respondeat superior doctrine in New Jersey

2026See G.A.-H. v. K.G.G., 238 N.J. 401, 415 (2019) (“For liability to attach to an employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the plaintiff must prove the existence of an employer- employee relationship and that the employee’s tortious actions ‘occurred within the scope of that employment.’” (quoting Carter v. Reynolds, 175 N.J. 402, 409 (2003))).

2024“Although as a general rule of tort law, liability must be based on personal fault,” an employer will be held vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior “for the negligence of an employee causing injuries to third parties, if, at the time of the occurrence, the employee was acting within the scope of his or her employment.” Ibid.

2026See G.A.-H. v. K.G.G., 238 N.J. 401, 415 (2019) (“For liability to attach to an employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the plaintiff must prove the existence of an employer- employee relationship and that the employee’s tortious actions ‘occurred within the scope of that employment.’” (quoting Carter v. Reynolds, 175 N.J. 402, 409 (2003))).

2026"The imposition of vicarious liability upon employers for the acts of an employee, also known as the doctrine of respondeat superior, is based upon the idea that the employee is the agent . . . of the employer." G.A.-H. v. K.G.G., 238 N.J. 401, 415 (2019).

2026"Under respondeat superior, an employer can be found liable for the negligence of an employee causing injuries to third parties, if, at the time of the occurrence, the employee was acting within the scope of his or her employment." Carter v. Reynolds, 175 N.J. 402, 408-09 (2003) (citing Lehmann v, Toys 'R' Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587, 619 (1993)).

2020Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, "an employer can be found liable for the negligence of an employee causing injuries to third parties if, at A-5058-18T2 4 the time of the occurrence, the employee was acting within the scope of his or her employment." Carter v. Reynolds, 175 N.J. 402, 408-09 (2003) (citing Lehman v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587, 619 (1993)).

2020"Generally, an employee who is 'going to' or 'coming from' his or her place of employment is not considered to be acting within the scope of employment" because a commuting employee is "deemed to be acting in their own interests without constraint by the employer regarding the method or means of the commute." Id. at 412, 413 (citing Mannes v. Healey, 306 N.J.

2001See Id. at 357, 703 A. 2d 944 , (citing Government Employees Ins.

1997Thus, “the scope of employment limitation on liability which is a part of the respondeat superior doctrine is not implicit in the wrong of negligent hiring.” Id. at 172-73 , 450 A.2d 508 .

1997Thus, “the scope of employment limitation on liability which is a part of the respondeat superior doctrine is not implicit in the wrong of negligent hiring.” Id. at 172-73 , 450 A.2d 508 .

2024A-0366-22 25 Our Supreme Court has noted "[t]here are three principal liability sections in the Act": N.J.S.A. 59:2-2, incorporating the doctrine of respondeat superior; N.J.S.A. 59:2-3, addressing discretionary activities and including "both immunity and liability provisions"; and N.J.S.A. 59:4-2, providing liability for dangerous conditions of public property, Rochinsky, 110 N.J. at 409 -10 — although there are certainly others tucked throughout the Act, see, e.g., N.J.S.A. 59:4-4 (establishing liability for failure to provide emergency signals on a street or highway); N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(a), (b

1995N.J.S.A. 59:2-2 incorporates the doctrine of respondeat superior, Rochinsky, supra, 110 N.J. at 409 , 541 A. 2d 1029 , and provides that "[a] public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of a public employee within the scope of his employment in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances." N.J.S.A. 59:4-2, not pertinent to this matter, deals with the liability of a public entity for dangerous conditions on its property.

2026“The doctrine of respondeat superior (‘let the superior make answer’) originated in the seventeenth-century common law of England, based upon the 35 concept ‘that one who would manage his or her affairs through others is obligated to third persons damaged by such others acting in the course of their employment.” Davis v. Devereux Found., 209 N.J. 269, 287 (2012) (citation omitted) (quoting 1 J.D.

2021Plaintiff's complaint alleged defendant: was negligent in the "hiring, retention, training and supervision of [Fred]," and also its "negligence permitted . . . [Fred] access to" the children; negligently inflicted emotional distress on Gloria and Barbara; violated the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -50; violated the Child Sexual Abuse Act (CSAA), N.J.S.A. 2A:61B-1; and was vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior or "agency principles" for various common law torts.4 Defendant moved for summary judgment following discovery, arguing that pursu

2004N.J.S.A. 59:2-2; McAndrew v. Mularchuk, 33 N.J. 172, 195 , 162 A. 2d 820 (1960); O'Brien v. Borough of Woodbury Heights, 679 F.Supp. 429, 439 (D.N.J.1988).

2004N.J.S.A. 59:2-2; McAndrew v. Mularchuk, 33 N.J. 172, 195 , 162 A. 2d 820 (1960); O'Brien v. Borough of Woodbury Heights, 679 F.Supp. 429, 439 (D.N.J.1988).

2009See Seal Tite Corp. v. Bressi, 312 N.J.Super. 532, 539 , 712 A.2d 262 (App.Div.), certif denied, 156 N.J. 411 , 719 A.2d 643 (1998).

2009See Seal Tite Corp. v. Bressi, 312 N.J.Super. 532, 539 , 712 A.2d 262 (App.Div.), certif denied, 156 N.J. 411 , 719 A.2d 643 (1998).

2003See McFadden v. Turner, 159 N.J.Super. 360 , 388 A. 2d 244 (App.Div.1978). [T]his court, in Moss v. Jones, 93 N.J.Super. 179 , 225 A. 2d 369 (App.Div. 1966), has heretofore held that when a plaintiff has a cause of action against two possible defendants, namely the negligent actor and the person vicariously liable for the negligent conduct, he need not join both in a single action but has the option of suing them separately in successive actions.

1968The defendant, Preben Jensen, was negligent in that he permitted such overload to work with full knowledge of the condition of the equipment maintained by Mayfair Fabrics, and negligently caused the switches controlling said equipment to be turned off and then again switched on and did by his negligence switch on other switches, causing fuel oil to be pumped upon the electrical equipment, which was defective, causing the fire in question." It is clear that, absent a release of liability under the exculpatory and insurance clause, the tenant as employer or master of Jensen would be liable to th

2026Robert Construction Co., the Court addressed the scope of vicarious liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior. 179 N.J. 462, 467-68 (2004).

2024See also Jones v. Morey's Pier, Inc., 230 N.J. 142, 157 (2017) (holding that "excluding contribution and indemnification claims from the tort claims notice Of course, the failure to meet the medical expense and permanency thresholds of N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d) "in no way affects the maintainability of the action itself.

2024As the Third Circuit explained, "[l]iability is imposed 'when the policy or custom itself violates the Constitution or when the policy or custom, while not unconstitutional itself, is the "moving force" behind the constitutional tort of A-2479-22 18 one of its employees.'" Thomas v. Cumberland Cnty., 749 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 946 F.2d 1017 , 1027 (3d Cir. 1991)).

2021Stomel, 192 N.J. at 145 (citing, e.g., Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91 ); see also Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986) (“The ‘official policy’ requirement was intended to distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of [its] employees . . . .”).

2020"Ordinarily, an employer that hires an independent contractor is not liable for the negligent acts of the contractor in the performance of the contract." Bahrle v. Exxon Corp., 145 N.J. 144, 156 (1996).

2019Davis v. Devereux Found. , 209 N.J. 269 , 287, 37 A.3d 469 (2012) ; see also Schultz v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese , 95 N.J. 530 , 538, 472 A.2d 531 (1984) ("[A] corporation can act only through its agents or servants."); Meir Dan-Cohen, Responsibility and the Boundaries of the Self , 105 Harv.

2019Davis v. Devereux Found. , 209 N.J. 269 , 287, 37 A.3d 469 (2012) ; see also Schultz v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese , 95 N.J. 530 , 538, 472 A.2d 531 (1984) ("[A] corporation can act only through its agents or servants."); Meir Dan-Cohen, Responsibility and the Boundaries of the Self , 105 Harv.

2018Furthermore, PATH maintains that the essence of a respondeat superior was included, when the judge instructed in section 89-22: "The fourth element is whether an injury to the plaintiff resulted in whole or in part from the negligence of the railroad or its employees or agents." PATH argues the omission of the instruction still would not have prejudiced Orrico based on Howard v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 78 F. App'x 842, 843 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding the jury instruction "that the employer was directly liable for the negligence of its employees" was sufficient notice of the emplo

2017Di Cosala v. Kay, 91 N.J. 159, 174 (1982); Lingar v. Live-In Companions, Inc., 300 N.J.

2012In similar circum stances, other courts have recognized that although egregious criminal acts “lend themselves to arguably the most instinctive conclusion that [they] could never be within the scope of one’s employment ... the resolution of the question does not turn on the type of act committed or on the perpetrator’s emotional baggage.” Stropes, supra, 547 N.E.2d at 248-49 (concluding that sexual assault by staff member on severely disabled individual in residential facility should not have been dismissed without trial); see Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psych. and Neuro., 329 N.W.2d 306,

2012In similar circum stances, other courts have recognized that although egregious criminal acts “lend themselves to arguably the most instinctive conclusion that [they] could never be within the scope of one’s employment ... the resolution of the question does not turn on the type of act committed or on the perpetrator’s emotional baggage.” Stropes, supra, 547 N.E.2d at 248-49 (concluding that sexual assault by staff member on severely disabled individual in residential facility should not have been dismissed without trial); see Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psych. and Neuro., 329 N.W.2d 306,