exigent circumstances exception (Rhode Island) · Go Syfert
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exigent circumstances exception in Rhode Island

10 Rhode Island opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2025 2 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Rhode Island courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (15)

CaseFollowedCited
State v. Jenningsgreen
ri · 1983 · cited in 5 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 1987–2016
2 sentences

2010The exigent circumstances exception justifies warrantless searches when "evidence is likely to be lost, destroyed, or removed during the time required to obtain a warrant . . . "or where the police must act to "protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury." State v. Gonsalves , 553 A.2d 1073 (R.I. 1989) (quoting State v. Jennings , 461 A.2d 361 (R.I 1983)).

1989In State v. Jennings, 461 A.2d 361 (R.I. 1983), we defined the exigent circumstances exception to include situations in which “evidence is likely to be lost, destroyed, or removed during the time required to obtain a warrant and when, because of the circumstances, it is difficult to secure a warrant, a warrantless entry and search may be justified.

35
State v. Gonsalvesgreen
ri · 1989 · cited in 3 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 2010–2023
2 sentences

2023“Whether circumstances rise to the level of exigency is determined by referring to the facts known to the police at the time of the arrest. * * * ‘[T]he police [must] have an objective, reasonable belief that a crisis can only be avoided by swift and immediate action.’” State v. Gonsalves, 553 A.2d 1073, 1075 (R.I. 1989) (quoting Duquette, 471 A.2d at 1363 ).

2010The exigent circumstances exception justifies warrantless searches when "evidence is likely to be lost, destroyed, or removed during the time required to obtain a warrant . . . "or where the police must act to "protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury." State v. Gonsalves , 553 A.2d 1073 (R.I. 1989) (quoting State v. Jennings , 461 A.2d 361 (R.I 1983)).

23
State v. Tony Gonzalezgreen
ri · 2016 · cited in 2 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 2017–2023
2 sentences

2023Examples of exigent circumstances include “law enforcement’s need to provide emergency assistance to an occupant of a home,” or to “engage in hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect,” or “enter a burning building to put out a fire and investigate its cause,” or “prevent the imminent destruction of evidence.” Gonzalez, 136 A.3d at 1164 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting McNeely, 569 U.S. at 149 ). “[T]he typical situation in which the exigent-circumstances exception applies occurs when police officers are pursuing an offender [who] they have probable cause to believe - 29 - committed a known offense.

2023“The exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement applies when ‘there is compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant.’” State v. Gonzalez, 136 A.3d 1131, 1164 (R.I. 2016) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting McNeely, 569 U.S. at 149 ).

22
Michigan v. Tylergreen
scotus · 1978 · cited in 2 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
2 sentences

2016The exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement applies when “there is compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant.” McNeely, 138 S.Ct. at 1559 (quoting Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 , 98 S.Ct. 1942 , 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978)).

2016The exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement applies when “there is compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant.” McNeely, 138 S.Ct. at 1559 (quoting Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 , 98 S.Ct. 1942 , 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978)).

22
Duquette v. Godboutgreen
ri · 1984 · cited in 2 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 2017–2023
2 sentences

2023Examples of exigent circumstances include “law enforcement’s need to provide emergency assistance to an occupant of a home,” or to “engage in hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect,” or “enter a burning building to put out a fire and investigate its cause,” or “prevent the imminent destruction of evidence.” Gonzalez, 136 A.3d at 1164 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting McNeely, 569 U.S. at 149 ). “[T]he typical situation in which the exigent-circumstances exception applies occurs when police officers are pursuing an offender [who] they have probable cause to believe - 29 - committed a known offense.

2023“Whether circumstances rise to the level of exigency is determined by referring to the facts known to the police at the time of the arrest. * * * ‘[T]he police [must] have an objective, reasonable belief that a crisis can only be avoided by swift and immediate action.’” State v. Gonsalves, 553 A.2d 1073, 1075 (R.I. 1989) (quoting Duquette, 471 A.2d at 1363 ).

12
Mincey v. Arizonagreen
scotus · 1978 · cited in 2 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 1987–1989
2 sentences

1987A search within the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement must be “ ‘strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation.’ Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. at 393 , 98 S.Ct. at 2413 , 57 L.Ed.2d at 300 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 , 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1882 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 908 (1968)).” State v. Jennings, 461 A.2d at 367.

1987A search within the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement must be “ ‘strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation.’ Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. at 393 , 98 S.Ct. at 2413 , 57 L.Ed.2d at 300 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 , 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1882 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 908 (1968)).” State v. Jennings, 461 A.2d at 367.

12
United States v. Snipegreen
ca9 · 2008 · cited in 1 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
2 sentences

2025See generally United States v. Snipe, 515 F.3d 947, 951-52 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Considering the totality of the circumstances, law enforcement must have an objectively reasonable basis for concluding that there is an immediate need to protect others or - 21 - themselves from serious harm.”) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Huffman, 461 F.3d 777, 783 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that “[t]he government, in order to satisfy the exigent-circumstances exception” must demonstrate that “there was a risk of serious injury posed to the officers or others that required swift action. * * * In reviewi

2025See generally United States v. Snipe, 515 F.3d 947, 951-52 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Considering the totality of the circumstances, law enforcement must have an objectively reasonable basis for concluding that there is an immediate need to protect others or - 21 - themselves from serious harm.”) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Huffman, 461 F.3d 777, 783 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that “[t]he government, in order to satisfy the exigent-circumstances exception” must demonstrate that “there was a risk of serious injury posed to the officers or others that required swift action. * * * In reviewi

11
United States v. Che Borgess Huffmangreen
ca6 · 2006 · cited in 1 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
2 sentences

2025See generally United States v. Snipe, 515 F.3d 947, 951-52 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Considering the totality of the circumstances, law enforcement must have an objectively reasonable basis for concluding that there is an immediate need to protect others or - 21 - themselves from serious harm.”) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Huffman, 461 F.3d 777, 783 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that “[t]he government, in order to satisfy the exigent-circumstances exception” must demonstrate that “there was a risk of serious injury posed to the officers or others that required swift action. * * * In reviewi

2025See generally United States v. Snipe, 515 F.3d 947, 951-52 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Considering the totality of the circumstances, law enforcement must have an objectively reasonable basis for concluding that there is an immediate need to protect others or - 21 - themselves from serious harm.”) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Huffman, 461 F.3d 777, 783 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that “[t]he government, in order to satisfy the exigent-circumstances exception” must demonstrate that “there was a risk of serious injury posed to the officers or others that required swift action. * * * In reviewi

11
United States v. Giambrogreen
ca1 · 2025 · cited in 1 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
2 sentences

2025Yet a “report that someone has died cannot always satisfy” the exigent-circumstances standard “because the report of a death generally indicates that emergency assistance is no longer needed.” Giambro, 126 F.4th at 57 .

2025Yet a “report that someone has died cannot always satisfy” the exigent-circumstances standard “because the report of a death generally indicates that emergency assistance is no longer needed.” Giambro, 126 F.4th at 57.

11
Brigham City v. Stuartgreen
scotus · 2006 · cited in 1 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
2 sentences

2017In Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 406-07 , 126 S.Ct. 1943 , the United States Supreme Court held that the exigent-circumstances exception justified the police officers’ war-rantless entry.

2017In Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 406-07 , the United States Supreme Court held that the exigent-circumstances exception justified the police officers’ warrantless entry.

11
Kentucky v. Kinggreen
scotus · 2011 · cited in 1 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
2 sentences

2017The United States Supreme Court has underscored that “[t]he calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving.” Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 466 , 131 S.Ct. 1849 , 179 L.Ed.2d 865 (2011) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97 , 109 S.Ct. 1865 ).

2017The United States Supreme Court has underscored that “[t]he calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving.” Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 466 (2011) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97 ).

11
United States v. Carol E. Adamsgreen
ca1 · 1980 · cited in 1 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
2 sentences

2017Any delay in obtaining a warrant at one o’clock in the morning could have ignited an already volatile situation.” From our view, this case falls squarely within the applicability of the exigent- circumstances exception because the above-mentioned circumstances precisely demonstrate “such a compelling necessity for immediate action as will not brook the delay of obtaining a warrant.” State v. Gonzalez, 136 A.3d 1131, 1151 (R.I. 2016) (quoting United States v. Adams, 621 F.2d 41, 44 (1st Cir. 1980)). “[P]olice are in the emergency service business and they usually have little or no time to leisu

2017Any delay in obtaining a warrant at one o’clock in the morning could have ignited an already volatile situation.” From our view, this case falls squarely within the applicability of the exigent- circumstances exception because the above-mentioned circumstances precisely demonstrate “such a compelling necessity for immediate action as will not brook the delay of obtaining a warrant.” State v. Gonzalez, 136 A.3d 1131, 1151 (R.I. 2016) (quoting United States v. Adams, 621 F.2d 41, 44 (1st Cir. 1980)). “[P]olice are in the emergency service business and they usually have little or no time to leisu

11
State v. Portesgreen
ri · 2004 · cited in 1 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
2 sentences

2017Any delay in obtaining a warrant at one o’clock in the morning could have ignited an already volatile situation.” From our view, this case falls squarely within the applicability of the exigent-circumstances exception because the above-mentioned circumstances precisely demonstrate “such a compelling necessity for immediate action as will not brook the delay of obtaining a warrant.” State v. Gonzalez, 136 A.3d 1131, 1151 (R.I. 2016) (quoting United States v. Adams, 621 F.2d 41, 44 (1st Cir. 1980)). “[P]olice are in the emergency service business and they usually have little or no time to leisur

2017Any delay in obtaining a warrant at one o’clock in the morning could have ignited an already volatile situation.” From our view, this case falls squarely within the applicability of the exigent- circumstances exception because the above-mentioned circumstances precisely demonstrate “such a compelling necessity for immediate action as will not brook the delay of obtaining a warrant.” State v. Gonzalez, 136 A.3d 1131, 1151 (R.I. 2016) (quoting United States v. Adams, 621 F.2d 41, 44 (1st Cir. 1980)). “[P]olice are in the emergency service business and they usually have little or no time to leisu

11
Terry v. Ohiogreen
scotus · 1968 · cited in 1 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 1987–1987
2 sentences

1987A search within the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement must be “ ‘strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation.’ Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. at 393 , 98 S.Ct. at 2413 , 57 L.Ed.2d at 300 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 , 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1882 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 908 (1968)).” State v. Jennings, 461 A.2d at 367.

1987A search within the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement must be “ ‘strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation.’ Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. at 393 , 98 S.Ct. at 2413 , 57 L.Ed.2d at 300 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 , 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1882 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 908 (1968)).” State v. Jennings, 461 A.2d at 367.

11
United States v. Boothgreen
dc · 1983 · cited in 1 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 1984–1984
1 sentence

1984United States v. Booth, 455 A.2d 1351, 1354 (D.C.App.1983).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Rhode Island. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (7)

CaseCitedYears
Missouri v. McNeely green
scotus · 2013
2 sentences

2023Examples of exigent circumstances include “law enforcement’s need to provide emergency assistance to an occupant of a home,” or to “engage in hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect,” or “enter a burning building to put out a fire and investigate its cause,” or “prevent the imminent destruction of evidence.” Gonzalez, 136 A.3d at 1164 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting McNeely, 569 U.S. at 149 ). “[T]he typical situation in which the exigent-circumstances exception applies occurs when police officers are pursuing an offender [who] they have probable cause to believe - 29 - committed a known offense.

2023“The exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement applies when ‘there is compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant.’” State v. Gonzalez, 136 A.3d 1131, 1164 (R.I. 2016) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting McNeely, 569 U.S. at 149 ).

32016–2023
State v. Boghos Terzian green
ri · 2017
1 sentence

2023“In demonstrating a compelling and urgent necessity sufficient to circumvent the constitutional mandate of a warrant, the police ‘bear a heavy burden[.]’” Terzian, 162 A.3d at 1241 (quoting Gonzalez, 136 A.3d at 1151 ).

12023–2023
Graham v. Connor green
scotus · 1989
2 sentences

2017The United States Supreme Court has underscored that “[t]he calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving.” Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 466 , 131 S.Ct. 1849 , 179 L.Ed.2d 865 (2011) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97 , 109 S.Ct. 1865 ).

2017The United States Supreme Court has underscored that “[t]he calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving.” Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 466 (2011) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97 ).

12017–2017
State v. Roger Morin green
ri · 2013
2 sentences

2017State v. Morin, 68 A.3d 61 , 67 n.11 (R.I. 2013) (citing Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 404 , 126 S.Ct. 1943 ).

2017State v. Morin, 68 A.3d 61 , 67 n.11 (R.I. 2013) (citing Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 404 ).

12017–2017
Zuza v. Office of the High Representative green
scotus · 2018
1 sentence

2016The exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement applies when “there is compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant.” McNeely, 138 S.Ct. at 1559 (quoting Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 , 98 S.Ct. 1942 , 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978)).

12016–2016
United States v. Chadwick red
scotus · 1977
2 sentences

1983We agree. *378 The exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, as it relates to warrantless searches of personal effects such as luggage and parcels in the mail, is controlled by principles that the Supreme Court enunciated in United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 , 97 S.Ct. 2476 , 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977), and Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 , 99 S.Ct. 2586 , 61 L.Ed.2d 235 (1979).

1983We agree. *378 The exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, as it relates to warrantless searches of personal effects such as luggage and parcels in the mail, is controlled by principles that the Supreme Court enunciated in United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 , 97 S.Ct. 2476 , 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977), and Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 , 99 S.Ct. 2586 , 61 L.Ed.2d 235 (1979).

11983–1983
Arkansas v. Sanders red
scotus · 1979
2 sentences

1983We agree. *378 The exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, as it relates to warrantless searches of personal effects such as luggage and parcels in the mail, is controlled by principles that the Supreme Court enunciated in United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 , 97 S.Ct. 2476 , 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977), and Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 , 99 S.Ct. 2586 , 61 L.Ed.2d 235 (1979).

1983We agree. *378 The exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, as it relates to warrantless searches of personal effects such as luggage and parcels in the mail, is controlled by principles that the Supreme Court enunciated in United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 , 97 S.Ct. 2476 , 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977), and Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 , 99 S.Ct. 2586 , 61 L.Ed.2d 235 (1979).

11983–1983

Statutes the citing opinions construe

RI § R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-23-1 (4)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

TX 133 (1975–2025) PA 115 (1974–2026) OH 106 (1978–2025) CA 82 (1977–2026) WA 71 (1973–2022) NJ 57 (1970–2026) WI 54 (1982–2026) IL 50 (1977–2025) IA 46 (1977–2025) MI 45 (1981–2025) OR 41 (1972–2021) CO 41 (1977–2026) FL 40 (1981–2024) NM 35 (1975–2022) VA 34 (1992–2026) ID 33 (1978–2026) MN 31 (1984–2025) NY 31 (1973–2024) TN 28 (1996–2020) IN 28 (1985–2025) SC 24 (1986–2023) MO 23 (1985–2019) CT 23 (1978–2023) ME 22 (1974–2024) UT 19 (1991–2025) ND 18 (1984–2019) LA 18 (1981–2026) DC 17 (1976–2018) GA 17 (1975–2026) KS 16 (1990–2022) MD 15 (1973–2026) MA 15 (1975–2025) NH 14 (1974–2018) AZ 13 (1984–2018) AL 13 (1976–2015) NC 13 (1983–2024) MT 13 (1996–2024) DE 11 (1974–2026) SD 11 (1978–2021) RI 10 (1983–2025) WV 9 (1985–2023) KY 9 (1979–2025) AR 7 (1992–2005) NV 7 (1989–2025) HI 6 (1981–2002) AK 5 (1993–2009) VT 5 (1982–2023) MS 4 (1997–2017) VI 2 (1984–2012) WY 2 (1987–2017) NE 2 (2015–2024)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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