respondeat superior doctrine in Texas

2025“Under the common-law doctrine of respondeat superior, or vicarious liability, ‘liability for one person’s fault may be imputed to another who is himself entirely without fault solely because of the relationship between them.’” Painter v. Amerimex Drilling I, Ltd., 561 S.W.3d 125, 130 (Tex. 2018) (quoting St.

2024According to appellants, there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Schroeder was an agent of appellees, thereby triggering the doctrine of respondeat superior, and whether appellees had a duty to disclose information regarding “the true status of the factoring invoices to be acquired by TEF.” “Under the common-law doctrine of respondeat superior, or vicarious liability, ‘liability for one person’s fault may be imputed to another who is himself entirely without fault solely because of the relationship between them.’” Painter v. Amerimex Drilling I, Ltd., 561 S.W.3d 125, 130 (Tex.

2022Sys. v. Sampson, 969 S.W.2d 945 , 947–48 (Tex. 1998) (“Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is vicariously liable for the negligence of an agent or employee acting within the scope of his or her agency or employment . . . .

2015Sys. v. Sampson, 969 S.W.2d 945, 947 (Tex.1998) (under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is vicariously liable for the negligence of an employee acting within the scope of his employment, although the employer has not personally committed a wrong).

2025Joseph Hosp. v. Wolff, 94 S.W.3d 513 , 541–42 (Tex. 2002) 17 (“Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is vicariously liable for the negligence of an agent or employee acting within the scope of his or her agency or employment, although the principal or employer has not personally committed a wrong.” (quoting Baptist Mem’l Hosp.

2024Joseph Hosp. v. Wolff, 94 S.W.3d 513 , 541–42 (Tex. 2002) (holding that “[u]nder the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is vicariously liable for the negligence of an agent or employee acting within the scope of his or her agency or employment, although the principal or employer has not personally 29 committed a wrong”).

2022Code Ann. § 545.351 (b)(2); Montes, 61 S.W.3d at 509 ; Carney, 837 S.W.2d at 210 . 33 See Stanley, 466 S.W.2d at 553 ; Holcomb, 916 S.W.2d at 514 . 34 See Painter, 561 S.W.3d at 131 ; DeWitt, 904 S.W.2d at 654 . 22 negligent hiring, supervision, training, or retention of Pease. 35 We overrule Appellant’s first issue.

2018Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mayes, 236 S.W.3d 754, 757 (Tex. 2007); DeWitt v. Harris Cty., 904 S.W.2d 650, 654 (Tex. 1995). “[A]n employer is liable for its employee’s tort only when the tortious act falls within the scope of the employee’s general authority in furtherance of the employer’s business and for the accomplishment of the object for which the employee was hired.” Minyard Food Stores, Inc. v. Goodman, 80 S.W.3d 573, 577 (Tex. 2002).

2016Robertson Tank Lines, Inc. v. Van Cleave, 468 S.W.2d 354, 357 (Tex. 1971).

2009Butt Grocery Co. , 758 S.W.2d 904, 906 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, no writ) (citing Robertson Tank Lines, Inc. v. Van Cleave , 468 S.W.2d 354, 357 (Tex. 1971)).

2015Burkett, 42 S.W.3d at 288–89; Darensburg, 887 S.W.2d. at 86–87 (explaining that in Texas, “[a]n ‘agent, servant, or employee’ within the meaning of Section 3(a) of the workers’ compensation statute is one for whose conduct the employer would be legally responsible under the doctrine of respondeat superior”); see also Long v. Turner, 871 S.W.2d 220, 223 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1993, writ. denied) (“In addressing the meaning of the former ‘exclusive remedy’ statute, the Supreme Court has found that an agent, servant, or employee within the meaning of the statute is ordinarily one for whose 4 conduct

2015This appeal ensued. employer would, aside from the Workmen’s Compensation Act, be legally responsible under the doctrine of respondeat superior.”) (citing McKelvy v. Barber, 381 S.W.2d 59, 62 (Tex.1964)).

2003Marange v. Marshall, 402 S.W.2d 236, 238 (Tex.Civ.App.-Corpus Christi 1966, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

2003Marange v. Marshall , 402 S.W.2d 236, 238 (Tex. Civ.

1990The Supreme Court specifically held in Knutson v. Morton Foods, Ind., 603 S.W.2d 805 (Tex.1980), that a settlement and release from an agent does not operate to release the principal under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

1990The Supreme Court specifically held in Knutson v. Morton Foods, Inc., 603 S.W.2d 805 (Tex.1980), that a settlement and release from an agent does not operate to release the principal under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

2026Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer such as the City may be vicariously liable for its employee’s negligent acts “if the employee’s actions are within the course and scope of his employment.” Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Mayes, 236 S.W.3d 754, 757 (Tex. 2007) (citing Baptist Mem’l Hosp.

2020In the “course and scope of employment” means “within the scope of the employee’s general authority in furtherance of the employer’s business and for the accomplishment of the object for which the employee was hired.” Id. (quoting Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mayes, 236 S.W.3d 754, 757 (Tex. 2007)).

2026Sys. v. Sampson, 969 S.W.2d 945, 947 (Tex. 1998)). “[A]n employer is liable for its employee’s tort only when the tortious act falls within the scope of the employee’s general authority in furtherance of the employer’s business and for the accomplishment of the object for which the employee was hired.” Id. (citing 6 Minyard Food Stores, Inc. v. Goodman, 80 S.W.3d 573, 577 (Tex. 2002)).

2016Morgan v. Compugraphic Corp., 675 S.W.2d 729, 732 (Tex. 1984). 16 officers’ normal duties; Zaffar did not file his complaint until after he had left work on the day of his altercation with Black; and “Smith did not authorize, benefit from or ratify such conduct.” Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer may be vicariously liable for an employee’s tortious act if the “act falls within the scope of the employee’s general authority in furtherance of the employer’s business and for the accomplishment of the object for which the employee was hired.” Minyard Food Stores, Inc. v. Goodma

2003Leyendecker Assocs., Inc. v. Wechter, 683 S.W.2d 369, 375 (Tex.1984); McIntosh v. Copeland, 894 S.W.2d 60, 63 (Tex.App.-Austin 1995, writ denied); Leitch v. Hornsby, 885 S.W.2d 243, 249 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1994), rev’d on other grounds, 935 S.W.2d 114 (Tex.1996) (employee is responsible for own acts and may be found negligent for those acts, as may corporation under doctrine of respondeat superior; corporate officer or agent can also be hable to others for own negligence when officer or agent owes independent duty of reasonable care to injured party).

2003Leyendecker Assocs., Inc. v. Wechter , 683 S.W.2d 369, 375 (Tex. 1984); McIntosh v. Copeland , 894 S.W.2d 60, 63 (Tex. App.—Austin 1995, writ denied); Leitch v. Hornsby , 885 S.W.2d 242, 249 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1994, rev’d on other grounds , 935 S.W.2d 114 (Tex. 1996) (employee is responsible for own acts and may be found negligent for those acts, as may corporation under doctrine of respondeat superior ; corporate officer or agent can also be liable to others for own negligence when officer or agent owes independent duty of reasonable care to injured party).

2015Burkett, 42 S.W.3d at 288–89; Darensburg, 887 S.W.2d. at 86–87 (explaining that in Texas, “[a]n ‘agent, servant, or employee’ within the meaning of Section 3(a) of the workers’ compensation statute is one for whose conduct the employer would be legally responsible under the doctrine of respondeat superior”); see also Long v. Turner, 871 S.W.2d 220, 223 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1993, writ. denied) (“In addressing the meaning of the former ‘exclusive remedy’ statute, the Supreme Court has found that an agent, servant, or employee within the meaning of the statute is ordinarily one for whose 4 conduct

2015Moreover, there was evidence that Arnold designed the configuration of the complained-of mechanisms and that those machines, which included a processing line conveyor, were fixed in place in the warehouse for years and attached to mechanized pieces of equipment that were affixed to the walls of the warehouse and bolted to the floors— acts that a jury could have believed were undertaken in order to rent the facility to other entities. 8 S.W.3d at 288–89 (defining the term “employee of the employer” as an employee for whose conduct the employer is legally responsible under the doctrine of respon

2020See Munoz, 545 S.W.3d at 98 ; Dietes, 739 S.W.2d at 408 (“If course and scope was a required element of a negligent hiring and supervision claim, negligent hiring and supervision as a unique cause of action would be rendered superfluous by the respondeat superior doctrine.”).

2011Tools , 739 S.W.2d 405, 408 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1987, writ denied) (“If course and scope was a required element of a negligent hiring and supervision claim, negligent hiring and supervision as a unique cause of action would be rendered superfluous by the respondeat superior doctrine.”); cf. Knight v. City Streets, L.L.C. , 167 S.W.3d 580, 584 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (to prevail in a negligent-supervision claim, the plaintiff must prove that the employer had a duty to the plaintiff to supervise the employee, breached the duty, and the breach proximately caused the p

2018Butt Grocery Co., 758 S.W.2d 904, 907 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1988, no writ); see also Pilgrim v. Fortune Drilling Co., Inc., 653 F.2d 982, 988 (5th Cir. 1981) (rejecting plaintiffs’ argument that Fortune was liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior because “Fortune paid a travel allowance to one member of the drilling crew each day”); cf. Painter, 2018 WL 2749862 , at *7 (holding that defendant was not entitled to summary judgment as to respondeat superior claim when plaintiff “presented evidence that one of his specific duties as a driller—and one for which he was paid additional m

2009Butt Grocery Co. , 758 S.W.2d 904, 906 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, no writ) (citing Robertson Tank Lines, Inc. v. Van Cleave , 468 S.W.2d 354, 357 (Tex. 1971)).

2015See Houston Transit Co. v. Felder, 146 Tex. 428 , 208 S.W.2d 880, 881 (1948).

2015See Houston Transit Co. v. Felder, 146 Tex. 428 , 208 S.W.2d 880, 881 (1948).

2013See RGV Healthcare Assocs., Inc. v. Estevis, 294 S.W.3d 264, 278 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2009, pet. denied) (“When a plaintiffs claim against a hospital is not for direct negligence, but is based on the conduct of an employee through the doctrine of respondeat superior,” the report “is sufficient as against the hospital to satisfy the expert report requirement for the vicarious liability claims” if “the report identifies conduct by the hospital’s employee, the hospital is implicated, and ... the report adequately addresses the standard of care applicable to the employee, how the employee brea

2012When a plaintiff’s claim against a hospital is not for direct negligence, but is based on the conduct of an employee through the doctrine of respondeat superior, the expert report need not identify the hospital by name or include an opinion about how the employee was acting in the course and scope of employment for the hospital. 5 RGV Healthcare Assocs., Inc. v. Estevis, 294 S.W.3d 264, 273 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2009, pet. denied) (citing Univ. of Tex. Sw.

2011See Bedford v. Moore, 166 S.W.3d 454, 461 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet.). 7 We find no authority justifying the treatment of settling employees differently than defendant employees under section 33.003(a).

2010See Bedford v. Moore, 166 S.W.3d 454, 461 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet.).

2013Buck v. Blum, 130 S.W.3d 285, 288 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.).

2013Buck v. Blum, 130 S.W.3d 285, 288 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.).

2022See Waste Mgmt. of Tex., Inc. v. Stevenson, 622 S.W.3d 273 , 281 (Tex. 2021) (quoting Garza v. Exel Logistics, Inc., 161 S.W.3d 473, 481 (Tex. 2005)) (discussing this distinction).4 Though the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act may define injuries arising from trips for necessities as compensable, such trips are not generally special missions within the course and scope of employment under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

2016See Garza v. Exel Logistics, Inc., 161 S.W.3d 473, 481 (Tex. 2005) (“In this case, we are construing only the Labor Code, specifically the Workers' Compensation Act; we are not applying general common-law principles regarding vicarious liability for injuries to third parties.

2015Burkett, 42 S.W.3d at 288–89; Darensburg, 887 S.W.2d. at 86–87 (explaining that in Texas, “[a]n ‘agent, servant, or employee’ within the meaning of Section 3(a) of the workers’ compensation statute is one for whose conduct the employer would be legally responsible under the doctrine of respondeat superior”); see also Long v. Turner, 871 S.W.2d 220, 223 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1993, writ. denied) (“In addressing the meaning of the former ‘exclusive remedy’ statute, the Supreme Court has found that an agent, servant, or employee within the meaning of the statute is ordinarily one for whose 4 conduct

2015Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that because it was Burkett, 42 S.W.3d at 287 ; see also Lockett v. HB Zachry “obvious that the parties’ common employer would not, Co., 285 S.W.3d 63, 75 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] under the Respondeat superior doctrine, have been 2009, no pet.) (concluding that the employer was immune responsible for the negligence of either of the parties to from premises liability cause of action because employee the automobile collision[,]” the defendant driver had received workers’ compensation).

2015See Baptist Mem'l Hosp. dys. v. Sampson, 969 S.W.2d 945, 947 (Tex. 1995) (an employer, as principal, may be held liable for tortious acts committed by its employees as agents in the course and scope of their employment under the doctrine of respondeat superior); Soto v. El Paso l{atural Gas Co., 942 S.W.2d 671,680 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1997, writ l^-^:^-J\- fr/-.1 Lr-.,-z Clt- . -' ' r,-- ,- /1 '.l-' -- Cl Irr ô ) tr11 /'-f'^-, C1 ^,- ^ô^ ^-^-^ Antonio 1996, writ denied) (corporate liability for an employee's negligent torts is governed by the same rules as those that determine the liability of a

2002Generally, to impose liability upon an employer for the tort of his employee under the doctrine of respondeat superior, acts of the employee must fall within the scope of the employee’s general authority in furtherance of the employer’s business and for the accomplishment of the object for which the employee was hired. *494 Soto v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 942 S.W.2d 671, 681 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1997, writ denied); Durand v. Moore, 879 S.W.2d 196, 199 (TexApp.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ).

2013This doctrine “holds the master liable for the torts of his servant committed in the course of his employment” and is “essentially a policy doctrine .... ” Newspapers, Inc. v. Love, 380 S.W.2d 582, 589 (Tex.1964). “[EJxcept for acts personally directed by the principal, the liability of the master is founded upon the contractual arrangement with the servant, either expressed or implied which vests in him the right to control the details of the work.” Id.; see also Leyendecker & Assocs., Inc. v. Wechter, 683 S.W.2d 369, 375 (Tex.1984) (employer and employee were jointly and severally liable for

2013This doctrine “holds the master liable for the torts of his servant committed in the course of his employment” and is “essentially a policy doctrine . . . .” Newspapers, Inc. v. Love, 380 S.W.2d 582, 589 (Tex. 1964). “[E]xcept for acts personally directed by the principal, the liability of the master is founded upon the contractual arrangement with the servant, either expressed or implied which vests in him the right to control the details of the work.” Id.; see also Leyendecker & Assocs., Inc. v. Wechter, 683 S.W.2d 369, 375 (Tex. 1984) (employer and employee were jointly and severally liable

2012Estevis, 294 S.W.3d at 273 (“When a plaintiff’s claim against a hospital is not for direct negligence, but is based on the conduct of an employee through the doctrine of respondeat superior,” the hospital is implicated if the report identifies conduct by the hospital’s employee); Dale, 188 S.W.3d at 879 ; see also Women’s Clinic of S. Tex. v. Alonzo, No. 13-10-00159-CV, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 2177 , at *13–14 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Mar. 24, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“A health care liability plaintiff fulfills her expert report requirement as to a defendant hospital, clinic, or other facility

2011See Gardner v. U.S. Imaging, Inc., 274 S.W.3d 669, 671-72 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam) (holding that, if a defendant surgical facility's liability is vicarious, the expert report requirement is fulfilled as 9 to the surgical facility if the report is adequate as to the employees alleged to be directly liable); RGV Healthcare Assocs., Inc. v. Estevis, 294 S.W.3d 264, 273 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 2009, pet. denied) ("When a plaintiff's claim against a hospital is not for direct negligence, but is based on the conduct of an employee through the doctrine of respondeat superior," the report "is suffic

2025See 20801, Inc. v. Parker, 249 S.W.3d 392 , 397 n.6 (Tex. 2008) (“Generally, to succeed on a respondeat superior theory, plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing that an employee acted within the course and scope of his or her employment.”).

2011Bev.Code Ann. §§ 1.04(6), (11), (16), 2.01(1); 20801, Inc. v. Parker, 249 S.W.3d 392 , 397 n. 6 (Tex.2008) (Dram Shop “Act authorizes vicarious liability [that] ... is in some ways similar to liability arising from the common law doctrine of respondeat superior, under which an employer [or principal] is vicariously liable for the negligence of an agent or employee acting within the scope of his or her agency or employment, although the principal or employer has not personally committed a wrong.” (internal quotation omitted)). 4 Corral Club’s motion for summary judgment fails to assert a challe

2015Burkett, 42 S.W.3d at 288–89; Darensburg, 887 S.W.2d. at 86–87 (explaining that in Texas, “[a]n ‘agent, servant, or employee’ within the meaning of Section 3(a) of the workers’ compensation statute is one for whose conduct the employer would be legally responsible under the doctrine of respondeat superior”); see also Long v. Turner, 871 S.W.2d 220, 223 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1993, writ. denied) (“In addressing the meaning of the former ‘exclusive remedy’ statute, the Supreme Court has found that an agent, servant, or employee within the meaning of the statute is ordinarily one for whose 4 conduct

2015“In order to impose liability upon an employer for the negligence of his employee under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the acts of the employee must fall within the scope of the general authority of the employee and must be in furtherance of the employer’s business and for the accomplishment of the object for which the employee was hired.” Long, 871 S.W.2d at 224 .

2014Co., 127 S.W.3d 134, 138 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (“Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is exposed to liability not because of any negligence on its part, but because of the employee’s negligence in the scope of that employment.”). 10 that the expert report establish that relationship. 21 All that is required is that the expert report set out the required elements as to a party for whom Family seeks to hold Hospital liable.

2011Id.