245 Illinois opinions name it 3 courts 1866–2025 13 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Pyne v. Witmergreen2 sentences2003Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer can be held vicariously liable for the tortious acts of its employees (Pyne v. Witmer, 129 Ill. 2d 351, 359 (1989)), including negligent, wilful, malicious, or even criminal acts of its employees when such acts are committed in the course of employment and in furtherance of the business of the employer (Brown v. King, 328 Ill. 2003Under the doctrine of respondeat superior , an employer can be held vicariously liable for the tortious acts of its employees ( Pyne v. Witmer , 129 Ill. 2d 351, 359 (1989)), including negligent, wilful, malicious, or even criminal acts of its employees when such acts are committed in the course of employment and in furtherance of the business of the employer ( Brown v. King , 328 Ill. | 13 | 18 |
Moy v. County of Cookgreen2 sentences2019“When an action is brought against a master based on allegedly negligent acts of the servant and no independent wrong is charged on behalf of the master, liability is entirely derivative, being founded upon the doctrine of respondeat superior.” Moy v. County of Cook, 159 Ill. 2d 519, 524 (1994); Sperl v. C.H. 2011“When an action is brought against a master based on allegedly negligent acts of the servant and no independent wrong is charged on behalf of the master, liability is entirely derivative, being founded upon the doctrine of respondeat superior.” Moy v. County of Cook, 159 Ill. 2d 519, 524 (1994). | 11 | 16 |
Woods v. Colegreen2 sentences2023Id. “ ‘Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a principal may be held liable for the tortious actions of an agent which cause a plaintiff’s injury, even if the principal does not himself [or herself] engage in any conduct in relation to the plaintiff.’ ” Id. (quoting Woods v. Cole, 181 Ill. 2d 512, 517 (1998)). ¶ 26 A principal is vicariously liable for the conduct of its agent but not for the conduct of an independent contractor. 2017“Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a principal may be held liable for the tortious actions of an agent which cause a plaintiff’s injury, even if the principal does not himself engage in any conduct in relation to the plaintiff.” Woods v. Cole, 181 Ill. 2d 512, 517 (1998). | 11 | 15 |
Vancura v. Katrisgreen2 sentences2020Vancura v. Katris, 238 Ill. 2d 352, 375 (2010). 2018Vancura v. Katris, 238 Ill. 2d 352, 375 (2010). | 4 | 4 |
Carver v. Sheriff of La Salle Countygreen2 sentences2017See Carver, 203 Ill. 2d at 506-07, 515-16 ; Moy, 159 Ill. 2d at 523-25, 527-30 . 2016See Carver, 203 Ill. 2d at 506-07, 515-16 ; Moy, 159 Ill. 2d at 523-25, 527-30 . | 4 | 4 |
Towns v. Yellow Cab Co.green2 sentences2025See Towns, 73 Ill.2d at 124 (dismissal of employee for failure to exercise reasonable diligence in serving him was an adjudication on the merits and precluded holding defendant’s employer liable under doctrine of respondeat superior). ¶ 33 Other Claims Against Metropolis ¶ 34 Keefe argues the trial court erred in dismissing his claims against Metropolis for defamation, false light invasion of privacy, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. 2006App. 3d at 559 , 732 N.E.2d at 118 , citing Towns v. Yellow Cab Co., 73 Ill. 2d 113, 123-24 , 382 N.E.2d 1217, 1221 (1978) (wherein 11 No. 1-04-3155 the court stated: "When an action is brought against a master based on the alleged negligent acts of his servant, and no independent wrong is charged on behalf of the master, his liability is entirely derivative, being founded upon the doctrine of respondeat superior. | 3 | 19 |
American Nat. Bank and Trust Co. v. Columbus-Cuneo-Cabrini Medical Centergreen2 sentences2018App. 3d 497, 502 (1996) (“Contribution contemplates the distribution -7- of liability for a loss among joint tortfeasors according to each tortfeasor’s percentage of relative fault.”). ¶ 28 When a principal is held vicariously liable for its agent’s conduct (for example, when an employer is held liable for its employee’s negligence under the doctrine of respondeat superior), the principal is not “at fault in fact.” American National Bank, 154 Ill. 2d at 354 . 2017App. 3d 497 , 502, 217 Ill.Dec. 775 , 667 N.E.2d 1351 (1996) ("Contribution contemplates the distribution of liability for a loss among joint tortfeasors according to each tortfeasor's percentage of relative fault."). ¶ 28 When a principal is held vicariously liable for its agent's conduct (for example, when an employer is held liable for its employee's negligence under the doctrine of respondeat superior ), the principal is not "at fault in fact." American National Bank , 154 Ill. 2d at 354 , 181 Ill.Dec. 917 , 609 N.E.2d 285 . | 3 | 12 |
Palmer v. Millergreen2 sentences2003See Palmer, 380 Ill. at 259-60 (holding that minor cannot establish relationship of master and servant and so cannot be held liable under doctrine of respondeat superior); see also Raglin v. HMO Illinois, Inc. (1992), 230 Ill. 2003"When an action is brought against a master based on allegedly negligent acts of the servant and no independent wrong is charged on behalf of the master, liability is entirely derivative, being founded upon the doctrine of respondeat superior . ( Kirk v. Michael Reese Hospital & Medical Center (1987), 117 Ill. 2d 507, 533 .) '[T]o impute the negligence of one person to another, such persons must stand in a relation of privity and there is no such thing as imputable negligence except in those cases where such a privity as master and servant or principal and agent exists.' ( Palmer v. Miller (19 | 3 | 9 |
Lawlor v. North American Corporation of Illinoisgreen2 sentences2023“Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a principal may be held liable for the tortious actions of an agent which cause a plaintiff’s injury, even if the principal does not himself engage in any conduct in relation to the plaintiff.” Lawlor v. North American Corp. of Illinois, 2012 IL 112530, ¶ 42 . 2015Lawlor v. North American Corp. of Illinois, 2012 IL 112530, ¶ 42 . " 'Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a principal may be held liable for the tortious actions of an agent which cause a plaintiff's injury, even if the principal does not himself engage in any conduct in relation to the plaintiff.' " Id. (quoting Woods v. Cole, 181 Ill. 2d 512, 517 (1998)). | 3 | 8 |
Sperl v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc.green2 sentences2020See Lawlor v. North American Corp. of Illinois, 2012 IL 112530, ¶ 42 ; Adames, 233 Ill. 2d at 298 ; Sperl, 408 Ill. 2019Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 408 Ill. | 3 | 6 |
Davila v. Yellow Cab Co.green2 sentences2014Instead, the focus is on whether or not the act was performed within the “scope of employment.” ’ [Citation.] *** The term ‘scope of employment’ had not been precisely defined, but Illinois uses the following criteria in determining whether an act is within the scope of employment: ‘ “(1) Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but only if: (a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform; (b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits; (c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master ***[.] *** (2) Conduct of a servant is not wi 2014Instead, the focus is on whether or not the act was performed within the "scope of employment." ' [Citation.] *** 50 1-11-2615, 1-11-2616, 1-11-2617 & 1-11-2622 (cons.) The term 'scope of employment' had not been precisely defined, but Illinois uses the following criteria in determining whether an act is within the scope of employment: ' " (1) Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but only if: (a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform; (b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits; (c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve | 3 | 5 |
Lang v. Silvagreen2 sentences2017See, e.g., Lang v. Silva, 306 Ill. 2017See, e.g., Lang v. Silva, 306 Ill. | 3 | 4 |
Raglin v. H M O Illinois, Inc.green2 sentences2003See Palmer, 380 Ill. at 259-60 (holding that minor cannot establish relationship of master and servant and so cannot be held liable under doctrine of respondeat superior); see also Raglin v. HMO Illinois, Inc. (1992), 230 Ill. 2003See Palmer , 380 Ill. at 259-60 (holding that minor cannot establish relationship of master and servant and so cannot be held liable under doctrine of respondeat superior ); see also Raglin v. HMO Illinois, Inc (1992), 230 Ill. | 3 | 3 |
Wilson v. Edward Hospitalgreen2 sentences2020We hold that it does. 4 ¶ 19 Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a principal or employer is generally subject to vicarious liability for the tortious conduct of its agent or employee only if the conduct “fell within the scope of the agency or employment.” Wilson, 2012 IL 112898, ¶ 18 . 2020We hold that it does. 4 ¶ 19 Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a principal or employer is generally subject to vicarious liability for the tortious conduct of its agent or employee only if the conduct “fell within the scope of the agency or employment.” Wilson, 2012 IL 112898, ¶ 18 . | 2 | 5 |
Brown v. Kinggreen2 sentences2003Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer can be held vicariously liable for the tortious acts of its employees (Pyne v. Witmer, 129 Ill. 2d 351, 359 (1989)), including negligent, wilful, malicious, or even criminal acts of its employees when such acts are committed in the course of employment and in furtherance of the business of the employer (Brown v. King, 328 Ill. 2003Under the doctrine of respondeat superior , an employer can be held vicariously liable for the tortious acts of its employees ( Pyne v. Witmer , 129 Ill. 2d 351, 359 (1989)), including negligent, wilful, malicious, or even criminal acts of its employees when such acts are committed in the course of employment and in furtherance of the business of the employer ( Brown v. King , 328 Ill. | 2 | 4 |
Sunseri v. Pucciagreen2 sentences2001See, e.g., Sunseri v. Puccia, 97 Ill. 2001See, e.g. , Sunseri v. Puccia , 97 Ill. | 2 | 4 |
Darner v. Colbygreen2 sentences1991The doctrine of respondeat superior is an exception to the general rule that a person injured by another's negligence may only seek redress from the individual who caused the injury. ( McConnell v. Freeman United Coal Co. (1990), 198 Ill. *581 App.3d 322, 325, 144 Ill.Dec. 474 , 555 N.E.2d 993 .) Under this doctrine a master is liable for the negligence of a servant or agent if the negligent act was committed within the scope of employment. ( Darner v. Colby (1941), 375 Ill. 558, 566 , 31 N.E.2d 950 .) Whether such a relationship exists is a factual question which will depend upon the relation 1991The doctrine of respondeat superior is an exception to the general rule that a person injured by another's negligence may only seek redress from the individual who caused the injury. ( McConnell v. Freeman United Coal Co. (1990), 198 Ill. *581 App.3d 322, 325, 144 Ill.Dec. 474 , 555 N.E.2d 993 .) Under this doctrine a master is liable for the negligence of a servant or agent if the negligent act was committed within the scope of employment. ( Darner v. Colby (1941), 375 Ill. 558, 566 , 31 N.E.2d 950 .) Whether such a relationship exists is a factual question which will depend upon the relation | 2 | 3 |
| Township of Jubilee v. State of Illinoisgreen | 2 | 2 |
| In re Parentage of Scarlett Z.-D.green | 2 | 2 |
| McClure v. Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp.green | 2 | 2 |
| Loyola Academy v. S & S Roof Maintenance, Inc.green | 2 | 2 |
| Jones v. Chicago HMO Ltd. of Illinoisgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Hengels v. Gilskigreen | 2 | 2 |
| Bagent v. Blessing Care Corp.green | 2 | 2 |
| Wilson v. St. Louis Area Councilgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Mauch v. Kisslinggreen | 2 | 2 |
| Glover Ex Rel. Dyson v. Boy Scouts of Americagreen | 2 | 2 |
| Alessi v. Boy Scouts of America Greater Niagara Frontier Council, Inc.green | 2 | 2 |
| Toledo, Wabash & Western Railway Co. v. Durkingreen | 2 | 2 |
Deloney v. Board of Education of Thornton Township, School District No. 205green2 sentences2012See Deloney, 281 Ill. 2012See Deloney, 281 Ill. | 1 | 3 |
Bank of America, NA v. Birdgreen2 sentences2010Bank of America, N.A. v. Bird, 392 Ill. 2009Co. v. Durkin, 76 Ill. 395, 396 (1875) (noting the existence of the “doctrine of respondeat superior” in both the courts of England and America); Bank of America, N.A. v. Bird, 392 Ill. | 1 | 3 |
McNerney v. Allamuradovgreen2 sentences2025McNerney v. Allamuradov, 2017 IL App (1st) 153515, ¶ 67 . 2023See McNerney v. Allamuradov, 2017 IL App (1st) 153515, ¶ 67 . | 1 | 2 |
| Santho v. Boy Scouts of Americagreen | 1 | 2 |
| Griffin v. Fluellengreen | 1 | 2 |
| Kocsis v. Harrisongreen | 1 | 2 |
| Webb v. Jewel Companies, Inc.green | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Elmore v. Drainage Commissioners
green
2 sentences1921The rule that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to the State has been upheld in many decisions of our Supreme Court, among which are the following: Elmore v. Drainage Commissioners, 135 Ill., 269 . 1919The State is not liable in this kind of a case for the reason that ‘the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to the State’, Elmore v. Drainage Commissioners, 135 Ill., 269 . | 6 | 1902–1921 |
City of Chicago v. Dermody
neutral
2 sentences1915Therefore, under the foregoing decisions (City of Chicago v. Joney, 60 Ill. 383 , and City of Chicago v. Dermody, 61 Ill. 431 , supra), Duffy was not an independent contractor, and for his negligence the doctrine of respondeat superior must apply. ’ ’ The very language in the contract quoted by the court in the Murdock case, supra, was construed in the Foster case, supra, by Judge Freeman of the Appellate Court as merely reserving to the city the right to generally supervise the work so as to insure compliance with the contract and to obtain the result called for thereby. 1904Therefore, under the foregoing decisions, (City of Chicago v. Joney, and City of Chicago v. Dermody, supra,) Duffy was not an independent contractor, and for his negligence the doctrine of respondeat superior must apply. | 5 | 1877–1915 |
Bristow v. Griffitts Construction Co.
green
2 sentences2010Accordingly, the court held that where a plaintiff brings a respondeat superior claim against a principal, “any settlement between the agent and the plaintiff must also extinguish the principal’s vicarious liability.” American National Bank & Trust Co., 154 Ill. 2d at 355 , citing Bristow v. Griffitts Construction Co., 140 Ill. 2010Accordingly, the court held that where a plaintiff brings a respondeat superior claim against a principal, “any settlement between the agent and the plaintiff must also extinguish the principal’s vicarious liability.” American National Bank & Trust Co., 154 Ill. 2d at 355 , citing Bristow v. Griffitts Construction Co., 140 Ill. | 4 | 2004–2010 |
Kirk v. Michael Reese Hospital & Medical Center
green
2 sentences2003"When an action is brought against a master based on allegedly negligent acts of the servant and no independent wrong is charged on behalf of the master, liability is entirely derivative, being founded upon the doctrine of respondeat superior . ( Kirk v. Michael Reese Hospital & Medical Center (1987), 117 Ill. 2d 507, 533 .) '[T]o impute the negligence of one person to another, such persons must stand in a relation of privity and there is no such thing as imputable negligence except in those cases where such a privity as master and servant or principal and agent exists.' ( Palmer v. Miller (19 1994Respondeat Superior When an action is brought against a master based on allegedly negligent acts of the servant and no independent wrong is charged on behalf of the master, liability is entirely derivative, being founded upon the doctrine of respondeat superior. ( Kirk v. Michael Reese Hospital & Medical Center (1987), 117 Ill.2d 507, 533 , 111 Ill.Dec. 944 , 513 N.E.2d 387 .) "[T]o impute the negligence of one person to another, such persons must stand in a relation of privity and there is no such thing as imputable negligence except in those cases where such a privity as master and servant o | 4 | 1992–2003 |
Wilcox v. City of Chicago
green
2 sentences1943(Wilcox v. City of Chicago, 107 Ill. 334 ; Culver v. City of Streator, 130 id. 238.) The injury to plaintiff did not arise from negligence in the use of the hydrant for the purpose of extinguishing fire. 1912Wilcox v. City of Chicago, supra; City of Chicago v. Turner, 80 Ill. 419 ; Culver v. City of Streator, 130 Ill. 238 ; Craig v. City of Charleston, 180 Ill. 154 ; City of Chicago v. Williams, 182 Ill. 135 ; Brown v. District of Columbia, supra. In view of the conclusion thus reached, it is not necessary for us to discuss the question of notice to the city. | 4 | 1903–1943 |
City of Chicago v. Joney
neutral
2 sentences1915Therefore, under the foregoing decisions (City of Chicago v. Joney, 60 Ill. 383 , and City of Chicago v. Dermody, 61 Ill. 431 , supra), Duffy was not an independent contractor, and for his negligence the doctrine of respondeat superior must apply. ’ ’ The very language in the contract quoted by the court in the Murdock case, supra, was construed in the Foster case, supra, by Judge Freeman of the Appellate Court as merely reserving to the city the right to generally supervise the work so as to insure compliance with the contract and to obtain the result called for thereby. 1902In the case of City of Chicago v. Joney, 60 Ill. 383 , cited in behalf of appellant, it was found by the court that there ‘was dependence,—subserviency,—in the contractors, and for their negligence the doctrine of respondeat superior must apply.’ In City of Chicago v. Dermody, 61 Ill. 431 , it was found that by the statute then in force, as well as by ordinance, the board of public works was required to take charge of the work, and it was their duty to see that it was performed according to the plans and specifications, the deviation from which caused the injury complained of, and the same doc | 4 | 1871–1915 |
RANDI F. v. High Ridge YMCA
green
2 sentences2021On appeal, this court found that “sexual assault by its very nature precludes a conclusion that it occurred within the employee’s scope of employment under the doctrine of respondeat superior. [Citation.] That is, [the teacher’s] alleged sexual assault of plaintiff cannot be said to have furthered defendant’s business.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. ¶ 30. ¶ 24 Also, in Randi F. v. High Ridge YMCA, 170 Ill. 1997Randi F. v. High Ridge YMCA, 170 Ill. | 3 | 1997–2021 |
Edgar County Bank & Trust Co. v. Paris Hospital, Inc.
green
2 sentences2010App. 3d 191 , 488 N.E.2d 332 (1986). -9- 1-08-2986 In Gilbert, our supreme court recognized that although its decision in American National Bank & Trust Co. held a plaintiff’s settlement with an agent extinguishes the principal’s vicarious liability, its prior holding in Edgar County Bank & Trust Co. v. Paris Hospital, Inc., 57 Ill. 2d 298 , 312 N.E.2d 259 (1974), still renewed the principal’s liability if the covenant not to sue the agent expressly reserved the plaintiff’s right to seek recovery from the principal. 2010App. 3d 191 , 488 N.E.2d 332 (1986). -9- 1-08-2986 In Gilbert, our supreme court recognized that although its decision in American National Bank & Trust Co. held a plaintiff’s settlement with an agent extinguishes the principal’s vicarious liability, its prior holding in Edgar County Bank & Trust Co. v. Paris Hospital, Inc., 57 Ill. 2d 298 , 312 N.E.2d 259 (1974), still renewed the principal’s liability if the covenant not to sue the agent expressly reserved the plaintiff’s right to seek recovery from the principal. | 3 | 1986–2010 |
Braden v. Shell Oil Co.
neutral
2 sentences1965Subsequent cases applying the Kennerly decision have held that control of the structural activities is not a relevant factor (Pankey v. Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc., 167 F Supp 609 (1958)), and that the effect of the act was to impose an absolute, and independent, nondelegable duty of compliance beyond the doctrine of respondeat superior, and irrespective of whether control has been given to an independent contractor. *459 In Braden v. Shell Oil Co., 24 Ill. 1961The Kennerly case has been uniformly interpreted by the Federal and Illinois Appellate Courts,, with the exception of the court below, as imposing an absolute, and independent nondelegable duty of compliance on owners, beyond the doctrine of respondeat superior, and irrespective of whether control has been given to an independent contractor. ( Schmid v. United States 273 F.2d 172 ; Pankey v. Hiram Walker & Sons, 167 F. Supp. 609 ; Bounougias v. Republic Steel Corp. (7th cir.), 277 F.2d 726 ; Braden v. Shell Oil Co. 24 Ill. | 3 | 1961–1965 |
Pankey v. Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc.
neutral
2 sentences1965Subsequent cases applying the Kennerly decision have held that control of the structural activities is not a relevant factor (Pankey v. Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc., 167 F Supp 609 (1958)), and that the effect of the act was to impose an absolute, and independent, nondelegable duty of compliance beyond the doctrine of respondeat superior, and irrespective of whether control has been given to an independent contractor. *459 In Braden v. Shell Oil Co., 24 Ill. 1965Subsequent cases applying the Kennerly decision have held that control of the structural activities is not a relevant factor (Pankey v. Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc., 167 F Supp 609 (1958)), and that the effect of the act was to impose an absolute, and independent, nondelegable duty of compliance beyond the doctrine of respondeat superior, and irrespective of whether control has been given to an independent contractor. | 3 | 1961–1965 |
| Sperl v. Henry green | 2 | 2022–2024 |
| Mashal v. City of Chicago green | 2 | 2018–2020 |
| In re Haley D. green | 2 | 2018–2020 |
| Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of Illinois, Inc. green | 2 | 2015–2015 |
| Kellerman v. MCI Telecommunications Corp. green | 2 | 2013–2013 |
| Pyskaty v. Oyama green | 2 | 2011–2011 |
| Hudson v. City of Chicago green | 2 | 2011–2011 |
| Anderson v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc. green | 2 | 2010–2010 |
| Alms v. Baum green | 2 | 2007–2007 |
| Merritt v. Randall Painting Co. green | 2 | 2006–2006 |
| Mitchell v. Norman James Construction Co. green | 2 | 2001–2001 |
| Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Center green | 2 | 1998–1998 |
| Samuels v. Southern Baptist Hosp. green | 2 | 1998–1998 |
| City of North Chicago v. North Chicago News, Inc. green | 2 | 1997–1997 |
| Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs. green | 2 | 1987–1994 |
| Holda v. County of Kane green | 2 | 1991–1994 |
| Metzler v. Layton green | 2 | 1987–1993 |
| Gomien v. Wear-Ever Aluminum, Inc. green | 2 | 1989–1992 |
| Alford v. Phipps green | 2 | 1992–1992 |
| Holcomb v. Flavin green | 2 | 1986–1986 |
| Lasko v. Meier green | 2 | 1973–1981 |
| Kelly v. Ogilvie green | 2 | 1975–1976 |
| Boucher v. Thomsen green | 2 | 1965–1966 |
| Ellis v. Jewett Rhodes Motor Co. green | 2 | 1965–1966 |
| Vincent W. Schmid v. United States of America, and Third Party Loren'mike' Krause Construction Company, Inc., Third Party green | 2 | 1961–1961 |
| cluster 250798 green | 2 | 1961–1961 |
| McHale v. McQuigg neutral | 2 | 1927–1928 |
| Johnson v. Magnuson neutral | 2 | 1901–1926 |
| Schmidt v. Balling neutral | 2 | 1925–1926 |
| Herman Berghoff Brewing Co. v. Przbylski neutral | 2 | 1925–1926 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.