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38 Minnesota opinions name it 2 courts 1897–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Minnesota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
M.L. v. Magnusongreen2 sentences2007M.L. v. Magnuson, 531 N.W.2d 849, 858 (Minn.App.1995), review denied (Minn. Jul. 20, 1995). 2002Negligent Supervision Negligent supervision is derived “from the doctrine of respondeat superior” and, therefore, in order to successfully make out a claim for negligent supervision, a party must show “that the employee’s actions occurred within the scope of employment.” M.L. v. Magnuson, 531 N.W.2d 849, 858 (Minn.App.1995), review denied (Minn. July 20, 1995). | 4 | 4 |
Schneider v. Buckmangreen2 sentences2009See id. (identifying a four-pronged collateral-estoppel test in which the privity prong is equivalent to that in the res-judicata test). [2] Appellant conceded at oral argument that under some circumstances an attorney and a client could be found to be in privity for purposes of res judicata, but in this case, attorney does not argue privity on any ground other than existence of the attorney-client relationship. [3] Note that an employee-employer relationship does not create de facto privity, as recognized in Schneider v. Buckman, 433 N.W.2d 98, 101-02 (Minn.1988), where, under the doctrine of 2009Note that an employee-employer relationship does not create de facto privity, as recognized in Schneider v. Buckman, 433 N.W.2d 98, 101-02 (Minn.1988), where, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employee and employer were found to be jointly and severally liable, making separate actions against them permissible. . | 2 | 2 |
Hagen v. Burmeister & Associates, Inc.green2 sentences2007The supreme court has interpreted the doctrine in Minnesota to hold an employer liable for even the intentional misconduct of its employees when "(1) the source of the attack is related to the duties of the employee, and (2) the assault occurs within work-related limits of time and place." Id. (quotation omitted). "[A]n important consideration in determining whether an act is related to the duties of employment is whether the act was foreseeable." Hagen v. Burmeister & Assocs., Inc., 633 N.W.2d 497, 504 (Minn. 2001). 2007The supreme court has interpreted the doctrine in Minnesota to hold an employer liable for even the intentional misconduct of its employees when “(1) the source of the attack is related to the duties of the employee, and (2) the assault occurs within work-related limits of time and place.” Id. (quotation omitted). “[A]n important consideration in determining whether an act is related to the duties of employment is whether the act was foreseeable.” Hagen v. Burmeister & Assocs., Inc., 633 N.W.2d 497, 504 (Minn. 2001). | 2 | 2 |
Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry & Neurology, Ltd.green2 sentences2002In Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry and Neurology, Ltd., the supreme court affirmed the Lange rule and held that where the plaintiff provided evidence that “sexual relations between a psychologist and a patient is a well-known hazard and thus, to a degree, foreseeable and a risk of employment” a question of fact exists as to whether an employer is liable on a respondeat superior claim for a psychologist’s sexual misconduct with a patient. 329 N.W.2d 306, 310-11 (Minn.1982). 1993See Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry & Neurology, Ltd., 329 N.W.2d 306 (Minn.1982). | 2 | 2 |
Kaiser v. Memorial Blood Center of Minneapolis, Inc.green2 sentences2002See Kaiser v. Mem'l Blood Ctr. of Minneapolis, Inc., 486 N.W.2d 762, 767 (Minn.1992); Grondahl v. Bulluck, 318 N.W.2d 240, 244 (Minn.1982). 1995See Kaiser v. Memorial Blood Ctr. of Mpls., 486 N.W.2d 762, 767 (Minn.1992) (citing Grondahl v. Bulluck, 318 N.W.2d 240, 244 (Minn.1982)). | 2 | 2 |
Grondahl v. Bulluckgreen2 sentences2002See Kaiser v. Mem'l Blood Ctr. of Minneapolis, Inc., 486 N.W.2d 762, 767 (Minn.1992); Grondahl v. Bulluck, 318 N.W.2d 240, 244 (Minn.1982). 1995See Kaiser v. Memorial Blood Ctr. of Mpls., 486 N.W.2d 762, 767 (Minn.1992) (citing Grondahl v. Bulluck, 318 N.W.2d 240, 244 (Minn.1982)). | 2 | 2 |
Lange v. National Biscuit Companygreen2 sentences1999The majority, citing Lange v. National Biscuit Co., 297 Minn. 399, 403 , 211 N.W.2d 783, 785 (1973), also turns to the policy behind the doctrine of respondeat superior when it states that an employer’s liability “stems from public policy rather than from any fault of the employer.” This policy determination should have limits, but the majority’s interpretation of orn-ease law leaves almost no barrier in Minnesota to recovery by persons injured by the criminal acts of employees when, as is the case here, there is no evidence of negligence on the part of the employer. 1999The majority, citing Lange v. National Biscuit Co., 297 Minn. 399, 403 , 211 N.W.2d 783, 785 (1973), also turns to the policy behind the doctrine of respondeat superior when it states that an employer’s liability “stems from public policy rather than from any fault of the employer.” This policy determination should have limits, but the majority’s interpretation of orn-ease law leaves almost no barrier in Minnesota to recovery by persons injured by the criminal acts of employees when, as is the case here, there is no evidence of negligence on the part of the employer. | 2 | 2 |
Watson v. Metropolitan Transit Commissiongreen1 sentence2014Transit Comm’n, 553 N.W.2d 406, 415 (Minn.1996) (“Where an employee or agent is protected by official immunity, the government entity will not be called on to indemnify that individual nor will the government entity be liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior.”). | 1 | 1 |
Urban v. American Legion Department of Minnesotagreen1 sentence2014Legion Dep’t of Minn., 723 N.W.2d 1, 4-6 (Minn.2006) (finding the Legislature had clearly stated that “licensees” were responsible under the Civil Damages Act thus impliedly did not intend for the common law doctrine of respondeat superior to apply to CDA liability). 7 Axelberg next argues that the common law defense of necessity should be available because we have referred to the implied consent law as “quasi-criminal,” and therefore, common law defenses available in criminal cases should likewise apply to implied consent cases. | 1 | 1 |
D.M.S. v. Barbergreen1 sentence2013Similarly, “[negligent supervision is the failure of an employer to exercise ordinary care in supervising the employment relationship so as to prevent foreseeable misconduct of an employee from causing harm to others.” Olson v. First Church of Nazareno, 661 N.W.2d 254, 264-65 (Minn.App.2003) (“[N]egligent supervision derives from the doctrine of respondeat superior, so that a plaintiff must prove that the employee’s action occurred within the scope of employment.”); see also D.M.S. v. Barber, 645 N.W.2d 383, 390 (Minn.2002) (“Under the well-established principle of respondeat superior, an empl | 1 | 1 |
Olson v. First Church of Nazarenegreen1 sentence2013Similarly, “[negligent supervision is the failure of an employer to exercise ordinary care in supervising the employment relationship so as to prevent foreseeable misconduct of an employee from causing harm to others.” Olson v. First Church of Nazareno, 661 N.W.2d 254, 264-65 (Minn.App.2003) (“[N]egligent supervision derives from the doctrine of respondeat superior, so that a plaintiff must prove that the employee’s action occurred within the scope of employment.”); see also D.M.S. v. Barber, 645 N.W.2d 383, 390 (Minn.2002) (“Under the well-established principle of respondeat superior, an empl | 1 | 1 |
Mark Manicki v. Brian Zeilmann and City of Ottawagreen1 sentence2009Manicki v. Zeilmann, 443 F.3d 922, 926 (7th Cir.2006) (citing, among other cases, Lawlor v. Nat'l Screen Serv. | 1 | 1 |
Westby v. Itasca Countygreen1 sentence1996See Minn. Stat. § 466.02 (1994); Westby v. Itasca County, 290 N.W.2d 437, 438 (Minn.1980). | 1 | 1 |
Rettman v. City of Litchfieldgreen1 sentence1995We must affirm a decision to deny a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict “if there is any competent evidence reasonably tending to sustain the verdict.” Rettman v. City of Litchfield, 354 N.W.2d 426, 429 (Minn.1984) (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Semrad v. Edina Realty, Inc.green1 sentence1993See Semrad v. Edina Realty, Inc., 493 N.W.2d 528, 534 (Minn.1992). | 1 | 1 |
Rosenthal & Company v. Commodity Futures Trading Commissiongreen1 sentence1992"Principals are strictly liable for their agents' acts — even if the agents are not employees — if the principals authorize or ratify the acts or even just create an appearance that the acts are authorized." Rosenthal & Co. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 802 F.2d 963, 966 (7th Cir.1986) (commodity brokerage vicariously liable for fraud of salesperson). | 1 | 1 |
Northernaire Productions, Inc. v. County of Crow Winggreen2 sentences1992See Northernaire Prods., Inc. v. County of Crow Wing, 309 Minn. 386, 388 , 244 N.W.2d 279, 281 (1976) (where plaintiff was found to have no cause of action against individual county officials it was unnecessary to consider whether the county was vicariously liable); accord Roderick v. Snyder Bros. 1992See Northernaire Prods., Inc. v. County of Crow Wing, 309 Minn. 386, 388 , 244 N.W.2d 279, 281 (1976) (where plaintiff was found to have no cause of action against individual county officials it was unnecessary to consider whether the county was vicariously liable); accord Roderick v. Snyder Bros. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Minnesota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Rait v. New England Furniture & Carpet Co.
neutral
2 sentences1925Co. 66 Minn. 76 , 68 N. W. 729 , Mr. Justice Mitchell said: “In every case the decisive question in determining whether the doctrine of respondeat superior applies is, had the defendant the right to control in the given particular the conduct of the person doing the wrong. * * * If this control existed, it makes no difference whether the person doing the injury was the ‘servant’ of the defendant, in the popular sense of that word, or a person merely employed to do a specified job or piece of work.” In Meyers v. Tri-State Automobile Co. 121 Minn. 68 , 140 N. W. 184 , it was said that the right 1925Co. 66 Minn. 76 , 68 N. W. 729 , Mr. Justice Mitchell said: “In every case the decisive question in determining whether the doctrine of respondeat superior applies is, had the defendant the right to control in the given particular the conduct of the person doing the wrong. * * * If this control existed, it makes no difference whether the person doing the injury was the ‘servant’ of the defendant, in the popular sense of that word, or a person merely employed to do a specified job or piece of work.” In Meyers v. Tri-State Automobile Co. 121 Minn. 68 , 140 N. W. 184 , it was said that the right | 4 | 1897–1925 |
Fahrendorff Ex Rel. Fahrendorff v. North Homes, Inc.
green
2 sentences2007Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, "liability stems not from any fault of the employer, but from a public policy determination that liability for acts committed within the scope of employment should be allocated to the employer as a cost of engaging in that business." Id. 2007Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, “liability stems not from any fault of the employer, but from a public policy determination that liability for acts committed within the scope of employment should be allocated to' the employer as a cost of engaging in that business.” Id. | 2 | 2007–2007 |
Yunker v. Honeywell, Inc.
green
2 sentences2003Yunker, 496 N.W.2d at 422 . 1995Yunker, 496 N.W.2d at 422 . | 2 | 1995–2003 |
Meyers v. Tri-State Automobile Co.
green
2 sentences1925Co. 66 Minn. 76 , 68 N. W. 729 , Mr. Justice Mitchell said: “In every case the decisive question in determining whether the doctrine of respondeat superior applies is, had the defendant the right to control in the given particular the conduct of the person doing the wrong. * * * If this control existed, it makes no difference whether the person doing the injury was the ‘servant’ of the defendant, in the popular sense of that word, or a person merely employed to do a specified job or piece of work.” In Meyers v. Tri-State Automobile Co. 121 Minn. 68 , 140 N. W. 184 , it was said that the right 1925Co. 66 Minn. 76 , 68 N. W. 729 , Mr. Justice Mitchell said: “In every case the decisive question in determining whether the doctrine of respondeat superior applies is, had the defendant the right to control in the given particular the conduct of the person doing the wrong. * * * If this control existed, it makes no difference whether the person doing the injury was the ‘servant’ of the defendant, in the popular sense of that word, or a person merely employed to do a specified job or piece of work.” In Meyers v. Tri-State Automobile Co. 121 Minn. 68 , 140 N. W. 184 , it was said that the right | 2 | 1914–1925 |
Gahagan v. Aermotor Co.
green
2 sentences1897The decisive test “in determining whether the doctrine of respondeat superior applies is whether the defendant had, under the contract of employment, the right to control in the given particular the conduct of the person doing the wrong.” Eait v. New England, 66 Minn. 76 ; 68 N. W. 729 ; Gahagan v. Aermotor, 67 Minn. 252 , 69 N. W. 914 . 1897The decisive test “in determining whether the doctrine of respondeat superior applies is whether the defendant had, under the contract of employment, the right to control in the given particular the conduct of the person doing the wrong.” Eait v. New England, 66 Minn. 76 ; 68 N. W. 729 ; Gahagan v. Aermotor, 67 Minn. 252 , 69 N. W. 914 . | 2 | 1897–1914 |
Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District
green
2 sentences1999Dist., 524 U.S. 274 , ___, 118 S.Ct. 1989, 2000 , 141 L.Ed.2d 277 (1998). [2] We do not, however, concur with the dissent's statement that "[t]here is nothing in the record to suggest that Kist's conduct was anything but unusual or startling." While the information is more relevant to a direct liability action than a respondeat superior claim, the record does show that two prior allegations of sexual misconduct against other female residents were levied against Kist during his employment at I.T.A.S.K.I.N. 1999Dist., 524 U.S. 274 , ___, 118 S.Ct. 1989, 2000 , 141 L.Ed.2d 277 (1998). [2] We do not, however, concur with the dissent's statement that "[t]here is nothing in the record to suggest that Kist's conduct was anything but unusual or startling." While the information is more relevant to a direct liability action than a respondeat superior claim, the record does show that two prior allegations of sexual misconduct against other female residents were levied against Kist during his employment at I.T.A.S.K.I.N. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Jett v. Dallas Independent School District
green
1 sentence1992Id. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Jamison v. Encarnacion
green
2 sentences1986In Jamison v. Encamacion, 281 U.S. 635 , 50 S.Ct. 440 , 74 L.Ed. 1082 (1930), the Court applied the doctrine of respondeat superior and held that the term “negligence” in the Act was broad enough to include an assault committed by a railway employee in the course of discharging his or her duties and in furtherance of the railroad’s business. 1986In Jamison v. Encamacion, 281 U.S. 635 , 50 S.Ct. 440 , 74 L.Ed. 1082 (1930), the Court applied the doctrine of respondeat superior and held that the term “negligence” in the Act was broad enough to include an assault committed by a railway employee in the course of discharging his or her duties and in furtherance of the railroad’s business. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Harrison v. Missouri Pacific Railroad
green
2 sentences1986In Harrison v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 372 U.S. 248 , 83 S.Ct. 690 , 9 L.Ed.2d 711 (1963) (per curiam), the Court, recognizing a direct-negligence theory of liability under the Act, held that a railroad can be liable if it hires and retains an employee disposed toward violence and that employee intentionally assaults a co-employee. 1986In Harrison v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 372 U.S. 248 , 83 S.Ct. 690 , 9 L.Ed.2d 711 (1963) (per curiam), the Court, recognizing a direct-negligence theory of liability under the Act, held that a railroad can be liable if it hires and retains an employee disposed toward violence and that employee intentionally assaults a co-employee. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Hubbard v. United Press International, Inc.
green
1 sentence1986Under Hubbard v. United Press International Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428 (Minn.1983), to sustain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (1) the defendants' conduct must be extreme and outrageous, (2) it must be intentional or reckless, (3) it must cause emotional distress, and (4) the distress must be severe. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Wallstedt v. Swedish Hospital
green
2 sentences1970The question arises as to whether the hospital is liable for the employee’s negligent conduct under the doctrine of respondeat superior or whether under that doctrine the surgeon is liable for her conduct as a “borrowed servant.” It appears from our authorities that generally, “when a hospital assigns its nurses to a duty for an operating surgeon in its operating room and surrenders to the surgeon the direction and control of the nurses in relation to the work to be done by them, the nurses become the servants of the operating surgeon insofar as their services *274 relate to the work so contro 1970The question arises as to whether the hospital is liable for the employee’s negligent conduct under the doctrine of respondeat superior or whether under that doctrine the surgeon is liable for her conduct as a “borrowed servant.” It appears from our authorities that generally, “when a hospital assigns its nurses to a duty for an operating surgeon in its operating room and surrenders to the surgeon the direction and control of the nurses in relation to the work to be done by them, the nurses become the servants of the operating surgeon insofar as their services *274 relate to the work so contro | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Porter v. Grennan Bakeries, Inc.
green
2 sentences1961Its true basis is largely one of public or social policy under which it has been determined that, irrespective of fault, a party should be held to respond for the acts of another. 2 In Porter v. Grennan Bakeries, Inc. 219 Minn. 14, 21 , 16 N. W. (2d) 906, 909 , we said: “Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, according to the generally accepted view, vicarious liability to third persons is imposed upon the master for his servant’s torts, not because the master is at fault, or because he authorized the particular act, or because the servant represents him, but because the servant is conduct 1961Its true basis is largely one of public or social policy under which it has been determined that, irrespective of fault, a party should be held to respond for the acts of another. 2 In Porter v. Grennan Bakeries, Inc. 219 Minn. 14, 21 , 16 N. W. (2d) 906, 909 , we said: “Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, according to the generally accepted view, vicarious liability to third persons is imposed upon the master for his servant’s torts, not because the master is at fault, or because he authorized the particular act, or because the servant represents him, but because the servant is conduct | 1 | 1961–1961 |
| Tschida v. Dorle green | 1 | 1961–1961 |
McDonald v. Western Union Telegraph Co., Inc.
green
2 sentences1961Co. Inc. 250 Minn. 406 , 84 N. W. (2d) 630 . 1961Co. Inc. 250 Minn. 406 , 84 N. W. (2d) 630 . | 1 | 1961–1961 |
| Hanson v. Bailey green | 1 | 1961–1961 |
| Bakal v. University Heights Sanitarium, Inc. neutral | 1 | 1952–1952 |
| Elliason v. Western Coal & Coke Co. green | 1 | 1949–1949 |
| Linden v. City Car Co. green | 1 | 1944–1944 |
| Young v. Masci green | 1 | 1943–1943 |
| Clay County Land Co. v. Alcox green | 1 | 1937–1937 |
| Robertson v. Sichel green | 1 | 1933–1933 |
| Waters v. Pioneer Fuel Co. green | 1 | 1915–1915 |
| Corrigan v. Elsinger green | 1 | 1915–1915 |
| State ex rel. Virginia & Rainy Lake Co. v. District Court neutral | 1 | 1915–1915 |
| Standard Oil Co. v. Parkinson green | 1 | 1914–1914 |
| Barg v. Bousfield green | 1 | 1902–1902 |
| Whitson v. Ames neutral | 1 | 1902–1902 |
| Vosbeck v. Kellogg neutral | 1 | 1902–1902 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.