collateral estoppel doctrine in Michigan

2023In King v Munro, 329 Mich App 594 , 599; 944 NW2d 198 (2019), this Court explained: The doctrine of collateral estoppel “precludes relitigation of an issue in a subsequent, different cause of action between the same parties when the prior proceeding culminated in a valid final judgment and the issue was actually and necessarily determined in that prior proceeding.” Rental Props Owners Ass’n of Kent Co v Kent Co Treasurer, 308 Mich App 498, 528-529 ; 866 NW2d 817 (2014).

2022If at all possible, this Court should interpret a court rule to avoid inconsistencies. [Id. at 446-447 (footnotes omitted).] The plain language selected by the Supreme Court limited the persons who could seek relief under MCR 2.612(C)(1) to “a party or the legal representative of a party.” The Court did not choose to define the term “party.” As used in the litigation context, Black’s Law Dictionary -4- (11th ed) defines a party as “[o]ne by or against whom a lawsuit is brought; anyone who both is directly interested in a lawsuit and has a right to control the proceedings, make a defense, or ap

2025The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies when “(1) a question of fact essential to the judgment was actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, (2) the same parties had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue, and (3) there was mutuality of estoppel.” Estes v Titus, 481 Mich 573, 585 ; 751 NW2d 493 (2008).

2025The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies when “(1) a question of fact essential to the judgment was actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, (2) the same parties had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue, and (3) there was mutuality of estoppel.” Estes v Titus, 481 Mich 573, 585 ; 751 NW2d 493 (2008).

2018In Rzepka v Michael, 171 Mich App 748, 756 ; 431 NW2d 441 (1988), this Court stated, “Because claims are settled rather than actually adjudicated in a consent judgment, the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply to such judgments.” In Van Pembrook v Zero Mfg Co, 146 Mich App 87, 102-103 ; 380 NW2d 60 (1985), this Court explained in detail why “collateral estoppel may not be applied to consent judgments in Michigan,” stating: First, collateral estoppel rules do not require that a consent judgment bind a party to facts which were originally in issue in the action that was settled.

2018In Rzepka v Michael, 171 Mich App 748, 756 ; 431 NW2d 441 (1988), this Court stated, “Because claims are settled rather than actually adjudicated in a consent judgment, the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply to such judgments.” In Van Pembrook v Zero Mfg Co, 146 Mich App 87, 102-103 ; 380 NW2d 60 (1985), this Court explained in detail why “collateral estoppel may not be applied to consent judgments in Michigan,” stating: First, collateral estoppel rules do not require that a consent judgment bind a party to facts which were originally in issue in the action that was settled.

2019Garrett v Washington, 314 Mich App 436, 440-441 ; 886 NW2d 762 (2016); Holton v Ward, 303 Mich App 718, 731 ; 847 NW2d 1 (2014). 1 Munro also sought eviction of plaintiff from the property, which became a non-issue after plaintiff voluntarily vacated the property two days later. 2 The circuit court did not address res judicata. -2- A. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL The doctrine of collateral estoppel “precludes relitigation of an issue in a subsequent, different cause of action between the same parties when the prior proceeding culminated in a valid final judgment and the issue was actually and necessari

2019Garrett v Washington, 314 Mich App 436, 440-441 ; 886 NW2d 762 (2016); Holton v Ward, 303 Mich App 718, 731 ; 847 NW2d 1 (2014). 1 Munro also sought eviction of plaintiff from the property, which became a non-issue after plaintiff voluntarily vacated the property two days later. 2 The circuit court did not address res judicata. -2- A. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL The doctrine of collateral estoppel “precludes relitigation of an issue in a subsequent, different cause of action between the same parties when the prior proceeding culminated in a valid final judgment and the issue was actually and necessari

2017Nonetheless, plaintiff relies on Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich 38 , for the proposition that the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not bar his claim because the incentives to litigate the issue of 7 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436 ; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). 8 This Court specifically held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to hold a Ginther hearing.

2017Nonetheless, plaintiff relies on Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich 38 , for the proposition that the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not bar his claim because the incentives to litigate the issue of 7 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436 ; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). 8 This Court specifically held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to hold a Ginther hearing.

2017This Court has previously held that “where a full and fair determination has been made in a previous criminal action that the client received the effective assistance of counsel, the defendant-attorney in a subsequent civil malpractice action brought by the same client may defensively assert collateral estoppel as a bar.” Knoblauch v Kenyon, 163 Mich App 712, 725 ; 415 NW2d 286 (1987). “[T]he legal standards for ineffective assistance of counsel in criminal proceedings and for legal malpractice in civil proceedings are equivalent for purposes of application of the doctrine of collateral estopp

2017This Court has previously held that “where a full and fair determination has been made in a previous criminal action that the client received the effective assistance of counsel, the defendant-attorney in a subsequent civil malpractice action brought by the same client may defensively assert collateral estoppel as a bar.” Knoblauch v Kenyon, 163 Mich App 712, 725 ; 415 NW2d 286 (1987). “[T]he legal standards for ineffective assistance of counsel in criminal proceedings and for legal malpractice in civil proceedings are equivalent for purposes of application of the doctrine of collateral estopp

2017This Court reviews “de novo both a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for summary disposition and issues concerning the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.”71 We first address whether Ric-Man has standing to recover lost profits on behalf of Mancini Enterprises. 72 “Whether a party has standing is a question of law subject to review de novo.”73 69 Ditmore v Michalik, 244 Mich App 569, 578 ; 625 NW2d 462 (2001). 70 We do wish to note our disagreement with Ric-Man’s position on appeal.

2017This Court reviews “de novo both a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for summary disposition and issues concerning the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.”71 We first address whether Ric-Man has standing to recover lost profits on behalf of Mancini Enterprises. 72 “Whether a party has standing is a question of law subject to review de novo.”73 69 Ditmore v Michalik, 244 Mich App 569, 578 ; 625 NW2d 462 (2001). 70 We do wish to note our disagreement with Ric-Man’s position on appeal.

2017This Court reviews de novo “issues concerning the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.” Barrow v Pritchard, 235 Mich App 478, 480 ; 597 NW2d 853 (1999).

2017This Court reviews de novo “issues concerning the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.” Barrow v Pritchard, 235 Mich App 478, 480 ; 597 NW2d 853 (1999).

2017Where a claim is precluded by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, summary disposition is proper under MCR 2.116(C)(7).4 Minicuci v Scientific Data Mgt, Inc, 243 Mich App 28, 42 ; 620 NW2d 657 (2000); see also Alcona Co v Wolverine Environmental Prod, Inc, 233 Mich App 238, 246 ; 590 NW2d 586 (1998).

2017Where a claim is precluded by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, summary disposition is proper under MCR 2.116(C)(7).4 Minicuci v Scientific Data Mgt, Inc, 243 Mich App 28, 42 ; 620 NW2d 657 (2000); see also Alcona Co v Wolverine Environmental Prod, Inc, 233 Mich App 238, 246 ; 590 NW2d 586 (1998).

2016“The doctrine of collateral estoppel must be applied so as to strike a balance between the need to eliminate repetitious and needless litigation and the interest in affording litigants a full and fair adjudication of the issues involved in their claims.” Storey v Meijer, Inc, 431 Mich 368, 372 ; 429 NW2d 169 (1988).

2016“The doctrine of collateral estoppel must be applied so as to strike a balance between the need to eliminate repetitious and needless litigation and the interest in affording litigants a full and fair adjudication of the issues involved in their claims.” Storey v Meijer, Inc, 431 Mich 368, 372 ; 429 NW2d 169 (1988).

2023McMichael v McMichael, 217 Mich App 723, 727 ; 552 NW2d 688 (1996).

2023McMichael v McMichael, 217 Mich App 723, 727 ; 552 NW2d 688 (1996).

1973Jones v Chambers (1958), 353 Mich 674 ; Jacobson v Miller (1879), 41 Mich 90 .” In sum, res judicata bars the reinstitution of the same cause of action by the same parties in a subsequent suit.

1972Jones v Chambers (1958), 353 Mich 674 ; Jacobson v Miller (1879), 41 Mich 90 .” (Emphasis supplied.) *670 The case now under consideration is based upon a new cause of action.

2022“Collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of an issue in a subsequent, different cause of action between the same parties where the prior proceeding culminated in a valid, final judgment and the issue was (1) actually litigated, and (2) necessarily determined.” People v Gates, 434 Mich 146, 154 ; 452 NW2d 627 (1990).

2022“Collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of an issue in a subsequent, different cause of action between the same parties where the prior proceeding culminated in a valid, final judgment and the issue was (1) actually litigated, and (2) necessarily determined.” People v Gates, 434 Mich 146, 154 ; 452 NW2d 627 (1990).

2022Washington v Washington, 283 Mich App 667, 671 ; 770 NW2d 908 (2009).

2022Washington v Washington, 283 Mich App 667, 671 ; 770 NW2d 908 (2009).

2022“Generally, for collateral estoppel to apply three elements must be satisfied: (1) a question of fact essential to the judgment must have been actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment; (2) the same parties must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue; and (3) there must be mutuality of estoppel.” William Beaumont Hosp v Wass, 315 Mich App 392, 398 ; 889 NW2d 745 (2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2022“Generally, for collateral estoppel to apply three elements must be satisfied: (1) a question of fact essential to the judgment must have been actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment; (2) the same parties must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue; and (3) there must be mutuality of estoppel.” William Beaumont Hosp v Wass, 315 Mich App 392, 398 ; 889 NW2d 745 (2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2018In Rzepka v Michael, 171 Mich App 748, 756 ; 431 NW2d 441 (1988), this Court stated, “Because claims are settled rather than actually adjudicated in a consent judgment, the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply to such judgments.” In Van Pembrook v Zero Mfg Co, 146 Mich App 87, 102-103 ; 380 NW2d 60 (1985), this Court explained in detail why “collateral estoppel may not be applied to consent judgments in Michigan,” stating: First, collateral estoppel rules do not require that a consent judgment bind a party to facts which were originally in issue in the action that was settled.

2018In Rzepka v Michael, 171 Mich App 748, 756 ; 431 NW2d 441 (1988), this Court stated, “Because claims are settled rather than actually adjudicated in a consent judgment, the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply to such judgments.” In Van Pembrook v Zero Mfg Co, 146 Mich App 87, 102-103 ; 380 NW2d 60 (1985), this Court explained in detail why “collateral estoppel may not be applied to consent judgments in Michigan,” stating: First, collateral estoppel rules do not require that a consent judgment bind a party to facts which were originally in issue in the action that was settled.

2017Nonetheless, plaintiff relies on Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich 38 , for the proposition that the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not bar his claim because the incentives to litigate the issue of 7 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436 ; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). 8 This Court specifically held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to hold a Ginther hearing.

2017Nonetheless, plaintiff relies on Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich 38 , for the proposition that the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not bar his claim because the incentives to litigate the issue of 7 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436 ; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). 8 This Court specifically held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to hold a Ginther hearing.

2017More specifically regarding the conflict-of-interest allegation, plaintiff argued that defendant had a duty to inform the trial court that attorney Legghio’s representation of Natalie Allie, as an 5 Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668 ; 104 S Ct 2052 ; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984). -4- adverse witness against plaintiff who was granted immunity, constituted a potential or actual conflict of interest because defendant had referred Legghio to meet with plaintiff and therefore knew about the prior relationship between Legghio and plaintiff.

2017More specifically regarding the conflict-of-interest allegation, plaintiff argued that defendant had a duty to inform the trial court that attorney Legghio’s representation of Natalie Allie, as an 5 Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668 ; 104 S Ct 2052 ; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984). -4- adverse witness against plaintiff who was granted immunity, constituted a potential or actual conflict of interest because defendant had referred Legghio to meet with plaintiff and therefore knew about the prior relationship between Legghio and plaintiff.

2017Where the proffered evidence fails to 8 Id. at 955-967. 9 Id. at 964. 10 Id. 11 Id. at 965. 12 Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118 ; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). -8- establish a genuine issue regarding any material fact, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.[13] As is explained below, the lynchpin to our analysis is our application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

2017Where the proffered evidence fails to 8 Id. at 955-967. 9 Id. at 964. 10 Id. 11 Id. at 965. 12 Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118 ; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). -8- establish a genuine issue regarding any material fact, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.[13] As is explained below, the lynchpin to our analysis is our application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

2017The doctrine of collateral estoppel, “also known as issue preclusion,” Bennett v Mackinac Bridge Auth, 289 Mich App 616 , 637 n 11; 808 NW2d 471 (2010), “bars relitigation of an issue in a new action arising between the same parties or their privies when the earlier proceeding resulted in a valid final judgment and the issue in question was actually and necessarily determined in that prior proceeding,” Leahy v Orion Twp, 269 Mich App 527, 530 ; 711 NW2d 438 (2006).

2017The doctrine of collateral estoppel, “also known as issue preclusion,” Bennett v Mackinac Bridge Auth, 289 Mich App 616 , 637 n 11; 808 NW2d 471 (2010), “bars relitigation of an issue in a new action arising between the same parties or their privies when the earlier proceeding resulted in a valid final judgment and the issue in question was actually and necessarily determined in that prior proceeding,” Leahy v Orion Twp, 269 Mich App 527, 530 ; 711 NW2d 438 (2006).

2016However, collateral estoppel “does not apply to consent judgments where factual issues are neither tried nor conceded.” Smit v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 207 Mich App 674, 682 ; 525 NW2d 528 (1994), citing Van Pembrook v Zero Mfg Co, 146 Mich App 87, 102-103 ; 380 NW2d 60 (1985).

2016However, collateral estoppel “does not apply to consent judgments where factual issues are neither tried nor conceded.” Smit v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 207 Mich App 674, 682 ; 525 NW2d 528 (1994), citing Van Pembrook v Zero Mfg Co, 146 Mich App 87, 102-103 ; 380 NW2d 60 (1985).