respondeat superior doctrine in Tennessee

2012This Court previously acknowledged that, “[w]hile the principles embodied in the respondeat superior doctrine are relatively easy to articulate, they are not always easy to apply.” Id. at 937 (citation omitted).

2008This Court has further acknowledged that, “[w]hile the principles embodied in the respondeat superior doctrine are relatively easy to articulate, they are not always easy to apply.” Tennessee Farmers, 840 S.W.2d at 937 (citation omitted).

2015This understanding of Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20 - 206 is in line with prior case law concerning the doctrine of respondeat superior. “[I]f an injured person is barred by law from suing the servant he is likewise barred from maintaining a suit against the master when liability is predicated solely on the doctrine of respondeat superior.” Stewart v. Craig, 344 S.W.2d 761, 763 (Tenn. 1961) (italics omitted).

2001It has long been the law in this State that “if an injured person is barred by law from suing the servant he is likewise barred from maintaining a suit against the master when liability is predicated solely on the doctrine of respondeat superior.” Stewart v. Craig, 208 Tenn. 212, 217 , 344 S.W.2d 761, 763 (1961); Carr by Carr v. Carr, 726 S.W.2d 932, 933 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986); Willis v. Guyton, C/A No. 02A01-9311-CV-00247, 1995 WL 328714 , at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. W.S., filed June 2, 1995).

2002The Court reasoned that since the plaintiff could not maintain a direct action against her husband, she “could not avoid the forbidden frontal attack by an encircling movement against [the principal, her husband’s father]_” Raines, 165 Tenn. 415, 420 , 55 S.W.2d 263, 264 (1932); See also Graham v. Miller, 182 Tenn. 434 , 187 S.W.2d 622 (1945) (holding that the general rule prohibiting a child from suing his parent prevents the imposition of liability to the parent’s employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior); Ownby v. Kleyhammer, 194 Tenn. 109 , 250 S.W.2d 37 (1952); Smith v. Henson,

2002The Court reasoned that since the plaintiff could not maintain a direct action against her husband, she “could not avoid the forbidden frontal attack by an encircling movement against [the principal, her husband’s father]_” Raines, 165 Tenn. 415, 420 , 55 S.W.2d 263, 264 (1932); See also Graham v. Miller, 182 Tenn. 434 , 187 S.W.2d 622 (1945) (holding that the general rule prohibiting a child from suing his parent prevents the imposition of liability to the parent’s employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior); Ownby v. Kleyhammer, 194 Tenn. 109 , 250 S.W.2d 37 (1952); Smith v. Henson,

2002The Court reasoned that since the plaintiff could not maintain a direct action against her husband, she “could not avoid the forbidden frontal attack by an encircling movement against [the principal, her husband’s father]_” Raines, 165 Tenn. 415, 420 , 55 S.W.2d 263, 264 (1932); See also Graham v. Miller, 182 Tenn. 434 , 187 S.W.2d 622 (1945) (holding that the general rule prohibiting a child from suing his parent prevents the imposition of liability to the parent’s employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior); Ownby v. Kleyhammer, 194 Tenn. 109 , 250 S.W.2d 37 (1952); Smith v. Henson,

2002The Court reasoned that since the plaintiff could not maintain a direct action against her husband, she “could not avoid the forbidden frontal attack by an encircling movement against [the principal, her husband’s father]_” Raines, 165 Tenn. 415, 420 , 55 S.W.2d 263, 264 (1932); See also Graham v. Miller, 182 Tenn. 434 , 187 S.W.2d 622 (1945) (holding that the general rule prohibiting a child from suing his parent prevents the imposition of liability to the parent’s employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior); Ownby v. Kleyhammer, 194 Tenn. 109 , 250 S.W.2d 37 (1952); Smith v. Henson,

2002The Court reasoned that since the plaintiff could not maintain a direct action against her husband, she “could not avoid the forbidden frontal attack by an encircling movement against [the principal, her husband’s father]_” Raines, 165 Tenn. 415, 420 , 55 S.W.2d 263, 264 (1932); See also Graham v. Miller, 182 Tenn. 434 , 187 S.W.2d 622 (1945) (holding that the general rule prohibiting a child from suing his parent prevents the imposition of liability to the parent’s employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior); Ownby v. Kleyhammer, 194 Tenn. 109 , 250 S.W.2d 37 (1952); Smith v. Henson,

2002The Court reasoned that since the plaintiff could not maintain a direct action against her husband, she “could not avoid the forbidden frontal attack by an encircling movement against [the principal, her husband’s father]_” Raines, 165 Tenn. 415, 420 , 55 S.W.2d 263, 264 (1932); See also Graham v. Miller, 182 Tenn. 434 , 187 S.W.2d 622 (1945) (holding that the general rule prohibiting a child from suing his parent prevents the imposition of liability to the parent’s employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior); Ownby v. Kleyhammer, 194 Tenn. 109 , 250 S.W.2d 37 (1952); Smith v. Henson,

2021Plaintiff claimed that Varangon is responsible for the alleged negligent actions of the nurses who provided care to Plaintiff. “[U]nder the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer may be held vicariously liable for torts committed by its employee within the course and scope of his or her employment.” Gunter v. Estate of Armstrong, 600 S.W.3d 916 , 923 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting Heflin v. Iberiabank Corp., 571 S.W.3d 727, 735 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2018)).

2019This Court has previously elucidated that “[u]nder the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer may be held vicariously liable for torts committed by its employee within the course and scope of his or her employment.” Heflin v. Iberiabank Corp., 571 S.W.3d 727, 735 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2018).

2017Hamrick v. Spring City Motor Co., 708 S.W.2d 383, 386 (Tenn. 1986); Tennessee Farmers Mut.

1998Hamrick v. Spring City Motor Co., 708 S.W.2d 383, 386 (Tenn.1986); Tennessee Farmers Mut.

2000See, e.g., Howard v. Haven, 198 Tenn. 572, 582 , 281 S.W.2d 480, 484-85 (1955); Tennessee Farmers Mut. v. American Mut., 840 S.W.2d 933, 937 (Tenn.Ct.

2000See, e.g., Howard v. Haven, 198 Tenn. 572, 582 , 281 S.W.2d 480, 484-85 (1955); Tennessee Farmers Mut. v. American Mut., 840 S.W.2d 933, 937 (Tenn.Ct.

2020See Hauck, 469 S.W.3d at 570 (citing McCullough v. Johnson City Emergency Physicians, P.C., 106 S.W.3d 36 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002)) (“[W]e [have] implicitly recognized the applicability of the discovery rule to claims based on the doctrine of respondeat superior.”); Sutton v. Barnes, 78 S.W.3d 908 , 916–17 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (“Our review of the foregoing leads us to conclude that the -5- discovery rule should be applied to cases involving the GTLA.”). “[A] cause of action ‘arises’ under the GTLA when the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have discovered, that he

2015McCullough v. Johnson City Emergency Physicians, P.C., 106 S.W.3d 36 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (perm. app. denied May 27, 2003).

1998“The employer is strictly liable for a supervisor’s quid pro quo harassment under the doctrine of respondeat superior.” Carr v. United Parcel Service, 955 S.W.2d 832, 837 (Tenn. 1997); Sanders v. Lanier, _____S.W.2d _____(Tenn. 1998).

1998Carr, 955 S.W.2d at 837 .

2020See Hauck, 469 S.W.3d at 570 (citing McCullough v. Johnson City Emergency Physicians, P.C., 106 S.W.3d 36 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002)) (“[W]e [have] implicitly recognized the applicability of the discovery rule to claims based on the doctrine of respondeat superior.”); Sutton v. Barnes, 78 S.W.3d 908 , 916–17 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (“Our review of the foregoing leads us to conclude that the -5- discovery rule should be applied to cases involving the GTLA.”). “[A] cause of action ‘arises’ under the GTLA when the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have discovered, that he

2020See Hauck, 469 S.W.3d at 570 (citing McCullough v. Johnson City Emergency Physicians, P.C., 106 S.W.3d 36 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002)) (“[W]e [have] implicitly recognized the applicability of the discovery rule to claims based on the doctrine of respondeat superior.”); Sutton v. Barnes, 78 S.W.3d 908 , 916–17 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (“Our review of the foregoing leads us to conclude that the -5- discovery rule should be applied to cases involving the GTLA.”). “[A] cause of action ‘arises’ under the GTLA when the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have discovered, that he

2020See Hauck, 469 S.W.3d at 570 (citing McCullough v. Johnson City Emergency Physicians, P.C., 106 S.W.3d 36 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002)) (“[W]e [have] implicitly recognized the applicability of the discovery rule to claims based on the doctrine of respondeat superior.”); Sutton v. Barnes, 78 S.W.3d 908 , 916–17 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (“Our review of the foregoing leads us to conclude that the -5- discovery rule should be applied to cases involving the GTLA.”). “[A] cause of action ‘arises’ under the GTLA when the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have discovered, that he

2018See Washington v. 822 Corp., 43 S.W.3d 491, 494 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (citing Tenn. Farmers Mut.

2016See Russell v. City of Memphis, 106 S.W.3d 655, 657 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) 8 A showing of lack of probable cause gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of malice.

2016Tucker v. Sierra Builders, 180 S.W.3d 109, 120 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Johnson v. LeBonheur Children’s Med.

2015Applicability of the Discovery Rule to Actions Asserting Vicarious Liability It is well-established that the discovery rule, where' applicable, ⅛ an equitable exception that tolls the running of the statute of limitations until the plaintiff knows, or in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should know that an injury has been sustained.” Pero’s Steak and Spaghetti House v. Lee, 90 S.W.3d 614, 621 (Tenn. 2002) (citations omitted).

2012Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 340 S.W.3d 352, 363 (Tenn. 2011) (quoting White v. Revco Disc.

2012In cases involving the respondeat superior doctrine, Tennessee courts have turned to the Restatement (Second) of Agency to determine “whether an act was within the scope of employment in a particular case.” Hughes, 340 S.W.3d at 363 (citing Kelly v. La.

2012Oil Refining Co., 167 Tenn. 101 , 66 S.W.2d 997, 998 (Tenn. 1934); Tenn. Farmers Mut.

2012Oil Refining Co., 167 Tenn. 101 , 66 S.W.2d 997, 998 (Tenn. 1934); Tenn. Farmers Mut.

2011See Abshure v. Methodist Healthcare-Memphis Hospitals, W2008-01486-SC-R11-CV, 2010 WL 4188221, at *7 (Tenn. Oct. 20, 2010).

2010Willis v. Settle, 162 S.W.3d 169, 183 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that a private security company was liable for its employee’s negligent action in leaving an inmate alone in a hospital room, even though the guard disobeyed the company’s policy).