respondeat superior doctrine in Georgia

2025See Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 753-754 (7) ( 452 SE2d 476 ) (1994) (“Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a principal has no defense based on an agent’s immunity from civil liability for an act committed in the course of employment.”). (b) We now turn to whether Georgia law provides another basis for holding a physician who supervises a medical student during a medical procedure vicariously liable for the medical student’s negligence.

2025See Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 753-754 (7) ( 452 SE2d 476 ) (1994) (“Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a principal has no defense based on an agent’s immunity from civil liability for an act committed in the course of employment.”). (b) We now turn to whether Georgia law provides another basis for holding a physician who supervises a medical student during a medical procedure vicariously liable for the medical student’s negligence.

1969The factual situation here clearly comes within the ruling in Fielder v. Davison, 139 Ga. 509 (5) ( 77 SE 618 ) that: “If while a servant is not engaged in the performance of his master’s business, and during a time when he is free to engage in his own pursuits, his master lends him an automobile, and while he is using it for his own pleasure, disconnected from any business of the master, he negligently injures another by its operation, the servant will stand in the same position as would another borrower, and the master will not be liable for his acts, on the doctrine of respondeat superior.”

1966“For a tort committed by the servant entirely disconnected from the service or business of the master, the latter is not responsible under the doctrine of respondeat superior, although it may occur during the general term of the servant’s employment.” Fielder v. Davison, 139 Ga. 509, 512 ( 77 SE 618 ).

2018"The doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in slander cases, and a corporation is not liable for the slanderous utterances of an agent acting within the scope of his employment, unless it affirmatively appears that the agent was expressly directed or authorized to slander the plaintiff." (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.) Lepard v. Robb , 201 Ga. App. 41 , 42 (1), 410 S.E.2d 160 (1991).

2018"The doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in slander cases, and a corporation is not liable for the slanderous utterances of an agent acting within the scope of his employment, unless it affirmatively appears that the agent was expressly directed or authorized to slander the plaintiff." (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.) Lepard v. Robb , 201 Ga. App. 41 , 42 (1), 410 S.E.2d 160 (1991).

2023See, e.g., Hicks, 286 Ga. at 865; Palladino, 276 Ga. at 613.

2022Because suppression of information about whether the Church knew Father Edwards was dangerous in the 1970s could not have hindered an attempt to hold the Church vicariously liable for Father Edwards’s conduct once Doe reached the age of majority in the 1980s, the Court of Appeals 7 See Piedmont Hosp., 276 Ga. at 614 (“Georgia courts have consistently held that an employer cannot be held liable under respondeat superior for an employee’s sexual misconduct when the alleged acts were not taken in furtherance of the employer’s business and were outside the scope of employment.”). 17 majority corre

2025See also Quynn v. Hulsey, 310 Ga. 473 , 474 n.2 ( 850 SE2d 725 ) (2020) (“[T]he test to determine if the master is liable [under the doctrine of respondeat superior] is whether or not the servant was at the time of the injury acting within the scope of his employment and on the business of the master.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

2025See also Quynn v. Hulsey, 310 Ga. 473 , 474 n.2 ( 850 SE2d 725 ) (2020) (“[T]he test to determine if the master is liable [under the doctrine of respondeat superior] is whether or not the servant was at the time of the injury acting within the scope of his employment and on the business of the master.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

2025As we have explained, the “borrowed servant” doctrine is a “widely recognized exception to the doctrine of respondeat superior,” under which a master (often 18 referred to as a “general master”) who “lends his servants to another” master (often referred to as a “special master”) “is not responsible for any negligence of the servant committed within the scope of his employment by the other.” Hoffman, 260 Ga. at 589 (2).

2025See also Hoffman, 260 Ga. at 590 (2) (holding that a nurse in an operating room was a servant of the doctor, rather than of the hospital, even though the nurse was employed and paid by the hospital, rather than by the doctor). 4 Although “[c]ontractual interpretation is generally a matter of law to be decided by the court,” Knott v. Knott, 277 Ga. 380, 381 (2) ( 589 SE2d 99 ) (2003), we need not decide here whether the Court of Appeals’ lead opinion correctly interpreted the Agreement because, as described above, the undisputed evidence was sufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fa

2010See Withrow Timber Co. v. Blackburn, 244 Ga. 549, 551 ( 261 SE2d 361 ) (1979) (“the bare denial of the existence of an agency relationship, when made by a purported party to the relationship, is a statement of fact sufficient to support a motion for summary judgment in an action based on the doctrine of respondeat superior”) (citations omitted).

2010See Withrow Timber Co. v. Blackburn, 244 Ga. 549, 551 ( 261 SE2d 361 ) (1979) (“the bare denial of the existence of an agency relationship, when made by a purported party to the relationship, is a statement of fact sufficient to support a motion for summary judgment in an action based on the doctrine of respondeat superior”) (citations omitted).

2000Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 1. “[W]here the liability of the [employer] to an injured third person is purely derivative and dependent entirely upon the doctrine of respondeat superior, a judgment on the merits in favor of the [employee] and against the third person is res judicata in favor of the [employer] in a suit by such third person. . . .” Gilmer v. Porterfield, 233 Ga. 671 (1) ( 212 SE2d 842 ) (1975).

2000Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 1. “[W]here the liability of the [employer] to an injured third person is purely derivative and dependent entirely upon the doctrine of respondeat superior, a judgment on the merits in favor of the [employee] and against the third person is res judicata in favor of the [employer] in a suit by such third person. . . .” Gilmer v. Porterfield, 233 Ga. 671 (1) ( 212 SE2d 842 ) (1975).

2025See also Summerlin, 286 Ga. at 596 (2) (noting that we had held that the “borrowed servant rule is [an] exception to [the] tort doctrine of respondeat superior”); Six Flags Over Ga. v. Hill, 247 Ga. 375, 377 (1) ( 276 SE2d 572 ) (1981) (referring to an employer who lends an employee to another as the “general master,” and referring to an employer who borrows the employee as the “special master” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

2025See also Summerlin, 286 Ga. at 594 - 596 (2) (explaining that borrowed servants are servants under Georgia law).7 In other words, a plaintiff who seeks to hold a special master vicariously liable for a borrowed servant’s conduct cannot rely on the borrowed servant doctrine but instead must establish the elements of a respondeat superior claim — that, when the injury 7 The parties cite Hendley v. Evans, 319 Ga. App. 310 ( 734 SE2d 548 ) (2012), a case in which the Court of Appeals purported to reject an argument that “the borrowed servant doctrine may only be used defensively by a party seeking

2023See also Doe v. Saint Joseph’s Catholic Church, 313 Ga. 558, 565 (870 SE2d 365) (2022) 12 (quoting the test set forth in Palladino); Quynn v. Hulsey, 310 Ga. 473, 474 n.2 (850 SE2d 725) (2020) (“Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, ‘[w]hen a servant causes an injury to another, the test to determine if the master is liable is whether or not the servant was at the time of the injury acting within the scope of his employment and on the business of the master.’”) (quoting Hicks v. Heard, 286 Ga. 864, 865 (692 SE2d 360) (2010)).

2023See also Doe v. Saint Joseph’s Catholic Church, 313 Ga. 558, 565 (870 SE2d 365) (2022) 12 (quoting the test set forth in Palladino); Quynn v. Hulsey, 310 Ga. 473, 474 n.2 (850 SE2d 725) (2020) (“Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, ‘[w]hen a servant causes an injury to another, the test to determine if the master is liable is whether or not the servant was at the time of the injury acting within the scope of his employment and on the business of the master.’”) (quoting Hicks v. Heard, 286 Ga. 864, 865 (692 SE2d 360) (2010)).

2023See also Doe v. Saint Joseph’s Catholic Church, 313 Ga. 558, 565 (870 SE2d 365) (2022) 12 (quoting the test set forth in Palladino); Quynn v. Hulsey, 310 Ga. 473, 474 n.2 (850 SE2d 725) (2020) (“Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, ‘[w]hen a servant causes an injury to another, the test to determine if the master is liable is whether or not the servant was at the time of the injury acting within the scope of his employment and on the business of the master.’”) (quoting Hicks v. Heard, 286 Ga. 864, 865 (692 SE2d 360) (2010)).

2023See also Doe v. Saint Joseph’s Catholic Church, 313 Ga. 558, 565 (870 SE2d 365) (2022) 12 (quoting the test set forth in Palladino); Quynn v. Hulsey, 310 Ga. 473, 474 n.2 (850 SE2d 725) (2020) (“Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, ‘[w]hen a servant causes an injury to another, the test to determine if the master is liable is whether or not the servant was at the time of the injury acting within the scope of his employment and on the business of the master.’”) (quoting Hicks v. Heard, 286 Ga. 864, 865 (692 SE2d 360) (2010)).

2022OCGA § 51-2-2; Allen Kane’s Major Dodge, Inc. v. Barnes, 243 Ga. 776, 777 ( 257 SE2d 186 ) (1979).

2022OCGA § 51-2-2; Allen Kane’s Major Dodge, Inc. v. Barnes, 243 Ga. 776, 777 ( 257 SE2d 186 ) (1979).

2000Johnson Construction Co., 220 Ga. App. 719 ( 470 SE2d 283 ) (1996). 16 Dozier v. Clayton County Hospital Authority, 206 Ga. App. 62, 65 ( 424 SE2d 632 ) (1992) (“[T]o the extent that the complaint avers claims of liability, based on the doctrine of respondeat superior, arising from acts or omissions constituting malpractice by doctors, registered professional nurses, or other ‘professionals’ ... an appropriate affidavit . . . was required under OCGA § 9-11-9.1.”). 17 Adams v. Coweta County, 208 Ga. App. 334 ( 430 SE2d 599 ) (1993) (applying the rationale of Dozier to counties). 18 Jackson v. D

2000Johnson Construction Co., 220 Ga. App. 719 ( 470 SE2d 283 ) (1996). 16 Dozier v. Clayton County Hospital Authority, 206 Ga. App. 62, 65 ( 424 SE2d 632 ) (1992) (“[T]o the extent that the complaint avers claims of liability, based on the doctrine of respondeat superior, arising from acts or omissions constituting malpractice by doctors, registered professional nurses, or other ‘professionals’ ... an appropriate affidavit . . . was required under OCGA § 9-11-9.1.”). 17 Adams v. Coweta County, 208 Ga. App. 334 ( 430 SE2d 599 ) (1993) (applying the rationale of Dozier to counties). 18 Jackson v. D

1990(Moreover, this analysis gratuitously gives Johnson the benefit of construing the evidence to warrant the inference that Carter at one time was also Barnes’ agent or employee despite the statement in Barnes’ affidavit that she only knew that Carter worked for her former husband.) Therefore, since the affidavits also negated an essential element for recovery under the doctrine of respondeat superior (see Sparks v. Buffalo Cab Co., 113 Ga. App. 528, 530 ( 148 SE2d 919 )) to which Johnsbn did not respond, Barries was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all theories of recovery fairly drawn

1990(Moreover, this analysis gratuitously gives Johnson the benefit of construing the evidence to warrant the inference that Carter at one time was also Barnes’ agent or employee despite the statement in Barnes’ affidavit that she only knew that Carter worked for her former husband.) Therefore, since the affidavits also negated an essential element for recovery under the doctrine of respondeat superior (see Sparks v. Buffalo Cab Co., 113 Ga. App. 528, 530 ( 148 SE2d 919 )) to which Johnsbn did not respond, Barries was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all theories of recovery fairly drawn

1975See Mathis v. Nelson, 79 Ga. App. 639, 640 (3.) (54 SE2d 710).”Parris v. Slaton, 131 Ga. App. 92 (2) ( 205 SE2d 67 ).

1975See Mathis v. Nelson, 79 Ga. App. 639, 640 (3.) (54 SE2d 710).”Parris v. Slaton, 131 Ga. App. 92 (2) ( 205 SE2d 67 ).

1992Co. v. Harbin, 135 Ga. 122 ( 68 SE 1103 ) (1910), it has been the rule that “where the liability of the master to an injured third person is purely derivative and dependent entirely upon the doctrine of respondeat superior, a judgment on the merits in favor of the servant and against the third person is res judicata in favor of the master in a suit by such third person, though the master was not a party to the action against his servant. [Cits.]” Gilmer v. Porterfield, 233 Ga. 671, 673 (1) ( 212 SE2d 842 ) (1975).

1964Co. v. Harbin, 135 Ga. 122 , supra, wherein it is held in an action against the railroad and its engineer, that the verdict absolving the engineer and finding the defendant railroad liable could not stand where the sole acts of negligence against the railroad were acts imputable to it under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

2012Accordingly, the borrowed servant doctrine “is applied in the context of the tort doctrine of respondeat superior.” Summerlin, 286 Ga. at 596 (2); see Staffing Resources v. Nash, 218 Ga. App. 525 (1) ( 462 SE2d 401 ) (1995).

2012Accordingly, the borrowed servant doctrine “is applied in the context of the tort doctrine of respondeat superior.” Summerlin, 286 Ga. at 596 (2); see Staffing Resources v. Nash, 218 Ga. App. 525 (1) ( 462 SE2d 401 ) (1995).

1979We think that these two separate and distinct findings are irreconcilably inconsistent.” In Roswell Road-Perimeter Highway Liquor Store v. Schurke, 138 Ga. App. 502, 504 ( 227 SE2d 282 ) (1976), the court held: "We conclude that since the verdict exonerating the servant was a legal verdict and that part of the verdict awarding damages against the master was illegal and void under the doctrine of respondeat superior, it is unnecessary to require that a new trial be granted on the issue of liability of either defendant.

1979We think that these two separate and distinct findings are irreconcilably inconsistent.” In Roswell Road-Perimeter Highway Liquor Store v. Schurke, 138 Ga. App. 502, 504 ( 227 SE2d 282 ) (1976), the court held: "We conclude that since the verdict exonerating the servant was a legal verdict and that part of the verdict awarding damages against the master was illegal and void under the doctrine of respondeat superior, it is unnecessary to require that a new trial be granted on the issue of liability of either defendant.

1969The factual situation here clearly comes within the ruling in Fielder v. Davison, 139 Ga. 509 (5) ( 77 SE 618 ) that: “If while a servant is not engaged in the performance of his master’s business, and during a time when he is free to engage in his own pursuits, his master lends him an automobile, and while he is using it for his own pleasure, disconnected from any business of the master, he negligently injures another by its operation, the servant will stand in the same position as would another borrower, and the master will not be liable for his acts, on the doctrine of respondeat superior.”

1969The factual situation here clearly comes within the ruling in Fielder v. Davison, 139 Ga. 509 (5) ( 77 SE 618 ) that: “If while a servant is not engaged in the performance of his master’s business, and during a time when he is free to engage in his own pursuits, his master lends him an automobile, and while he is using it for his own pleasure, disconnected from any business of the master, he negligently injures another by its operation, the servant will stand in the same position as would another borrower, and the master will not be liable for his acts, on the doctrine of respondeat superior.”

2025We therefore briefly describe the nature and operation of these doctrines before addressing the Court of Appeals’ application of the doctrines to the evidence presented on summary judgment. (i) (A) Georgia law has long recognized “[t]he common-law doctrine of respondeat superior, which is also known as the ‘master- servant’ rule.” Prodigies Child Care Mgmt. v. Cotton, 317 Ga. 371, 376 (2) (a) ( 893 SE2d 640 ) (2023); OCGA § 51-2-2 (“Every person shall be liable for torts committed by . . . his servant by his command or in the prosecution and within the scope of his business . . . .”).

2025We therefore briefly 13 describe the nature and operation of these doctrines before addressing the Court of Appeals’ application of the doctrines to the evidence presented on summary judgment. (i) (A) Georgia law has long recognized “[t]he common-law doctrine of respondeat superior, which is also known as the ‘master- servant’ rule.” Prodigies Child Care Mgmt., LLC v. Cotton, 317 Ga. 371, 376 (2) (a) (893 SE2d 640) (2023); OCGA § 51-2-2 (“Every person shall be liable for torts committed by . . . his servant by his command or in the prosecution and within the scope of his business . . . .”).

2023See SecureAlert, Inc. v. Boggs, 345 Ga. App. 812 , 815 ( 815 SE2d 156 ) (2018) (noting that under “the doctrine of respondeat superior, . . . the principal is entirely responsible for the agent’s negligence,” and fault “cannot be apportioned between the principal and the agent/tortfeasor”); PN Express v. Zegel, 304 Ga. App. 672, 680 (5) ( 697 SE2d 226 ) (2010) (explaining that where an employer’s liability is solely vicarious, the employer and employee “are regarded as a single tortfeasor”).

2023See SecureAlert, Inc. v. Boggs, 345 Ga. App. 812 , 815 ( 815 SE2d 156 ) (2018) (noting that under “the doctrine of respondeat superior, . . . the principal is entirely responsible for the agent’s negligence,” and fault “cannot be apportioned between the principal and the agent/tortfeasor”); PN Express v. Zegel, 304 Ga. App. 672, 680 (5) ( 697 SE2d 226 ) (2010) (explaining that where an employer’s liability is solely vicarious, the employer and employee “are regarded as a single tortfeasor”).

2021“Importantly, summary judgment for the master is appropriate when the evidence shows that the servant was not engaged in furtherance of his master’s business but was on a private enterprise of his own.” Lucas v. 9 Beckman Coulter, Inc., 348 Ga. App. 505, 508 (2) ( 823 SE2d 826 ) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2021“Importantly, summary judgment for the master is appropriate when the evidence shows that the servant was not engaged in furtherance of his master’s business but was on a private enterprise of his own.” Lucas v. 9 Beckman Coulter, Inc., 348 Ga. App. 505, 508 (2) ( 823 SE2d 826 ) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2017See Jones v. Howard, 153 Ga. App. 137, 142 ( 264 SE2d 587 ) (1980). (ii) Steve Wilburn’s Employment Status JSP next contends that the trial court erred in denying summary judgment because Steve Wilburn was not an employee acting within the course and scope of his employment at the time he decided to remove the tree limb from the gutter; therefore, according to JSP, Wilburn’s actions cannot be imputed onto JSP under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

2017See Jones v. Howard, 153 Ga. App. 137, 142 ( 264 SE2d 587 ) (1980). (ii) Steve Wilburn’s Employment Status JSP next contends that the trial court erred in denying summary judgment because Steve Wilburn was not an employee acting within the course and scope of his employment at the time he decided to remove the tree limb from the gutter; therefore, according to JSP, Wilburn’s actions cannot be imputed onto JSP under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

1992Co. v. Harbin, 135 Ga. 122 ( 68 SE 1103 ) (1910), it has been the rule that “where the liability of the master to an injured third person is purely derivative and dependent entirely upon the doctrine of respondeat superior, a judgment on the merits in favor of the servant and against the third person is res judicata in favor of the master in a suit by such third person, though the master was not a party to the action against his servant. [Cits.]” Gilmer v. Porterfield, 233 Ga. 671, 673 (1) ( 212 SE2d 842 ) (1975).

1992Co. v. Harbin, 135 Ga. 122 ( 68 SE 1103 ) (1910), it has been the rule that "where the liability of the master to an injured third person is purely derivative and dependent entirely upon the doctrine of respondent superior, a judgment on the merits in favor of the servant and against the third person is res judicata in favor of the master in a suit by such third person, though the master was not a party to the action against his servant. [Cits.]" Gilmer v. Porterfield, 233 Ga. 671, 673 (1) ( 212 SE2d 842 ) (1975).

2022We rather held that, where an employer “has admitted respondeat superior liability and the plaintiff is not seeking punitive damages” — a situation not present in this case — the employer is entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff’s claims for negligent hiring, training, supervision, and retention, which “are merely duplicative of the respondeat superior claim.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted).

2020They ask this Court to accept the reasoning of the Court of Appeals in Fender, which held that the Respondeat Superior Rule was not superseded by the apportionment statute because claims subject thereto “are derivative of the underlying tortious conduct of the employee” and “merely duplicative of the respondeat superior claim.” 342 Ga. App. at 23 (2) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2022Id.

2019See generally Hillside Orchard Farms v. Murphy, 222 Ga. App. 106, 109 (1) ( 473 SE2d 181 ) (1996) (“The doctrine of respondeat superior holds the master responsible for the negligent act of his servant, committed while the servant is acting within the general scope of his employment and engaged in his master’s business.

2020“Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer can be held vicariously liable for the negligence of an employee when the employee is acting within the course and scope of his employment.” (Punctuation omitted.) Yim, supra, 349 Ga. App. 898 (1) (b).

2019In Georgia, however, if a defendant employer concedes that it will be vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior if its employee is found negligent, the employer is entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff’s claims 1 “Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer can be held vicariously liable for the negligence of an employee when the employee is acting within the course and scope of his [or her] employment.” Yim v. Carr, 349 Ga. App. 892, 898 (1) (b) ( 827 SE2d 685 ) (2019) (citations and punctuation omitted). 2 for negligent entrustment, hiring, training, sup

2014TGM Ashley Lakes, Inc. v. Jennings, 264 Ga. App. 456, 460-462 (1) (b) ( 590 SE2d 807 ) (2003) (distinguishing and explaining concept of “color of employment,” used in the negligent/hiring retention context, and “scope of employment” used in respondeat superior cases); see also Georgia Interlocal Risk Mgmt.

2014TGM Ashley Lakes, Inc. v. Jennings, 264 Ga. App. 456, 460-462 (1) (b) ( 590 SE2d 807 ) (2003) (distinguishing and explaining concept of “color of employment,” used in the negligent/hiring retention context, and “scope of employment” used in respondeat superior cases); see also Georgia Interlocal Risk Mgmt.