collateral estoppel doctrine in West Virginia

2009We have made this summary of the doctrine of collateral estoppel: *178 “But where the causes of action are not the same, the parties being identical or in privity, the bar extends to only those matters which were actually litigated in the former proceeding, as distinguished from those matters that might or could have been litigated therein, and arises by way of estoppel rather than by way of strict res adjudicata.” Lane v. Williams, 150 W.Va. 96, 100 , 144 S.E.2d 234, 236 (1965).[ 15 ] Syl. pt. 2, Conley v. Spillers, 171 W.Va. 584 , 301 S.E.2d 216 (footnote added).

2009We have made this summary of the doctrine of collateral estoppel: *178 “But where the causes of action are not the same, the parties being identical or in privity, the bar extends to only those matters which were actually litigated in the former proceeding, as distinguished from those matters that might or could have been litigated therein, and arises by way of estoppel rather than by way of strict res adjudicata.” Lane v. Williams, 150 W.Va. 96, 100 , 144 S.E.2d 234, 236 (1965).[ 15 ] Syl. pt. 2, Conley v. Spillers, 171 W.Va. 584 , 301 S.E.2d 216 (footnote added).

2012This Court first will address the petitioners’ argument that the circuit court erred in dismissing the Retirement Board and Director Miller based on collateral estoppel. 2 We previously have recognized that “[u]nder the doctrine of collateral estoppel ... the second action is upon a different cause of action and the judgment in the prior suit precludes relitigation of issues actually litigated and necessary to the outcome of the first action.” Conley v. Spillers, 171 W.Va. 584, 589 , 301 S.E.2d 216, 220 (1983), quoting Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 , 326 n. 5, 99 S.Ct. 645, 649,

2012This Court first will address the petitioners’ argument that the circuit court erred in dismissing the Retirement Board and Director Miller based on collateral estoppel. 2 We previously have recognized that “[u]nder the doctrine of collateral estoppel ... the second action is upon a different cause of action and the judgment in the prior suit precludes relitigation of issues actually litigated and necessary to the outcome of the first action.” Conley v. Spillers, 171 W.Va. 584, 589 , 301 S.E.2d 216, 220 (1983), quoting Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 , 326 n. 5, 99 S.Ct. 645, 649,

2022Va. at 275 , 617 S.E.2d at 822 . establish a prescriptive easement independently and that the circuit court erred in its denial of petitioner’s motion to amend the judgment to correct “clear errors,” are moot. 7 Respondents dispute petitioner’s argument that the circuit court, sua sponte, applied the doctrine of res judicata merely because the circuit court had also applied and ruled on the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

2022Va. at 275 , 617 S.E.2d at 822 . establish a prescriptive easement independently and that the circuit court erred in its denial of petitioner’s motion to amend the judgment to correct “clear errors,” are moot. 7 Respondents dispute petitioner’s argument that the circuit court, sua sponte, applied the doctrine of res judicata merely because the circuit court had also applied and ruled on the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

2009See also Kennedy v. First Nat'l Bank of Decatur, 129 Ill.App.3d 633 , 85 Ill.Dec. 236 , 473 N.E.2d 604, 608 (1985) ("[T]he doctrine of collateral estoppel does not bar the issue of whether [plaintiff] was injured individually because (1) such issue was not actually or necessarily decided in the bankruptcy proceeding, and (2) the Bankruptcy Court expressly determined that it had no jurisdiction over such issue."); Eicher v. Mid Am.

2009See also Kennedy v. First Nat'l Bank of Decatur, 129 Ill.App.3d 633 , 85 Ill.Dec. 236 , 473 N.E.2d 604, 608 (1985) ("[T]he doctrine of collateral estoppel does not bar the issue of whether [plaintiff] was injured individually because (1) such issue was not actually or necessarily decided in the bankruptcy proceeding, and (2) the Bankruptcy Court expressly determined that it had no jurisdiction over such issue."); Eicher v. Mid Am.

2024Va. 3 , 459 S.E.2d 114 (1995). i HUTCHISON, Justice: In this appeal from the Circuit Court of Cabell County, we consider the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

2024Va. 3, 9 , 459 S.E.2d 114, 120 (1995), we discussed the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

2012This Court first will address the petitioners’ argument that the circuit court erred in dismissing the Retirement Board and Director Miller based on collateral estoppel. 2 We previously have recognized that “[u]nder the doctrine of collateral estoppel ... the second action is upon a different cause of action and the judgment in the prior suit precludes relitigation of issues actually litigated and necessary to the outcome of the first action.” Conley v. Spillers, 171 W.Va. 584, 589 , 301 S.E.2d 216, 220 (1983), quoting Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 , 326 n. 5, 99 S.Ct. 645, 649,

2012This Court first will address the petitioners’ argument that the circuit court erred in dismissing the Retirement Board and Director Miller based on collateral estoppel. 2 We previously have recognized that “[u]nder the doctrine of collateral estoppel ... the second action is upon a different cause of action and the judgment in the prior suit precludes relitigation of issues actually litigated and necessary to the outcome of the first action.” Conley v. Spillers, 171 W.Va. 584, 589 , 301 S.E.2d 216, 220 (1983), quoting Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 , 326 n. 5, 99 S.Ct. 645, 649,

2010This Court agrees. 8 The doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, 9 “forecloses the relitiga *688 tion of ‘issues that were actually litigated in an earlier suit even though the causes of action [in the former and subsequent proceedings] are different.”’ Peters v. Rivers Edge Mining, Inc., 224 W.Va. 160, 177 , 680 S.E.2d 791, 808 (2009) (quoting Mellon-Stuart Co. v. Hall, 178 W.Va. 291, 298-99 , 359 S.E.2d 124, 131-32 (1987)).

2010This Court agrees. 8 The doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, 9 “forecloses the relitiga *688 tion of ‘issues that were actually litigated in an earlier suit even though the causes of action [in the former and subsequent proceedings] are different.”’ Peters v. Rivers Edge Mining, Inc., 224 W.Va. 160, 177 , 680 S.E.2d 791, 808 (2009) (quoting Mellon-Stuart Co. v. Hall, 178 W.Va. 291, 298-99 , 359 S.E.2d 124, 131-32 (1987)).

2021In an unpublished order dated October 17, 2016, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the First Judicial Department, relying upon an application of collateral estoppel, found 7 See In re Dunn, 27 N.E.3d 465, 468 (N.Y. 2015) (“[T]he doctrine of collateral estoppel has been applied to attorney disciplinary matters in the past and can continue to be applied where the necessary prerequisites have been met—i.e., where the attorney has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the prior proceeding.”). 8 The New York Rules of Professional Conduct identified in the petition included: Rul

2015Pt. 1, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189, 190 , 451 S.E.2d 755, 756 (1994).

2015Pt. 1, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189, 190 , 451 S.E.2d 755, 756 (1994).

2010Taylor v. Janes, 225 W.Va. 329, 335 , 693 S.E.2d 82, 88 (2010) (citing Yeager v. U.S., — U.S. —, 129 S.Ct. 2360 , 2367 n. 4, 174 L.Ed.2d 78 (2009)). 10 .

2010Taylor v. Janes, 225 W.Va. 329, 335 , 693 S.E.2d 82, 88 (2010) (citing Yeager v. U.S., — U.S. —, 129 S.Ct. 2360 , 2367 n. 4, 174 L.Ed.2d 78 (2009)). 10 .

2010This Court agrees. 8 The doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, 9 “forecloses the relitiga *688 tion of ‘issues that were actually litigated in an earlier suit even though the causes of action [in the former and subsequent proceedings] are different.”’ Peters v. Rivers Edge Mining, Inc., 224 W.Va. 160, 177 , 680 S.E.2d 791, 808 (2009) (quoting Mellon-Stuart Co. v. Hall, 178 W.Va. 291, 298-99 , 359 S.E.2d 124, 131-32 (1987)).

2010This Court agrees. 8 The doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, 9 “forecloses the relitiga *688 tion of ‘issues that were actually litigated in an earlier suit even though the causes of action [in the former and subsequent proceedings] are different.”’ Peters v. Rivers Edge Mining, Inc., 224 W.Va. 160, 177 , 680 S.E.2d 791, 808 (2009) (quoting Mellon-Stuart Co. v. Hall, 178 W.Va. 291, 298-99 , 359 S.E.2d 124, 131-32 (1987)).

2007See State v. Navy, 123 W.Va. 722, 725 , 17 S.E.2d 626, 628 (1941) ("A bawdy house is a public nuisance per se that may be abated by injunction"). [10] Because we find that the first condition of a collateral estoppel bar is not present, we need not consider the remaining conditions. [11] The appellees also argue that the judgment of the circuit court must be affirmed because the appellants failed to assign error to and brief all of the grounds enumerated by the circuit court for granting judgment on the pleadings.

2007See State v. Navy, 123 W.Va. 722, 725 , 17 S.E.2d 626, 628 (1941) ("A bawdy house is a public nuisance per se that may be abated by injunction"). [10] Because we find that the first condition of a collateral estoppel bar is not present, we need not consider the remaining conditions. [11] The appellees also argue that the judgment of the circuit court must be affirmed because the appellants failed to assign error to and brief all of the grounds enumerated by the circuit court for granting judgment on the pleadings.

1993In this case, to require the Postlethwaits to take the additional step of getting a judgment against the tortfeasor flies in the face of concepts of judicial economy, which we outlined in Christian v. Sizemore, 181 W.Va. 628, 632 , 383 S.E.2d 810, 814 (1989): “Permitting an adjudication of the respective rights and duties of the parties in the same proceeding as the underlying tort action also enhances judicial economy by avoiding multiple lawsuits and the possibility, as here, of separate proceedings in different courts.” (Citation omitted).

1993In this case, to require the Postlethwaits to take the additional step of getting a judgment against the tortfeasor flies in the face of concepts of judicial economy, which we outlined in Christian v. Sizemore, 181 W.Va. 628, 632 , 383 S.E.2d 810, 814 (1989): “Permitting an adjudication of the respective rights and duties of the parties in the same proceeding as the underlying tort action also enhances judicial economy by avoiding multiple lawsuits and the possibility, as here, of separate proceedings in different courts.” (Citation omitted).

1991We have made this summary of the doctrine of collateral estoppel: `But where the causes of action are not the same, the parties being identical or in privity, the bar extends to only those matters which were actually litigated in the former proceeding, as distinguished from those matters that might or could have been litigated therein, and arises by way of estoppel rather than by way of strict res adjudicata.' Lane v. Williams, 150 W.Va. 96, 100 , 144 S.E.2d 234, 236 (1965)." [7] This proceeding was the subject of the lawsuit in Long v. City of Weirton, 158 W.Va. 741 , 214 S.E.2d 832 (1975). [