collateral estoppel doctrine in Maryland

2017The Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel “The Supreme Court has recognized that the Double Jeopardy Clause incorporates the doctrine of collateral estoppel.” Odum v. State, 412 Md. 693 , 603, 989 A.2d 232, 238 (2010) (citing Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 444-45 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 , 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970)).

2017The Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel “The Supreme Court has recognized that the Double Jeopardy Clause incorporates the doctrine of collateral estoppel.” Odum v. State, 412 Md. 693 , 603, 989 A.2d 232, 238 (2010) (citing Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 444-45 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 , 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970)).

2002See also, Welsh v. Gerber Products, Inc., 315 Md. 510, 518 , 555 A.2d 486, 490 (1989)(referring to the Supreme Court’s Standefer decision and noting that the doctrine of non-mutual collateral estoppel cannot be applied in criminal cases); People v. Berkowitz, 428 N.Y.S.2d 927 , 406 N.E.2d at 789-90 (holding that a conspiracy defendant whose sole alleged co-conspirator had been previously acquitted of the conspiracy charge could not utilize the doctrine of collateral estoppel as a bar to his own prosecution because that there will often be significant disparities in the proof available against

2002See also, Welsh v. Gerber Products, Inc., 315 Md. 510, 518 , 555 A.2d 486, 490 (1989)(referring to the Supreme Court’s Standefer decision and noting that the doctrine of non-mutual collateral estoppel cannot be applied in criminal cases); People v. Berkowitz, 428 N.Y.S.2d 927 , 406 N.E.2d at 789-90 (holding that a conspiracy defendant whose sole alleged co-conspirator had been previously acquitted of the conspiracy charge could not utilize the doctrine of collateral estoppel as a bar to his own prosecution because that there will often be significant disparities in the proof available against

2017In a similar vein, this Court has described the doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, as follows: “[W]hen an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.” Colandrea v. Wilde Lake Cmty. Ass’n, Inc., 361 Md. 371, 387 , 761 A.2d 899, 907 (2000) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

2017In a similar vein, this Court has described the doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, as follows: “[W]hen an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.” Colandrea v. Wilde Lake Cmty. Ass’n, Inc., 361 Md. 371, 387 , 761 A.2d 899, 907 (2000) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

2021Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, “[w]hen an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.” Murray Int’l Freight Corp. v. Graham, 315 Md. 543, 547 (1989) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2016The doctrine of collateral estoppel provides that, “[w]hen an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.” Cosby v. Dep’t of Human Res., 425 Md. 629, 639 , 42 A.3d 596 (2012) (alteration in original) (quoting Murray Int’l Freight Corp. v. Graham, 315 Md. 543, 547 , 555 A.2d 502 (1989)).

2022Ass’n, Inc., 443 Md. 148, 162 , 115 A.3d 185, 193 (2015) (noting “[f]or the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply,” the reviewing court must scrutinize “facts necessary to resolve the pertinent issues [that] were adjudicated in that action[]”) (emphasis added). 11 Implementing the general concepts did not address the substantive traffic safety concerns of the 2004 plan.

2022Ass’n, Inc., 443 Md. 148, 162 , 115 A.3d 185, 193 (2015) (noting “[f]or the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply,” the reviewing court must scrutinize “facts necessary to resolve the pertinent issues [that] were adjudicated in that action[]”) (emphasis added). 11 Implementing the general concepts did not address the substantive traffic safety concerns of the 2004 plan.

2002Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel (also called issue preclusion), “[wjhen an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.” Murray Int’l Freight Corp. v. Graham, 315 Md. 543, 547 , 555 A.2d 502 (1989) (quoting Restatement (Second) Judgments, supra, § 27; MFC v. Kenny, 279 Md. 29, 32 , 367 A.2d 486 (1977).

2002Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel (also called issue preclusion), “[wjhen an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.” Murray Int’l Freight Corp. v. Graham, 315 Md. 543, 547 , 555 A.2d 502 (1989) (quoting Restatement (Second) Judgments, supra, § 27; MFC v. Kenny, 279 Md. 29, 32 , 367 A.2d 486 (1977).

2013See Powell v. Breslin, 480 Md. 52 , 68, 59 A.8d 531, 537-38 (2013) (discussing the affirmative defense of res judicata); Rourke v. Amchem Products, Inc., 384 Md. 329, 340-41 , 863 A.2d 926, 933 (2004) (explaining the doctrine of collateral estoppel).

2013See Powell v. Breslin, 480 Md. 52 , 68, 59 A.8d 531, 537-38 (2013) (discussing the affirmative defense of res judicata); Rourke v. Amchem Products, Inc., 384 Md. 329, 340-41 , 863 A.2d 926, 933 (2004) (explaining the doctrine of collateral estoppel).

1995In a collateral estoppel challenge, the burden is “on the defendant to demonstrate that the issue whose relitigation he seeks to foreclose was actually decided in the first proceeding.” Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 350 , 110 S.Ct. 668, 673 , 107 L.Ed.2d 708, 719 (1990).

1995In a collateral estoppel challenge, the burden is “on the defendant to demonstrate that the issue whose relitigation he seeks to foreclose was actually decided in the first proceeding.” Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 350 , 110 S.Ct. 668, 673 , 107 L.Ed.2d 708, 719 (1990).

1994United States v. Smith, 337 A.2d [499] at 503-04 [1975] (Kern, J., concurring)." We reaffirmed this principle in Ferrell v. State, supra , where we made clear that the focus, for purposes of applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel, must be upon the count on which the jury had returned a verdict, "with that [verdict] being viewed as a rational resolution of the underlying facts." 318 Md. at 254-255, 567 A.2d at 947 .

1994United States v. Smith, 337 A.2d [499] at 503-04 [1975] (Kern, J., concurring).” We reaffirmed this principle in Ferrell v. State, supra, where we made clear that the focus, for purposes of applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel, must be upon the count on which the jury had returned a verdict, “with that [verdict] being viewed as a rational resolution of the underlying facts.” 318 Md. at 254-255, 567 A.2d at 947 .

2015Comm’rs of Frederick Cnty., 427 Md. 231, 249-50 , 46 A.3d 1182, 1193 (2012), quoting Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm’n v. TKU Assocs., 281 Md. 1, 18-19 , 376 A.2d 505, 514 (1977). “[F]or the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply, the probable fact-finding that undergirds the judgment used to estop must be scrutinized to determine if the issues raised in that proceeding were actually litigated, or facts necessary to resolve the pertinent issues were adjudicated in that action.” Colandrea v. Wilde Lake Cmty. Ass’n, Inc., 361 Md. 371, 391-92 , 761 A.2d 899, 910 (2000), citing Burkett v. State, 98

2015Comm’rs of Frederick Cnty., 427 Md. 231, 249-50 , 46 A.3d 1182, 1193 (2012), quoting Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm’n v. TKU Assocs., 281 Md. 1, 18-19 , 376 A.2d 505, 514 (1977). “[F]or the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply, the probable fact-finding that undergirds the judgment used to estop must be scrutinized to determine if the issues raised in that proceeding were actually litigated, or facts necessary to resolve the pertinent issues were adjudicated in that action.” Colandrea v. Wilde Lake Cmty. Ass’n, Inc., 361 Md. 371, 391-92 , 761 A.2d 899, 910 (2000), citing Burkett v. State, 98

2015Comm’rs of Frederick Cnty., 427 Md. 231, 249-50 , 46 A.3d 1182, 1193 (2012), quoting Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm’n v. TKU Assocs., 281 Md. 1, 18-19 , 376 A.2d 505, 514 (1977). “[F]or the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply, the probable fact-finding that undergirds the judgment used to estop must be scrutinized to determine if the issues raised in that proceeding were actually litigated, or facts necessary to resolve the pertinent issues were adjudicated in that action.” Colandrea v. Wilde Lake Cmty. Ass’n, Inc., 361 Md. 371, 391-92 , 761 A.2d 899, 910 (2000), citing Burkett v. State, 98

2015Comm’rs of Frederick Cnty., 427 Md. 231, 249-50 , 46 A.3d 1182, 1193 (2012), quoting Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm’n v. TKU Assocs., 281 Md. 1, 18-19 , 376 A.2d 505, 514 (1977). “[F]or the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply, the probable fact-finding that undergirds the judgment used to estop must be scrutinized to determine if the issues raised in that proceeding were actually litigated, or facts necessary to resolve the pertinent issues were adjudicated in that action.” Colandrea v. Wilde Lake Cmty. Ass’n, Inc., 361 Md. 371, 391-92 , 761 A.2d 899, 910 (2000), citing Burkett v. State, 98

2006See also Gibson v. State, 328 Md. 687, 693 , 616 A.2d 877 (1992) (“The collateral estoppel doctrine operates to a preclusive end, so that when an issue of ultimate fact has been determined once by a valid and final judgment, *27 that issue cannot be litigated again between the same parties in a future action.”); Cousins v. State, 277 Md. 383, 398 , 354 A.2d 825 (1976) (“Collateral estoppel prevents the State from litigating a second time an issue of ultimate fact where there has already been a final determination of that issue in the accused’s favor.”).

2006See also Gibson v. State, 328 Md. 687, 693 , 616 A.2d 877 (1992) (“The collateral estoppel doctrine operates to a preclusive end, so that when an issue of ultimate fact has been determined once by a valid and final judgment, *27 that issue cannot be litigated again between the same parties in a future action.”); Cousins v. State, 277 Md. 383, 398 , 354 A.2d 825 (1976) (“Collateral estoppel prevents the State from litigating a second time an issue of ultimate fact where there has already been a final determination of that issue in the accused’s favor.”).

2004Pat Perusse Realty v. Lingo, 249 Md. 33, 42 , 238 A.2d 100, 106 (1968), quoting Williams v. Messick, 177 Md. 605, 615 , 11 A.2d 472, 476 (1940).

2004Pat Perusse Realty v. Lingo, 249 Md. 33, 42 , 238 A.2d 100, 106 (1968), quoting Williams v. Messick, 177 Md. 605, 615 , 11 A.2d 472, 476 (1940).

2017Unlike the plea of autrefois acquit, the doctrine of collateral estoppel “is not based on two offenses being the same”; instead, it is based on two offenses “having a common necessary factual component.” Apostoledes v. State, 323 Md. 456, 463 , 593 A.2d 1117, 1121 (1991).

2017Unlike the plea of autrefois acquit, the doctrine of collateral estoppel “is not based on two offenses being the same”; instead, it is based on two offenses “having a common necessary factual component.” Apostoledes v. State, 323 Md. 456, 463 , 593 A.2d 1117, 1121 (1991).

2017See LaBonte , 229 Md.App. at 204 , 206-07 , 144 A.3d at 866 , 867-68 .

2017See LaBonte , 229 Md.App. at 204 , 206-07 , 144 A.3d at 866 , 867-68 .

2006See also Gibson v. State, 328 Md. 687, 693 , 616 A.2d 877 (1992) (“The collateral estoppel doctrine operates to a preclusive end, so that when an issue of ultimate fact has been determined once by a valid and final judgment, *27 that issue cannot be litigated again between the same parties in a future action.”); Cousins v. State, 277 Md. 383, 398 , 354 A.2d 825 (1976) (“Collateral estoppel prevents the State from litigating a second time an issue of ultimate fact where there has already been a final determination of that issue in the accused’s favor.”).

2006See also Gibson v. State, 328 Md. 687, 693 , 616 A.2d 877 (1992) (“The collateral estoppel doctrine operates to a preclusive end, so that when an issue of ultimate fact has been determined once by a valid and final judgment, *27 that issue cannot be litigated again between the same parties in a future action.”); Cousins v. State, 277 Md. 383, 398 , 354 A.2d 825 (1976) (“Collateral estoppel prevents the State from litigating a second time an issue of ultimate fact where there has already been a final determination of that issue in the accused’s favor.”).

1984“The primary purpose of the doctrine of collateral estoppel ... is to avoid compelling an accused to prove his innocence to two or more juries.” 285 Md. at 287 , 401 A.2d 1031 . “[An accused should not be] compelled again to prove his innocence before a second jury in a second trial.” 285 Md. at 288 , 401 A.2d 1031 . “[T]he accused is precluded from being tried a second time.” 285 Md. at 288 , 401 A.2d 1031 .

1984“The primary purpose of the doctrine of collateral estoppel ... is to avoid compelling an accused to prove his innocence to two or more juries.” 285 Md. at 287 , 401 A.2d 1031 . “[An accused should not be] compelled again to prove his innocence before a second jury in a second trial.” 285 Md. at 288 , 401 A.2d 1031 . “[T]he accused is precluded from being tried a second time.” 285 Md. at 288 , 401 A.2d 1031 .

2004Co. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 48-49 , 18 S.Ct. 18, 27 , 42 L.Ed. 355, 376-377 (1897): “A fundamental precept of common-law adjudication, embodied in the related doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata, is that a ‘right, question or fact distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction ... cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies....”’ See Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 , 326 n. 5, 99 S.Ct. 645 , 649 n. 5, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 , 559 n. 5 (1979) (“Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel ...

2004Co. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 48-49 , 18 S.Ct. 18, 27 , 42 L.Ed. 355, 376-377 (1897): “A fundamental precept of common-law adjudication, embodied in the related doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata, is that a ‘right, question or fact distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction ... cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies....”’ See Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 , 326 n. 5, 99 S.Ct. 645 , 649 n. 5, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 , 559 n. 5 (1979) (“Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel ...

2016The doctrine of collateral estoppel provides that, “[w]hen an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.” Cosby v. Dep’t of Human Res., 425 Md. 629, 639 , 42 A.3d 596 (2012) (alteration in original) (quoting Murray Int’l Freight Corp. v. Graham, 315 Md. 543, 547 , 555 A.2d 502 (1989)).

2016The doctrine of collateral estoppel provides that, “[w]hen an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.” Cosby v. Dep’t of Human Res., 425 Md. 629, 639 , 42 A.3d 596 (2012) (alteration in original) (quoting Murray Int’l Freight Corp. v. Graham, 315 Md. 543, 547 , 555 A.2d 502 (1989)).

2023Contrary to the plurality’s suggestion in Currier, however, our jurisprudence seems to indicate that the doctrine of collateral estoppel “will apply to evidentiary facts” but only when “it appears substantially certain that a jury has already decided a fact essential to conviction in the accused’s favor[.]” Wise v. State, 47 Md.

1984Judge Davidson, reasoning for the Court that the only conceivable issue before the jury was whether the accused was one of the robbers, invoked the doctrine of collateral estoppel, and concluded that "... more precisely the doctrine’s purpose is to avoid compelling relitigation of a fact material to the question of innocence when it appears substantially certain that a jury has already decided that fact in the accused’s favor.” Subsequently, in Wise v. State, 47 Md.App. 656 , 425 A.2d 652 (1981), where the defendant was tried and convicted of *337 first degree murder after being acquitted of c

2017The Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel “The Supreme Court has recognized that the Double Jeopardy Clause incorporates the doctrine of collateral estoppel.” Odum v. State, 412 Md. 693 , 603, 989 A.2d 232, 238 (2010) (citing Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 444-45 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 , 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970)).

2017Under the doctrine of collateral estop-pel, which applies to both civil cases and criminal cases, “when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.” Odum, 412 Md. *180 at 603, 989 A.2d at 238 (quoting Ashe, 397 U.S. at 443 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 ) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2011The Court’s determination that F.L. § 5-706.1 “does not necessarily preclude a collateral estoppel defense in a proper case,” 407 Md. at 194 , 963 A.2d 773 , corresponds with our conclusion that the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel to a F.L. § 5-706.1 hearing is neither prohibited by nor inconsistent with the statute’s language and legislative history.

2011The Court’s determination that F.L. § 5-706.1 “does not necessarily preclude a collateral estoppel defense in a proper case,” 407 Md. at 194 , 963 A.2d 773 , corresponds with our conclusion that the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel to a F.L. § 5-706.1 hearing is neither prohibited by nor inconsistent with the statute’s language and legislative history.

1998The doctrine of collateral estoppel *202 provides that 'when a[n] issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties...” State v. Woodson, 338 Md. 322, 331 , 658 A.2d 272, 277 (1995) (citations omitted).

1998The doctrine of collateral estoppel *202 provides that 'when a[n] issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties...” State v. Woodson, 338 Md. 322, 331 , 658 A.2d 272, 277 (1995) (citations omitted).

2001Comm’rs, 106 Md.App. 578, 594-95 , 665 A.2d 713 (1995); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28(1) (1982) (designating this element as an exception to the availability of the collateral estoppel doctrine)). 31 .

2001Comm’rs, 106 Md.App. 578, 594-95 , 665 A.2d 713 (1995); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28(1) (1982) (designating this element as an exception to the availability of the collateral estoppel doctrine)). 31 .