respondeat superior doctrine in Arkansas

2025Jackson v. Ivory, 353 Ark. 847, 120 S.W.3d 587 (2003).

2025Jackson v. Ivory, 353 Ark. 847, 120 S.W.3d 587 (2003).

2011Id. at 211 , 818 S.W.2d at 944 ; see also Kenning v. St.

2011Id. at 211 , 818 S.W.2d at 944 ; see also Kenning v. St.

2009This court stated in Sainé, supra, that under the negligent supervision and negligent retention theories of recovery, “employers are subject to direct liability for their negligent supervision or negligent retention of employees when third parties are injured as a result of the tortious acts of those employees.” 854 Ark. at 497, 126 S.W.Bd at 342 (emphasis added). 1 |7Although Medical Assurance cites Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Co. v. Davis, 289 Ark. 1059 , 397 S.W.2d 360 (1965), to assert that the applicable “rule” in this case required a finding in its favor when the jury did not

2006Additionally, as the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has observed, "[i]t is well-settled that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply under § 1983, [citing Monell, supra ], and that `[m]unicipal liability attaches only where the decisionmaker possesses final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action ordered.'" Ware v. Jackson County, 150 F.3d 873 , 885 (8th Cir. 1998), quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 , 481 (1986).

2006The Eighth Circuit in Ware emphasized that "`the authority to make municipal policy is necessarily the authority to make final policy.'" 150 F.3d at 885 (quoting City of St.

2006Additionally, as the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has observed, "[i]t is well-settled that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply under § 1983, [citing Monell, supra ], and that `[m]unicipal liability attaches only where the decisionmaker possesses final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action ordered.'" Ware v. Jackson County, 150 F.3d 873 , 885 (8th Cir. 1998), quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 , 481 (1986).

2006Additionally, as the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has observed, "[i]t is well-settled that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply under § 1983, [citing Monell, supra ], and that `[m]unicipal liability attaches only where the decisionmaker possesses final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action ordered.'" Ware v. Jackson County, 150 F.3d 873 , 885 (8th Cir. 1998), quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 , 481 (1986).

1997More recently, we reviewed our test, commonly referred to as the respondeat superior doctrine, in Gordon v. Planters & Merchants Bankshares, 326 Ark. 1046 , 935 S.W.2d 544 (1996).

1997More recently, we reviewed our test, commonly referred to as the respondeat superior doctrine, in Gordon v. Planters & Merchants Bankshares, 326 Ark. 1046 , 935 S.W.2d 544 (1996).

1996National Bank of Commerce v. HCA Health Servs. of Midwest, Inc., 304 Ark. 55, 58 , 800 S.W.2d 694 (1990).

1996National Bank of Commerce v. HCA Health Servs. of Midwest, Inc., 304 Ark. 55, 58 , 800 S.W.2d 694 (1990).

1991In Medi-Stat, Inc. v. Kusturin, 303 Ark. 45 , 792 S.W.2d 869 (1990), we held that a business corporation may be liable for the acts of a physician under the doctrine of respondeat superior, but that principle has not been extended to charitable corporations.

1991In Medi-Stat, Inc. v. Kusturin, 303 Ark. 45 , 792 S.W.2d 869 (1990), we held that a business corporation may be liable for the acts of a physician under the doctrine of respondeat superior, but that principle has not been extended to charitable corporations.

1990Co. v. Pierson, 98 Ark. 399 , 139 S.W. 917 (1908), but that was because the primary thrust of appellant’s argument, in reliance on those cases, was that medical doctors cannot be employees as a matter of law so as to give rise to vicarious liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

1990The Kansas Supreme Court, quoting Swan Savings Bank v. Snyder, 124 Kan. 827 , 262 P. 547 (1928), said: One who desires to borrow money at a bank, or to renew an indebtedness he has there, and who goes to another, to get him to sign the note with him in order that he can get the bank to accept it, acts for himself and does not act for the bank.

1990The Kansas Supreme Court, quoting Swan Savings Bank v. Snyder, 124 Kan. 827 , 262 P. 547 (1928), said: One who desires to borrow money at a bank, or to renew an indebtedness he has there, and who goes to another, to get him to sign the note with him in order that he can get the bank to accept it, acts for himself and does not act for the bank.

1990Co. v. Pierson, 98 Ark. 399 , 139 S.W. 917 (1908), but that was because the primary thrust of appellant’s argument, in reliance on those cases, was that medical doctors cannot be employees as a matter of law so as to give rise to vicarious liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

1941We are cited to Vincennes Steel Corporation v. Gibson, 194 Ark. 58 , 106 S. W. 2d 173 , and to Ward v. George, 195 Ark. 216 , 112 S. W. 2d 30 .

1941We are cited to Vincennes Steel Corporation v. Gibson, 194 Ark. 58 , 106 S. W. 2d 173 , and to Ward v. George, 195 Ark. 216 , 112 S. W. 2d 30 .

1941We are cited to Vincennes Steel Corporation v. Gibson, 194 Ark. 58 , 106 S. W. 2d 173 , and to Ward v. George, 195 Ark. 216 , 112 S. W. 2d 30 .

1941We are cited to Vincennes Steel Corporation v. Gibson, 194 Ark. 58 , 106 S. W. 2d 173 , and to Ward v. George, 195 Ark. 216 , 112 S. W. 2d 30 .

1938The test of an employer’s liability for the act of his servant is stated in Hunter v. First State Bank, 181 Ark. 907 , 28 S. W. 2d 712 , and in many other cases decided by this court, as follows: “The test of the liability of the master for his servant’s acts is whether the latter was at the time acting within the scope of his employment. ’ ’ The doctrine of respondeat superior, of course, rests upon the proposition that, in doing the acts out of which the accident arose, the servant was representing the master at the time; that is, the acts were being done by virtue of the servant’s employmen

1938The test of an employer’s liability for the act of his servant is stated in Hunter v. First State Bank, 181 Ark. 907 , 28 S. W. 2d 712 , and in many other cases decided by this court, as follows: “The test of the liability of the master for his servant’s acts is whether the latter was at the time acting within the scope of his employment. ’ ’ The doctrine of respondeat superior, of course, rests upon the proposition that, in doing the acts out of which the accident arose, the servant was representing the master at the time; that is, the acts were being done by virtue of the servant’s employmen

1906The principle upon which the law proceeds in cases of this sort is well expressed in Downes v. Harper Hospital, 101 Mich. 559 , 60 N. W. 42 : “If, in the proper execution of the trust, a trustee or an employee commits an act of negligence, he may be held responsible for his negligent act; but the law jealously guards the charitable trust fund, and does not permit it to be frittered away by the negligent acts of those employed in its execution.