respondeat superior doctrine in Pennsylvania

1995As our Supreme Court stated in Wicks v. Milzoco Builders, Inc., “whether appellees acted within the scope of their authority as corporate officers is irrelevant. ‘The fact that an officer is acting for a corporation also may make the corporation vicariously or secondarily liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior; it does not however relieve the individual of his responsibility.’ ” 503 Pa. 614, 620 , 470 A.2d 86 , 89 n. 5 (1983) (quoting Donsco, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 587 F.2d 602, 606 (3d Cir.1978)).

1995As our Supreme Court stated in Wicks v. Milzoco Builders, Inc., “whether appellees acted within the scope of their authority as corporate officers is irrelevant. ‘The fact that an officer is acting for a corporation also may make the corporation vicariously or secondarily liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior; it does not however relieve the individual of his responsibility.’ ” 503 Pa. 614, 620 , 470 A.2d 86 , 89 n. 5 (1983) (quoting Donsco, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 587 F.2d 602, 606 (3d Cir.1978)).

1985Where that relation exists the law imputes to the master the negligence of the servant, and the doctrine of respondeat superior applies.” Betcher v. McChesney, 255 Pa. 394 , 100 Atl. 124 (1917).

1985Where that relation exists the law imputes to the master the negligence of the servant, and the doctrine of respondeat superior applies.” Betcher v. McChesney, 255 Pa. 394 , 100 Atl. 124 (1917).

1963As to the former the doctrine of respondeat superior applies; as to the latter, it does not.” The Supreme Court also pointed out in the case of Boorse v. Springfield Township, 377 Pa. 109 (1954), that exceptions to this immunity would be cases involving highway construction, the building of public works or the maintenance of a nuisance.

1960It is true that municipalities are not clothed with immunity in certain cases, such as those involving highway construction, the building of public works, or the maintenance of a nuisance; these are well established exceptions to the rule and as such are explained in Scibilia v. Philadelphia, 279 Pa. 549, 555, 556 , 124 A. 273, 275 , 276”: Boorse v. Springfield Twp., 377 Pa. 109, 112 .

1959In Bojarski v. Howlett, Inc., 291 Pa. 485 (1928), this Court said: “The doctrine of respondeat superior applies only when the relation of master and servant is shown to exist between the wrongdoer and the person sought to be charged for the result of the wrong at the time, and in respect to the very transaction out of which the injury arose.” Paugh sent Petersen to hold the ladder and plaintiff asked him, on arrival, to do the very thing he had been sent to do.

1928“The doctrine of respondeat superior applies only when the relation of master and servant is shown to exist between the wrongdoer and the person sought to be charged for the result of the wrong, at the time, and in respect to the very transaction out of which the injury arose; and a servant employed and paid by one person may nevertheless be the servant of another in a particular transaction even when the general employer is interested in the work”: Bojarski v. Howlett, 291 Pa. 485, 490 ; Byrne v. Hitner’s Sons Co., 290 Pa, 225.

2013Unlike the doctrine of respondeat superior, “where the wrongful conduct of the employee is attributable to the master vicariously,” direct liability provides “a remedy to injured third parties who would otherwise be foreclosed from recovery under the master-servant doctrine because the wrongful acts of employees in these cases are likely to be outside the scope of employment or not in furtherance of the master’s business.” Id.

2013The defendants seem to assert that claims under respondeat superior and direct corporate negligence cannot be brought together due to a high danger of prejudice, under Holben v. Midwest Emery Freight System, Inc. and its progeny. 525 F. Supp. 1224 (W.D.

2000Molek v. Hickey, 136 Pa.Cmwlth. 223 , 582 A.2d 734 (1990), this court stated that the principle of imputed negligence, or vicarious liability, is given the Latin name of respondeat superior. [2] The majority does indicate that the Board made certain findings relating to the common law doctrine of respondeat superior.

2000Molek v. Hickey, 136 Pa.Cmwlth. 223 , 582 A.2d 734 (1990), this court stated that the principle of imputed negligence, or vicarious liability, is given the Latin name of respondeat superior. [2] The majority does indicate that the Board made certain findings relating to the common law doctrine of respondeat superior.

1995As our Supreme Court stated in Wicks v. Milzoco Builders, Inc., “whether appellees acted within the scope of their authority as corporate officers is irrelevant. ‘The fact that an officer is acting for a corporation also may make the corporation vicari ously or secondarily liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior; it does not however relieve the individual of his responsibility.’ ” 508 Pa. 614 , 620, 470 A.2d 86 , 89 n. 5 (1983) (quoting Donsco, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 587 F.2d 602, 606 (3d Cir.1978)).

1995Fitzgerald v. McCutcheon, 270 Pa. Super. 102 , 410 A.2d 1270 (1979); Advanced Power Systems Inc. v. Hi-Tech Systems Inc., 1994 WL 116121 (E.D.

1995Fitzgerald v. McCutcheon, 270 Pa. Super. 102 , 410 A.2d 1270 (1979); Advanced Power Systems Inc. v. Hi-Tech Systems Inc., 1994 WL 116121 (E.D.

1991See Ramone v. Mani, 535 S.W.2d 654 (Tex.Civ.App. — Eastland 1975) (negligence of nurses in counting sponges during surgery imputed to hospital under doctrine of respondeat superior), aff’d, 550 S.W.2d 270 (Tex.1977); Seneris v. Haas, 45 Cal.2d 811 , 291 P.2d 915 (1955) (anesthesiologist, whose negligence resulted in patient’s paralysis, was ostensible agent of hospital; and Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital, 33 Ill.2d 326 , 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied 383 U.S. 946 , 86 S.Ct. 1204 , 16 L.Ed.2d 209 (1966) (corporate negligence of hospital based on holding that hospital ow

1991See Ramone v. Mani, 535 S.W.2d 654 (Tex.Civ.App. — Eastland 1975) (negligence of nurses in counting sponges during surgery imputed to hospital under doctrine of respondeat superior), aff’d, 550 S.W.2d 270 (Tex.1977); Seneris v. Haas, 45 Cal.2d 811 , 291 P.2d 915 (1955) (anesthesiologist, whose negligence resulted in patient’s paralysis, was ostensible agent of hospital; and Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital, 33 Ill.2d 326 , 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied 383 U.S. 946 , 86 S.Ct. 1204 , 16 L.Ed.2d 209 (1966) (corporate negligence of hospital based on holding that hospital ow

1991Therefore, for this limited purpose only, I would not consider a governmental defendant's tort liability to be secondary merely because the liability is imposed under the respondeat superior doctrine. [13] 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(b)(4). [1] In Crowell we noted that had the Supreme Court decided Mascaro on the grounds that the criminal conduct of a third party acted as an intervening cause, Crowell could be distinguished because "there is no conduct on the part of Lewis which permits us to conclude that Lewis' conduct was an intervening cause of the injuries sustained by the Crowells . . . ." 131 Pa.

1991Therefore, for this limited purpose only, I would not consider a governmental defendant's tort liability to be secondary merely because the liability is imposed under the respondeat superior doctrine. [13] 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(b)(4). [1] In Crowell we noted that had the Supreme Court decided Mascaro on the grounds that the criminal conduct of a third party acted as an intervening cause, Crowell could be distinguished because "there is no conduct on the part of Lewis which permits us to conclude that Lewis' conduct was an intervening cause of the injuries sustained by the Crowells . . . ." 131 Pa.

1991See Ramone v. Mani, 535 S.W.2d 654 (Tex.Civ.App. — Eastland 1975) (negligence of nurses in counting sponges during surgery imputed to hospital under doctrine of respondeat superior), aff’d, 550 S.W.2d 270 (Tex.1977); Seneris v. Haas, 45 Cal.2d 811 , 291 P.2d 915 (1955) (anesthesiologist, whose negligence resulted in patient’s paralysis, was ostensible agent of hospital; and Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital, 33 Ill.2d 326 , 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied 383 U.S. 946 , 86 S.Ct. 1204 , 16 L.Ed.2d 209 (1966) (corporate negligence of hospital based on holding that hospital ow

1991See Ramone v. Mani, 535 S.W.2d 654 (Tex.Civ.App. — Eastland 1975) (negligence of nurses in counting sponges during surgery imputed to hospital under doctrine of respondeat superior), aff’d, 550 S.W.2d 270 (Tex.1977); Seneris v. Haas, 45 Cal.2d 811 , 291 P.2d 915 (1955) (anesthesiologist, whose negligence resulted in patient’s paralysis, was ostensible agent of hospital; and Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital, 33 Ill.2d 326 , 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied 383 U.S. 946 , 86 S.Ct. 1204 , 16 L.Ed.2d 209 (1966) (corporate negligence of hospital based on holding that hospital ow

1991See Ramone v. Mani, 535 S.W.2d 654 (Tex.Civ.App. — Eastland 1975) (negligence of nurses in counting sponges during surgery imputed to hospital under doctrine of respondeat superior), aff’d, 550 S.W.2d 270 (Tex.1977); Seneris v. Haas, 45 Cal.2d 811 , 291 P.2d 915 (1955) (anesthesiologist, whose negligence resulted in patient’s paralysis, was ostensible agent of hospital; and Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital, 33 Ill.2d 326 , 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied 383 U.S. 946 , 86 S.Ct. 1204 , 16 L.Ed.2d 209 (1966) (corporate negligence of hospital based on holding that hospital ow

1991See Ramone v. Mani, 535 S.W.2d 654 (Tex.Civ.App. — Eastland 1975) (negligence of nurses in counting sponges during surgery imputed to hospital under doctrine of respondeat superior), aff'd, 550 S.W.2d 270 (Tex.1977); Seneris v. Haas, 45 Cal.2d 811 , 291 P.2d 915 (1955) (anesthesiologist, whose negligence resulted in patient's paralysis, was ostensible agent of hospital; and Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital, 33 Ill.2d 326 , 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied 383 U.S. 946 , 86 S.Ct. 1204 , 16 L.Ed.2d 209 (1966) (corporate negligence of hospital based on holding that hospital ow

1991See Ramone v. Mani, 535 S.W.2d 654 (Tex.Civ.App. — Eastland 1975) (negligence of nurses in counting sponges during surgery imputed to hospital under doctrine of respondeat superior), aff’d, 550 S.W.2d 270 (Tex.1977); Seneris v. Haas, 45 Cal.2d 811 , 291 P.2d 915 (1955) (anesthesiologist, whose negligence resulted in patient’s paralysis, was ostensible agent of hospital; and Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital, 33 Ill.2d 326 , 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied 383 U.S. 946 , 86 S.Ct. 1204 , 16 L.Ed.2d 209 (1966) (corporate negligence of hospital based on holding that hospital ow

1991See Ramone v. Mani, 535 S.W.2d 654 (Tex.Civ.App. — Eastland 1975) (negligence of nurses in counting sponges during surgery imputed to hospital under doctrine of respondeat superior), aff'd, 550 S.W.2d 270 (Tex.1977); Seneris v. Haas, 45 Cal.2d 811 , 291 P.2d 915 (1955) (anesthesiologist, whose negligence resulted in patient's paralysis, was ostensible agent of hospital; and Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital, 33 Ill.2d 326 , 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied 383 U.S. 946 , 86 S.Ct. 1204 , 16 L.Ed.2d 209 (1966) (corporate negligence of hospital based on holding that hospital ow

1990See Falls Township v. Scally, 115 Pa.Commonwealth 56, 539 A.2d 912 (1988) (Proprietary-governmental function distinction was utilized to determine whether a contract was ultra vires and not binding on the current board of township supervisors.); Faiella v. Bartoles, 102 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 258, 517 A.2d 1019 (1986) (Proprietary-governmental function distinction is no longer relevant to governmental and sovereign immunity cases.); Kunz v. City of Titusville, 373 Pa. 528 , 97 A.2d 42 (1953) (The *540 doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to governmental functions but does to proprietary

1990See Falls Township v. Scally, 115 Pa.Commonwealth 56, 539 A.2d 912 (1988) (Proprietary-governmental function distinction was utilized to determine whether a contract was ultra vires and not binding on the current board of township supervisors.); Faiella v. Bartoles, 102 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 258, 517 A.2d 1019 (1986) (Proprietary-governmental function distinction is no longer relevant to governmental and sovereign immunity cases.); Kunz v. City of Titusville, 373 Pa. 528 , 97 A.2d 42 (1953) (The *540 doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to governmental functions but does to proprietary

1990See Falls Township v. Scally, 115 Pa.Commonwealth 56, 539 A.2d 912 (1988) (Proprietary-governmental function distinction was utilized to determine whether a contract was ultra vires and not binding on the current board of township supervisors.); Faiella v. Bartoles, 102 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 258, 517 A.2d 1019 (1986) (Proprietary-governmental function distinction is no longer relevant to governmental and sovereign immunity cases.); Kunz v. City of Titusville, 373 Pa. 528 , 97 A.2d 42 (1953) (The *540 doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to governmental functions but does to proprietary

1990See Falls Township v. Scally, 115 Pa.Commonwealth 56, 539 A.2d 912 (1988) (Proprietary-governmental function distinction was utilized to determine whether a contract was ultra vires and not binding on the current board of township supervisors.); Faiella v. Bartoles, 102 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 258, 517 A.2d 1019 (1986) (Proprietary-governmental function distinction is no longer relevant to governmental and sovereign immunity cases.); Kunz v. City of Titusville, 373 Pa. 528 , 97 A.2d 42 (1953) (The *540 doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to governmental functions but does to proprietary