respondeat superior doctrine in Florida

2026They are in no sense joint tort-feasors, but the basis of the liability of the principal, or master, is the well-known doctrine of respondeat superior.” See id. at 697 .

2025Joseph’s Hosp., Inc., 112 So. 3d 685, 686 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013)); see also Mallory v. O’Neil, 69 So. 2d 313, 315 (Fla. 1954) (providing that under the doctrine of respondeat superior, which makes an employer responsible for the 3 wrongful acts of the employee if committed within the scope of employment, the negligence of the employer is immaterial “since [the Florida Supreme Court] is committed to the rule that if the employee is not liable the employer is not liable” (citing Williams v. Hines, 86 So. 695 , 697–98 (Fla. 1920))).

2023Compare Mallory v. O’Neil, 69 So. 2d 313, 315 (Fla. 1954) (explaining that “if the employee is not liable[,] the employer is not liable”), Walsingham v. Browning, 525 So. 2d 996, 997-98 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (holding that the claimants’ voluntary dismissal with prejudice was sufficient for precluding a vicarious liability claim), Jones v. Gulf Coast Newspapers, Inc., 595 So. 2d 90, 91 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) (holding that a settlement resulting in a joint motion to dismiss with prejudice exonerated the employer from vicarious liability), and Buettner, 700 So. 2d at 48 (“[W]hen a principal’s liability

2015Farish, 464 So. 2d 530, 532 (Fla. 1985) (holding that “when a principal’s liability rests solely on the doctrine of respondeat superior, a principal cannot be held liable if the agent is exonerated”).

2025Joseph’s Hosp., Inc., 112 So. 3d 685, 686 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013)); see also Mallory v. O’Neil, 69 So. 2d 313, 315 (Fla. 1954) (providing that under the doctrine of respondeat superior, which makes an employer responsible for the 3 wrongful acts of the employee if committed within the scope of employment, the negligence of the employer is immaterial “since [the Florida Supreme Court] is committed to the rule that if the employee is not liable the employer is not liable” (citing Williams v. Hines, 86 So. 695 , 697–98 (Fla. 1920))).

2023Compare Mallory v. O’Neil, 69 So. 2d 313, 315 (Fla. 1954) (explaining that “if the employee is not liable[,] the employer is not liable”), Walsingham v. Browning, 525 So. 2d 996, 997-98 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (holding that the claimants’ voluntary dismissal with prejudice was sufficient for precluding a vicarious liability claim), Jones v. Gulf Coast Newspapers, Inc., 595 So. 2d 90, 91 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) (holding that a settlement resulting in a joint motion to dismiss with prejudice exonerated the employer from vicarious liability), and Buettner, 700 So. 2d at 48 (“[W]hen a principal’s liability

2003This, NME claims, would extend the holding of Mercury Motors Express v. Smith, 393 So.2d 545 (Fla.1981), which held that before an employer may be held vicariously liable for punitive damages under the doctrine of respondeat superior, there must be some fault on his part since punitive damages are imposed only as a punishment of the defendant and as a deterrent to others.

1985Under the rule established in Mercury Motors Express, Inc. v. Smith, 393 So.2d 545 (Fla. 1981), before an employer may be held vicariously liable for punitive damages under the doctrine of respondeat superior, there must be some fault on his part since punitive damages are imposed only as punishment of the defendant and as a deterrent to others.

2004Unlike a suit based on the doctrine of respondeat superior, this cause of action is grounded upon the negligence of the employer.") (citation omitted); Williams v. Feather Sound, Inc., 386 So.2d 1238, 1239-40 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980) ("Most jurisdictions, including Florida, recognize that independent of the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is liable for the willful tort of his employee committed against a third person if he knew or should have known that the employee was a threat to others.") (footnotes omitted), review denied, 392 So.2d 1374 (Fla.1981).

1991The basic underlying rule of employer liability was stated in Williams, 386 So.2d at 1239 -1240: Most jurisdictions, including Florida, recognize that independent of the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is liable for the willful tort of his employee committed against a third person if he knew or should have known that the employee was a threat to others. (footnotes omitted).

2004NOTES [1] The arbitration provision in the contract requires arbitration "of any dispute between the parties as to any matter arising out of or relating to this contract." See Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Melamed, 453 So.2d 858 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)(claim against account executive, a non-signatory who was employed by securities firm, was subject to arbitration pursuant to arbitration clause in a contract governing the cash management account between the securities firm/employer and customer, where the language of the contract was broad enough to include persons within the respond

1990Applying Vic Potamkin Chevrolet, Inc. v. Bloom, 386 So.2d 286 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), to the complaint in this case, Fernandez is within the scope of the respondeat superior doctrine and is therefore entitled to invoke the arbitration clause with respect to the claims against him.

2024Count Fifteen specifically alleged that, “[a]s the principal, master, and/or employer of SLHI, [Orlando Health] is vicariously liable for the fault of SLHI as specifically alleged in Count [Fourteen.]” “[W]hen a principal’s liability rests solely on the doctrine of respondeat superior, a principal cannot be held liable if the agent is exonerated.” Buettner v. Cellular One, Inc., 700 So. 2d 48, 48 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).

2023Compare Mallory v. O’Neil, 69 So. 2d 313, 315 (Fla. 1954) (explaining that “if the employee is not liable[,] the employer is not liable”), Walsingham v. Browning, 525 So. 2d 996, 997-98 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (holding that the claimants’ voluntary dismissal with prejudice was sufficient for precluding a vicarious liability claim), Jones v. Gulf Coast Newspapers, Inc., 595 So. 2d 90, 91 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) (holding that a settlement resulting in a joint motion to dismiss with prejudice exonerated the employer from vicarious liability), and Buettner, 700 So. 2d at 48 (“[W]hen a principal’s liability

2023Compare Mallory v. O’Neil, 69 So. 2d 313, 315 (Fla. 1954) (explaining that “if the employee is not liable[,] the employer is not liable”), Walsingham v. Browning, 525 So. 2d 996, 997-98 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (holding that the claimants’ voluntary dismissal with prejudice was sufficient for precluding a vicarious liability claim), Jones v. Gulf Coast Newspapers, Inc., 595 So. 2d 90, 91 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) (holding that a settlement resulting in a joint motion to dismiss with prejudice exonerated the employer from vicarious liability), and Buettner, 700 So. 2d at 48 (“[W]hen a principal’s liability

1997Co. v. Farish, 464 So.2d 530, 532 (Fla.1985); Walsingham v. Browning, 525 So.2d 996, 997 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)(stating that "[i]n an action against an employer for the actions of the employee based upon the theory of vicarious liability or respondeat superior, the plaintiff must show liability on the part of the employee: `[I]f the employee is not liable the employer is not liable.'") (quoting Mallory v. O'Neil, 69 So.2d 313, 315 (Fla.1954)).

2015See Williams v., Hines, 80 Fla. 690 , 86 So. 695, 697 (1920) (“They [principal and agent] are in no sense joint tort-feasors, but the basis of the liability of the principal, or master, is the well-known doctrine óf respondeat superior.”); Grobman v. Posey, 863 So.2d 1230 , 1235- (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (“Vicarious liability does not mesh with the concept of liability that can be apportioned among joint tortfea-sors.”); Phillips v. Hall, 297 So.2d 136, 137 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974) (“While at’ times the term ‘joint tort-feasors’ has been loosely used ... in connection with the doctrine of respondeat sup

1980In Phillips v. Hall, 297 So.2d 136, 137 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974), this court held: While at times the term "joint tortfeasor" has been loosely used in some cases in connection with the doctrine of respondeat superior ... in its true sense, a master and servant are not joint tortfeasors when the only relationship which the master has to the tort of the servant is that he is his employer.

2015Passenger Corp., 908 So. 2d 459, 467-68 (Fla. 2005) (“The vicariously liable party is liable only for the amount of liability apportioned to the tortfeasor.”); Williams v. Hines, 86 So. 695, 697-98 (Fla. 1920) (“[T]he employer is liable [for the 12 negligent acts of an employee], not as if the act was done by himself, but because of the doctrine of respondeat superior—the rule of law which holds the master responsible for the negligent act of his servant, committed while and servant is acting within the general scope of his employment and engaged in his master’s business.”); see also Buford v.

2015Passenger Corp., 908 So.2d 459, 467-68 (Fla.2005) (“The vicariously liable party is liable only for the amount of liability apportioned to the tortfeasor.”); Williams v. Hines, 80 Fla. 690 , 86 So. 695, 697-98 (1920) (“[T]he employer is liable [for the negligent acts of an employee], not as if the act was done by himself, but because of the doctrine of respondeat superior—the. rule of law which holds the master responsible, for the negligent act of his servant, committed *767 while and servant is acting within the general scope of his employment and engaged in his master’s business.”); see als

2015Co., 77 So.2d 468, 472 (Fla. 1955) (" ‘[I]f an agent has an immunity from liability as distinguished from a privilege of acting, the principal does not share the immunity.' " (quoting Restatement (First) of Agency § 217 (1933))).

1960See May v. Palm Beach Chemical Company, Fla. 1955, 77 So.2d 468 ; Gulick v. Whitaker, Fla.App. 1958, 102 So.2d 847 .

2015Passenger Corp., 908 So. 2d 459, 467-68 (Fla. 2005) (“The vicariously liable party is liable only for the amount of liability apportioned to the tortfeasor.”); Williams v. Hines, 86 So. 695, 697-98 (Fla. 1920) (“[T]he employer is liable [for the 12 negligent acts of an employee], not as if the act was done by himself, but because of the doctrine of respondeat superior—the rule of law which holds the master responsible for the negligent act of his servant, committed while and servant is acting within the general scope of his employment and engaged in his master’s business.”); see also Buford v.

2015Passenger Corp., 908 So.2d 459, 467-68 (Fla.2005) (“The vicariously liable party is liable only for the amount of liability apportioned to the tortfeasor.”); Williams v. Hines, 80 Fla. 690 , 86 So. 695, 697-98 (1920) (“[T]he employer is liable [for the negligent acts of an employee], not as if the act was done by himself, but because of the doctrine of respondeat superior—the. rule of law which holds the master responsible, for the negligent act of his servant, committed *767 while and servant is acting within the general scope of his employment and engaged in his master’s business.”); see als

1979The teachings of Hoffman v. Jones, supra , remind us that policy opinions overruling decisions of the Florida Supreme Court may be made only by that court. [10] E.g., Waller v. First Savings and Trust Co., 103 Fla. 1025 , 138 So. 780 (1931) (abolished the common law principle that an action for personal injuries was abated upon the death of the tortfeasor); Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So.2d 130 (Fla. 1957) (holding a municipal corporation may be held liable for the torts of police officers under the doctrine of respondeat superior); Gates v. Foley, 247 So.2d 40 (Fla. 1971) (permitting

1973In Waller v. First Savings & Trust Co., 103 Fla. 1025 , 138 So. 780 (1931), this Court refused to follow the common law principle that an action for personal injuries was abated upon the death of the tortfeasor, the Court saying: "This court has expressly recognized the principle that in specific instances certain rules which were admittedly a part of the old English common law did not become a part of the Florida common law, because contrary to our customs, institutions, or intendments of our statutes on other subjects." (p. 784) This Court receded from the common law and held, in Hargrove v.

2023Lines, Inc., 350 So. 2d 1128, 1130 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) (under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is liable for its employee’s negligence undertaken within the scope of employment notwithstanding the employer’s conduct); Christensen, 140 So. 3d at 501 (the dangerous instrumentality doctrine imposes “strict vicarious liability” on those with an identifiable property ownership interest in the negligently driven vehicle).

1980Not only has the Supreme Court reaffirmed it, [2] but District Courts of Appeal have followed it as well, either explicitly or in principle. [3] In Alexander v. Alterman Transport Lines, Inc., 350 So.2d 1128 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), the First District would not permit an award of punitive damages against the employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior, holding that some act of the employer, such as negligent hiring or knowledge of the employee's propensities was necessary before such award could be sustained.

2005See Freeman v. Manpower, Inc., 453 So.2d 208 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Saudi Arabian Airlines Corp. v. Dunn, 438 So.2d 116 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).

1984See Saudi Arabian Airlines Corp. v. Dunn, 438 So.2d 116, 122 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).

2004NOTES [1] The arbitration provision in the contract requires arbitration "of any dispute between the parties as to any matter arising out of or relating to this contract." See Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Melamed, 453 So.2d 858 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)(claim against account executive, a non-signatory who was employed by securities firm, was subject to arbitration pursuant to arbitration clause in a contract governing the cash management account between the securities firm/employer and customer, where the language of the contract was broad enough to include persons within the respond

1990Id. at 288 ; accord Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Melamed, 453 So.2d 858, 860 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), aff'd, 476 So.2d 140 (Fla. 1985). "`[A] party to a contract calling for arbitration may [not] avoid that undertaking by the simple device of joining as defendants in its lawsuit others with which the party has no such agreement'...." Post Tensioned Engineering Corp. v. Fairways Plaza Associates, 429 So.2d 1212, 1214 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (citation omitted).

2002See Vari ety Children’s Hospital, Inc. v. Perkins, 382 So.2d 331 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)(citing Mumby v. Bowden, 25 Fla. 454 , 6 So. 453 (1889)).

1980It is a fundamental rule that the respondeat superior doctrine applies only when the alleged master has the ability and authority to direct and control the pertinent acts of the employee, Murphy v. Bowden, 25 Fla. 454 , 6 So. 453 (1889); Berrier v. Associated Indemnity Co., 142 Fla. 351 , 196 So. 188 (1939) (lent servant doctrine).

1987See Wilson v. Lee Memorial Hospital, 65 So.2d 40 (Fla. 1953); Irving v. Doctors Hospital of Lake Worth, Inc., 415 So.2d 55 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied, 422 So.2d 842 (Fla. 1982).

1967Wilson v. Lee Memorial Hospital, Fla. 1953, 65 So.2d 40, 42 ; Danks v. Maher, La.

1986See Thurston v. Morrison, 141 So.2d 291 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962); Friedman v. Mutual Broadcasting System, Inc., 380 So.2d 1313 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 388 So.2d 1112 (Fla. 1980).

1983Harris v. Trojan Fireworks Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 452, 455 , 120 Cal. App.3d 157, 162 (4th Dist. 1981); Thurston v. Morrison, 141 So.2d 291 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1962).

1975See Columbia By The Sea, Inc. v. Petty, Fla.App. 1963, 157 So.2d 190 .

1966In Columbia by the Sea, Inc. v. Petty, Fla.App. 1963, 157 So.2d 190 , Chief Judge Allen, speaking for the Second District, gives an excellent exposition of the law pertaining to the doctrine of respondeat superior.