respondeat superior doctrine in Maryland

2016The verdicts were irreconcilably inconsistent because the jury found that a defendant employer was liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior, yet found that the defendant employees were not liable for the “conduct [that] was alleged to be the sole basis of the claim for liability.” Id. at 486 , 836 A.2d at 641 .

2016The verdicts were irreconcilably inconsistent because the jury found that a defendant employer was liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior, yet found that the defendant employees were not liable for the “conduct [that] was alleged to be the sole basis of the claim for liability.” Id. at 486 , 836 A.2d at 641 .

2012See Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 30 , 660 A.2d 423, 426 (1995) (holding that "[t]he doctrine of respondeat superior, in Maryland, allows an employer to be held vicariously liable for the tortious conduct of its employee when that employee was acting within the scope of the employment relationship" (citations omitted)); Gallagher's Estate v. Battle, 209 Md. 592, 602 , 122 A.2d 93, 98 (1956) (emphasizing that "the doctrine [of respondeat superior] applies ... only when the relationship of master and servant existed in respect to the very thing from which the injury arose" (quotation omitted)).

2012See Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 30 , 660 A.2d 423, 426 (1995) (holding that "[t]he doctrine of respondeat superior, in Maryland, allows an employer to be held vicariously liable for the tortious conduct of its employee when that employee was acting within the scope of the employment relationship" (citations omitted)); Gallagher's Estate v. Battle, 209 Md. 592, 602 , 122 A.2d 93, 98 (1956) (emphasizing that "the doctrine [of respondeat superior] applies ... only when the relationship of master and servant existed in respect to the very thing from which the injury arose" (quotation omitted)).

2012See Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 30 , 660 A.2d 423, 426 (1995) (holding that "[t]he doctrine of respondeat superior, in Maryland, allows an employer to be held vicariously liable for the tortious conduct of its employee when that employee was acting within the scope of the employment relationship" (citations omitted)); Gallagher's Estate v. Battle, 209 Md. 592, 602 , 122 A.2d 93, 98 (1956) (emphasizing that "the doctrine [of respondeat superior] applies ... only when the relationship of master and servant existed in respect to the very thing from which the injury arose" (quotation omitted)).

2012See Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 30 , 660 A.2d 423, 426 (1995) (holding that "[t]he doctrine of respondeat superior, in Maryland, allows an employer to be held vicariously liable for the tortious conduct of its employee when that employee was acting within the scope of the employment relationship" (citations omitted)); Gallagher's Estate v. Battle, 209 Md. 592, 602 , 122 A.2d 93, 98 (1956) (emphasizing that "the doctrine [of respondeat superior] applies ... only when the relationship of master and servant existed in respect to the very thing from which the injury arose" (quotation omitted)).

2003See DiPino v. Davis, 354 Md. 18, 47 , 729 A.2d 354, 370 (1999); Baltimore Police Dep't v. Cherkes, 140 Md.App. 282, 332 , 780 A.2d 410, 439 (2001).

2003See DiPino v. Davis, 354 Md. 18, 47 , 729 A.2d 354, 370 (1999); Baltimore Police Dep't v. Cherkes, 140 Md.App. 282, 332 , 780 A.2d 410, 439 (2001).

2017Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is vicariously liable for a tort committed by its employee while acting within the scope of his employment: Respondeat superior, or vicarious liability as it is also known, is a principle of tort law which “means that, by reason of some relationship existing between A and B, the negligence of A is to be charged against B, although B has *658 played no part in it, has done nothing whatever to aid or encourage it, or indeed has done all that he possibly can to prevent it.” James v. Prince George’s Cty, 288 Md. 315, 332 , 418 A.2d 1173 (1980)

2017Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is vicariously liable for a tort committed by its employee while acting within the scope of his employment: Respondeat superior, or vicarious liability as it is also known, is a principle of tort law which “means that, by reason of some relationship existing between A and B, the negligence of A is to be charged against B, although B has *658 played no part in it, has done nothing whatever to aid or encourage it, or indeed has done all that he possibly can to prevent it.” James v. Prince George’s Cty, 288 Md. 315, 332 , 418 A.2d 1173 (1980)

2012See Dhanraj, 305 Md. at 628 , 506 A.2d at 226 (“The application of the doctrine rests upon the power of control and direction which the superior has over the subordinate, and ... does not arise when the servant is not actually or constructively under the direction and control of the master.” (internal quotation omitted)); Oaks, 339 Md. at 31 , 660 A.2d at 426-27 (“The ‘right to control’ concept is key to a respondeat superior analysis in the motor vehicle context.”); Henkelmann, 180 Md. at 599 , 26 A.2d at 423 (noting that in order to be vicariously liable an employer must have “the right to c

2012See Dhanraj, 305 Md. at 628 , 506 A.2d at 226 (“The application of the doctrine rests upon the power of control and direction which the superior has over the subordinate, and ... does not arise when the servant is not actually or constructively under the direction and control of the master.” (internal quotation omitted)); Oaks, 339 Md. at 31 , 660 A.2d at 426-27 (“The ‘right to control’ concept is key to a respondeat superior analysis in the motor vehicle context.”); Henkelmann, 180 Md. at 599 , 26 A.2d at 423 (noting that in order to be vicariously liable an employer must have “the right to c

2020In Cox, 296 Md. at 164, 171, 169 , 460 A.2d at 1039, 1043, 1042 , this Court held that a trial court erred in dismissing a complaint,6 where the plaintiffs’ allegations— 6 In Cox, 296 Md. at 165 , 460 A.2d at 1039 , the trial court “sustained [a] demurrer[,]” which is “[a] pleading stating that[,] although the facts [that are] alleged in a complaint may be true, they are insufficient for the plaintiff to state a claim for relief[.] . . . [] In most jurisdictions, such a pleading is now termed a motion to dismiss[.]” Demurrer, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (italics in original).

2020In Cox, 296 Md. at 164, 171, 169 , 460 A.2d at 1039, 1043, 1042 , this Court held that a trial court erred in dismissing a complaint,6 where the plaintiffs’ allegations— 6 In Cox, 296 Md. at 165 , 460 A.2d at 1039 , the trial court “sustained [a] demurrer[,]” which is “[a] pleading stating that[,] although the facts [that are] alleged in a complaint may be true, they are insufficient for the plaintiff to state a claim for relief[.] . . . [] In most jurisdictions, such a pleading is now termed a motion to dismiss[.]” Demurrer, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (italics in original).

2016Under the doctrine of respondeat-superior, an employer is vicariously liable for the acts of its employee, within the scope of employment, even if the employer does not commit any negligent acts. 11 See Barclay v. Briscoe, 427 Md. 270, 282-83 , 47 A.3d 560, 567-68 (2012).

2016Under the doctrine of respondeat-superior, an employer is vicariously liable for the acts of its employee, within the scope of employment, even if the employer does not commit any negligent acts. 11 See Barclay v. Briscoe, 427 Md. 270, 282-83 , 47 A.3d 560, 567-68 (2012).

2001Penney Company, 24 Cal.3d 579 , 595 P.2d 975 , 156 Cal.Rptr. 198 (1979) (an off-duty police officer, acting as a private security guard in a store, falsely arrested a customer for shoplifting, and the Supreme Court of California reversed a judgment in favor of the store and ordered a new trial); Blair v. Tynes, 621 So.2d 591, 598-599 (La.1993) (the private secondary employer was liable, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, for the tortious conduct of off-duty deputy sheriffs hired to provide security); Duryea v. Handy, 700 So.2d 1123 (La.App.1997) (applies traditional agency principles t

2001Penney Company, 24 Cal.3d 579 , 595 P.2d 975 , 156 Cal.Rptr. 198 (1979) (an off-duty police officer, acting as a private security guard in a store, falsely arrested a customer for shoplifting, and the Supreme Court of California reversed a judgment in favor of the store and ordered a new trial); Blair v. Tynes, 621 So.2d 591, 598-599 (La.1993) (the private secondary employer was liable, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, for the tortious conduct of off-duty deputy sheriffs hired to provide security); Duryea v. Handy, 700 So.2d 1123 (La.App.1997) (applies traditional agency principles t

2001Penney Company, 24 Cal.3d 579 , 595 P.2d 975 , 156 Cal.Rptr. 198 (1979) (an off-duty police officer, acting as a private security guard in a store, falsely arrested a customer for shoplifting, and the Supreme Court of California reversed a judgment in favor of the store and ordered a new trial); Blair v. Tynes, 621 So.2d 591, 598-599 (La.1993) (the private secondary employer was liable, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, for the tortious conduct of off-duty deputy sheriffs hired to provide security); Duryea v. Handy, 700 So.2d 1123 (La.App.1997) (applies traditional agency principles t

2001Penney Company, 24 Cal.3d 579 , 595 P.2d 975 , 156 Cal.Rptr. 198 (1979) (an off-duty police officer, acting as a private security guard in a store, falsely arrested a customer for shoplifting, and the Supreme Court of California reversed a judgment in favor of the store and ordered a new trial); Blair v. Tynes, 621 So.2d 591, 598-599 (La.1993) (the private secondary employer was liable, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, for the tortious conduct of off-duty deputy sheriffs hired to provide security); Duryea v. Handy, 700 So.2d 1123 (La.App.1997) (applies traditional agency principles t

2016Penney Company, 24 Cal.3d 579 , 595 P.2d 975 , 156 Cal.Rptr. 198 (1979) (when off-duty police officer, acting as a private security guard in a store, falsely arrested a customer for shoplifting, store was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law); Blair v. Tynes, 621 So.2d 591, 598-599 (La. 1993) (private employer was liable, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, for torts committed by off-duty deputy sheriffs hired to provide security); Duryea v. Handy, 700 So.2d 1123 (La.

2001Penney Company, 24 Cal.3d 579 , 595 P.2d 975 , 156 Cal.Rptr. 198 (1979) (an off-duty police officer, acting as a private security guard in a store, falsely arrested a customer for shoplifting, and the Supreme Court of California reversed a judgment in favor of the store and ordered a new trial); Blair v. Tynes, 621 So.2d 591, 598-599 (La.1993) (the private secondary employer was liable, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, for the tortious conduct of off-duty deputy sheriffs hired to provide security); Duryea v. Handy, 700 So.2d 1123 (La.App.1997) (applies traditional agency principles t

2015See Keitz, 214 Md. at 493 , 134 A.2d 296 (evidence sufficient to support sending to the jury the issue whether truck driver was the servant of a paving company at the time of the accident, even though he was employed by the owner of the truck).

2015See Keitz, 214 Md. at 493 , 134 A.2d 296 (evidence sufficient to support sending to the jury the issue whether truck driver was the servant of a paving company at the time of the accident, even though he was employed by the owner of the truck).

2003Section 5-522(b)’s phrase, “within the scope of the public duties of the State personnel,” for purposes of a State official’s or employee’s immunity from suit under the Maryland Tort Claims Act, generally “is coextensive with the common law concept of ‘scope of employment’ under the doctrine of respondeat superior,’ ” Sawyer v. Humphries, 322 Md. 247, 254 , 587 A.2d 467, 470 (1991). 2 In Sawyer v. Humphries, supra, 322 Md. at 255 , 587 A.2d at 470-471 , we summarized the general principles for determining scope of employment as follows: “The general test set forth in numerous Maryland cases fo

2003Section 5-522(b)’s phrase, “within the scope of the public duties of the State personnel,” for purposes of a State official’s or employee’s immunity from suit under the Maryland Tort Claims Act, generally “is coextensive with the common law concept of ‘scope of employment’ under the doctrine of respondeat superior,’ ” Sawyer v. Humphries, 322 Md. 247, 254 , 587 A.2d 467, 470 (1991). 2 In Sawyer v. Humphries, supra, 322 Md. at 255 , 587 A.2d at 470-471 , we summarized the general principles for determining scope of employment as follows: “The general test set forth in numerous Maryland cases fo

2001Relying on the holding of Bradshaw v. Prince George’s County, 284 Md. 294, 305 , 396 A.2d 255, 262 (1979), that a governmental employer “cannot be held liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior ” when the governmental employee individually is not liable because of public official immunity, the Court of Special Appeals held that “there can be no *711 liability on the part of [Anderson’s] employers, the State of Maryland,” the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, the Baltimore City Police Department, and the Police Commissioner.

2001Relying on the holding of Bradshaw v. Prince George’s County, 284 Md. 294, 305 , 396 A.2d 255, 262 (1979), that a governmental employer “cannot be held liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior ” when the governmental employee individually is not liable because of public official immunity, the Court of Special Appeals held that “there can be no *711 liability on the part of [Anderson’s] employers, the State of Maryland,” the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, the Baltimore City Police Department, and the Police Commissioner.

2001DiPino v. Davis, supra, 354 *706 Md. at 48 n. 6, 729 A.2d at 370 n. 6; Parker v. State, supra, 337 Md. at 286 , 653 A.2d at 443 ; Boyer v. State, supra, 323 Md. at 582-583 , 594 A.2d at 133 ; Surratt v. Prince George’s County, 320 Md. 439, 443-445 , 578 A.2d 745, 747-748 (1990); Hatzinicolas v. Protopapas, 314 Md. 340, 355-356 , 550 A.2d 947, 954-955 (1988); Clea v. City of Baltimore, 312 Md. 662 , 667 n. 2, 541 A.2d 1303 , 1305 n. 2 (1988); Cox v. Prince George’s County, 296 Md. 162, 167-169 , 460 A.2d 1038, 1041 (1983); James v. Prince George’s County, supra, 288 Md. at 331, 418 A.2d at 1182

2001DiPino v. Davis, supra, 354 *706 Md. at 48 n. 6, 729 A.2d at 370 n. 6; Parker v. State, supra, 337 Md. at 286 , 653 A.2d at 443 ; Boyer v. State, supra, 323 Md. at 582-583 , 594 A.2d at 133 ; Surratt v. Prince George’s County, 320 Md. 439, 443-445 , 578 A.2d 745, 747-748 (1990); Hatzinicolas v. Protopapas, 314 Md. 340, 355-356 , 550 A.2d 947, 954-955 (1988); Clea v. City of Baltimore, 312 Md. 662 , 667 n. 2, 541 A.2d 1303 , 1305 n. 2 (1988); Cox v. Prince George’s County, 296 Md. 162, 167-169 , 460 A.2d 1038, 1041 (1983); James v. Prince George’s County, supra, 288 Md. at 331, 418 A.2d at 1182

2012In discussing public official immunity specifically, we held in James that "the government, when it has waived immunity ... is liable for torts committed by its officers even though those officers themselves are not liable because of public-official immunity." James, 288 Md. at 333 , 418 A.2d at 1183 (citations omitted); see Parker, 337 Md. at 286 , 653 A.2d at 443 (holding that "[t]he qualified immunity of a public official does not necessarily protect a government employer sued on a theory of respondeat superior ").

2012In discussing public official immunity specifically, we held in James that "the government, when it has waived immunity ... is liable for torts committed by its officers even though those officers themselves are not liable because of public-official immunity." James, 288 Md. at 333 , 418 A.2d at 1183 (citations omitted); see Parker, 337 Md. at 286 , 653 A.2d at 443 (holding that "[t]he qualified immunity of a public official does not necessarily protect a government employer sued on a theory of respondeat superior ").

2012We upheld summary judgment in favor of the employer because the doctrine of respondeat superior could only “be properly invoked if the master has, expressly or impliedly, authorized the [servant] to use his [or her] personal vehicle in the execution of his [or her] duties, and the employee [wa]s in fact engaged in such endeavors at the time of the accident.” Dhanraj, 305 Md. at 628 , 506 A.2d at 226 (internal quotation and citations omitted).

2012We upheld summary judgment in favor of the employer because the doctrine of respondeat superior could only “be properly invoked if the master has, expressly or impliedly, authorized the [servant] to use his [or her] personal vehicle in the execution of his [or her] duties, and the employee [wa]s in fact engaged in such endeavors at the time of the accident.” Dhanraj, 305 Md. at 628 , 506 A.2d at 226 (internal quotation and citations omitted).

2012This Court has recognized consistently the doctrine of respondeat superior, as “it is hornbook law that an employer is ordinarily responsible for the tortious conduct of his employee committed while the servant was acting within the scope of the employment relationship.” Embrey v. Holly, 293 Md. 128, 134 , 442 A.2d 966, 969 (1982); accord S. Mgmt.

2012This Court has recognized consistently the doctrine of respondeat superior, as “it is hornbook law that an employer is ordinarily responsible for the tortious conduct of his employee committed while the servant was acting within the scope of the employment relationship.” Embrey v. Holly, 293 Md. 128, 134 , 442 A.2d 966, 969 (1982); accord S. Mgmt.

1998Co., 233 Md. 205, 215 , 196 A.2d 76, 81 (1963) C[T]he claims against [masters] were predicated no( upon their active negligence, but upon their vicarious, or imputed, liability for [servant’s] negligent actions under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

1998Co., 233 Md. 205, 215 , 196 A.2d 76, 81 (1963) C[T]he claims against [masters] were predicated no( upon their active negligence, but upon their vicarious, or imputed, liability for [servant’s] negligent actions under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

2020App. 548, 577, 570-71 , 65 A.3d 785, 802, 798 , cert. denied, 434 Md. 312 , 75 A.3d 318 (2013), the Court of Special Appeals held that, in shooting delivery people at his residence, a law enforcement officer acted outside the scope of employment for purposes of the doctrine of respondeat superior.