16 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re General Determination of the Rights to Use of All Watergreen2 sentences2022That third element requires Thompson to demonstrate that “the issue in the first action was completely, fully, and fairly litigated.” See Buckner, 2004 UT 78, ¶ 13 ; see also Murdock, 1999 UT 39, ¶ 18 (stating that the elements of collateral estoppel require that the issue in (…continued) more lenient standards, it is at least conceivable that a given expert’s testimony could be admissible under Utah law even if it is not admissible under federal law. 2022That third element requires Thompson to demonstrate that “the issue in the first action was completely, fully, and fairly litigated.” See Buckner, 2004 UT 78, ¶ 13 ; see also Murdock, 1999 UT 39, ¶ 18 (stating that the elements of collateral estoppel require that the issue in (…continued) more lenient standards, it is at least conceivable that a given expert’s testimony could be admissible under Utah law even if it is not admissible under federal law. | 2 | 2 |
Stevensen v. Goodsongreen2 sentences1997Res judicata, which “subsumes the doctrine of collateral estoppel,” Stevensen v. Goodson, 924 P.2d 339, 353 (Utah 1996), applies to administrative adjudications in Utah. 2 We noted recently in Salt Lake Citizens v. Mountain States, 846 P.2d 1245 (Utah 1992), that “the doctrine of res judicata has been applied to administrative agency decisions in Utah since at least 1950.” Id. at 1251 (citing North Salt Lake v. St. 1997Res judicata, which "subsumes the doctrine of collateral estoppel," Stevensen v. Goodson, 924 P.2d 339, 353 (Utah 1996), applies to administrative adjudications in Utah. [2] We noted recently in Salt Lake Citizens v. Mountain States, 846 P.2d 1245 (Utah 1992), that "the doctrine of res judicata has been applied to administrative agency decisions in Utah since at least 1950." Id. at 1251 (citing North Salt Lake v. St. | 2 | 2 |
International Resources v. Dunfieldgreen2 sentences1983This Court has previously stated that the doctrine of collateral estoppel “does not apply to issues that merely ‘could have been tried’ in the prior case, but operates only to issues which were actually asserted and tried in that case.” International Resources v. Dunfield, Utah, 599 P.2d 515, 517 (1979) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 1983This Court has previously stated that the doctrine of collateral estoppel "does not apply to issues that merely `could have been tried' in the prior case, but operates only to issues which were actually asserted and tried in that case." International Resources v. Dunfield, Utah, 599 P.2d 515, 517 (1979) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Buckner v. Kennardgreen2 sentences2022That third element requires Thompson to demonstrate that “the issue in the first action was completely, fully, and fairly litigated.” See Buckner, 2004 UT 78, ¶ 13 ; see also Murdock, 1999 UT 39, ¶ 18 (stating that the elements of collateral estoppel require that the issue in (…continued) more lenient standards, it is at least conceivable that a given expert’s testimony could be admissible under Utah law even if it is not admissible under federal law. 2022That third element requires Thompson to demonstrate that “the issue in the first action was completely, fully, and fairly litigated.” See Buckner, 2004 UT 78, ¶ 13 ; see also Murdock, 1999 UT 39, ¶ 18 (stating that the elements of collateral estoppel require that the issue in (…continued) more lenient standards, it is at least conceivable that a given expert’s testimony could be admissible under Utah law even if it is not admissible under federal law. | 1 | 3 |
United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearmsgreen2 sentences2001Nevertheless, although a conviction in the criminal proceeding would control the juvenile court as to her culpability for T.A.'s death, Mother's argument fails if the criminal court acquitted her, as the State could still pursue her in a juvenile proceeding with its lower burden of proof. [9] See United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 362 , 104 S.Ct. 1099, 1104 , 79 L.Ed.2d 361 (1984) ("It is clear that the difference in the *1179 relative burdens of proof in criminal and civil actions precludes the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel."). ¶ 31 Further, res 2001Nevertheless, although a conviction in the criminal proceeding would control the juvenile court as to her culpability for T.A.'s death, Mother's argument fails if the criminal court acquitted her, as the State could still pursue her in a juvenile proceeding with its lower burden of proof. [9] See United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 362 , 104 S.Ct. 1099, 1104 , 79 L.Ed.2d 361 (1984) ("It is clear that the difference in the *1179 relative burdens of proof in criminal and civil actions precludes the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel."). ¶ 31 Further, res | 1 | 1 |
Searle Bros. v. Searlegreen1 sentence1988This case turns on application of the collateral estoppel doctrine since Monte Vista and its shareholders were not parties to the prior action but, rather, contend the issue of whether any commission was owed had been litigated in that action and decided adversely to Trimble, who was a party to the prior action. *454 In Searle Bros. v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 691 (Utah 1978), the Utah Supreme Court outlined the following test to determine whether collateral estoppel applies: 1) Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with the one presented in the action in question? 2) Was ther | 1 | 1 |
Copper State Thrift and Loan v. Brunogreen1 sentence1987Collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of an issue only if “the issue actually litigated in the first suit must have been essential to the resolution of that suit.” Copper State Thrift and Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387, 390 (Utah App.1987). 1 In addition, collateral estoppel requires application of the following criteria: 1. | 1 | 1 |
Morrissey v. Brewergreen2 sentences1986Admittedly, this distinction is important in determining what procedural elements are necessary to satisfy due process, Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. at 489 , 92 S.Ct. at 2604 ; however, once that issue has been resolved, the distinction is no longer pertinent. 1986Admittedly, this distinction is important in determining what procedural elements are necessary to satisfy due process, Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. at 489 , 92 S.Ct. at 2604 ; however, once that issue has been resolved, the distinction is no longer pertinent. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Salt Lake Citizens Congress v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co.
green
2 sentences1997Res judicata, which "subsumes the doctrine of collateral estoppel," Stevensen v. Goodson, 924 P.2d 339, 353 (Utah 1996), applies to administrative adjudications in Utah. [2] We noted recently in Salt Lake Citizens v. Mountain States, 846 P.2d 1245 (Utah 1992), that "the doctrine of res judicata has been applied to administrative agency decisions in Utah since at least 1950." Id. at 1251 (citing North Salt Lake v. St. 1997Res judicata, which "subsumes the doctrine of collateral estoppel," Stevensen v. Goodson, 924 P.2d 339, 353 (Utah 1996), applies to administrative adjudications in Utah. [2] We noted recently in Salt Lake Citizens v. Mountain States, 846 P.2d 1245 (Utah 1992), that "the doctrine of res judicata has been applied to administrative agency decisions in Utah since at least 1950." Id. at 1251 (citing North Salt Lake v. St. | 2 | 1997–1997 |
Cohen Braffits Development v. Shae Financial Group
green
1 sentence2024Shae argued that CBED was thus precluded from relitigating that issue in this case. 20210448-CA 7 2024 UT App 12 Cohen Braffits v. Shae Financial ¶18 CBED opposed the motion for summary judgment. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Doyle
green
2 sentences2020State v. Doyle, 2018 UT App 239, ¶ 19 , 437 P.3d 1266 . ¶23 Finally, Thornock challenges the trial court’s determination that his Fourth Amendment arguments regarding his arrest were barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. 2020State v. Doyle, 2018 UT App 239, ¶ 19 , 437 P.3d 1266 . ¶23 Finally, Thornock challenges the trial court’s determination that his Fourth Amendment arguments regarding his arrest were barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Hughes v. Brown
green
2 sentences2017And this ambiguity precludes application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel, as the relevant issue has not been resolved by a final judgment. 10 III ¶ 37 We affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to 2DP. 2DP is entitled to title of Parcel 2 free and clear of any interest Palmer may have previously had in the property. 1 Palmer does not assert that 2DP had knowledge of his intention to foreclose Parcel 2 at the time it purchased the property. 2 Hughes v. Brown , 62 Ohio App.3d 417 , 575 N.E.2d 1186 , 1190 (1989) (citation omitted). 3 The parties frame their arguments on this 2017And this ambiguity precludes application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel, as the relevant issue has not been resolved by a final judgment. 10 III ¶ 37 We affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to 2DP. 2DP is entitled to title of Parcel 2 free and clear of any interest Palmer may have previously had in the property. 1 Palmer does not assert that 2DP had knowledge of his intention to foreclose Parcel 2 at the time it purchased the property. 2 Hughes v. Brown , 62 Ohio App.3d 417 , 575 N.E.2d 1186 , 1190 (1989) (citation omitted). 3 The parties frame their arguments on this | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Ameritemps, Inc. v. Labor Commission
green
2 sentences2016IV, § 1, or the doctrine of collateral estoppel. ¶13 “Subject matter jurisdiction is the authority and competency of the court to decide the case,” Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, 2000 UT App 110 , ¶ 24 n.3, 2 P.3d 451 , and is “a prerequisite to [the] court’s power to consider substantive issues,” Ameritemps, Inc. v. Labor Comm’n, 2005 UT App 491, ¶ 10 , 128 P.3d 31 . 2016IV, § 1, or the doctrine of collateral estoppel. ¶13 “Subject matter jurisdiction is the authority and competency of the court to decide the case,” Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, 2000 UT App 110 , ¶ 24 n.3, 2 P.3d 451 , and is “a prerequisite to [the] court’s power to consider substantive issues,” Ameritemps, Inc. v. Labor Comm’n, 2005 UT App 491, ¶ 10 , 128 P.3d 31 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Sonntag v. Ward
neutral
2 sentences2016As Tangren points out, “‘[c]hallenges to subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, even for the first time on appeal.’” (Quoting Sonntag v. Ward, 2011 UT App 122, ¶ 2 , 253 P.3d 1120 .) ¶14 The district court presumably had subject matter jurisdiction in this case, considering “[t]he district court has original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law.” See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-5-102(1) (LexisNexis 2012). 2016As Tangren points out, “‘[c]hallenges to subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, even for the first time on appeal.’” (Quoting Sonntag v. Ward, 2011 UT App 122, ¶ 2 , 253 P.3d 1120 .) ¶14 The district court presumably had subject matter jurisdiction in this case, considering “[t]he district court has original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law.” See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-5-102(1) (LexisNexis 2012). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin
green
2 sentences2016IV, § 1, or the doctrine of collateral estoppel. ¶13 “Subject matter jurisdiction is the authority and competency of the court to decide the case,” Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, 2000 UT App 110 , ¶ 24 n.3, 2 P.3d 451 , and is “a prerequisite to [the] court’s power to consider substantive issues,” Ameritemps, Inc. v. Labor Comm’n, 2005 UT App 491, ¶ 10 , 128 P.3d 31 . 2016IV, § 1, or the doctrine of collateral estoppel. ¶13 “Subject matter jurisdiction is the authority and competency of the court to decide the case,” Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, 2000 UT App 110 , ¶ 24 n.3, 2 P.3d 451 , and is “a prerequisite to [the] court’s power to consider substantive issues,” Ameritemps, Inc. v. Labor Comm’n, 2005 UT App 491, ¶ 10 , 128 P.3d 31 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
MONAVIE, LLC v. Quixtar Inc.
green
2 sentences2016Cf. Monavie, LLC v. Quixtar Inc., 741 F.Supp.2d 1227 , 1234 n.8 (D. 2016Cf. Monavie, LLC v. Quixtar Inc., 741 F. Supp. 2d 1227 , 1234 n.8 (D. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
VCS, Inc. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.
green
2 sentences2016Accordingly, we decline to address it. 5 See, e.g., VCS, Inc. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 2015 UT 46, ¶ 21 , 349 P.3d 704 (“We decline to address the merits of this argument, however, because it is unpreserved.”). ¶15 Tangren also argues that the district court was barred from considering the issue of insurance on the Property because it had been “fully litigated in Nevada.” Specifically, he claims that the doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, prohibited the district court’s order regarding insurance on the Property. 6 ¶16 We use a four-part test to determine whether the 2016Accordingly, we decline to address it. 5 See, e.g., VCS, Inc. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 2015 UT 46, ¶ 21 , 349 P.3d 704 (“We decline to address the merits of this argument, however, because it is unpreserved.”). ¶15 Tangren also argues that the district court was barred from considering the issue of insurance on the Property because it had been “fully litigated in Nevada.” Specifically, he claims that the doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, prohibited the district court’s order regarding insurance on the Property. 6 ¶16 We use a four-part test to determine whether the | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Parrish v. LAYTON CITY CORPORATION
green
1 sentence1996Id. at 1087 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Allen v. McCurry
green
2 sentences1988RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL The doctrine of res judicata reflects the refusal of courts to tolerate pointless litigation and is based on the premise that the proper administration of justice is best served by limiting parties to one fair trial of an issue or cause. 46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 395 (1969). “[R]es judicata and collateral estoppel relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication.” Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 , 101 S.Ct. 411, 414 , 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (198 1988RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL The doctrine of res judicata reflects the refusal of courts to tolerate pointless litigation and is based on the premise that the proper administration of justice is best served by limiting parties to one fair trial of an issue or cause. 46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 395 (1969). “[R]es judicata and collateral estoppel relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication.” Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 , 101 S.Ct. 411, 414 , 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (198 | 1 | 1988–1988 |
In Re Dunham
green
2 sentences1986See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. at 480 , 92 S.Ct. at 2599 ; In re Dunham, 16 Cal.3d 63 , 127 Cal.Rptr. 343 , 545 P.2d 255 , 76 A.L.R.3d 571 (1976). 1986See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. at 480 , 92 S.Ct. at 2599 ; In re Dunham, 16 Cal.3d 63 , 127 Cal.Rptr. 343 , 545 P.2d 255 , 76 A.L.R.3d 571 (1976). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.