collateral estoppel doctrine in Louisiana

33 Louisiana opinions name it 2 courts 1971–2020 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Louisiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (5)

Case	Followed	Cited
Welch v. Crown Zellerbach Corp.green la · 1978 · cited in 7 Louisiana opinions naming this issue, 1980–2010 2 sentences 2004However, I respectfully disagree with the majority's statement that Louisiana law 640 does not recognize the doctrine of collateral estoppel, citing Steptoe v. Lallie Kemp Hospital, 93-1359 (La.3/21/94), 634 So.2d 331 ; Welch v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 359 So.2d 154 (La.1978); and Avenal v. State, 99-0127 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/3/99) , 757 So.2d 1 . 2004*Rather, as the Louisiana Supreme Court held in Welch, supra at 157 , our civil law terminology differs from that of the common law, resulting in the limited application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel in Louisiana.	4	7
Steptoe v. Lallie Kemp Hosp.green la · 1994 · cited in 3 Louisiana opinions naming this issue, 2000–2010 2 sentences 2010Steptoe v. Lallie Kemp Hospital, 634 So.2d 331, 335 (La.1994); Welch v.Crown Zellerbach Corp., 359 So.2d 154, 156 (La.1978). 2004However, I respectfully disagree with the majority's statement that Louisiana law *640 does not recognize the doctrine of collateral estoppel, citing Steptoe v. Lallie Kemp Hospital, 93-1359 (La.3/21/94), 634 So.2d 331 ; Welch v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 359 So.2d 154 (La.1978); and Avenal v. State, 99-0127 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/3/99) , 757 So.2d 1 .	2	3
Ashe v. Swensongreen scotus · 1970 · cited in 12 Louisiana opinions naming this issue, 1972–2015 2 sentences 2001The Supreme Court affirmed defendant's conviction, finding the doctrine of collateral estoppel inapposite in that case. 575 The Court stated that, under the collateral estoppel doctrine, "when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit." Id. at 445-46 , 90 S.Ct. at 1195 . 1994*The collateral estoppel doctrine, determined in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 , 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970) to be a component of the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy, is primarily designed to prevent the state from conducting successive prosecutions against the same defendant for crimes arising out of the same course of conduct.	1	12
State v. Cottongreen la · 2001 · cited in 1 Louisiana opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011 1 sentence 2011Mr. Harris asserts that identity was previously decided in his favor in the L.C. trial when L.C. failed to make an in-court identification. 8 In State v. Cotton, 00-850, p. 11 (La.1/29/01), 778 So.2d 569, 578 (citing Dowling v. U.S., 493 U.S. 342 , 110 S.Ct. 668 , 107 L.Ed.2d 708 (1990)), rehearing granted in part for clarification, 00-0850 (La.4/20/01), 787 So.2d 278 (per curiam), the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the constitutional protections of double jeopardy, which included the collateral estoppel doctrine, did not preclude the admission of 404(B) evidence relating to prior sexual of	1	1
State v. Boldengreen la · 1994 · cited in 1 Louisiana opinions naming this issue, 1996–1996 1 sentence 1996In so doing, as noted by the supreme court in Bolden, 639 So.2d at 726, n. 5 , it had to "... produce corroborating evidence to show that defendant's statements to the New Jersey authorities were in fact truthful." The state was successful in doing so without violating the doctrine of collateral estoppel.	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Louisiana. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (33)

Case	Cited	Years
Slagel v. Shell Petroleum, Inc. green scotus · 1997 2 sentences 2011Id. 2006Id.	3	2004–2011
Dowling v. United States green scotus · 1990 2 sentences 2011Mr. Harris asserts that identity was previously decided in his favor in the L.C. trial when L.C. failed to make an in-court identification. 8 In State v. Cotton, 00-850, p. 11 (La.1/29/01), 778 So.2d 569, 578 (citing Dowling v. U.S., 493 U.S. 342 , 110 S.Ct. 668 , 107 L.Ed.2d 708 (1990)), rehearing granted in part for clarification, 00-0850 (La.4/20/01), 787 So.2d 278 (per curiam), the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the constitutional protections of double jeopardy, which included the collateral estoppel doctrine, did not preclude the admission of 404(B) evidence relating to prior sexual of 2011Mr. Harris asserts that identity was previously decided in his favor in the L.C. trial when L.C. failed to make an in-court identification. 8 In State v. Cotton, 00-850, p. 11 (La.1/29/01), 778 So.2d 569, 578 (citing Dowling v. U.S., 493 U.S. 342 , 110 S.Ct. 668 , 107 L.Ed.2d 708 (1990)), rehearing granted in part for clarification, 00-0850 (La.4/20/01), 787 So.2d 278 (per curiam), the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the constitutional protections of double jeopardy, which included the collateral estoppel doctrine, did not preclude the admission of 404(B) evidence relating to prior sexual of	2	2001–2011
Allen v. United States green ca4 · 1912 2 sentences 1996United States v. Nash, 447 F.2d 1382 (4th Cir.1971) (Winter, J. concurring); Kuskulis v. United States, 37 F.2d 241 (10th Cir.1929) (Winter, J., concurring); Allen v. United States, 194 F. 664 (4th Cir.1912); see also, Note, Perjury by Defendants: The Uses of Double Jeopardy and Collateral Estoppel, 74 Harv. 1994United States v. Nash, 447 F.2d 1382 (4th Cir.1971) (Winter, J. concurring); Kuskulis v. United States, 37 F.2d 241 (10th Cir.1929); Allen v. United States, 194 F. 664 (4th Cir.1912); see also, Note, Perjury by Defendants: The Uses of Double Jeopardy and Collateral Estoppel, 74 Harv.L.Rev. 752, 763 (1961).	2	1994–1996
Kuskulis v. United States green ca10 · 1929 2 sentences 1996United States v. Nash, 447 F.2d 1382 (4th Cir.1971) (Winter, J. concurring); Kuskulis v. United States, 37 F.2d 241 (10th Cir.1929) (Winter, J., concurring); Allen v. United States, 194 F. 664 (4th Cir.1912); see also, Note, Perjury by Defendants: The Uses of Double Jeopardy and Collateral Estoppel, 74 Harv. 1994United States v. Nash, 447 F.2d 1382 (4th Cir.1971) (Winter, J. concurring); Kuskulis v. United States, 37 F.2d 241 (10th Cir.1929); Allen v. United States, 194 F. 664 (4th Cir.1912); see also, Note, Perjury by Defendants: The Uses of Double Jeopardy and Collateral Estoppel, 74 Harv.L.Rev. 752, 763 (1961).	2	1994–1996
United States v. Estelle O. Nash green ca4 · 1971 2 sentences 1996United States v. Nash, 447 F.2d 1382 (4th Cir.1971) (Winter, J. concurring); Kuskulis v. United States, 37 F.2d 241 (10th Cir.1929) (Winter, J., concurring); Allen v. United States, 194 F. 664 (4th Cir.1912); see also, Note, Perjury by Defendants: The Uses of Double Jeopardy and Collateral Estoppel, 74 Harv. 1994United States v. Nash, 447 F.2d 1382 (4th Cir.1971) (Winter, J. concurring); Kuskulis v. United States, 37 F.2d 241 (10th Cir.1929); Allen v. United States, 194 F. 664 (4th Cir.1912); see also, Note, Perjury by Defendants: The Uses of Double Jeopardy and Collateral Estoppel, 74 Harv.L.Rev. 752, 763 (1961).	2	1994–1996
United States v. Jarel T. Haines green ca7 · 1973 2 sentences 1996Adams v. United States, 287 F.2d 701 (5th Cir.1961). "[T]he doctrine of collateral estoppel does not bar the perjury prosecution unless the issues of fact central to that prosecution were necessarily determined in the former trial. [Cits.] Unless the record of the prior proceeding affirmatively demonstrates that an issue involved in the second trial was definitely determined in the former trial (emphasis added), the possibility that it may have been does not prevent the relitigation of that issue. [Cit.]" United States v. Haines, 485 F.2d 564 (7th Cir.1973). 1994United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58 , 71 S.Ct. 595 , 95 L.Ed. 747 (1951); United States v. Haines, 485 F.2d 564 (7th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 977 , 94 S.Ct. 3184 , 41 L.Ed.2d 1147 (1974); State v. Conway, 661 P.2d 1355 (Okla.Crim.App.1983).	2	1994–1996
Shell Oil Company v. Texas Gas Transmission Corp. green lactapp · 1965 2 sentences 1992For this proposition the plaintiffs cite Shell Oil Company v. Texas Gas Transmission Corp., 176 So.2d 692 (La.App. 4th Cir.1964). 1985Shell Oil Company v. Texas Gas Transmission Corp., 176 So.2d 692 (La.App. 4th Cir.1965).	2	1985–1992
State v. Smith green la · 1978 1 sentence 2020As the Supreme Court noted in Smith, “[t]he doctrine of collateral estoppel simply means that, when an issue of 5 ultimate fact has been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.” Smith, 359 So.2d at 163 .	1	2020–2020
Richards v. BOARD OF COM'RS OF THE PORT green lactapp · 2011 1 sentence 2020Richards v. Board of Comm’rs of the Port of New Orleans, 2010-1171, p. 4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/2/11), 57 So.3d 1135, 1139 .	1	2020–2020
Samour v. Louisiana Casino Cruises, Inc. green lactapp · 2002 1 sentence 2017Samour, 818 So.2d at 175 , 2 Under collateral estop-pel, once an issue of ultimate fact is actually and necessarily determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, that determination is conclusive in subsequent suits based on a different cause of action involving a party to the prior litigation.	1	2017–2017
United States v. Brackett green ca5 · 1997 1 sentence 2015Ingram, supra (citing Brackett, supra.) The determination of whether the Ashe collateral estoppel doctrine applies is not to be determined based on a “hyper-technical and archaic approach ... but with realism and rationality....	1	2015–2015
State v. Brumfield green lactapp · 2012 1 sentence 2015App. 4 Cir. 11/29/12), 104 So.3d 701, 708 , writ denied, 12-2764 (La.5/31/13), 118 So.3d 389 . .	1	2015–2015
State ex rel. Campbell v. State neutral la · 2013 1 sentence 2015App. 4 Cir. 11/29/12), 104 So.3d 701, 708 , writ denied, 12-2764 (La.5/31/13), 118 So.3d 389 . .	1	2015–2015
State v. Cotton neutral la · 2001 1 sentence 2011Mr. Harris asserts that identity was previously decided in his favor in the L.C. trial when L.C. failed to make an in-court identification. 8 In State v. Cotton, 00-850, p. 11 (La.1/29/01), 778 So.2d 569, 578 (citing Dowling v. U.S., 493 U.S. 342 , 110 S.Ct. 668 , 107 L.Ed.2d 708 (1990)), rehearing granted in part for clarification, 00-0850 (La.4/20/01), 787 So.2d 278 (per curiam), the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the constitutional protections of double jeopardy, which included the collateral estoppel doctrine, did not preclude the admission of 404(B) evidence relating to prior sexual of	1	2011–2011
Nielson v. Spanaway General Medical Clinic green wash · 1998 1 sentence 2011Nielson v. Spanaway General Medical Clinic, 185 Wash.2d 255 , 956 P.2d 312 (1998), involved a factually similar scenario and provides guidance in this matter.	1	2011–2011
Avenal v. State green lactapp · 2000 1 sentence 2004However, I respectfully disagree with the majority's statement that Louisiana law *640 does not recognize the doctrine of collateral estoppel, citing Steptoe v. Lallie Kemp Hospital, 93-1359 (La.3/21/94), 634 So.2d 331 ; Welch v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 359 So.2d 154 (La.1978); and Avenal v. State, 99-0127 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/3/99) , 757 So.2d 1 .	1	2004–2004
cluster 6952 green · 1 sentence 2002RecoverEdge L.P. v. Pentecost, 44 F.3d 1284 (5th Cir.1995).	1	2002–2002
One Lot Emerald Cut Stones and One Ring v. United States green scotus · 1972 2 sentences 2001The Court noted that the result it reached was consistent with earlier cases holding that "an acquittal in a criminal case does not preclude the government from relitigating an issue when it is presented in a subsequent action governed by a lower standard of proof." Id., citing United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 , 104 S.Ct. 1099 , 79 L.Ed.2d 361 (1984) (allowing in rem proceeding against firearms even though gun owner had been acquitted of charge of dealing guns without a license); One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232 , 93 S.Ct. 489 , 34 L.Ed.2d 4 2001The Court noted that the result it reached was consistent with earlier cases holding that "an acquittal in a criminal case does not preclude the government from relitigating an issue when it is presented in a subsequent action governed by a lower standard of proof." Id., citing United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 , 104 S.Ct. 1099 , 79 L.Ed.2d 361 (1984) (allowing in rem proceeding against firearms even though gun owner had been acquitted of charge of dealing guns without a license); One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232 , 93 S.Ct. 489 , 34 L.Ed.2d 4	1	2001–2001
United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms green scotus · 1984 2 sentences 2001The Court noted that the result it reached was consistent with earlier cases holding that "an acquittal in a criminal case does not preclude the government from relitigating an issue when it is presented in a subsequent action governed by a lower standard of proof." Id., citing United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 , 104 S.Ct. 1099 , 79 L.Ed.2d 361 (1984) (allowing in rem proceeding against firearms even though gun owner had been acquitted of charge of dealing guns without a license); One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232 , 93 S.Ct. 489 , 34 L.Ed.2d 4 2001The Court noted that the result it reached was consistent with earlier cases holding that "an acquittal in a criminal case does not preclude the government from relitigating an issue when it is presented in a subsequent action governed by a lower standard of proof." Id., citing United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 , 104 S.Ct. 1099 , 79 L.Ed.2d 361 (1984) (allowing in rem proceeding against firearms even though gun owner had been acquitted of charge of dealing guns without a license); One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232 , 93 S.Ct. 489 , 34 L.Ed.2d 4	1	2001–2001
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation green scotus · 1971 2 sentences 2000Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc., v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 , 91 S.Ct. 1434 , 28 L.Ed.2d 788 (1970). 2000Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc., v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 , 91 S.Ct. 1434 , 28 L.Ed.2d 788 (1970).	1	2000–2000
Z. A. Adams and Jean Adams v. United States green ca5 · 1961 1 sentence 1996Adams v. United States, 287 F.2d 701 (5th Cir.1961). "[T]he doctrine of collateral estoppel does not bar the perjury prosecution unless the issues of fact central to that prosecution were necessarily determined in the former trial. [Cits.] Unless the record of the prior proceeding affirmatively demonstrates that an issue involved in the second trial was definitely determined in the former trial (emphasis added), the possibility that it may have been does not prevent the relitigation of that issue. [Cit.]" United States v. Haines, 485 F.2d 564 (7th Cir.1973).	1	1996–1996
State v. Tate green gactapp · 1975 2 sentences 1996State v. Tate, 136 Ga.App. 181, 185-6 , 220 S.E.2d 741 (footnote omitted). 1996State v. Tate, 136 Ga.App. 181, 185-6 , 220 S.E.2d 741 (footnote omitted).	1	1996–1996
United States v. Williams green scotus · 1951 2 sentences 1994United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58 , 71 S.Ct. 595 , 95 L.Ed. 747 (1951); United States v. Haines, 485 F.2d 564 (7th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 977 , 94 S.Ct. 3184 , 41 L.Ed.2d 1147 (1974); State v. Conway, 661 P.2d 1355 (Okla.Crim.App.1983). 1994United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58 , 71 S.Ct. 595 , 95 L.Ed. 747 (1951); United States v. Haines, 485 F.2d 564 (7th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 977 , 94 S.Ct. 3184 , 41 L.Ed.2d 1147 (1974); State v. Conway, 661 P.2d 1355 (Okla.Crim.App.1983).	1	1994–1994
State v. Conway neutral oklacrimapp · 1983 1 sentence 1994United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58 , 71 S.Ct. 595 , 95 L.Ed. 747 (1951); United States v. Haines, 485 F.2d 564 (7th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 977 , 94 S.Ct. 3184 , 41 L.Ed.2d 1147 (1974); State v. Conway, 661 P.2d 1355 (Okla.Crim.App.1983).	1	1994–1994
Cox v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad green scotus · 1974 2 sentences 1994United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58 , 71 S.Ct. 595 , 95 L.Ed. 747 (1951); United States v. Haines, 485 F.2d 564 (7th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 977 , 94 S.Ct. 3184 , 41 L.Ed.2d 1147 (1974); State v. Conway, 661 P.2d 1355 (Okla.Crim.App.1983). 1994United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58 , 71 S.Ct. 595 , 95 L.Ed. 747 (1951); United States v. Haines, 485 F.2d 564 (7th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 977 , 94 S.Ct. 3184 , 41 L.Ed.2d 1147 (1974); State v. Conway, 661 P.2d 1355 (Okla.Crim.App.1983).	1	1994–1994
State v. Blache green la · 1985	1	1989–1989
Helvering v. Mitchell green scotus · 1938	1	1988–1988
Cook v. State green mdctspecapp · 1977	1	1978–1978
State v. Greenwood green oklacrimapp · 1977	1	1978–1978
Stone v. Powell green scotus · 1976	1	1978–1978
State v. Cain green la · 1975	1	1978–1978
State v. Jackson green la · 1976	1	1978–1978
State v. Hurst neutral mont · 1971	1	1971–1971

Statutes the citing opinions construe

LA § La. Rev. Stat. § 15 (10) LA § La. Rev. Stat. § 1 (7) LA § La. Rev. Stat. § 14:95.1 (5) LA § La. Rev. Stat. § 13:4231 (4) LA § La. Rev. Stat. § 14:64 (4) LA § La. Rev. Stat. § 14:18 (3) LA § La. Rev. Stat. § 14:27 (3) LA § La. Rev. Stat. § 14:30.1 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

NY 740 (1955–2026) CA 380 (1950–2026) TX 343 (1961–2026) IL 277 (1971–2026) PA 247 (1963–2026) CT 139 (1975–2026) WA 121 (1972–2024) OH 120 (1979–2025) NC 112 (1958–2026) NJ 111 (1955–2026) MI 109 (1971–2025) MD 97 (1968–2025) FL 93 (1971–2025) MO 87 (1973–2025) GA 86 (1970–2023) VA 65 (1976–2024) AL 62 (1971–2025) MA 55 (1980–2016) IN 53 (1974–2025) TN 52 (1963–2026) MS 48 (1965–2024) RI 41 (1972–2026) SC 41 (1983–2025) DC 41 (1965–2026) WV 39 (1983–2025) AZ 37 (1965–2023) DE 37 (1956–2026) VT 34 (1984–2026) LA 33 (1971–2020) NM 32 (1972–2022) MN 31 (1975–2023) WY 31 (1984–2020) HI 30 (1975–2022) NE 30 (1981–2023) KS 29 (1969–2022) MT 29 (1978–2025) CO 28 (1972–2013) NH 26 (1970–2025) AR 24 (1970–2017) AK 23 (1978–2023) WI 20 (1978–2019) OR 19 (1970–1993) ME 19 (1974–2018) OK 19 (1970–2024) UT 16 (1983–2024) IA 16 (1959–2021) SD 15 (1979–2026) ID 14 (1976–2019) KY 6 (1984–2024) NV 6 (1973–2013) ND 6 (1985–2022) VI 4 (1979–2016) PR 2 (1949–1971)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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