215 Ohio opinions name it 8 courts 1883–2026 37 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Clark v. Southview Hospital & Family Health Centergreen2 sentences2026Accordingly, the court must first determine whether CoreCivic is an independent contractor or an agent of defendant. {¶7} “Generally, an employer or principal is vicariously liable for the torts of its employees or agents under the doctrine of respondeat superior, but not for the negligence of an independent contractor over whom it retained no right to control the mode and manner of doing the contracted-for work.” Clark v. Southview Hasp. & Family Health Ctr., 68 Ohio St.3d 435 , 438 (1994). {¶8} “The Ohio Supreme Court has set out a test to distinguish an agency relationship (sometimes also r 2026“Generally, an employer or principal is vicariously liable for the torts of its employees or agents under the doctrine of respondeat superior . . . .” Clark v. Southview Hosp. & Family Health Ctr., 68 Ohio St.3d 435, 438 (1994). | 9 | 33 |
Byrd v. Fabergreen2 sentences2025“It is well-established that in order for an employer to be liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the tort of the employee must be committed within the scope of employment.” Byrd v. Faber, 57 Ohio St.3d 56, 58 (1991). “[A]s a matter of law, a master is not liable for the negligence of his servant while the latter is driving to work at a fixed place of employment, where such driving involves no special benefit to the master other than the making of the servant’s services available to the master at the place where they are needed.” Boch v. New York Life Ins. 2023Pickaway No. 18CA15, 2019-Ohio- 3260, at ¶ 22, this court explained: Ross App. No. 22CA26 16 The doctrine of respondeat superior is expressed in the Restatement of the Law 2d, Agency (1958) 481, Section 219(1), which states as follows: “A master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants committed while acting in the scope of their employment.” Ohio law provides, “[i]t is well-established that in order for an employer to be liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the tort of the employee must be committed within the scope of employment.” {¶28} Additionally, it is “axiomati | 8 | 49 |
Berdyck v. Shindegreen2 sentences2026Ctr., 2004- Ohio-6072, ¶ 10 (10th Dist.). {¶ 23} “Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a hospital is liable for the negligent acts of its employees.” Berdyck v. Shinde, 66 Ohio St.3d 573, 578 (1993), citing Klema v. St. 2023However, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a hospital “is liable for the negligent acts of its employees.” Berdyck Case No. 2019-00852JD -10- DECISION v. Shinde, 66 Ohio St.3d 573, 577 , 613 N.E.2d 1014 (1993), citing Klema v. St. | 4 | 12 |
Osborne v. Lylesgreen2 sentences2023Osborne v. Lyles, 63 Ohio St.3d 326, 330 , 587 N.E.2d 825 (1992); see Morrison v. Horseshoe Casino, 2020-Ohio-4131 , 157 N.E.3d 406, ¶ 94 (8th Dist.) (“For an employer * * * to be vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the tort committed by the employee must be committed within the scope of employment.”). 2023Osborne v. Lyles, 63 Ohio St.3d 326, 330 , 587 N.E.2d 825 (1992); see Morrison v. Horseshoe Casino, 2020-Ohio-4131 , 157 N.E.3d 406, ¶ 94 (8th Dist.) (“For an employer * * * to be vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the tort committed by the employee must be committed within the scope of employment.”). | 3 | 17 |
Albain v. Flower Hospitalgreen2 sentences2026Orac v. Montefiore Found., 2024-Ohio-4904 , ¶ 22 (8th Dist.), quoting Albain v. Flower Hosp., 50 Ohio St.3d 251, 255 (1990) (“In the employment-law context, ‘the most common form of derivative or vicarious liability is that imposed by the law of agency, through the doctrine of respondeat superior.’”) Therefore, “‘a principal is vicariously liable only when an agent could be held directly liable.’” Id., quoting Natl. 2026Orac v. Montefiore Found., 2024-Ohio-4904 , ¶ 22 (8th Dist.), quoting Albain v. Flower Hosp., 50 Ohio St.3d 251, 255 (1990) (“In the employment-law context, ‘the most common form of derivative or vicarious liability is that imposed by the law of agency, through the doctrine of respondeat superior.’”) Therefore, “‘a principal is vicariously liable only when an agent could be held directly liable.’” Id., quoting Natl. | 3 | 10 |
Comer v. Riskogreen2 sentences2020See Comer v. 3 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS Risko, 106 Ohio St.3d 185 , 2005-Ohio-4559 , 833 N.E.2d 712 , ¶ 18 (noting that under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a principal is not liable for torts of an independent contractor over whom it retained no control). 2014For purposes of Section 2307.22 of the Revised Code, a principal and agent, a master and servant, or other persons having a vicarious liability relationship shall constitute a single party when determining percentages of tortious conduct in a tort action in which vicarious liability is asserted. {¶48} The Supreme Court of Ohio has stated that, “an employer or principal is vicariously liable for the torts if its employees or agents under the doctrine of respondeat superior.” Comer v. Risko, 106 Ohio St.3d 185 , 2005-Ohio-4559 , 833 N.E.2d 712 . | 3 | 8 |
Strock v. Pressnellgreen2 sentences2023Cuyahoga No. 70712, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 5784 , 16 (Dec. 19, 1996) (“Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, without an underlying tort claim against an employee, a plaintiff has no claim against the employee’s employer.”), citing Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St. 3d 207, 217 , 527 N.E.2d 1235 (1988) (“It is axiomatic that for the doctrine of respondeat superior to apply, an employee must be liable for a tort committed in the scope of his employment.”). 2023Cuyahoga No. 70712, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 5784 , 16 (Dec. 19, 1996) (“Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, without an underlying tort claim against an employee, a plaintiff has no claim against the employee’s employer.”), citing Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St. 3d 207, 217 , 527 N.E.2d 1235 (1988) (“It is axiomatic that for the doctrine of respondeat superior to apply, an employee must be liable for a tort committed in the scope of his employment.”). | 2 | 17 |
Jeffers v. Olexogreen2 sentences2025“The rule of proximate cause ‘requires that the injury sustained shall be the natural and probable consequence of the negligence alleged; that is, such No. 24AP-84 22 consequence as under the surrounding circumstances of the particular case might, and should have been foreseen or anticipated by the wrongdoer as likely to follow his negligent act.’ ” (Further quotation marks deleted and citations omitted.) Jeffers v. Olexo, 43 Ohio St.3d 140, 143 (1989), quoting Ross v. Nutt, 177 Ohio St. 113 , 114 (1964). {¶ 72} Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a hospital is liable for the negligence 2024“The rule of proximate cause ‘requires that the injury sustained shall be the natural and probable consequence of the negligence alleged; that is, such consequence as under the surrounding circumstances of the particular case might, and should have been foreseen or anticipated by the wrongdoer as likely to follow his negligent act.’ ” Jeffers v. Olexo, 43 Ohio St.3d 140, 143 (1989), quoting Ross v. Nutt, 177 Ohio St. 113 , 114 (1964) (further quotation and citation omitted). {¶ 39} Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a hospital is liable for the negligence of its employees. | 2 | 2 |
Latham v. Ohio State University Hospitalgreen2 sentences2024Hosp., 71 Ohio App.3d 535, 537-38 (10th Dist.1991). 2021Hosp., 71 Ohio App.3d 535, 537-38 (10th Dist.1991), citing Albain v. Flower Hosp., 50 Ohio St.3d 251, 254-55 (1990). | 2 | 2 |
Morrison v. Horseshoe Casinogreen2 sentences2023Osborne v. Lyles, 63 Ohio St.3d 326, 330 , 587 N.E.2d 825 (1992); see Morrison v. Horseshoe Casino, 2020-Ohio-4131 , 157 N.E.3d 406, ¶ 94 (8th Dist.) (“For an employer * * * to be vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the tort committed by the employee must be committed within the scope of employment.”). 2023Osborne v. Lyles, 63 Ohio St.3d 326, 330 , 587 N.E.2d 825 (1992); see Morrison v. Horseshoe Casino, 2020-Ohio-4131 , 157 N.E.3d 406, ¶ 94 (8th Dist.) (“For an employer * * * to be vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the tort committed by the employee must be committed within the scope of employment.”). | 2 | 2 |
Pusey v. Batorgreen2 sentences2019No. 14AP-153, 2014-Ohio-4359, ¶ 8 , citing Pusey v. Bator, 94 Ohio St.3d 275, 278 (2002) (and adding at ¶ 16 that "the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply" with regard to alleged negligence by the independent contractor); see also, e.g., Hughes v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., Ct. of Cl. 2014Employee v. Independent Contractor {¶61} Generally, while an employer is vicariously liable for the negligent acts of its employees committed within the scope of employment under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer of an independent contractor is not -34- Case No. 10-13-11 liable for the negligent acts of the independent contractor.10 Pusey v. Bator, 94 Ohio St.3d 275, 278 (2002); Clark v. Southview Hosp. & Family Health Ctr., 68 Ohio St.3d 435, 438 (1994). {¶62} To determine whether a party is an employee or an independent contractor, we must resolve the central question of “who | 2 | 2 |
| Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 95,552 International Controls Corp. v. Robert L. Vesco, and Vesco & Co., Inc.green | 2 | 2 |
Hanson v. Kynastgreen2 sentences2017“In order to establish a claim under the doctrine of respondeat superior, it must be demonstrated that a principal-agent relationship existed, and that tortious conduct was committed by the agent while in the scope of his agency.” Hanson v. Kynast, 24 Ohio St.3d 171, 173 , 494 N.E.2d 1091 (1986), fn. 4, citing Baird v. Sickler, 69 Ohio St.2d 652 , 433 N.E.2d 593 (1982). {¶25} “An agency relationship is created ‘if, but only if, there is an understanding between the parties which, as interpreted by the court, creates a fiduciary relation in which the fiduciary is subject to the directions of th 2017“In order to establish a claim under the doctrine of respondeat superior, it must be demonstrated that a principal-agent relationship existed, and that tortious conduct was committed by the agent while in the scope of his agency.” Hanson v. Kynast, 24 Ohio St.3d 171, 173 , 494 N.E.2d 1091 (1986), fn. 4, citing Baird v. Sickler, 69 Ohio St.2d 652 , 433 N.E.2d 593 (1982). {¶25} “An agency relationship is created ‘if, but only if, there is an understanding between the parties which, as interpreted by the court, creates a fiduciary relation in which the fiduciary is subject to the directions of th | 1 | 8 |
Losito v. Kruse, Jr.green2 sentences2024This is best illustrated by starting with the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Losito and working our way forward. {¶ 22} In Losito, 136 Ohio St. 183 , the Ohio Supreme Court made several points that have helped shape the doctrine of respondeat superior. 2024First, the Court held that “[w]hen, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a master becomes liable in damages for personal injuries caused solely by the negligent act of his servant, the latter is primarily liable and the former secondarily liable to the injured party[.]” Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus. | 1 | 8 |
Adams v. Peoplesgreen2 sentences2023The court concluded that the physician-employee's potential immunity as a state employee was "immaterial" to his private employer's vicarious liability, because "[a]n employee's immunity from liability is no shield to the employer's liability for acts under the doctrine of respondeat superior." Id. at ¶ 21, 28, citing Adams v. Peoples, 18 Ohio St.3d 140, 142-43 (1985). {¶ 60} The instant case is distinguishable from Sawicki. 2022We concluded that the employee’s potential immunity as a state employee was “immaterial” to his private employer’s vicarious liability, id. at ¶ 21, because “[a]n employee’s immunity from liability is no shield to the employer’s liability for acts under the doctrine of respondeat superior,” id. at ¶ 28, citing Adams v. Peoples, 18 Ohio St.3d 140, 142-143 , 480 N.E.2d 428 (1985). | 1 | 3 |
Pretty v. Muellergreen2 sentences2023Franklin No. 03AP-205, 2003-Ohio-5343, ¶ 6 , citing Pretty v. Mueller, 132 Ohio App.3d 717, 723 , 726 N.E.2d 503 (1st Dist.1997). 2011Dist. (1978), 55 Ohio St.2d 72 , syllabus (“[B]ased upon the doctrine of respondeat superior, as between the same parties, a judgment in favor of the servant on the merits renders invalid any judgment against the master.”); Pretty v. Mueller (1997), 132 Ohio App.3d 717, 723 (providing that an employer “cannot be independently found liable under respondeat superior” if the accused employee “has been found to have no liability”). | 1 | 3 |
Cooke v. Montgomery Countygreen2 sentences2019Allen No. 1-15-42, 2016-Ohio-253, ¶ 20 , citing Cooke v. Montgomery Cty., 158 Ohio App.3d 139 , 2004-Ohio-3780, ¶ 17 (2d Dist.). “‘An employee’s conduct is within the scope of his employment if it is the type of action which he is employed to perform, occurs substantially within the authorized limits of time and space [of employment], and is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master.’” Id., quoting Armaly v. Wapakoneta, 3d Dist. 2019Allen No. 1-15-42, 2016-Ohio-253, ¶ 20 , citing Cooke v. Montgomery Cty., 158 Ohio App.3d 139 , 2004-Ohio-3780, ¶ 17 (2d Dist.). “‘An employee’s conduct is within the scope of his employment if it is the type of action which he is employed to perform, occurs substantially within the authorized limits of time and space [of employment], and is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master.’” Id., quoting Armaly v. Wapakoneta, 3d Dist. | 1 | 3 |
Groob v. KeyBankgreen2 sentences2013See also Groob v. Keybank, 108 Ohio St.3d 348, 358 , 2006-Ohio-1189 , ¶ 58 ("an employer is not liable under a theory of respondeat superior unless its employee is acting within the scope of her employment when committing a tort-merely being aided by her employment status is not enough"). {¶ 61} In Byrd, the Supreme Court of Ohio found that a cleric's nonconsensual sexual conduct with a parishioner's spouse was an independent self-serving act that did not facilitate or promote characteristic church activity, and that the church was not subject to liability under the doctrine of respondeat supe 2008The trial court did not err by entering summary judgment in favor of Vanderwist on this claim. {¶ 21} Whelan claims Vanderwist was liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. "`It is well-established that in order for an employer to be liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the tort of the employee must be committed within the *Page 9 scope of employment.'" Groob v. KeyBank , 108 Ohio St.3d 348 , 2006-Ohio-1189 , at ¶ 42 . | 1 | 3 |
Cope v. Miami Valley Hospitalgreen2 sentences2025See Meehan v. AMN Healthcare, Inc., 2012- Ohio-557, ¶ 11 (1st Dist.), citing Cope v. Miami Valley Hosp., 2011-Ohio-4869, ¶ 18 (2d Dist.) (“Medical claims alleging the negligence of a hospital employee, such as a nurse, are governed by the doctrine of respondeat superior . . . [in which] a plaintiff may elect to sue the employer or both the employer and the employee.”). 2012Thus, she argues, Wuerth was not applicable and summary judgment should not have been granted. {¶18} In Cope v. Miami Valley Hosp., 195 Ohio App.3d 513 , 2011-Ohio-4869 (2d Dist.), the Second District addressed this issue. | 1 | 2 |
| Athens & Pomeroy Coal & Land Co. v. Tracygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bauman v. Bob Evans Farms, Unpublished Decision (1-16-2007)green | 1 | 1 |
| Thornton v. Delatoregreen | 1 | 1 |
| Haney v. Barringer, 06 Ma 141 (12-27-2007)green | 1 | 1 |
| Whalen v. T.J. Automation, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Curtis v. Gulley, Unpublished Decision (11-20-2006)green | 1 | 1 |
| Weiler v. Knox Community Hosp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Herron v. City of Youngstowngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sitton v. Massage Odyssey, L.L.C.green | 1 | 1 |
| cluster 769645green | 1 | 1 |
| Anita Arrington-Bey v. City of Bedford Heightsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Reynolds v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Simpkins v. Grace Brethren Church of Delawaregreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ramey v. Muddgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Butler v. Bakergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sickles v. Jackson County Highway Departmentgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Baird v. Sickler
green
2 sentences2017“In order to establish a claim under the doctrine of respondeat superior, it must be demonstrated that a principal-agent relationship existed, and that tortious conduct was committed by the agent while in the scope of his agency.” Hanson v. Kynast, 24 Ohio St.3d 171, 173 , 494 N.E.2d 1091 (1986), fn. 4, citing Baird v. Sickler, 69 Ohio St.2d 652 , 433 N.E.2d 593 (1982). {¶25} “An agency relationship is created ‘if, but only if, there is an understanding between the parties which, as interpreted by the court, creates a fiduciary relation in which the fiduciary is subject to the directions of th 2017“In order to establish a claim under the doctrine of respondeat superior, it must be demonstrated that a principal-agent relationship existed, and that tortious conduct was committed by the agent while in the scope of his agency.” Hanson v. Kynast, 24 Ohio St.3d 171, 173 , 494 N.E.2d 1091 (1986), fn. 4, citing Baird v. Sickler, 69 Ohio St.2d 652 , 433 N.E.2d 593 (1982). {¶25} “An agency relationship is created ‘if, but only if, there is an understanding between the parties which, as interpreted by the court, creates a fiduciary relation in which the fiduciary is subject to the directions of th | 7 | 1986–2017 |
Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs.
green
2 sentences2007Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York (1978), 436 U.S. 658 , 692 , 98 S.Ct. 2018 . 2007Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York (1978), 436 U.S. 658 , 692 , 98 S.Ct. 2018 . | 5 | 1991–2007 |
Auer v. Paliath (Slip Opinion)
green
2 sentences2019(See Appellants’ Brief at 15-17). {¶39} “The respondeat superior doctrine makes an employer or principal vicariously liable for the torts of its employees or agents.” Auer v. Paliath, 140 Ohio St.3d 276 , 2014-Ohio-3632, ¶ 13 , citing Clark v. Southview Hosp. & Family Health Ctr., 68 Ohio St.3d 435, 438 (1994). 2019(See Appellants’ Brief at 15-17). {¶39} “The respondeat superior doctrine makes an employer or principal vicariously liable for the torts of its employees or agents.” Auer v. Paliath, 140 Ohio St.3d 276 , 2014-Ohio-3632, ¶ 13 , citing Clark v. Southview Hosp. & Family Health Ctr., 68 Ohio St.3d 435, 438 (1994). | 4 | 2016–2025 |
Natl. Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. Wuerth
green
2 sentences2022Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. Wuerth, 122 Ohio St.3d 594 , 2009-Ohio-3601 , 913 N.E.2d 939 , in which we clearly stated that a plaintiff may choose to proceed against only an employer/principal: As we explained in Clark v. Southview Hosp. & Family Health Ctr., 68 Ohio St.3d 435, 438 , 628 N.E.2d 46 (1994), “[g]enerally, an employer or principal is vicariously liable for the torts of its employees or agents under the doctrine of respondeat superior.” Id., citing Councell v. Douglas, 163 Ohio St. 292 , 295- 296, 126 N.E.2d 597 (1955). 2022Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. Wuerth, 122 Ohio St.3d 594 , 2009-Ohio-3601 , 913 N.E.2d 939 , in which we clearly stated that a plaintiff may choose to proceed against only an employer/principal: As we explained in Clark v. Southview Hosp. & Family Health Ctr., 68 Ohio St.3d 435, 438 , 628 N.E.2d 46 (1994), “[g]enerally, an employer or principal is vicariously liable for the torts of its employees or agents under the doctrine of respondeat superior.” Id., citing Councell v. Douglas, 163 Ohio St. 292 , 295- 296, 126 N.E.2d 597 (1955). | 3 | 2010–2025 |
Berdyck v. Shinde
green
2 sentences2025Berdyck v. Shinde, 1993-Ohio-183 , 66 Ohio St.3d 573, 577 . 2002Berdyck v. Shinde, 66 Ohio St.3d 573 , 578 , 1993-Ohio-183 , citing Klema v. St. | 2 | 2002–2025 |
Hauser v. Dayton Police Dept. (Slip Opinion)
green
2 sentences2016“The Board, under the age old doctrine of respondeat superior, is vicariously liable for the retaliatory actions of its employee, Superintendent Notar.” Appellant’s Brief at 14. {¶31} Crawford relies on the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Hauser v. Dayton Police Dept., 140 Ohio St.3d 268 , 2014-Ohio-3636 , 17 N.E.3d 554 , for the proposition that “the employment-discrimination provisions in R.C. 4112.01(A)(2) and 4112.02(A) do not expressly impose civil liability on such employees, but instead impose vicarious liability on the political-subdivision itself.” Id. at ¶ 1. 2016“The Board, under the age old doctrine of respondeat superior, is vicariously liable for the retaliatory actions of its employee, Superintendent Notar.” Appellant’s Brief at 14. {¶31} Crawford relies on the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Hauser v. Dayton Police Dept., 140 Ohio St.3d 268 , 2014-Ohio-3636 , 17 N.E.3d 554 , for the proposition that “the employment-discrimination provisions in R.C. 4112.01(A)(2) and 4112.02(A) do not expressly impose civil liability on such employees, but instead impose vicarious liability on the political-subdivision itself.” Id. at ¶ 1. | 2 | 2016–2024 |
Orebaugh v. Wal-Mart Store, Inc., Ca2006-08-185 (9-24-2007)
green
2 sentences2019There is no requirement that the employee be named as a party to the suit in order to prove his negligent acts." Id. - 16 - Butler CA2018-12-238 {¶ 63} Wulf cites three cases for the proposition that the identity of a negligent employee need not be established to hold the employer liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. 2008Orebaugh v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , Butler App. No. CA2006-08-185, 2007-Ohio-4969 , ¶ 8 . | 2 | 2008–2019 |
Moncol v. Board of Education
green
2 sentences2011Dist. (1978), 55 Ohio St.2d 72 , syllabus (“[B]ased upon the doctrine of respondeat superior, as between the same parties, a judgment in favor of the servant on the merits renders invalid any judgment against the master.”); Pretty v. Mueller (1997), 132 Ohio App.3d 717, 723 (providing that an employer “cannot be independently found liable under respondeat superior” if the accused employee “has been found to have no liability”). 1985Moncol v. Bd. of Edn. (1978), 55 Ohio St. 2d 72 [ 9 O.O.3d 75 ], syllabus. | 2 | 1985–2011 |
Dipietro v. Lighthouse Ministries
green
2 sentences2011DiPietro v. Lighthouse Ministries, 159 Ohio App.3d 766 , 2005- Ohio-639, ¶15, quoting Byrd v. Faber (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 56, 58 . {¶34} In addition to the intentional torts of assault and battery, plaintiffs have also asserted claims for negligence. 2008DiPietro v. Lighthouse Ministries , 159 Ohio App.3d 766 , 2005-Ohio-639 , ¶ 15 , citing Byrd v. Faber (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 56 , 58 ; Taylor v. Doctors Hospital (1985), 21 Ohio App.3d 154 , 156-157 . | 2 | 2008–2011 |
Hubbuch v. City of Springfield
green
2 sentences2010The Wuerth court further noted that “ ‘[f]or the wrong of a servant acting within the scope of his authority, the plaintiff has a right of action against either the master or the servant, or against both, in separate actions, as a judgment against one is no bar to an action or judgment against the other until one judgment is satisfied.’ ” Wuerth at ¶ 21, quoting Losito v. Kruse (1940), 136 Ohio St. 183, 187 , 16 O.O. 185 , 24 N.E.2d 705 . {¶ 25} Illinois National interprets this general language to mean that in the context of malpractice liability asserted against a law firm, the plaintiff nee 1996The Ohio Supreme Court in Losito v. Kruse (1940), 136 Ohio St. 183 , 16 O.O. 185 , 24 N.E.2d 705 , held in its syllabus: “When, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a master becomes hable in damages for personal injuries caused solely by the neghgent act of his servant, the latter is primarily hable and the former secondarily hable to the injured party; and if the master is obhged to respond in damages by reason of such liability, he will be subrogated to the right of the injured party and may recover his loss from the servant, the one primarily hable.” The court in dicta then held that: | 2 | 1996–2010 |
Taylor v. Doctors Hospital
green
2 sentences2008DiPietro v. Lighthouse Ministries , 159 Ohio App.3d 766 , 2005-Ohio-639 , ¶ 15 , citing Byrd v. Faber (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 56 , 58 ; Taylor v. Doctors Hospital (1985), 21 Ohio App.3d 154 , 156-157 . 2001Taylor v. Doctors Hospital (1985), 21 Ohio App.3d 154 . "`* * * [A]n intentional and wilful attack committed by an agent or employee, to vent his own spleen or malevolence against the injured person, is a clear departure from his employment and his principal or employer is not responsible therefore.'" Schulman v. Cleveland (1972), 30 Ohio St.2d 196 , 198 , quoting Little Miami Railroad Co. v. Wetmore (1869), 19 Ohio St. 110 , 132 . | 2 | 2001–2008 |
Johnson v. Grant Hospital
green
2 sentences2006Hosps., Cuyahoga App. No. 80444, 2003-Ohio-398 , 2003 WL 195076 . {¶ 25} “Where the issue is one of an exercise of judgment or skill requiring the specialized training of a nurse, expert-opinion evidence would be required.” Johnson v. Grant Hosp. (1972), 31 Ohio App.2d 118, 124-125 , 60 O.O.2d 202 , 286 N.E.2d 308 , reversed on other grounds (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 169 , 291 N.E.2d 440 . {¶ 26} Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a hospital is liable for the negligent acts of its employees. 2006Hosps., Cuyahoga App. No. 80444, 2003-Ohio-398 , 2003 WL 195076 . {¶ 25} “Where the issue is one of an exercise of judgment or skill requiring the specialized training of a nurse, expert-opinion evidence would be required.” Johnson v. Grant Hosp. (1972), 31 Ohio App.2d 118, 124-125 , 60 O.O.2d 202 , 286 N.E.2d 308 , reversed on other grounds (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 169 , 291 N.E.2d 440 . {¶ 26} Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a hospital is liable for the negligent acts of its employees. | 2 | 2003–2006 |
| Johnson v. Grant Hospital green | 2 | 2003–2006 |
| Schulman v. City of Cleveland green | 2 | 2001–2001 |
| Mayfield v. Boy Scouts of America green | 2 | 1997–2000 |
| Kuhn v. Youlten green | 2 | 1999–2000 |
| Babbitt v. Say green | 2 | 1960–1997 |
| Sears v. City of Cincinnati green | 2 | 1973–1980 |
| Hyde v. City of Lakewood neutral | 2 | 1972–1973 |
| Rudy v. Lakeside Hospital neutral | 2 | 1960–1964 |
| Lakeside Hospital v. Kovar green | 2 | 1960–1964 |
| Clawson v. Hts. Chiropractic Physicians, L.L.C. green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Gysegem v. Ohio State Univ. Wexner Med. Ctr. green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Clements v. Ohio State Life Insurance green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Rush v. Univ. of Cincinnati Physicians, Inc. green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Walk v. Ohio Supreme Court, Unpublished Decision (10-7-2003) green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Bruni v. Tatsumi green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State ex rel. Howard v. Ferreri green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Ford v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. Correction, Unpublished Decision (5-23-2006) green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Verrastro v. Bayhospitalists, LLC green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| State v. Green, Unpublished Decision (7-13-2004) green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Hudson v. Flores green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Dahnke v. Meggitt green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Brown-Spurgeon v. Paul Davis Systems of Tri-State Area, Inc. green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Wright v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr. green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Evelyn M. Highlander v. K.F.C. National Management Co., D/B/A Zantigo Heublin Corporation Zantigo Mexican Restaurant green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Williams v. First United Church of Christ green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Ryan v. Ambrosio, 91036 (12-18-2008) green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Reno v. Centerville, Unpublished Decision (2-20-2004) green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Rodriguez green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.