respondeat superior doctrine in Michigan

2009The Geib Court concluded that the defendant was "guilty of no tortious act" but that "his liability arises only by operation of law.... his statutory liability is based upon the doctrine of respondeat superior. " Id. at 321 , 31 N.W.2d 65 (emphasis in original).

2009The Geib Court concluded that the defendant was "guilty of no tortious act" but that "his liability arises only by operation of law.... his statutory liability is based upon the doctrine of respondeat superior. " Id. at 321 , 31 N.W.2d 65 (emphasis in original).

2025A battery is the wilful and harmful or offensive touching of another person which results from an act intended to cause such a contact. [Espinoza v Thomas, 189 Mich App 110, 119 ; 472 NW2d 16 (1991) (citations omitted).] Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, “[a]n employer is generally liable for the torts its employees commit within the scope of their employment” and “not liable for the torts . . . committed by an employee when those torts are beyond the scope of the employer’s business.” Hamed v Wayne Co, 490 Mich 1, 10-11 ; 803 NW2d 237 (2011) (quotation marks and citation 5 Jagu and P

2025A battery is the wilful and harmful or offensive touching of another person which results from an act intended to cause such a contact. [Espinoza v Thomas, 189 Mich App 110, 119 ; 472 NW2d 16 (1991) (citations omitted).] Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, “[a]n employer is generally liable for the torts its employees commit within the scope of their employment” and “not liable for the torts . . . committed by an employee when those torts are beyond the scope of the employer’s business.” Hamed v Wayne Co, 490 Mich 1, 10-11 ; 803 NW2d 237 (2011) (quotation marks and citation 5 Jagu and P

1983They base their decision on Drinkard v William J Pulte, Inc, 48 Mich. App 67; 210 NW2d 137 (1973), which held that the release of either a master or servant from liability operates to release the other from liability where liability is based on the doctrine of respondeat superior.

1983They base their decision on Drinkard v William J Pulte, Inc, 48 Mich App 67 ; 210 NW2d 137 (1973), which held that the release of either a master or servant from liability operates to release the other from liability where liability is based on the doctrine of respondeat superior.

1985In Theophelis v Lansing General Hospital, 141 Mich App 199, 203-204 ; 366 NW2d 249 (1985), this Court stated: "[W]here a master or principal does not actively participate in the negligent conduct of the servant or agent, and the master or principal’s liability is based solely on the doctrine of respondeat superior, the master or principal and servant or agent are not joint tortfeasors, Geib v Slater, 320 Mich 316, 321 ; 31 NW2d 65 (1948), overruled on other grounds in Moore v Palmer, 350 Mich 363, 394 ; 86 NW2d 585, 597 (1957); Willis v Total Health Care of Detroit, 125 Mich App 612, 617 ; 337

1985In Theophelis v Lansing General Hospital, 141 Mich App 199, 203-204 ; 366 NW2d 249 (1985), this Court stated: "[W]here a master or principal does not actively participate in the negligent conduct of the servant or agent, and the master or principal’s liability is based solely on the doctrine of respondeat superior, the master or principal and servant or agent are not joint tortfeasors, Geib v Slater, 320 Mich 316, 321 ; 31 NW2d 65 (1948), overruled on other grounds in Moore v Palmer, 350 Mich 363, 394 ; 86 NW2d 585, 597 (1957); Willis v Total Health Care of Detroit, 125 Mich App 612, 617 ; 337

2026Laster v Henry Ford Health Sys, 316 Mich App 726, 734 ; 892 NW2d 442 (2016).

2025However, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, “an employer may be liable for the negligent acts of its employee if the employee was acting within the scope of his employment.” Id.

1997Because most compensation acts contain no specific definition of the term “employee,” it was generally taken for granted that the common-law definition of employee, or servant, used for purposes of vicarious tort liability was to be used for purposes of workmen’s compensation laws. [Nichol v Billot, 406 Mich 284, 293-294 ; 279 NW2d 761 (1979).] This test attempted to separate those persons who were employees from those who were independent contractors.

1997Because most compensation acts contain no specific definition of the term “employee,” it was generally taken for granted that the common-law definition of employee, or servant, used for purposes of vicarious tort liability was to be used for purposes of workmen’s compensation laws. [Nichol v Billot, 406 Mich 284, 293-294 ; 279 NW2d 761 (1979).] This test attempted to separate those persons who were employees from those who were independent contractors.

1984Lockaby v Wayne County, 406 Mich 65 ; 276 NW2d 1 (1979); McCann v Michigan, 398 Mich 65 ; 247 NW2d 521 (1976); Shunk v Michigan, 97 Mich App 626 ; 296 NW2d 129 (1980); Antikiewicz v Motorists Mutual Ins Co, 91 Mich App 389 ; 283 NW2d 749 (1979), remanded on other grounds 407 Mich 936 (1979).” A governmental agency may be liable for an agent’s intentional misconduct under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

1984Lockaby v Wayne County, 406 Mich 65 ; 276 NW2d 1 (1979); McCann v Michigan, 398 Mich 65 ; 247 NW2d 521 (1976); Shunk v Michigan, 97 Mich App 626 ; 296 NW2d 129 (1980); Antikiewicz v Motorists Mutual Ins Co, 91 Mich App 389 ; 283 NW2d 749 (1979), remanded on other grounds 407 Mich 936 (1979).” A governmental agency may be liable for an agent’s intentional misconduct under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

1979The control theory is the traditional common-law test used to delineate the master-servant relationship. 2 The theory, in its delineation of the servant concept, has for its purpose the definition and delimitation of the scope of the master’s liabil *294 ity under the doctrine of respondeat superior. * 3 Because most compensation acts contain no specific definition of the term "employee”, it was generally taken for granted that the common-law definition of employee, or servant, used for purposes of vicarious tort liability was to be used for purposes of workmen’s compensation laws. 4 In Tata v

1979The control theory is the traditional common-law test used to delineate the master-servant relationship. 2 The theory, in its delineation of the servant concept, has for its purpose the definition and delimitation of the scope of the master’s liabil *294 ity under the doctrine of respondeat superior. * 3 Because most compensation acts contain no specific definition of the term "employee”, it was generally taken for granted that the common-law definition of employee, or servant, used for purposes of vicarious tort liability was to be used for purposes of workmen’s compensation laws. 4 In Tata v

2022Because Supervisor Slater was either aware of or involved in these instances of racial harassment, and because of his status as “higher management,” defendant either (1) had actual knowledge of the racial harassment before Lisa filed her August 3, 2016 complaint because Supervisor Slater had actual knowledge of the racial harassment, see Sheridan, 247 Mich App at 623 , or (2) the respondeat superior inquiry is unnecessary in the first instance “because holding an employer liable for personal actions is not unfair,” Radtke, 442 Mich at 397 .

2022Because Supervisor Slater was either aware of or involved in these instances of racial harassment, and because of his status as “higher management,” defendant either (1) had actual knowledge of the racial harassment before Lisa filed her August 3, 2016 complaint because Supervisor Slater had actual knowledge of the racial harassment, see Sheridan, 247 Mich App at 623 , or (2) the respondeat superior inquiry is unnecessary in the first instance “because holding an employer liable for personal actions is not unfair,” Radtke, 442 Mich at 397 .

2017Under this test, “ ‘[a]n independent contractor is one who, carrying on an independent business, contracts to do a piece of work according to his own methods, and without being subject to control of his employer as to the means by which the result is to be accomplished, but only as to the result of the work.’ ” Campbell, 273 Mich App at 234 , quoting Utley v Taylor & Gaskin, Inc, 305 Mich 561, 570 ; 9 NW2d 842 (1943) (emphasis by Campbell Court).

2017Under this test, “ ‘[a]n independent contractor is one who, carrying on an independent business, contracts to do a piece of work according to his own methods, and without being subject to control of his employer as to the means by which the result is to be accomplished, but only as to the result of the work.’ ” Campbell, 273 Mich App at 234 , quoting Utley v Taylor & Gaskin, Inc, 305 Mich 561, 570 ; 9 NW2d 842 (1943) (emphasis by Campbell Court).

2017Under this test, “ ‘[a]n independent contractor is one who, carrying on an independent business, contracts to do a piece of work according to his own methods, and without being subject to control of his employer as to the means by which the result is to be accomplished, but only as to the result of the work.’ ” Campbell, 273 Mich App at 234 , quoting Utley v Taylor & Gaskin, Inc, 305 Mich 561, 570 ; 9 NW2d 842 (1943) (emphasis by Campbell Court).

2017Under this test, “ ‘[a]n independent contractor is one who, carrying on an independent business, contracts to do a piece of work according to his own methods, and without being subject to control of his employer as to the means by which the result is to be accomplished, but only as to the result of the work.’ ” Campbell, 273 Mich App at 234 , quoting Utley v Taylor & Gaskin, Inc, 305 Mich 561, 570 ; 9 NW2d 842 (1943) (emphasis by Campbell Court).

2014Thus, “Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the negligence of an employee, arising out of acts done within the scope of his employment is imputed to his employer.” Hekman Biscuit Co v Commercial Credit Co, 291 Mich 156, 160 ; 289 NW 113 (1939).

2014Thus, “Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the negligence of an employee, arising out of acts done within the scope of his employment is imputed to his employer.” Hekman Biscuit Co v Commercial Credit Co, 291 Mich 156, 160 ; 289 NW 113 (1939).

2014Gipson Brothers moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that it was not liable for the acts of its employees under the “borrowed” or “loaned servant” doctrine first set forth in Janik v Ford Motor Co, 180 Mich 557 ; 147 NW 510 (1914).

2014Gipson Brothers moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that it was not liable for the acts of its employees under the “borrowed” or “loaned servant” doctrine first set forth in Janik v Ford Motor Co, 180 Mich 557 ; 147 NW 510 (1914).

2000Over the dissent of Judge Saad, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, 7 which apparently is to be limited to the allegations concerning negligence. 8 The majority said that proximate cause was the element in dispute and that “[t]he overwhelming weight of the evidence suggests that it was Flagle’s status as an employee, and his possession of keys to the facility, that created the opportunity for him to engage in sexual activity with Heather.” With regard to the allegations of assault, battery, and CSC, the majority upheld the jury’s finding that Mr. Flagle’s sexual touchin

2000Over the dissent of Judge Saad, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, 7 which apparently is to be limited to the allegations concerning negligence. 8 The majority said that proximate cause was the element in dispute and that “[t]he overwhelming weight of the evidence suggests that it was Flagle’s status as an employee, and his possession of keys to the facility, that created the opportunity for him to engage in sexual activity with Heather.” With regard to the allegations of assault, battery, and CSC, the majority upheld the jury’s finding that Mr. Flagle’s sexual touchin

1985Drinkard v William J Pulte, Inc, 48 Mich App 67, 76-78 ; 210 NW2d 137 (1973); Ravenis v Detroit General Hospital, 63 Mich App 79, 84 ; 234 NW2d 411 (1975), lv den 395 Mich 824 (1976); Willis v Total Health Care, supra. It is also true, however, that where the master or principal engages in some independent or concurrent act of negligence, or the master and servant are joint tortfeasors, a release of the servant will not operate to release the master from liability for his or her independent or concurrent negligent acts.

1985Drinkard v William J Pulte, Inc, 48 Mich App 67, 76-78 ; 210 NW2d 137 (1973); Ravenis v Detroit General Hospital, 63 Mich App 79, 84 ; 234 NW2d 411 (1975), lv den 395 Mich 824 (1976); Willis v Total Health Care, supra. It is also true, however, that where the master or principal engages in some independent or concurrent act of negligence, or the master and servant are joint tortfeasors, a release of the servant will not operate to release the master from liability for his or her independent or concurrent negligent acts.

1984Graves v Wayne County, 124 Mich App 36, 41 ; 333 NW2d 740 (1983); Gaston v Becker, 111 Mich App 692 ; 314 NW2d 728 (1981).

1984Graves v Wayne County, 124 Mich App 36, 41 ; 333 NW2d 740 (1983); Gaston v Becker, 111 Mich App 692 ; 314 NW2d 728 (1981).

1984Graves v Wayne County, 124 Mich App 36, 41 ; 333 NW2d 740 (1983); Gaston v Becker, 111 Mich App 692 ; 314 NW2d 728 (1981).

1984Graves v Wayne County, 124 Mich App 36, 41 ; 333 NW2d 740 (1983); Gaston v Becker, 111 Mich App 692 ; 314 NW2d 728 (1981).

1970The liability is broader than that imposed by the doctrine of respondeat superior, and to the degree that older eases, including Mittelstadt v. Kelly, 202 Mich 524 , and other like cases referred to in Moore v. Palmer, supra, are based upon the respondeat superior doctrine, they were held, by Mr. Justice Edwards, with whom we concurred, to be ‘expressly overruled.’ ” Similarly, see Mosier v. Carney (1965), 376 Mich 532 , where, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Souris, signed also by three other justices, the following observation appears (p 557): “[I]n Moore v. Palmer (1957), 350 Mich 363 , four m

1970The liability is broader than that imposed by the doctrine of respondeat superior, and to the degree that older eases, including Mittelstadt v. Kelly, 202 Mich 524 , and other like cases referred to in Moore v. Palmer, supra, are based upon the respondeat superior doctrine, they were held, by Mr. Justice Edwards, with whom we concurred, to be ‘expressly overruled.’ ” Similarly, see Mosier v. Carney (1965), 376 Mich 532 , where, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Souris, signed also by three other justices, the following observation appears (p 557): “[I]n Moore v. Palmer (1957), 350 Mich 363 , four m

1970The liability is broader than that imposed by the doctrine of respondeat superior, and to the degree that older eases, including Mittelstadt v. Kelly, 202 Mich 524 , and other like cases referred to in Moore v. Palmer, supra, are based upon the respondeat superior doctrine, they were held, by Mr. Justice Edwards, with whom we concurred, to be ‘expressly overruled.’ ” Similarly, see Mosier v. Carney (1965), 376 Mich 532 , where, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Souris, signed also by three other justices, the following observation appears (p 557): “[I]n Moore v. Palmer (1957), 350 Mich 363 , four m

1970The liability is broader than that imposed by the doctrine of respondeat superior, and to the degree that older eases, including Mittelstadt v. Kelly, 202 Mich 524 , and other like cases referred to in Moore v. Palmer, supra, are based upon the respondeat superior doctrine, they were held, by Mr. Justice Edwards, with whom we concurred, to be ‘expressly overruled.’ ” Similarly, see Mosier v. Carney (1965), 376 Mich 532 , where, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Souris, signed also by three other justices, the following observation appears (p 557): “[I]n Moore v. Palmer (1957), 350 Mich 363 , four m

1962The court distinguished cases like Hartley v. Miller, supra, and Brinkman v. Zuckerman, supra, which turned upon the doctrine of respondeat superior, and noted that plaintiff’s declara-, tion-alleged the dismissed defendant 2 had loaned the car-to a person he knew was an-incompetent driver.

1915Co., 86 Wis. 245 , [ 56 N. W. 465 ].” There is a discussion of the doctrine of respondeat superior in Hartley v. Miller, 165 Mich. 115 ( 130 N. W. 336 , 33 L.

2025“Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer may be vicariously liable for the acts of an employee committed within the scope of his employment.” Helsel v Morcom, 219 Mich App 14, 21 ; 555 NW2d 852 (1996).

2025“Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer may be vicariously liable for the acts of an employee committed within the scope of his employment.” Helsel v Morcom, 219 Mich App 14, 21 ; 555 NW2d 852 (1996).

2025A battery is the wilful and harmful or offensive touching of another person which results from an act intended to cause such a contact. [Espinoza v Thomas, 189 Mich App 110, 119 ; 472 NW2d 16 (1991) (citations omitted).] Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, “[a]n employer is generally liable for the torts its employees commit within the scope of their employment” and “not liable for the torts . . . committed by an employee when those torts are beyond the scope of the employer’s business.” Hamed v Wayne Co, 490 Mich 1, 10-11 ; 803 NW2d 237 (2011) (quotation marks and citation 5 Jagu and P

2025A battery is the wilful and harmful or offensive touching of another person which results from an act intended to cause such a contact. [Espinoza v Thomas, 189 Mich App 110, 119 ; 472 NW2d 16 (1991) (citations omitted).] Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, “[a]n employer is generally liable for the torts its employees commit within the scope of their employment” and “not liable for the torts . . . committed by an employee when those torts are beyond the scope of the employer’s business.” Hamed v Wayne Co, 490 Mich 1, 10-11 ; 803 NW2d 237 (2011) (quotation marks and citation 5 Jagu and P

2025Our Supreme Court has explained: “[T]he doctrine of vicarious liability allocates the risk of an employee’s negligent acts occurring during the course of employment on the employer.” Rogers v JB Hunt Transp, Inc, 466 Mich 645, 653 ; 649 NW2d 23 -4- (2002). “[T]he basis of vicarious liability is not merely that an employer typically has a greater ability to pay than an employee.” Id. at 651-652 .

2025Our Supreme Court has explained: “[T]he doctrine of vicarious liability allocates the risk of an employee’s negligent acts occurring during the course of employment on the employer.” Rogers v JB Hunt Transp, Inc, 466 Mich 645, 653 ; 649 NW2d 23 -4- (2002). “[T]he basis of vicarious liability is not merely that an employer typically has a greater ability to pay than an employee.” Id. at 651-652 .

2024By contrast, “[t]he conduct defined in [MCL 37.2103(k)(i) and (ii)] is usually referred to as quid pro quo sexual harassment.” Id. at 381 n 16. 6 NW2d 237 (2011).