12 North Dakota opinions name it 1 courts 1935–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Dakota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Randall Jackson v. Jay Nixongreen1 sentence2018See Jackson v. Nixon , 747 F.3d 537 , 543 (8th Cir. 2014) (stating, "While the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to § 1983 cases, a supervisor may still be liable under § 1983 if either his direct action or his 'failure to properly supervise and train the offending employee' caused the constitutional violation at issue."). | 1 | 1 |
Security State Bank of North Dakota v. Orvikgreen2 sentences2003See Security State Bank v. Orvik, 2001 ND 197, ¶ 6 , 636 N.W.2d 664 (holding nonappealable interlocutory orders, such as partial summary judgments, are reviewable in an appeal from a final judgment). [¶ 28] Generally, entities are liable for torts committed by their agents while acting within the scope of their employment. 2003See Security State Bank v. Orvik, 2001 ND 197, ¶ 6 , 636 N.W.2d 664 (holding nonappealable interlocutory orders, such as partial summary judgments, are reviewable in an appeal from a final judgment). [¶ 28] Generally, entities are liable for torts committed by their agents while acting within the scope of their employment. | 1 | 1 |
Newman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.green2 sentences1994See also Newman v. Sears, Roe *591 buck & Co., 77 N.D. 466 , 43 N.W.2d 411, 414 (1950). 1994See also Newman v. Sears, Roe *591 buck & Co., 77 N.D. 466 , 43 N.W.2d 411, 414 (1950). | 1 | 1 |
Wright Ex Rel. Wright v. Stategreen2 sentences1994See also Wright v. State, 189 N.W.2d 675 (N.D.1971). 1994See also Wright v. State, 189 N.W.2d 675 (N.D.1971). | 1 | 1 |
Royer v. Rasmussengreen2 sentences1989Royer v. Rasmussen, 34 N.D. 428 , 158 N.W. 988, 989-990 (1916); see also Edwards v. Great Northern Ry. 1989Royer v. Rasmussen, 34 N.D. 428 , 158 N.W. 988, 989-990 (1916); see also Edwards v. Great Northern Ry. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Dakota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Nelson v. Gillette
green
2 sentences2003Nelson v. Gillette , 1997 ND 205, ¶ 10 , 571 N.W.2d 332 ; Zimprich , 519 N.W.2d at 590-91 . 2003Nelson v. Gillette , 1997 ND 205, ¶ 10 , 571 N.W.2d 332 ; Zimprich , 519 N.W.2d at 590-91 . | 2 | 2003–2003 |
Vande Hoven v. Vande Hoven
green
1 sentence2003N.D.R.Civ.P. 7; Vande Hoven v. Vande Hoven, 399 N.W.2d 855 (N.D.1987). [¶ 34] There is no assertion here that Lerol and Farmers Union were misled by Wangler's failure to reallege the respondeat superior claim in the amended complaint. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Zimprich v. Broekel
green
1 sentence2003Nelson v. Gillette , 1997 ND 205, ¶ 10 , 571 N.W.2d 332 ; Zimprich , 519 N.W.2d at 590-91 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Herman v. Magnuson
green
1 sentence1989Although the family car doctrine is based on agency principles and imposes liability upon the “head of the family” under the doctrine of respondeat superior, [see Herman v. Magnuson, supra, 277 N.W.2d at 459-460 ], this court has treated principals and agents as joint tort-feasors, even when the liability of the principal rests upon the doctrine of respondeat superior. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Horejsi Ex Rel. Anton v. Anderson
green
1 sentence1988In support of its motion Agristor asserted that Zimprich’s action against Agristor was based solely upon a claim of vicarious liability, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, and therefore, under Horejsi v. Anderson, 353 N.W.2d 316 (N.D.1984), the release of Harvestore by Zimprich resulted, as a matter of law, in a release of Agristor from all further claims. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Kelly v. Lang
green
1 sentence1974Because this is true, the rule forbidding the imputing of negligence of the alleged agent to the minor would also apply to cases where the minor is engaged in a joint enterprise with the person who commits the negligent act in question.” North Dakota recognizes both a doctrine of “joint adventure”—Kelly v. Lang, 62 N.W.2d 770 (N.D.1954); Brudvik v. Frosaker Blaisdell Co., 56 N.D. 215 , 216 N.W. 891 (1927); Gehlhar v. Konoske, 50 N.D. 256 , 195 N.W. 558 (1923)—and one of “joint enterprise” for the purpose of imputing liability. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Gehlhar v. Konoske
green
2 sentences1974Because this is true, the rule forbidding the imputing of negligence of the alleged agent to the minor would also apply to cases where the minor is engaged in a joint enterprise with the person who commits the negligent act in question.” North Dakota recognizes both a doctrine of “joint adventure”—Kelly v. Lang, 62 N.W.2d 770 (N.D.1954); Brudvik v. Frosaker Blaisdell Co., 56 N.D. 215 , 216 N.W. 891 (1927); Gehlhar v. Konoske, 50 N.D. 256 , 195 N.W. 558 (1923)—and one of “joint enterprise” for the purpose of imputing liability. 1974Because this is true, the rule forbidding the imputing of negligence of the alleged agent to the minor would also apply to cases where the minor is engaged in a joint enterprise with the person who commits the negligent act in question.” North Dakota recognizes both a doctrine of “joint adventure”—Kelly v. Lang, 62 N.W.2d 770 (N.D.1954); Brudvik v. Frosaker Blaisdell Co., 56 N.D. 215 , 216 N.W. 891 (1927); Gehlhar v. Konoske, 50 N.D. 256 , 195 N.W. 558 (1923)—and one of “joint enterprise” for the purpose of imputing liability. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Brudvik v. Frosaker Blaisdell Co.
green
2 sentences1974Because this is true, the rule forbidding the imputing of negligence of the alleged agent to the minor would also apply to cases where the minor is engaged in a joint enterprise with the person who commits the negligent act in question.” North Dakota recognizes both a doctrine of “joint adventure”—Kelly v. Lang, 62 N.W.2d 770 (N.D.1954); Brudvik v. Frosaker Blaisdell Co., 56 N.D. 215 , 216 N.W. 891 (1927); Gehlhar v. Konoske, 50 N.D. 256 , 195 N.W. 558 (1923)—and one of “joint enterprise” for the purpose of imputing liability. 1974Because this is true, the rule forbidding the imputing of negligence of the alleged agent to the minor would also apply to cases where the minor is engaged in a joint enterprise with the person who commits the negligent act in question.” North Dakota recognizes both a doctrine of “joint adventure”—Kelly v. Lang, 62 N.W.2d 770 (N.D.1954); Brudvik v. Frosaker Blaisdell Co., 56 N.D. 215 , 216 N.W. 891 (1927); Gehlhar v. Konoske, 50 N.D. 256 , 195 N.W. 558 (1923)—and one of “joint enterprise” for the purpose of imputing liability. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Carpenter v. Dunnell
green
2 sentences1962In Carpenter v. Dunnell, 61 N.D. 263 , 237 N.W. 779 , the liability of the car owner for the negligence of a member of his family was predicated upon a master and servant relationship. 1962In Carpenter v. Dunnell, 61 N.D. 263 , 237 N.W. 779 , the liability of the car owner for the negligence of a member of his family was predicated upon a master and servant relationship. | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Montain v. City of Fargo
neutral
1 sentence1950Section 34-0401 NDEO 1943, defines a servant as “one who is employed to render personal services to his employer, otherwise than in the pursuit of an independent calling and who, in such service, remains entirely under the control and direction of the latter, who is called his master.” Of this definition, Chief Justice Bruce in Montain v. Fargo, 38 ND 432 , 440, 166 NW 416 , LRA1918C 600, writing for this-court says: “This definition of a servant, where it is sought to distinguish between a servant and an independent contractor, affords by inference a definition of an independent contractor, a | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Janneck v. Workmen's Compensation Bureau
green
1 sentence1950Section 34-0401 NDEO 1943, defines a servant as “one who is employed to render personal services to his employer, otherwise than in the pursuit of an independent calling and who, in such service, remains entirely under the control and direction of the latter, who is called his master.” Of this definition, Chief Justice Bruce in Montain v. Fargo, 38 ND 432 , 440, 166 NW 416 , LRA1918C 600, writing for this-court says: “This definition of a servant, where it is sought to distinguish between a servant and an independent contractor, affords by inference a definition of an independent contractor, a | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Slusher v. Hubble
neutral
2 sentences1935Bagan v. Bitterman, ante, 429, 259 N: W. 268; Slusher v. Hubble, 254 Ky. 595 , 72 S. W. (2d) 39 ; Saums v. Parfet, 270 Mich. 165 , 258 N. W. 235 . 1935Bagan v. Bitterman, ante, 429, 259 N: W. 268; Slusher v. Hubble, 254 Ky. 595 , 72 S. W. (2d) 39 ; Saums v. Parfet, 270 Mich. 165 , 258 N. W. 235 . | 1 | 1935–1935 |
Saums v. Parfet
green
2 sentences1935Bagan v. Bitterman, ante, 429, 259 N: W. 268; Slusher v. Hubble, 254 Ky. 595 , 72 S. W. (2d) 39 ; Saums v. Parfet, 270 Mich. 165 , 258 N. W. 235 . 1935Bagan v. Bitterman, ante, 429, 259 N: W. 268; Slusher v. Hubble, 254 Ky. 595 , 72 S. W. (2d) 39 ; Saums v. Parfet, 270 Mich. 165 , 258 N. W. 235 . | 1 | 1935–1935 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.