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16 Kansas opinions name it 2 courts 1990–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Birchfield v. N. Dakota. William Robert Bernardgreen2 sentences2020In that case, officers obtained a blood test from a driver over his objection; the Court held that—under the particularized facts of that case—the warrantless search fell into the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. 384 U.S. at 770-72 ; see also Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2174 (Schmerber's exigent circumstances exception by its nature requires case-by- case analysis and is not categorical); Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 156 , 133 S. Ct. 1552 , 185 L. 2020In that case, officers obtained a blood test from a driver over his objection; the Court held that—under the particularized facts of that case—the warrantless search fell into the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. 384 U.S. at 770-72 ; see also Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2174 (Schmerber's exigent circumstances exception by its nature requires case-by- case analysis and is not categorical); Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 156 , 133 S. Ct. 1552 , 185 L. | 2 | 4 |
State v. Houzegreen1 sentence2022See State v. Houze, 23 Kan. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Russell Dean Jonesgreen1 sentence2014There is no “absolute test for the presence of exigent circumstances, because such a determination ultimately depends on the unique facts of each controversy.” United States v. Jones, 635 F.2d 1357, 1361 (D. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Hendrixgreen1 sentence2013An 8-1 majority of the Court held “the exigent circumstances rule applies when the police do not gain entry to premises by means of an actual or threatened violation of the Fourth Amendment.” 131 S. Ct. at 1862 ; see United States v. Hendrix, 664 F.3d 1334 (10th Cir. 2011) (applying King to uphold a warrantless motel entiy because officers did not violate Fourth Amendment). | 1 | 1 |
Payton v. New Yorkgreen2 sentences2013See State v. Thomas, 280 Kan. 526, 530-31 , 124 P.3d 49 (2005) (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 , 100 S. Ct. 1371 , 63 L. 2013See State v. Thomas, 280 Kan. 526, 530-31 , 124 P.3d 49 (2005) (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 , 100 S. Ct. 1371 , 63 L. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Thomasgreen2 sentences2013See State v. Thomas, 280 Kan. 526, 530-31 , 124 P.3d 49 (2005) (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 , 100 S. Ct. 1371 , 63 L. 2013See State v. Thomas, 280 Kan. 526, 530-31 , 124 P.3d 49 (2005) (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 , 100 S. Ct. 1371 , 63 L. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Luis Raul Aquinogreen1 sentence1990As the Tenth Circuit noted in U.S. v. Aquino, 836 F.2d 1268, 1271 (1988), Santana is the “only case in which the Supreme Court has held the exigent circumstances exception sufficient to justify warrantless entry into a suspect’s home.” Though McKessor was not fleeing from the police when he reentered his motel room, the officers who arrested him knew that he was dangerous and armed, and that an accomplice might be in the room. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Jones
green
2 sentences2007In cases in which this doctrine applies there is no probable cause which would justify issuance of a search warrant, . . . , and the police are not entering to arrest, search, or gather evidence.’ ” State v. Jones, 24 Kan. 2004In cases in which this doctrine applies there is no probable cause which would justify issuance of a search warrant, . . . and the police are not entering to arrest, search, or gather evidence.’ ” (Emphasis added.) 24 Kan. | 3 | 2003–2007 |
State v. Fisher
green
2 sentences2004It quoted from State v. Fisher, 141 Ariz. 227, 240-41 , 686 P.2d 750 , cert. denied 469 U.S. 1066 (1984), regarding this crucial difference: “ ‘The exigent circumstances exception is triggered when the police, with probable cause but no warrant, enter a dwelling in the reasonable belief that the delay necessary to obtain a warrant threatens the destruction of evidence, [citations omitted], or when they have a reasonable belief that a crime is in progress or has just been committed in a dwelling and the delay attendant to obtaining a warrant endangers the safety or life of a person therein. [Ci 2004It quoted from State v. Fisher, 141 Ariz. 227, 240-41 , 686 P.2d 750 , cert. denied 469 U.S. 1066 (1984), regarding this crucial difference: “ ‘The exigent circumstances exception is triggered when the police, with probable cause but no warrant, enter a dwelling in the reasonable belief that the delay necessary to obtain a warrant threatens the destruction of evidence, [citations omitted], or when they have a reasonable belief that a crime is in progress or has just been committed in a dwelling and the delay attendant to obtaining a warrant endangers the safety or life of a person therein. [Ci | 3 | 1997–2004 |
Fisher v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2004It quoted from State v. Fisher, 141 Ariz. 227, 240-41 , 686 P.2d 750 , cert. denied 469 U.S. 1066 (1984), regarding this crucial difference: “ ‘The exigent circumstances exception is triggered when the police, with probable cause but no warrant, enter a dwelling in the reasonable belief that the delay necessary to obtain a warrant threatens the destruction of evidence, [citations omitted], or when they have a reasonable belief that a crime is in progress or has just been committed in a dwelling and the delay attendant to obtaining a warrant endangers the safety or life of a person therein. [Ci 2003The Jones II opinion explained the difference between the exigent circumstances exception and the emergency exception by setting forth the following quote from State v. Fisher, 141 Ariz. 227, 240-41 , 686 P.2d 750 , cert. denied 469 U.S. 1066 (1984). “ ‘The exigent circumstances exception is triggered when the police, with probable cause but no warrant, enter a dwelling in the reasonable belief that the delay necessary to obtain a warrant threatens the destruction of evidence, [citations omitted], or when they have a reasonable belief that a crime is in progress or has *426 just been committed | 3 | 1997–2004 |
Schmerber v. California
green
2 sentences2020In that case, officers obtained a blood test from a driver over his objection; the Court held that—under the particularized facts of that case—the warrantless search fell into the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. 384 U.S. at 770-72 ; see also Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2174 (Schmerber's exigent circumstances exception by its nature requires case-by- case analysis and is not categorical); Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 156 , 133 S. Ct. 1552 , 185 L. 2020In that case, officers obtained a blood test from a driver over his objection; the Court held that—under the particularized facts of that case—the warrantless search fell into the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. 384 U.S. at 770-72 ; see also Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2174 (Schmerber's exigent circumstances exception by its nature requires case-by- case analysis and is not categorical); Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 156 , 133 S. Ct. 1552 , 185 L. | 2 | 2020–2020 |
Missouri v. McNeely
green
2 sentences2020In that case, officers obtained a blood test from a driver over his objection; the Court held that—under the particularized facts of that case—the warrantless search fell into the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. 384 U.S. at 770-72 ; see also Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2174 (Schmerber's exigent circumstances exception by its nature requires case-by- case analysis and is not categorical); Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 156 , 133 S. Ct. 1552 , 185 L. 2020In that case, officers obtained a blood test from a driver over his objection; the Court held that—under the particularized facts of that case—the warrantless search fell into the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. 384 U.S. at 770-72 ; see also Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2174 (Schmerber's exigent circumstances exception by its nature requires case-by- case analysis and is not categorical); Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 156 , 133 S. Ct. 1552 , 185 L. | 2 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Boyd
green
2 sentences2014However, the Kansas Supreme Court has emphasized the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement does not include situations “ where only a mere possibility exists that evidence could be destroyed or concealed. [Citation omitted.]’ ” Fewell, 286 Kan. at 385 (quoting State v. Boyd, 275 Kan. 271, 274 , 64 P.3d 419 [2003]). 2014However, the Kansas Supreme Court has emphasized the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement does not include situations “ where only a mere possibility exists that evidence could be destroyed or concealed. [Citation omitted.]’ ” Fewell, 286 Kan. at 385 (quoting State v. Boyd, 275 Kan. 271, 274 , 64 P.3d 419 [2003]). | 2 | 2008–2014 |
State v. Dugan
green
1 sentence2018App. 2d 582 , 605, 276 P.3d 819 (2012), which relied on authority from the Fourth and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeals to more specifically outline the exigent circumstances factors applicable to a warrantless entry for evidence preservation. 2016 WL 1614177 , at *9. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Fewell
green
1 sentence2014However, the Kansas Supreme Court has emphasized the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement does not include situations “ where only a mere possibility exists that evidence could be destroyed or concealed. [Citation omitted.]’ ” Fewell, 286 Kan. at 385 (quoting State v. Boyd, 275 Kan. 271, 274 , 64 P.3d 419 [2003]). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Shively
green
2 sentences2013State v. Shively, 268 Kan. 589, 595 , 999 P.2d 259 (2000). 2013State v. Shively, 268 Kan. 589, 595 , 999 P.2d 259 (2000). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Robinson
green
1 sentence2013It held further that the officer did not violate tire law and upheld the officer’s warrantless home entry based on the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. 327 Wis. 2d at 326-27 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Platten
green
2 sentences2008Platten, 225 Kan. at 770 , 594 P.2d 201 . 2008Platten, 225 Kan. at 770 , 594 P.2d 201 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden
green
1 sentence2005The Court stated: “We have long recognized that such ‘hot pursuit’ cases fall within the exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, see Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), and therefore are distinguishable from the routine search situation presented here.” Steagald, 451 U.S. at 218 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
United States v. Santana
green
1 sentence2005In noting the hot pursuit doctrine’s application, the Court cited San tana, 427 U.S. 38 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Steagald v. United States
green
2 sentences2005The Court stated: “We have long recognized that such ‘hot pursuit’ cases fall within the exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, see Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), and therefore are distinguishable from the routine search situation presented here.” Steagald, 451 U.S. at 218 . 2005As examples, the Court noted that (1) “an arrest warrant alone will suffice to enter a suspect’s own residence” ( 451 U.S. at 221 ); (2) “if probable cause exists, no warrant is required to apprehend a suspected felon in a public place" ( 451 U.S. at 221 ); (3) “the subject of an arrest warrant can be readily seized before entering or after leaving the home of a third party” ( 451 U.S. at 221 ); and (4) under the exigent circumstances doctrine, “a warrantless entry of a home would be justified if the police were in ‘hot pursuit’ of a fugitive.” 451 U.S. at 221 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.