respondeat superior doctrine in Nebraska

1998RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is held vicariously liable for the negligent acts of an employee committed while the employee was acting within the scope of the employer's business. *440 Kocsis v. Harrison, 249 Neb. 274 , 543 N.W.2d 164 (1996).

1998RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is held vicariously liable for the negligent acts of an employee committed while the employee was acting within the scope of the employer's business. *440 Kocsis v. Harrison, 249 Neb. 274 , 543 N.W.2d 164 (1996).

2017Holloway v. State, 293 Neb. 12 , 875 N.W.2d 435 (2016).

2017Holloway v. State, 293 Neb. 12 , 875 N.W.2d 435 (2016).

2001Kocsis v. Harrison, 249 Neb. 274 , 543 N.W.2d 164 (1996); Plock v. Crossroads Joint Venture, 239 Neb. 211 , 475 N.W.2d 105 (1991), overruled on other grounds, Hynes v. Hogan, 251 Neb. 404 , 558 N.W.2d 35 (1997).

2001Kocsis v. Harrison, 249 Neb. 274 , 543 N.W.2d 164 (1996); Plock v. Crossroads Joint Venture, 239 Neb. 211 , 475 N.W.2d 105 (1991), overruled on other grounds, Hynes v. Hogan, 251 Neb. 404 , 558 N.W.2d 35 (1997).

2025Rodriguez v. Lasting Hope Recovery Ctr., 308 Neb. 538 , 955 N.W.2d 707 (2021).

2021Cite as 308 Neb. 538 [1] The first group, collectively referred to as the “UNMC Defendants,” consisted of UNMC Physicians; the Noll Company; and two employees of UNMC Physicians, “Jane Doe Physician #1” and “Jane Doe Nurse #1.” The second group, collectively referred to as the “Lasting Hope Defendants,” consisted of Catholic Health Initiatives, doing business as CHI Health; Alegent Health-Bergan Mercy Health System, doing business as Lasting Hope; and two employees of Lasting Hope, “John Doe #1” and “John Doe #2.” We note that certain of these entities were grouped together pursuant to the doc

2019In Hunt v. Methodist Hosp. , 240 Neb. 838 , 485 N.W.2d 737 (1992), the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's refusal to give the plaintiff's requested instruction which would have shifted liability to a separate physician under the doctrine of respondeat superior, when the plaintiff's complaint was predicated on specific acts of negligence of another named physician.

2019In Hunt v. Methodist Hosp. , 240 Neb. 838 , 485 N.W.2d 737 (1992), the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's refusal to give the plaintiff's requested instruction which would have shifted liability to a separate physician under the doctrine of respondeat superior, when the plaintiff's complaint was predicated on specific acts of negligence of another named physician.

2019In contrast, in Long v. Hacker , 246 Neb. 547 , 520 N.W.2d 195 (1994), the Supreme Court determined that the trial court erred in instructing the jury regarding alternate methods of localization for a spinal surgery because this was not at issue in the case.

2019In contrast, in Long v. Hacker , 246 Neb. 547 , 520 N.W.2d 195 (1994), the Supreme Court determined that the trial court erred in instructing the jury regarding alternate methods of localization for a spinal surgery because this was not at issue in the case.

1991Release § 50 at 689 (1952) as follows: “In a situation where several persons are not actively joint tort-feasors, but one person commits the tort and is primarily liable while the liability of the other person is derivative or secondary, as where it arises under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the releasor’s acceptance of satisfaction from one, discharges the other as well, as in the case of master and servant or principal and agent; and it has been held that this is true despite an attempted reservation of rights against the person secondarily liable, since if the rule were otherwise, su

1991Release § 50 at 689 (1952) as follows: “In a situation where several persons are not actively joint tort-feasors, but one person commits the tort and is primarily liable while the liability of the other person is derivative or secondary, as where it arises under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the releasor’s acceptance of satisfaction from one, discharges the other as well, as in the case of master and servant or principal and agent; and it has been held that this is true despite an attempted reservation of rights against the person secondarily liable, since if the rule were otherwise, su

2019To allow such claims would frustrate the pur- poses of the exception.”13 [7] To summarize, Johnson held that under the intentional torts exception, the State is immune from suit when the tort claim “is based on the mere fact of government employment (such as a respondeat superior claim) or on the employment relationship between the intentional tort-feasor and the gov- ernment (such as a negligent supervision or negligent hir- ing claim).”14 12 Sheridan v. United States, 487 U.S. 392 , 108 S. Ct. 2449 , 101 L.

2019To allow such claims would frustrate the pur- poses of the exception.”13 [7] To summarize, Johnson held that under the intentional torts exception, the State is immune from suit when the tort claim “is based on the mere fact of government employment (such as a respondeat superior claim) or on the employment relationship between the intentional tort-feasor and the gov- ernment (such as a negligent supervision or negligent hir- ing claim).”14 12 Sheridan v. United States, 487 U.S. 392 , 108 S. Ct. 2449 , 101 L.

2019Ed. 2d 352 (1988). 13 Johnson v. State, supra note 10, 270 Neb. at 322 , 700 N.W.2d at 625 (quoting Sheridan v. United States, supra note 12 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment)). 14 Johnson v. State, supra note 10, 270 Neb. at 323 , 700 N.W.2d at 625 . - 599 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 304 Nebraska Reports RUTLEDGE v. CITY OF KIMBALL Cite as 304 Neb. 593 [8] Similarly, in Britton v. City of Crawford,15 this court held that when conduct “‘aris[es] out of’ a battery,” it falls within the exception of § 13-910(7) and the political subdivision is not liable for damages resulting from

2019Ed. 2d 352 (1988). 13 Johnson v. State, supra note 10, 270 Neb. at 322 , 700 N.W.2d at 625 (quoting Sheridan v. United States, supra note 12 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment)). 14 Johnson v. State, supra note 10, 270 Neb. at 323 , 700 N.W.2d at 625 . - 599 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 304 Nebraska Reports RUTLEDGE v. CITY OF KIMBALL Cite as 304 Neb. 593 [8] Similarly, in Britton v. City of Crawford,15 this court held that when conduct “‘aris[es] out of’ a battery,” it falls within the exception of § 13-910(7) and the political subdivision is not liable for damages resulting from

2019Ed. 2d 352 (1988). 13 Johnson v. State, supra note 10, 270 Neb. at 322 , 700 N.W.2d at 625 (quoting Sheridan v. United States, supra note 12 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment)). 14 Johnson v. State, supra note 10, 270 Neb. at 323 , 700 N.W.2d at 625 . - 599 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 304 Nebraska Reports RUTLEDGE v. CITY OF KIMBALL Cite as 304 Neb. 593 [8] Similarly, in Britton v. City of Crawford,15 this court held that when conduct “‘aris[es] out of’ a battery,” it falls within the exception of § 13-910(7) and the political subdivision is not liable for damages resulting from

2018The question whether a legal duty exists for actionable negligence is a question 2 Christensen v. Gale, ante p. 19, 917 N.W.2d 145 (2018). 3 Id. 4 Gaytan v. Wal-Mart, 289 Neb. 49 , 853 N.W.2d 181 (2014). - 542 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 301 Nebraska R eports CRUZ v. LOPEZ Cite as 301 Neb. 531 of law dependent on the facts in a particular situation.5 The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties, however, will not defeat an otherwise properly sup- ported motion for summary judgment6; only disputes over facts that under the governing law might affect the ou

2018The question whether a legal duty exists for actionable negligence is a question 2 Christensen v. Gale, ante p. 19, 917 N.W.2d 145 (2018). 3 Id. 4 Gaytan v. Wal-Mart, 289 Neb. 49 , 853 N.W.2d 181 (2014). - 542 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 301 Nebraska R eports CRUZ v. LOPEZ Cite as 301 Neb. 531 of law dependent on the facts in a particular situation.5 The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties, however, will not defeat an otherwise properly sup- ported motion for summary judgment6; only disputes over facts that under the governing law might affect the ou

2018The question whether a legal duty exists for actionable negligence is a question 2 Christensen v. Gale, ante p. 19, 917 N.W.2d 145 (2018). 3 Id. 4 Gaytan v. Wal-Mart, 289 Neb. 49 , 853 N.W.2d 181 (2014). - 542 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 301 Nebraska R eports CRUZ v. LOPEZ Cite as 301 Neb. 531 of law dependent on the facts in a particular situation.5 The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties, however, will not defeat an otherwise properly sup- ported motion for summary judgment6; only disputes over facts that under the governing law might affect the ou

2018The Plaintiffs’ claims against M&D [remain] pending . . . .” As to M&D, appellants alleged that (1) Johnson was an agent of M&D, and M&D was liable for his negligence through the doctrine of respondeat superior; (2) M&D was negligent in hir- ing, training, or supervising Johnson given Johnson’s unfitness - 986 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 301 Nebraska R eports SPARKS v. M&D TRUCKING Cite as 301 Neb. 977 to operate motor vehicles on public roads and a criminal history regarding the operation of motor vehicles; and (3) M&D was negligent per se in that M&D was the operator and/or stat

2016Baker.” If an employee 36 Id. 37 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 , 129 S. Ct. 1937 , 173 L.

2016Baker.” If an employee 36 Id. 37 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 , 129 S. Ct. 1937 , 173 L.

2001Kocsis v. Harrison, 249 Neb. 274 , 543 N.W.2d 164 (1996); Plock v. Crossroads Joint Venture, 239 Neb. 211 , 475 N.W.2d 105 (1991), overruled on other grounds, Hynes v. Hogan, 251 Neb. 404 , 558 N.W.2d 35 (1997).

2001Kocsis v. Harrison, 249 Neb. 274 , 543 N.W.2d 164 (1996); Plock v. Crossroads Joint Venture, 239 Neb. 211 , 475 N.W.2d 105 (1991), overruled on other grounds, Hynes v. Hogan, 251 Neb. 404 , 558 N.W.2d 35 (1997).

2000Reeder v. State, 254 Neb. 707 , *734 578 N.W.2d 435 (1998).

2000Reeder v. State, 254 Neb. 707 , *734 578 N.W.2d 435 (1998).

1996Plock v. Crossroads Joint Venture, 239 Neb. 211 , 475 N.W.2d 105 (1991); Pullen v. Novak, 169 Neb. 211 , 99 N.W.2d 16 (1959).

1996Plock v. Crossroads Joint Venture, 239 Neb. 211 , 475 N.W.2d 105 (1991); Pullen v. Novak, 169 Neb. 211 , 99 N.W.2d 16 (1959).

1994Similarly, in a case involving an alleged partnership violation of criminally knowingly violating interstate commerce regulations for the safe transportation of explosives, the U.S. Supreme Court stated: “[I]t is elementary that such impersonal entities [as corporations and other associations] can be guilty of ‘knowing’ or ‘willful’ violations of regulatory statutes through the doctrine of respondeat superior.” United States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121, 125 , 79 S. Ct. 203 , 3 L.

1994Similarly, in a case involving an alleged partnership violation of criminally knowingly violating interstate commerce regulations for the safe transportation of explosives, the U.S. Supreme Court stated: “[I]t is elementary that such impersonal entities [as corporations and other associations] can be guilty of ‘knowing’ or ‘willful’ violations of regulatory statutes through the doctrine of respondeat superior.” United States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121, 125 , 79 S. Ct. 203 , 3 L.

1993Although noting that “[c]ourts generally have not made this distinction or have followed rules applicable to true joint tort-feasors even though recognizing the distinction,” id., citing Annot., 92 A.L.R.2d 533 (1963), the Dickey court declared that “in a tort action based exclusively on the alleged negligence of an employee or agent, a valid release of that employee-agent releases the employer or principal from liability, even though the release specifically reserves all claims against the employer-principal.” Dickey at 424 , 197 N.W.2d at 388 , citing Annot., 20 A.L.R.2d 1044 (1951); Bacon v

1993Although noting that "[c]ourts generally have not made this distinction or have followed rules applicable to true joint tortfeasors even though recognizing the distinction," id., citing Annot., 92 A.L.R.2d 533 (1963), the Dickey court declared that "in a tort action based exclusively on the alleged negligence of an employee or agent, a valid release of that employee-agent releases the employer or principal from liability, even though the release specifically reserves all claims against the employer-principal." *443 Dickey at 424 , 197 N.W.2d at 388 , citing Annot., 20 A.L.R.2d 1044 (1951); Bac

1993Although noting that “[c]ourts generally have not made this distinction or have followed rules applicable to true joint tort-feasors even though recognizing the distinction,” id., citing Annot., 92 A.L.R.2d 533 (1963), the Dickey court declared that “in a tort action based exclusively on the alleged negligence of an employee or agent, a valid release of that employee-agent releases the employer or principal from liability, even though the release specifically reserves all claims against the employer-principal.” Dickey at 424 , 197 N.W.2d at 388 , citing Annot., 20 A.L.R.2d 1044 (1951); Bacon v

1993Although noting that "[c]ourts generally have not made this distinction or have followed rules applicable to true joint tortfeasors even though recognizing the distinction," id., citing Annot., 92 A.L.R.2d 533 (1963), the Dickey court declared that "in a tort action based exclusively on the alleged negligence of an employee or agent, a valid release of that employee-agent releases the employer or principal from liability, even though the release specifically reserves all claims against the employer-principal." *443 Dickey at 424 , 197 N.W.2d at 388 , citing Annot., 20 A.L.R.2d 1044 (1951); Bac

1991Physicians and nurses who assist in an operation, though employed by the hospital, “normally become the temporary servants or agents of the surgeon in charge while the operation is in progress, and liability may be imposed upon him for their negligent acts under the doctrine of respondeat superior” Id.

1987As previously noted, this view is consistent with those expressed in Clark v. Brooks, supra , *112 and does not suggest that the release of the principal alleged to be liable exclusively on the theory of respondeat superior should serve to release the agent, regardless of the parties' intentions.

1987As previously noted, this view is consistent with those expressed in Clark v. Brooks, supra, and does not suggest that the release of the principal alleged to be liable exclusively on the theory of respondeat superior should serve to release the agent, regardless of the parties’ intentions.

1982Super. 363 , 244 A.2d 344 (1968); Mid-Continent Pipeline Co. v. Crauthers, 267 P.2d 568 (Okla. 1954); Spradley v. McCrackin, 505 S.W.2d 955 (Tex. Civ.