrantless, nonconsensual entry into Foiles' residence was excused under the doctrine of hot pursuit").

2008In the case at bar, the majority determines that the circumstances in this case constitute "hot pursuit" and then concludes that the exigent-circumstances requirement for an officer's warrantless, nonconsensual entry into private premises ( Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583-90 , 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1378-82 , 63 L.Ed.2d 639, 649-53 (1980)) was satisfied. 229 Ill.2d at 571 , 323 Ill.Dec. at 374 , 893 N.E.2d at 646 ("[Dawdy's] warrantless, nonconsensual entry into Foiles' residence was excused under the doctrine of hot pursuit").

2025S.C. 2016) (collecting cases) (courts routinely allow warrantless seizures of laptop computers and other electronic devices under the exigent circumstances doctrine because of the fragile and easily destructible nature of digital evidence at issue); cf. People v. Butler, 2015 IL App (1st) 131870, ¶ 44 (exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless search did not exist; officer did not merely seize the defendant’s cell phone and secure it until a warrant could be obtained, but also immediately searched its contents).

2020Initially, we question the continuing validity of Armer in light of Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2531 (2019), in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that the exigent-circumstances exception to Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement “almost always permits a blood test without a warrant” where a driver suspected of drunk driving is unconscious and therefore cannot be given a breath test.