66 Virginia opinions name it 14 courts 1914–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
McNeill v. Spindlergreen2 sentences2003However, it is well settled in Virginia that “under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is liable for the tortious act of his employee if the employee was performing his employer’s business and acting within the scope of his employment.” Kensington Associates v. West, 234 Va. 430, 432 , 362 S.E.2d 900, 901 (1987) (citing McNeill v. Spindler, 191 Va. 685, 694 , 62 S.E.2d 13, 17 (1950)). 2003However, it is well settled in Virginia that “under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is liable for the tortious act of his employee if the employee was performing his employer’s business and acting within the scope of his employment.” Kensington Associates v. West, 234 Va. 430, 432 , 362 S.E.2d 900, 901 (1987) (citing McNeill v. Spindler, 191 Va. 685, 694 , 62 S.E.2d 13, 17 (1950)). | 7 | 8 |
Kensington Associates v. Westgreen2 sentences2018Instead, under the traditional "doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is liable for the tortious act of his employee if the employee was performing his employer's business and acting within the scope of his employment." Kensington Assocs. v. West , 234 Va. 430 , 432, 362 S.E.2d 900 (1987). 2018Instead, under the traditional "doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is liable for the tortious act of his employee if the employee was performing his employer's business and acting within the scope of his employment." Kensington Assocs. v. West , 234 Va. 430 , 432, 362 S.E.2d 900 (1987). | 6 | 7 |
Barnes v. Hamptongreen2 sentences2018To put the matter succinctly, "[t]he doctrine of respondeat superior applies only when the relation of master and servant is shown to exist between the wrongdoer and the person sought to be charged for the result of some neglect or wrong at the time and in respect to the very transaction out of which the injury arose ." Manuel v. Cassada , 190 Va. 906 , 913, 59 S.E.2d 47 (1950) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted); see also Barnes v. Hampton , 149 Va. 740 , 744-45, 141 S.E. 836 (1928) (same); Blair , 121 Va. at 308 , 93 S.E. 632 (same). 2018To put the matter succinctly, "[t]he doctrine of respondeat superior applies only when the relation of master and servant is shown to exist between the wrongdoer and the person sought to be charged for the result of some neglect or wrong at the time and in respect to the very transaction out of which the injury arose ." Manuel v. Cassada , 190 Va. 906 , 913, 59 S.E.2d 47 (1950) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted); see also Barnes v. Hampton , 149 Va. 740 , 744-45, 141 S.E. 836 (1928) (same); Blair , 121 Va. at 308 , 93 S.E. 632 (same). | 4 | 5 |
Plummer v. Center Psychiatrists, Ltd.green2 sentences2024Under “the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is liable for the tortious acts of its employee if the employee was performing his employer’s business and acting within the -6- scope of his employment when the tortious acts were committed.” Plummer v. Center Psychiatrists, Ltd., 252 Va. 233, 235 (1996). 2000In this procedural posture, the issue presented in this case is whether the facts alleged in the motion for judgment are sufficient to support the plain *526 tiff’s legal conclusion that the employee acted within the scope of his employment when he committed the wrongful acts against the plaintiff and, thus, raise a material question of fact not amenable to resolution by summary judgment. 2 In Plummer , we held that an allegation that the employee, a therapist, had engaged in an improper sexual relationship with a patient stated a cause of action against his employer under the doctrine of resp | 3 | 7 |
Manuel v. Cassadagreen2 sentences2018To put the matter succinctly, "[t]he doctrine of respondeat superior applies only when the relation of master and servant is shown to exist between the wrongdoer and the person sought to be charged for the result of some neglect or wrong at the time and in respect to the very transaction out of which the injury arose ." Manuel v. Cassada , 190 Va. 906 , 913, 59 S.E.2d 47 (1950) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted); see also Barnes v. Hampton , 149 Va. 740 , 744-45, 141 S.E. 836 (1928) (same); Blair , 121 Va. at 308 , 93 S.E. 632 (same). 2018To put the matter succinctly, "[t]he doctrine of respondeat superior applies only when the relation of master and servant is shown to exist between the wrongdoer and the person sought to be charged for the result of some neglect or wrong at the time and in respect to the very transaction out of which the injury arose ." Manuel v. Cassada , 190 Va. 906 , 913, 59 S.E.2d 47 (1950) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted); see also Barnes v. Hampton , 149 Va. 740 , 744-45, 141 S.E. 836 (1928) (same); Blair , 121 Va. at 308 , 93 S.E. 632 (same). | 2 | 6 |
Sayles v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc.green2 sentences1998In other words, the doctrine of respondeat superior will only apply when the relation of employer and employee is shown to exist between defendants, Scott & Stringfellow and Walker, “at the time and in respect to the very transaction out of which the injury arose" Id. (emphasis added). 1995Similarly, in Sayles v. Piccadilly Cafeteria, 242 Va. 328 , 410 S.E.2d 632 (1991), the court noted: The test for determining whether an accidental injury “[arose] out of and in the course of the employment,” within the meaning of [the Workers’ Compensation Act], is not the same as the test for determining whether a servant acted within the scope of his employment under the doctrine of respondeat superior. 242 Va. at 331 . | 2 | 4 |
Nixon v. Rowlandgreen2 sentences1966We said: “ ‘The doctrine of respondeat superior applies only when the relation of master and servant is shown to exist between the wrongdoer and the person sought to be charged for the result of some neglect or wrong at the time and in respect to the very transaction out of which the injury arose.’ Nixon v. Rowland, 192 Va. 47 , 63 S.E. (2d) 757 .” 195 Va. at p. 385 . 1966We said: “ ‘The doctrine of respondeat superior applies only when the relation of master and servant is shown to exist between the wrongdoer and the person sought to be charged for the result of some neglect or wrong at the time and in respect to the very transaction out of which the injury arose.’ Nixon v. Rowland, 192 Va. 47 , 63 S.E. (2d) 757 .” 195 Va. at p. 385 . | 2 | 4 |
Butler v. SOUTHERN STATES CO-OP., INC.green2 sentences2024Thus, to successfully plead a respondeat superior claim, a plaintiff must assert that the employee’s tort occurred “within the scope of the employment relationship.” Butler v. S. States Coop., Inc., 270 Va. 459, 466 (2005). 2013See Butler v. Southern States Coop., Inc., 270 Va. 459, 466 , 620 S.E.2d 768, 773 (2005); Sayles v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 242 Va. 328, 332 , 410 S.E.2d 632, 634 (1991). | 2 | 2 |
McDonald v. HAMPTON TRAINING SCHOOLgreen2 sentences2002McDonald v. Hampton Training Sch. for Nurses, 254 Va. 79, 81 (1997). 2002McDonald v. Hampton Training School for Nurses, 254 Va. 79, 81 (1997). | 2 | 2 |
Gina Chin & Associates, Inc. v. First Union Bankgreen2 sentences2018Va., Inc. v. Messer , 263 Va. 435 , 440-41, 559 S.E.2d 704 (2002) ("The tort of negligent hiring is distinct from tort liability predicated upon the doctrine of respondeat superior; the two theories differ in focus."); Gina Chin , 260 Va. at 543 n.4, 537 S.E.2d 573 (describing direct liability for negligent hiring as "[a]n alternate approach" to vicarious liability); Restatement (Third) of Agency § 7.05(1) & illus. 1 & 4 (stating the rule of direct liability for negligent hiring and distinguishing it from vicarious liability); John L. 2000In Gina Chin & Associates, Inc. v. First Union Bank, 260 Va. 533 , 537 S.E.2d 573 (2000), also decided today, we have discussed in detail the necessary elements of a cause of action for liability against an employer for the willful and wrongful acts of its employee premised upon the doctrine of respondeat superior. | 1 | 3 |
Blair v. Broadwatergreen2 sentences2018Aware of these doctrinal vagaries, we hold to the belief first expressed over a century ago that "the only safe course to pursue is to revert to first principles, and adhere to ancient landmarks" rather than yielding to some "new principle sought to be engrafted upon the law" for the alleged purpose of addressing "supposed exigencies of new conditions." Blair v.Broadwater , 121 Va. 301 , 308, 93 S.E. 632 (1917) (declining to customize the doctrine of respondeat superior to the "advent of automobiles"); see also Kidd , 128 Va. at 443 , 105 S.E. 124 (same). 2018Aware of these doctrinal vagaries, we hold to the belief first expressed over a century ago that "the only safe course to pursue is to revert to first principles, and adhere to ancient landmarks" rather than yielding to some "new principle sought to be engrafted upon the law" for the alleged purpose of addressing "supposed exigencies of new conditions." Blair v.Broadwater , 121 Va. 301 , 308, 93 S.E. 632 (1917) (declining to customize the doctrine of respondeat superior to the "advent of automobiles"); see also Kidd , 128 Va. at 443 , 105 S.E. 124 (same). | 1 | 2 |
Kidd v. De Wittgreen2 sentences2018Aware of these doctrinal vagaries, we hold to the belief first expressed over a century ago that "the only safe course to pursue is to revert to first principles, and adhere to ancient landmarks" rather than yielding to some "new principle sought to be engrafted upon the law" for the alleged purpose of addressing "supposed exigencies of new conditions." Blair v.Broadwater , 121 Va. 301 , 308, 93 S.E. 632 (1917) (declining to customize the doctrine of respondeat superior to the "advent of automobiles"); see also Kidd , 128 Va. at 443 , 105 S.E. 124 (same). 2018Aware of these doctrinal vagaries, we hold to the belief first expressed over a century ago that "the only safe course to pursue is to revert to first principles, and adhere to ancient landmarks" rather than yielding to some "new principle sought to be engrafted upon the law" for the alleged purpose of addressing "supposed exigencies of new conditions." Blair v.Broadwater , 121 Va. 301 , 308, 93 S.E. 632 (1917) (declining to customize the doctrine of respondeat superior to the "advent of automobiles"); see also Kidd , 128 Va. at 443 , 105 S.E. 124 (same). | 1 | 2 |
Giant of Maryland, Inc. v. Engergreen2 sentences2018Restating the doctrine in such low-resolution terms, however, has led to "difficulties" in its application, Giant of Md., Inc. v. Enger , 257 Va. 513 , 516, 515 S.E.2d 111 (1999), and has proven to be conceptually "vexatious," Gina Chin & Assocs. v. First Union Bank , 260 Va. 533 , 541, 537 S.E.2d 573 (2000), and "perplexing," Kidd v. De Witt , 128 Va. 438 , 443, 105 S.E. 124 (1920). 2002Virginia case law makes it clear that “pursuant to the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is liable for the tortious acts of its employee if that employee was performing the employer’s business and acting within the scope of the employment when the tortious acts were committed.” Giant v. Enger, 257 Va. 513 (1999). 1 It is clear that respondeat superior can make an employer liable for intentional torts, as well as negligent ones. | 1 | 2 |
J . . . v. Victory Tabernacle Baptist Churchgreen2 sentences2002J. . . v. Victory Tabernacle Baptist Church, 236 Va. *441 206, 211, 372 S.E.2d 391, 394 (1988). 1998Negligent Hiring The Supreme Court in J. v. Victory Tabernacle Baptist Church, 236 Va. 206 (1988), explained its view of the tort: negligent hiring is a doctrine of primary liability; the employer is principally liable for negligently placing an unfit person in an employment situation involving an unreasonable risk of harm to others. | 1 | 2 |
Lee v. Leegreen1 sentence2025During argument on the motion to strike, however, Fitch never offered this “ground for . . . objection.” Lee v. Lee, 12 Va. App. 512, 515 (1991). | 1 | 1 |
Virginia Railway & Power Co. v. Dresslergreen1 sentence2019Although “dicta are entitled to respect, especially if supported by reason,” Virginia Ry. & Power Co. v. Dressler, 132 Va. 342, 350 (1922), we nevertheless “have always to bear in mind the oft-quoted statement of Chief Justice Marshall in Cohens v. Virginia”: It is a maxim, not to be disregarded, that general expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used. | 1 | 1 |
Duggin v. Adamsgreen1 sentence2019See Duggin v. Adams, 234 Va. 221, 229 (1987) (“Because the sole question in this appeal is whether the motion for judgment alleges a prima facie case . . . , we express no opinion respecting [defendant’s] affirmative defense.”); Durham & Smith, supra note 10, § 21:13 (describing First Amendment arguments “as a defense” to claims against religious organizations for sexual abuse); Sinclair, supra note 6, § 2-4[D][1], at 2-34 to -37 (describing charitable immunity as a defense that a defendant entity must prove); Sinclair & Middleditch, supra, § 2.32, at 202 (6th ed. 2014) (same). | 1 | 1 |
Interim Personnel of Central Virginia, Inc. v. Messergreen2 sentences2018Va., Inc. v. Messer , 263 Va. 435 , 440-41, 559 S.E.2d 704 (2002) ("The tort of negligent hiring is distinct from tort liability predicated upon the doctrine of respondeat superior; the two theories differ in focus."); Gina Chin , 260 Va. at 543 n.4, 537 S.E.2d 573 (describing direct liability for negligent hiring as "[a]n alternate approach" to vicarious liability); Restatement (Third) of Agency § 7.05(1) & illus. 1 & 4 (stating the rule of direct liability for negligent hiring and distinguishing it from vicarious liability); John L. 2018Va., Inc. v. Messer , 263 Va. 435 , 440-41, 559 S.E.2d 704 (2002) ("The tort of negligent hiring is distinct from tort liability predicated upon the doctrine of respondeat superior; the two theories differ in focus."); Gina Chin , 260 Va. at 543 n.4, 537 S.E.2d 573 (describing direct liability for negligent hiring as "[a]n alternate approach" to vicarious liability); Restatement (Third) of Agency § 7.05(1) & illus. 1 & 4 (stating the rule of direct liability for negligent hiring and distinguishing it from vicarious liability); John L. | 1 | 1 |
| MacCoy v. Colony House Builders, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Pike v. Eubankgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wyllie v. . Palmergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Monumental Motor Tours, Inc. v. Eatongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lockhart v. Friendly Finance Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Snyder v. Fatherlygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Town of Waynesboro v. Wisemangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commercial Business Systems, Inc. v. BellSouth Services, Inc.
green
2 sentences2018Sys., Inc. , 249 Va. at 44 -46 , 453 S.E.2d 261 (applying this principle to distinguish Tri-State Coach Corp. v. Walsh , 188 Va. 299 , 49 S.E.2d 363 (1948) and Davis , 133 Va. 69 , 112 S.E. 628 , from Cary ). 11 The respondeat superior analysis is employee-specific. 2018Sys., Inc. , 249 Va. at 44 -46 , 453 S.E.2d 261 (applying this principle to distinguish Tri-State Coach Corp. v. Walsh , 188 Va. 299 , 49 S.E.2d 363 (1948) and Davis , 133 Va. 69 , 112 S.E. 628 , from Cary ). 11 The respondeat superior analysis is employee-specific. | 2 | 2002–2018 |
Cary v. Hotel Rueger, Inc.
green
2 sentences2018Oral Argument Audio at 18:32 to 18:36. 8 As Justice Koontz, the author of Gina Chin , pointed out in Majorana , which was issued the same day, Gina Chin addressed "the necessary elements of a cause of action for liability against an employer for the willful and wrongful acts of its employee premised upon the doctrine of respondeat superior." Majorana , 260 Va. at 526 , 539 S.E.2d 426 (emphasis added). 9 Plummer and Majorana represent close questions on the boundaries of the respondeat superior doctrine, as evidenced by the four to three split of opinion in Plummer and the five to two split of 2018Oral Argument Audio at 18:32 to 18:36. 8 As Justice Koontz, the author of Gina Chin , pointed out in Majorana , which was issued the same day, Gina Chin addressed "the necessary elements of a cause of action for liability against an employer for the willful and wrongful acts of its employee premised upon the doctrine of respondeat superior." Majorana , 260 Va. at 526 , 539 S.E.2d 426 (emphasis added). 9 Plummer and Majorana represent close questions on the boundaries of the respondeat superior doctrine, as evidenced by the four to three split of opinion in Plummer and the five to two split of | 2 | 1995–2018 |
Davis v. Merrill
green
2 sentences2018Sys., Inc. , 249 Va. at 44 -46 , 453 S.E.2d 261 (applying this principle to distinguish Tri-State Coach Corp. v. Walsh , 188 Va. 299 , 49 S.E.2d 363 (1948) and Davis , 133 Va. 69 , 112 S.E. 628 , from Cary ). 11 The respondeat superior analysis is employee-specific. 2018Sys., Inc. , 249 Va. at 44 -46 , 453 S.E.2d 261 (applying this principle to distinguish Tri-State Coach Corp. v. Walsh , 188 Va. 299 , 49 S.E.2d 363 (1948) and Davis , 133 Va. 69 , 112 S.E. 628 , from Cary ). 11 The respondeat superior analysis is employee-specific. | 2 | 2000–2018 |
Tri-State Coach Corp. v. Walsh
green
2 sentences2018Sys., Inc. , 249 Va. at 44 -46 , 453 S.E.2d 261 (applying this principle to distinguish Tri-State Coach Corp. v. Walsh , 188 Va. 299 , 49 S.E.2d 363 (1948) and Davis , 133 Va. 69 , 112 S.E. 628 , from Cary ). 11 The respondeat superior analysis is employee-specific. 2018Sys., Inc. , 249 Va. at 44 -46 , 453 S.E.2d 261 (applying this principle to distinguish Tri-State Coach Corp. v. Walsh , 188 Va. 299 , 49 S.E.2d 363 (1948) and Davis , 133 Va. 69 , 112 S.E. 628 , from Cary ). 11 The respondeat superior analysis is employee-specific. | 2 | 2002–2018 |
Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2015(Id. at 4 (emphasis added).) To bolster this argument, that Doe was controlled by The Palace, Cherry cites Norfolk & Western Ry., (Id.); Cherry argues that one can reasonably infer from the Complaint that The Palace had the “ ‘right to control not merely the results but the progress and details of the work’ within his own establishment,” (Id. at 4 (citing Norfolk & Western Ry., 207 Va. at 983 , 154 S.E.2d at 136 ).). 2015(Id. at 4 (emphasis added).) To bolster this argument, that Doe was controlled by The Palace, Cherry cites Norfolk & Western Ry., (Id.); Cherry argues that one can reasonably infer from the Complaint that The Palace had the “ ‘right to control not merely the results but the progress and details of the work’ within his own establishment,” (Id. at 4 (citing Norfolk & Western Ry., 207 Va. at 983 , 154 S.E.2d at 136 ).). | 2 | 2011–2015 |
Hadeed v. Medic-24, Ltd.
green
2 sentences2012Hadeed, 237 Va. at 288 . 1997If the Court were to find that CAPMG is an agent of Health Care, CAPMG would also be considered a health care provider entitled to protection of the cap. 7 According to Hadeed v. Medic-24, Ltd., 237 Va. 277 (1989), cited by the Defendants, there are four factors a court must look to in determining agency: Four factors enter into determination of the question whether a master-servant relationship exists within the contemplation of the doctrine of respondeat superior, (1) selection and engagement of the servant, (2) payment of compensation, (3) power of dismissal, and (4) power of control. | 2 | 1997–2012 |
Sawyer v. City of Norfolk
green
2 sentences1941See Waynesboro v. Wiseman, 163 Va. 778 , 177 S. E. 224 ; Barnes v. Ashworth, Adm’r, 154 Va. 218, 226-230 , 153 S. E. 711 ; Virginia Ry. & Power Co. v. Leland, 143 Va. 920, 930 , 129 S. E. 700 ; Dalby v. Shannon, 139 Va. 488, 499 , 124 S. E. 186 ; Sawyer v. City of Norfolk, 136 Va. 66 , 116 S. E. 245 . 1941See Waynesboro v. Wiseman, 163 Va. 778 , 177 S. E. 224 ; Barnes v. Ashworth, Adm’r, 154 Va. 218, 226-230 , 153 S. E. 711 ; Virginia Ry. & Power Co. v. Leland, 143 Va. 920, 930 , 129 S. E. 700 ; Dalby v. Shannon, 139 Va. 488, 499 , 124 S. E. 186 ; Sawyer v. City of Norfolk, 136 Va. 66 , 116 S. E. 245 . | 2 | 1930–1941 |
Dalby v. Shannon & Florence
green
2 sentences1941See Waynesboro v. Wiseman, 163 Va. 778 , 177 S. E. 224 ; Barnes v. Ashworth, Adm’r, 154 Va. 218, 226-230 , 153 S. E. 711 ; Virginia Ry. & Power Co. v. Leland, 143 Va. 920, 930 , 129 S. E. 700 ; Dalby v. Shannon, 139 Va. 488, 499 , 124 S. E. 186 ; Sawyer v. City of Norfolk, 136 Va. 66 , 116 S. E. 245 . 1941See Waynesboro v. Wiseman, 163 Va. 778 , 177 S. E. 224 ; Barnes v. Ashworth, Adm’r, 154 Va. 218, 226-230 , 153 S. E. 711 ; Virginia Ry. & Power Co. v. Leland, 143 Va. 920, 930 , 129 S. E. 700 ; Dalby v. Shannon, 139 Va. 488, 499 , 124 S. E. 186 ; Sawyer v. City of Norfolk, 136 Va. 66 , 116 S. E. 245 . | 2 | 1930–1941 |
Bryant v. Bare
green
1 sentence2024Id. at 337-38 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Phillips Oil Co. v. Linn
neutral
1 sentence2018Cf. Phillips Oil Co. v. Linn , 194 F.2d 903 , 905 (5th Cir. 1952) ("Corporate liability for the negligent acts of a mere servant or employee rests upon the *824 doctrine of respondeat superior. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce
green
1 sentence2018The liability of the master for the negligent acts of his vice principal is placed upon very different grounds, namely, that the negligent acts of the vice principal are the very acts of the corporation itself." (citations omitted) ); GTE Sw., Inc. v. Bruce , 956 S.W.2d 636 , 641-42 (Tex. App. 1997) ("Those whose conduct creates direct corporate liability include corporate officers, those who have authority to employ, direct, and discharge servants of the master, those engaged in the performance of nondelegable or absolute duties of the master, and those to whom a corporation has confided the | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Majorana v. Crown Central Petroleum Corp.
green
2 sentences2018Oral Argument Audio at 18:32 to 18:36. 8 As Justice Koontz, the author of Gina Chin , pointed out in Majorana , which was issued the same day, Gina Chin addressed "the necessary elements of a cause of action for liability against an employer for the willful and wrongful acts of its employee premised upon the doctrine of respondeat superior." Majorana , 260 Va. at 526 , 539 S.E.2d 426 (emphasis added). 9 Plummer and Majorana represent close questions on the boundaries of the respondeat superior doctrine, as evidenced by the four to three split of opinion in Plummer and the five to two split of 2018Oral Argument Audio at 18:32 to 18:36. 8 As Justice Koontz, the author of Gina Chin , pointed out in Majorana , which was issued the same day, Gina Chin addressed "the necessary elements of a cause of action for liability against an employer for the willful and wrongful acts of its employee premised upon the doctrine of respondeat superior." Majorana , 260 Va. at 526 , 539 S.E.2d 426 (emphasis added). 9 Plummer and Majorana represent close questions on the boundaries of the respondeat superior doctrine, as evidenced by the four to three split of opinion in Plummer and the five to two split of | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Thurston Metals & Supply Co., Inc. v. Taylor green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| D.M.S. v. Barber green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Niese v. City of Alexandria green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| First Virginia Bank-Colonial v. Baker green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Utica Mutual Insurance v. Travelers Indemnity Co. green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Coward v. City of Richmond neutral | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Smith v. Landmark Communications, Inc. green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Virginia Iron, Coal & Coke Co. v. Odle's Adm'r green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Ritholz v. Commonwealth green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Revell v. Deegan green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Russell B. Vinnedge v. G. W. Gibbs, Superintendent of Jails, Department of Corrections for the State of Virginia green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Blunt v. Gee neutral | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Lawhorne v. Harlan green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Meek v. Graybeal green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| Smith v. Commonwealth green | 1 | 1956–1956 |
| Moncier v. Green neutral | 1 | 1951–1951 |
| Hannabass v. Ryan green | 1 | 1948–1948 |
| Hackley v. Robey green | 1 | 1948–1948 |
| Gable v. Bingler green | 1 | 1946–1946 |
| O'Donnell v. Commonwealth neutral | 1 | 1945–1945 |
| Hines v. Commonwealth green | 1 | 1941–1941 |
| Barnes v. Ashworth green | 1 | 1941–1941 |
| Virginia Railway & Power Co. v. Leland green | 1 | 1941–1941 |
| Litz v. Harman green | 1 | 1934–1934 |
| Bruhnke v. City of La Crosse green | 1 | 1929–1929 |
| Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada v. Bailey green | 1 | 1928–1928 |
| Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n green | 1 | 1921–1921 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.