respondeat superior doctrine in Nevada

2014Co. v. Superior Court, 132 Cal. Rptr. 3d 209, 221 (Ct. App. 2011) ("It is an established principle of law that admissions implied from the default of one defendant ordinarily are not binding upon a codefendant who, by answering, expressly denies and places in issue the truth of the allegations thus admitted by the absent party." (internal quotations omitted)); Morehouse v. Wanzo, 72 Cal. Rptr. 607 , 611 (Ct. App. 1968) ("The general contractor, SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA (0) 1947A 17 as an employer liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior, may take advantage of any favorable aspects of th

2014Co. v. Superior Court, 132 Cal. Rptr. 3d 209, 221 (Ct. App. 2011) ("It is an established principle of law that admissions implied from the default of one defendant ordinarily are not binding upon a codefendant who, by answering, expressly denies and places in issue the truth of the allegations thus admitted by the absent party." (internal quotations omitted)); Morehouse v. Wanzo, 72 Cal. Rptr. 607, 611 (Ct. App. 1968) ("The general contractor, SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA (0) 1947A 17 as an employer liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior, may take advantage of any favorable aspects of the

2014Ct. App. 1976) (finding that county could not be held vicariously liable based on its employee's failure to plead, and stating "[t]he default of one defendant, although an admission by him of the allegations of the complaint, does not operate as an admission of such allegation as against a contesting co-defendant"); United Salt Corp. v. McKee, 628 P.2d 310, 313 (N.M. 1981) (holding that an employer is not foreclosed from litigating issues of negligence, respondeat superior, and damages based on an employee's default); Balanta v. Stanlaine Taxi Corp., 763 N.Y.S.2d 840, 842 (App. Div. 2003) (sta

2014Ct. App. 1976) (finding that county could not be held vicariously liable based on its employee's failure to plead, and stating "[t]he default of one defendant, although an admission by him of the allegations of the complaint, does not operate as an admission of such allegation as against a contesting co-defendant"); United Salt Corp. v. McKee, 628 P.2d 310, 313 (N.M. 1981) (holding that an employer is not foreclosed from litigating issues of negligence, respondeat superior, and damages based on an employee's default); Balanta v. Stanlaine Taxi Corp., 763 N.Y.S.2d 840, 842 (App. Div. 2003) (sta

2014Co. v. Superior Court, 132 Cal. Rptr. 3d 209, 221 (Ct. App. 2011) ("It is an established principle of law that admissions implied from the default of one defendant ordinarily are not binding upon a codefendant who, by answering, expressly denies and places in issue the truth of the allegations thus admitted by the absent party." (internal quotations omitted)); Morehouse v. Wanzo, 72 Cal. Rptr. 607 , 611 (Ct. App. 1968) ("The general contractor, SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA (0) 1947A 17 as an employer liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior, may take advantage of any favorable aspects of th

2014Co. v. Superior Court, 132 Cal. Rptr. 3d 209, 221 (Ct. App. 2011) ("It is an established principle of law that admissions implied from the default of one defendant ordinarily are not binding upon a codefendant who, by answering, expressly denies and places in issue the truth of the allegations thus admitted by the absent party." (internal quotations omitted)); Morehouse v. Wanzo, 72 Cal. Rptr. 607, 611 (Ct. App. 1968) ("The general contractor, SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA (0) 1947A 17 as an employer liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior, may take advantage of any favorable aspects of the

2014Co. v. Superior Court, 132 Cal. Rptr. 3d 209, 221 (Ct. App. 2011) ("It is an established principle of law that admissions implied from the default of one defendant ordinarily are not binding upon a codefendant who, by answering, expressly denies and places in issue the truth of the allegations thus admitted by the absent party." (internal quotations omitted)); Morehouse v. Wanzo, 72 Cal. Rptr. 607 , 611 (Ct. App. 1968) ("The general contractor, SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA (0) 1947A 17 as an employer liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior, may take advantage of any favorable aspects of th

2014Co. v. Superior Court, 132 Cal. Rptr. 3d 209, 221 (Ct. App. 2011) ("It is an established principle of law that admissions implied from the default of one defendant ordinarily are not binding upon a codefendant who, by answering, expressly denies and places in issue the truth of the allegations thus admitted by the absent party." (internal quotations omitted)); Morehouse v. Wanzo, 72 Cal. Rptr. 607, 611 (Ct. App. 1968) ("The general contractor, SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA (0) 1947A 17 as an employer liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior, may take advantage of any favorable aspects of the

2014Ct. App. 1976) (finding that county could not be held vicariously liable based on its employee's failure to plead, and stating "[t]he default of one defendant, although an admission by him of the allegations of the complaint, does not operate as an admission of such allegation as against a contesting co-defendant"); United Salt Corp. v. McKee, 628 P.2d 310, 313 (N.M. 1981) (holding that an employer is not foreclosed from litigating issues of negligence, respondeat superior, and damages based on an employee's default); Balanta v. Stanlaine Taxi Corp., 763 N.Y.S.2d 840, 842 (App. Div. 2003) (sta

2014Ct. App. 1976) (finding that county could not be held vicariously liable based on its employee's failure to plead, and stating "[t]he default of one defendant, although an admission by him of the allegations of the complaint, does not operate as an admission of such allegation as against a contesting co-defendant"); United Salt Corp. v. McKee, 628 P.2d 310, 313 (N.M. 1981) (holding that an employer is not foreclosed from litigating issues of negligence, respondeat superior, and damages based on an employee's default); Balanta v. Stanlaine Taxi Corp., 763 N.Y.S.2d 840, 842 (App. Div. 2003) (sta

2007Co., 118 Nev. 299, 303 , 43 P.3d 1018, 1021 (2002) (explaining that a latent ambiguity exists when otherwise clear language, when applied to the facts at issue, renders uncertain results). [57] See NRS 41.745 (providing that public and private employers are not liable for harm caused by their employees' intentional conduct if that conduct was (1) "a truly independent venture of the employee," (2) "not committed in the course of the very task assigned to the employee," and (3) "not reasonably foreseeable under the facts and circumstances of the case considering the nature and scope of his emplo

2007See, e.g., Margan v. Niles, 250 F. Supp. 2d 63 , 75 n.13 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (noting that an inconsistency would exist if vicarious liability were imposed on a government employer that is exempted from civil liability).

2007Co., 118 Nev. 299, 303 , 43 P.3d 1018, 1021 (2002) (explaining that a latent ambiguity exists when otherwise clear language, when applied to the facts at issue, renders uncertain results). [57] See NRS 41.745 (providing that public and private employers are not liable for harm caused by their employees' intentional conduct if that conduct was (1) "a truly independent venture of the employee," (2) "not committed in the course of the very task assigned to the employee," and (3) "not reasonably foreseeable under the facts and circumstances of the case considering the nature and scope of his emplo

2007Co., 118 Nev. 299, 303 , 43 P.3d 1018, 1021 (2002) (explaining that a latent ambiguity exists when otherwise clear language, when applied to the facts at issue, renders uncertain results). [57] See NRS 41.745 (providing that public and private employers are not liable for harm caused by their employees' intentional conduct if that conduct was (1) "a truly independent venture of the employee," (2) "not committed in the course of the very task assigned to the employee," and (3) "not reasonably foreseeable under the facts and circumstances of the case considering the nature and scope of his emplo

2007NRS 41.0349 provides that a government employee may generally seek indemnification from his or her employer when a judgment is entered against the employee "based on any act or omission relating to his public duty or employment." In this case, as no individual employees were named in appellants' complaint, no indemnification issues exist. [60] See Martinez v. Maruszczak, 123 Nev. ___ , 168 P.3d 720 (2007). [61] NRCP 56(c). [1] See State v. Silva, 86 Nev. 911, 914 , 478 P.2d 591, 593 (1970). [2] Subject to capped liability under NRS 41.035. [3] See Smith's Food & Drug Cntrs. v. Bellegarde, 114

2007NRS 41.0349 provides that a government employee may generally seek indemnification from his or her employer when a judgment is entered against the employee "based on any act or omission relating to his public duty or employment." In this case, as no individual employees were named in appellants' complaint, no indemnification issues exist. [60] See Martinez v. Maruszczak, 123 Nev. ___ , 168 P.3d 720 (2007). [61] NRCP 56(c). [1] See State v. Silva, 86 Nev. 911, 914 , 478 P.2d 591, 593 (1970). [2] Subject to capped liability under NRS 41.035. [3] See Smith's Food & Drug Cntrs. v. Bellegarde, 114

2007NRS 41.0349 provides that a government employee may generally seek indemnification from his or her employer when a judgment is entered against the employee "based on any act or omission relating to his public duty or employment." In this case, as no individual employees were named in appellants' complaint, no indemnification issues exist. [60] See Martinez v. Maruszczak, 123 Nev. ___ , 168 P.3d 720 (2007). [61] NRCP 56(c). [1] See State v. Silva, 86 Nev. 911, 914 , 478 P.2d 591, 593 (1970). [2] Subject to capped liability under NRS 41.035. [3] See Smith's Food & Drug Cntrs. v. Bellegarde, 114

2007NRS 41.0349 provides that a government employee may generally seek indemnification from his or her employer when a judgment is entered against the employee "based on any act or omission relating to his public duty or employment." In this case, as no individual employees were named in appellants' complaint, no indemnification issues exist. [60] See Martinez v. Maruszczak, 123 Nev. ___ , 168 P.3d 720 (2007). [61] NRCP 56(c). [1] See State v. Silva, 86 Nev. 911, 914 , 478 P.2d 591, 593 (1970). [2] Subject to capped liability under NRS 41.035. [3] See Smith's Food & Drug Cntrs. v. Bellegarde, 114

2007NRS 41.0349 provides that a government employee may generally seek indemnification from his or her employer when a judgment is entered against the employee "based on any act or omission relating to his public duty or employment." In this case, as no individual employees were named in appellants' complaint, no indemnification issues exist. [60] See Martinez v. Maruszczak, 123 Nev. ___ , 168 P.3d 720 (2007). [61] NRCP 56(c). [1] See State v. Silva, 86 Nev. 911, 914 , 478 P.2d 591, 593 (1970). [2] Subject to capped liability under NRS 41.035. [3] See Smith's Food & Drug Cntrs. v. Bellegarde, 114

2007NRS 41.0349 provides that a government employee may generally seek indemnification from his or her employer when a judgment is entered against the employee "based on any act or omission relating to his public duty or employment." In this case, as no individual employees were named in appellants' complaint, no indemnification issues exist. [60] See Martinez v. Maruszczak, 123 Nev. ___ , 168 P.3d 720 (2007). [61] NRCP 56(c). [1] See State v. Silva, 86 Nev. 911, 914 , 478 P.2d 591, 593 (1970). [2] Subject to capped liability under NRS 41.035. [3] See Smith's Food & Drug Cntrs. v. Bellegarde, 114

2007NRS 41.0349 provides that a government employee may generally seek indemnification from his or her employer when a judgment is entered against the employee "based on any act or omission relating to his public duty or employment." In this case, as no individual employees were named in appellants' complaint, no indemnification issues exist. [60] See Martinez v. Maruszczak, 123 Nev. ___ , 168 P.3d 720 (2007). [61] NRCP 56(c). [1] See State v. Silva, 86 Nev. 911, 914 , 478 P.2d 591, 593 (1970). [2] Subject to capped liability under NRS 41.035. [3] See Smith's Food & Drug Cntrs. v. Bellegarde, 114

2007Co., 118 Nev. 299, 303 , 43 P.3d 1018, 1021 (2002) (explaining that a latent ambiguity exists when otherwise clear language, when applied to the facts at issue, renders uncertain results). [57] See NRS 41.745 (providing that public and private employers are not liable for harm caused by their employees' intentional conduct if that conduct was (1) "a truly independent venture of the employee," (2) "not committed in the course of the very task assigned to the employee," and (3) "not reasonably foreseeable under the facts and circumstances of the case considering the nature and scope of his emplo

2007Co., 118 Nev. 299, 303 , 43 P.3d 1018, 1021 (2002) (explaining that a latent ambiguity exists when otherwise clear language, when applied to the facts at issue, renders uncertain results). [57] See NRS 41.745 (providing that public and private employers are not liable for harm caused by their employees' intentional conduct if that conduct was (1) "a truly independent venture of the employee," (2) "not committed in the course of the very task assigned to the employee," and (3) "not reasonably foreseeable under the facts and circumstances of the case considering the nature and scope of his emplo

2007Co., 118 Nev. 299, 303 , 43 P.3d 1018, 1021 (2002) (explaining that a latent ambiguity exists when otherwise clear language, when applied to the facts at issue, renders uncertain results). [57] See NRS 41.745 (providing that public and private employers are not liable for harm caused by their employees' intentional conduct if that conduct was (1) "a truly independent venture of the employee," (2) "not committed in the course of the very task assigned to the employee," and (3) "not reasonably foreseeable under the facts and circumstances of the case considering the nature and scope of his emplo

2007Co., 118 Nev. 299, 303 , 43 P.3d 1018, 1021 (2002) (explaining that a latent ambiguity exists when otherwise clear language, when applied to the facts at issue, renders uncertain results). [57] See NRS 41.745 (providing that public and private employers are not liable for harm caused by their employees' intentional conduct if that conduct was (1) "a truly independent venture of the employee," (2) "not committed in the course of the very task assigned to the employee," and (3) "not reasonably foreseeable under the facts and circumstances of the case considering the nature and scope of his emplo

1995See Donsco, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 587 F.2d 602, 606 (3d Cir. 1978).

1978Compare, Meagher v. Garvin, 80 Nev. 211 , 391 P.2d 507 (1964).

1978Compare, Meagher v. Garvin, 80 Nev. 211 , 391 P.2d 507 (1964).