collateral estoppel doctrine in Alaska

1994See Briggs v. State, Dep’t of Public Safety, 732 P.2d 1078, 1082 (Alaska 1987) (“ ‘[F]inal judgment’ includes ‘any prior adjudication of an issue ... that is determined to be sufficiently firm to be accorded conclusive effect.’ ”). 4 The State argues, however, that the superior court’s decision should be upheld on the principle that when the courts of two states have reached conflicting decisions on the same issue and one of the conflicting decisions was rendered'by a court of the state in which the current action is pending, that decision is controlling, notwithstanding the Full Faith and Cre

1993For this reason, we hold that the original order of dismissal in this case did not amount to “a final judgment on the merits,” Briggs v. State, 732 P.2d at 1081 , for purposes of the collateral estoppel doctrine, and we conclude that the superior court erred in relying on collateral estoppel to order Williams’ second indictment dismissed. 6 *1346 2.

2023Collateral estoppel “bars the relitigation of issues actually determined in [earlier] proceedings.”3 It requires four elements: (1) the party against whom the preclusion is employed was a party to or in privity with a party to the first action; (2) the issue precluded from relitigation is identical to the issue decided in the first action; (3) the issue was resolved by the first action by a final judgment on the merits; and (4) the determination of the issue was essential to the final judgment.[4] We find persuasive the California Supreme Court’s analysis of this issue in Lucido v. Superior Co

2015Faye argues that under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the superior court was bound by this finding "as to whether [James] committed acts of domestic violence." (Emphasis added.) Collateral estoppel indeed "bars the relitigation of issues actually determined in [earlier] proceedings." Latham v. Palin, 251 P.3d 341, 344 (Alaska 2011) (alteration in original) (quoting Jeffries v. Glacier State Tel.

1993Briggs v. State, 732 P.2d 1078, 1081-82 (Alaska 1987); De-Sacia v. State, 469 P.2d 369, 379-80 (Alaska 1970); Boyles v. State, 647 P.2d 1113, 1116 (Alaska App.1982).

1984Boyles v. State, 647 P.2d 1113, 1116 (Alaska App.1982), ce rt. denied, — U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 1437 , 75 L.Ed.2d 795 (1983).

1984Our decision indicated that in each case the application of collateral es-toppel must be governed by the analysis enunciated in United States v. Hernandez, 572 F.2d 218, 220 (9th Cir.1978): The collateral estoppel analysis involves a three-step process: (1) an identification of the issues in the two actions for the purpose of determining whether the issues are sufficiently similar and sufficiently material in both actions to justify invoking the doctrine; (2) an examination of the record of the prior case to decide whether the issue was “litigated” in the first case; and (3) an examination of

1982Id. at 220 .

2023Collateral estoppel “bars the relitigation of issues actually determined in [earlier] proceedings.”3 It requires four elements: (1) the party against whom the preclusion is employed was a party to or in privity with a party to the first action; (2) the issue precluded from relitigation is identical to the issue decided in the first action; (3) the issue was resolved by the first action by a final judgment on the merits; and (4) the determination of the issue was essential to the final judgment.[4] We find persuasive the California Supreme Court’s analysis of this issue in Lucido v. Superior Co

2023Collateral estoppel “bars the relitigation of issues actually determined in [earlier] proceedings.”3 It requires four elements: (1) the party against whom the preclusion is employed was a party to or in privity with a party to the first action; (2) the issue precluded from relitigation is identical to the issue decided in the first action; (3) the issue was resolved by the first action by a final judgment on the merits; and (4) the determination of the issue was essential to the final judgment.[4] We find persuasive the California Supreme Court’s analysis of this issue in Lucido v. Superior Co

2023Collateral estoppel “bars the relitigation of issues actually determined in [earlier] proceedings.”3 It requires four elements: (1) the party against whom the preclusion is employed was a party to or in privity with a party to the first action; (2) the issue precluded from relitigation is identical to the issue decided in the first action; (3) the issue was resolved by the first action by a final judgment on the merits; and (4) the determination of the issue was essential to the final judgment.[4] We find persuasive the California Supreme Court’s analysis of this issue in Lucido v. Superior Co

2021Facilities, 296 P.3d 3, 8 (Alaska 2013) (alterations in original) (quoting Jeffries v. Glacier State Tel.

2020We addressed the application of collateral estoppel to child custody decisions in McAlpine v. Pacarro.16 There we held that “res judicata does not apply to custody modification motions, although the principle of finality does.”17 While “parties should not be allowed to relitigate ‘in the hope of gaining a more favorable position,’ ”18 we recognized that the rules are “relaxed . . . in custody matters involving domestic violence,” and the superior court must “look back to events that occurred before the initial custody order if not adequately addressed at the initial custody determination or su

2020We addressed the application of collateral estoppel to child custody decisions in McAlpine v. Pacarro.16 There we held that “res judicata does not apply to custody modification motions, although the principle of finality does.”17 While “parties should not be allowed to relitigate ‘in the hope of gaining a more favorable position,’ ”18 we recognized that the rules are “relaxed . . . in custody matters involving domestic violence,” and the superior court must “look back to events that occurred before the initial custody order if not adequately addressed at the initial custody determination or su

2020We addressed the application of collateral estoppel to child custody decisions in McAlpine v. Pacarro.16 There we held that “res judicata does not apply to custody modification motions, although the principle of finality does.”17 While “parties should not be allowed to relitigate ‘in the hope of gaining a more favorable position,’ ”18 we recognized that the rules are “relaxed . . . in custody matters involving domestic violence,” and the superior court must “look back to events that occurred before the initial custody order if not adequately addressed at the initial custody determination or su

2020There are three elements in res judicata, otherwise known as claim preclusion: “(1) a final judgment on the merits, (2) from a court of competent jurisdiction, (3) in a dispute between the same parties . . . about the same cause of action.” Id. at 625 (quoting Angleton v. Cox, 238 P.3d 610, 614 (Alaska 2010)). 18 Id. at 626 (unnoted alteration in original) (quoting Bunn v. House, 934 P.2d 753, 758 (Alaska 1997)). 19 Id. (emphasis added). -11- 7467 determination of the issue was essential to the final judgment.”20 Even then, this principle is to be employed sparingly — it requires careful discr

2020There are three elements in res judicata, otherwise known as claim preclusion: “(1) a final judgment on the merits, (2) from a court of competent jurisdiction, (3) in a dispute between the same parties . . . about the same cause of action.” Id. at 625 (quoting Angleton v. Cox, 238 P.3d 610, 614 (Alaska 2010)). 18 Id. at 626 (unnoted alteration in original) (quoting Bunn v. House, 934 P.2d 753, 758 (Alaska 1997)). 19 Id. (emphasis added). -11- 7467 determination of the issue was essential to the final judgment.”20 Even then, this principle is to be employed sparingly — it requires careful discr

2020There are three elements in res judicata, otherwise known as claim preclusion: “(1) a final judgment on the merits, (2) from a court of competent jurisdiction, (3) in a dispute between the same parties . . . about the same cause of action.” Id. at 625 (quoting Angleton v. Cox, 238 P.3d 610, 614 (Alaska 2010)). 18 Id. at 626 (unnoted alteration in original) (quoting Bunn v. House, 934 P.2d 753, 758 (Alaska 1997)). 19 Id. (emphasis added). -11- 7467 determination of the issue was essential to the final judgment.”20 Even then, this principle is to be employed sparingly — it requires careful discr

2020There are three elements in res judicata, otherwise known as claim preclusion: “(1) a final judgment on the merits, (2) from a court of competent jurisdiction, (3) in a dispute between the same parties . . . about the same cause of action.” Id. at 625 (quoting Angleton v. Cox, 238 P.3d 610, 614 (Alaska 2010)). 18 Id. at 626 (unnoted alteration in original) (quoting Bunn v. House, 934 P.2d 753, 758 (Alaska 1997)). 19 Id. (emphasis added). -11- 7467 determination of the issue was essential to the final judgment.”20 Even then, this principle is to be employed sparingly — it requires careful discr

2020We addressed the application of collateral estoppel to child custody decisions in McAlpine v. Pacarro.16 There we held that “res judicata does not apply to custody modification motions, although the principle of finality does.”17 While “parties should not be allowed to relitigate ‘in the hope of gaining a more favorable position,’ ”18 we recognized that the rules are “relaxed . . . in custody matters involving domestic violence,” and the superior court must “look back to events that occurred before the initial custody order if not adequately addressed at the initial custody determination or su

2010Hagans, Brown & Gibbs v. First Nat'l Bank of Anchorage, 783 P.2d 1164 , 1166 n. 2 (Alaska 1989) ("Issues not properly raised ... at trial are not properly before this court on appeal."). 6 .

2007See Snook v. Bowers, 12 P.3d 771, 777 (Alaska 2000).

2003See our discussion of a related point in State v. McDonald, 872 P.2d 627, 660 (Alaska App.1994).

2001Cozzen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 907 P.2d 473, 475 (Alaska 1995) (citation omitted). 2 .

2000Cf. State, Child Support Enforcement Div. v. Bromley, 987 P.2d 183, 192 (Alaska 1999) ("The ... doctrine of collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) prevents relitigation of an issue already litigated and decided. ..."). .

2000See, e.g., McGee v. McGee, 974 P.2d 983 (Alaska 1999); Johns v. Johns, 945 P.2d 1222 (Alaska 1997). .

1998See Malland v. State, Dep’t of Retirement Sys., 103 Wash.2d 484 , 694 P.2d 16 (1985).

1998See Malland v. State, Dep’t of Retirement Sys., 103 Wash.2d 484 , 694 P.2d 16 (1985).

1998Lucas argues that Board IPs termination of his benefits violated the doctrine of collateral estoppel. 7 This doctrine, which applies to administrative agencies, see Holmberg v. State, 796 P.2d 823, 827 (Alaska 1990), prohibits the relitigation of issues which have already been decided by a final judgment.

1998Lucas argues that Board II's termination of his benefits violated the doctrine of collateral estoppel. [7] This doctrine, which applies to administrative agencies, see Holmberg v. State, 796 P.2d 823, 827 (Alaska 1990), prohibits the relitigation of issues which have already been decided by a final judgment.

1998See Rapoport v. Tesoro Alaska Petroleum Co., 794 P.2d 949, 952 (Alaska 1990).

1998See Rapoport v. Tesoro Alaska Petroleum Co., 794 P.2d 949, 952 (Alaska 1990).

1994McKean v. Municipality of Anchorage, 783 P.2d 1169, 1171 (Alaska 1989) (quoting Murray v. Feight, 741 P.2d 1148, 1153 (Alaska 1987)). 9 There is identity of parties in the fee arbitration proceeding and in the legal malpractice action, 10 and a final decision and award on the merits was rendered in the fee arbitration proceeding. 11 Whether collateral estoppel applies thus turns on whether the issues in the fee arbitration proceeding and in the legal malpractice action are identical.

1994DISCUSSION The doctrine of collateral estoppel, also referred to as issue preclusion, “bars relitigation, even in an action on a different claim, of all ‘issues of fact or law that were actually litigated and necessarily decided’ in [a] prior proceeding.” Americana Fabrics v. L & L Textiles, 754 F.2d 1524, 1529 (9th Cir.1985) (citations omitted).

1994McKean v. Municipality of Anchorage, 783 P.2d 1169, 1171 (Alaska 1989) (quoting Murray v. Feight, 741 P.2d 1148, 1153 (Alaska 1987)). 9 There is identity of parties in the fee arbitration proceeding and in the legal malpractice action, 10 and a final decision and award on the merits was rendered in the fee arbitration proceeding. 11 Whether collateral estoppel applies thus turns on whether the issues in the fee arbitration proceeding and in the legal malpractice action are identical.

1993See, e.g., Taggard v. State, 500 P.2d 238, 244 (Alaska 1972). 4 At the same time, however, the court's recognition that the state would not have been barred from obtaining a reindictment on more or better evidence — and the court’s concomitant belief that collateral estoppel applied to Williams’ case only because of the similarity of evidence presented to the first and second grand juries— reveals a fundamental flaw with the court’s theory of the collateral estoppel doctrine.