collateral estoppel doctrine in Idaho

14 Idaho opinions name it 2 courts 1976–2019 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Idaho courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (11)

Case	Followed	Cited
Anderson v. City of Pocatellogreen idaho · 1987 · cited in 6 Idaho opinions naming this issue, 1991–2006 2 sentences 1996See Anderson v. City of Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176 , 731 P.2d 171 (1986) (setting forth elements of doctrine of collateral estoppel). 1996See Anderson v. City of Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176 , 731 P.2d 171 (1986) (setting forth elements of doctrine of collateral estoppel).	5	6
Duff v. Drapergreen idaho · 1974 · cited in 2 Idaho opinions naming this issue, 1976–1980 2 sentences 1980See Duff v. Draper, 96 Idaho 299 , 527 P.2d 1257 (1974); 1B Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 0.443[5] (2d ed. 1965). 1980See Duff v. Draper, 96 Idaho 299 , 527 P.2d 1257 (1974); 1B Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 0.443[5] (2d ed. 1965).	1	2
Howard L. Haupt v. T.D. Dillard, Robert Leonard Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department City of Las Vegas, Nevada and Clark County, Nevadagreen ca9 · 1994 · cited in 1 Idaho opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019 1 sentence 2019Autrey v. Stair, 512 F. App’x 572, 578 (6th Cir. 2013) (recognizing that a finding of probable cause made in the preliminary hearing of a criminal prosecution was a valid, final judgment for collateral estoppel purposes); Haupt, 17 F.3d at 288 (holding the probable cause determination in the preliminary hearing was “a final, conclusive determination of the issue.”); Fontana v. City of Auburn, No. C13-0245-JCC, 2014 WL 4162528 , at *7 (W.D.	1	1
John Autrey v. City of Detroitgreen ca6 · 2013 · cited in 1 Idaho opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019 1 sentence 2019Autrey v. Stair, 512 F. App’x 572, 578 (6th Cir. 2013) (recognizing that a finding of probable cause made in the preliminary hearing of a criminal prosecution was a valid, final judgment for collateral estoppel purposes); Haupt, 17 F.3d at 288 (holding the probable cause determination in the preliminary hearing was “a final, conclusive determination of the issue.”); Fontana v. City of Auburn, No. C13-0245-JCC, 2014 WL 4162528 , at *7 (W.D.	1	1
State v. Gusmangreen idaho · 1994 · cited in 1 Idaho opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019 2 sentences 2019First, in State v. Gusman, police arrested a driver for driving under the influence, among other charges. 125 Idaho 805, 806 , 874 P.2d 1112, 1113 (1994). 2019First, in State v. Gusman, police arrested a driver for driving under the influence, among other charges. 125 Idaho 805, 806 , 874 P.2d 1112, 1113 (1994).	1	1
Rodriguez v. Department of Correctiongreen idaho · 2001 · cited in 1 Idaho opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019 2 sentences 2019A “final judgment includes any prior adjudication of an issue in another action that is determined to be sufficiently firm to be accorded conclusive effect.” Rodriguez v. Dep’t of Correction, 136 Idaho 90, 94 , 29 P.3d 401, 405 (2001) (citation omitted). 2019A “final judgment includes any prior adjudication of an issue in another action that is determined to be sufficiently firm to be accorded conclusive effect.” Rodriguez v. Dep’t of Correction, 136 Idaho 90, 94 , 29 P.3d 401, 405 (2001) (citation omitted).	1	1
Richardson v. Four Thousand Five Hundred Forty-three Dollars, United States Currencygreen idahoctapp · 1991 · cited in 1 Idaho opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014 2 sentences 2014Richardson v. Four Thousand Five Hundred Forty-Three Dollars, U.S. Currency, 120 Idaho 220, 222 , 814 P.2d 952, 954 (Ct. App. 1991). 2014Richardson v. Four Thousand Five Hundred Forty-Three Dollars, U.S. Currency, 120 Idaho 220, 222 , 814 P.2d 952, 954 (Ct. App. 1991).	1	1
Ashe v. Swensongreen scotus · 1970 · cited in 1 Idaho opinions naming this issue, 2003–2003 2 sentences 2003The Double Jeopardy Clause incorporates the doctrine of collateral estoppel, which the Court defined as providing that “when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.” Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 , 90 S.Ct. 1189, 1194 , 25 L.Ed.2d 469, 475 (1970). 2003The Double Jeopardy Clause incorporates the doctrine of collateral estoppel, which the Court defined as providing that “when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.” Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 , 90 S.Ct. 1189, 1194 , 25 L.Ed.2d 469, 475 (1970).	1	1
Schiro v. Farleygreen scotus · 1994 · cited in 1 Idaho opinions naming this issue, 1995–1995 2 sentences 1995Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222 , -, 114 S.Ct. 783, 790-91 , 127 L.Ed.2d 47, 58 (1994). 1995Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222 , -, 114 S.Ct. 783, 790-91 , 127 L.Ed.2d 47, 58 (1994).	1	1
Pocatello Industrial Park Co. v. Steel West, Inc.green idaho · 1980 · cited in 1 Idaho opinions naming this issue, 1987–1987 2 sentences 1987This may be dependent on whether deciding the issue was "necessary to [the prior] judgment." Allen, supra, 449 U.S. at 94 , 101 S.Ct. at 414 ; citing Montana, supra, 440 U.S. at 153 , 99 S.Ct. at 973 ; Rajspic v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 104 Idaho 662, 665 , 662 179 P.2d 534, 537 (1983); Pocatello Industrial Park v. Steel West, Inc., 101 Idaho 783, 786 , 621 P.2d 399, 402 (1980) ("In order for the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply, the issue in question must have actually been litigated and resolved in the prior suit." (Emphasis in original; citations omitted.)). (4) "Was there 1987This may be dependent on whether deciding the issue was "necessary to [the prior] judgment." Allen, supra, 449 U.S. at 94 , 101 S.Ct. at 414 ; citing Montana, supra, 440 U.S. at 153 , 99 S.Ct. at 973 ; Rajspic v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 104 Idaho 662, 665 , 662 179 P.2d 534, 537 (1983); Pocatello Industrial Park v. Steel West, Inc., 101 Idaho 783, 786 , 621 P.2d 399, 402 (1980) ("In order for the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply, the issue in question must have actually been litigated and resolved in the prior suit." (Emphasis in original; citations omitted.)). (4) "Was there	1	1
Rajspic v. Nationwide Mutual Insurancegreen idaho · 1983 · cited in 1 Idaho opinions naming this issue, 1987–1987 2 sentences 1987This may be dependent on whether deciding the issue was “necessary to [the prior] judgment.” Allen, supra, 449 U.S. at 94 , 101 S.Ct. at 414 ; citing Montana, supra, 440 U.S. at 153 , 99 S.Ct. at 973 ; Rajspic v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 104 Idaho 662, 665 , 662 P.2d 534, 537 (1983); Pocatello Industrial Park v. Steel West, Inc., 101 Idaho 783, 786 , 621 P.2d 399, 402 (1980) (“In order for the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply, the issue in question must have actually been litigated and resolved in the prior suit.” (Emphasis in original; citations omitted.)). (4) “Was there a fi 1987This may be dependent on whether deciding the issue was "necessary to [the prior] judgment." Allen, supra, 449 U.S. at 94 , 101 S.Ct. at 414 ; citing Montana, supra, 440 U.S. at 153 , 99 S.Ct. at 973 ; Rajspic v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 104 Idaho 662, 665 , 662 *179 P.2d 534, 537 (1983); Pocatello Industrial Park v. Steel West, Inc., 101 Idaho 783, 786 , 621 P.2d 399, 402 (1980) ("In order for the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply, the issue in question must have actually been litigated and resolved in the prior suit." (Emphasis in original; citations omitted.)). (4) "Was there	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (1)

Case	Negative	Cited
Anderson v. City of Pocatellogreen idaho · 1987 · cited in 6 Idaho opinions naming this issue, 1991–2006 2 sentences 1996See Anderson v. City of Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176 , 731 P.2d 171 (1986) (setting forth elements of doctrine of collateral estoppel). 1996See Anderson v. City of Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176 , 731 P.2d 171 (1986) (setting forth elements of doctrine of collateral estoppel).	1	6

Also cited on this issue (13)

Case	Cited	Years
Allen v. McCurry green scotus · 1980 2 sentences 1991Before considering the application of collateral estoppel to this case, it is helpful to restate the doctrine and identify the values which it serves: Under the judicially-developed doctrine of collateral estoppel, once a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that decision is conclusive in a subsequent suit based on a different cause of action involving a party to the prior litigation____ Collateral estoppel, like the related doctrine of res judicata, serves to “relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by pr 1991Before considering the application of collateral estoppel to this case, it is helpful to restate the doctrine and identify the values which it serves: Under the judicially-developed doctrine of collateral estoppel, once a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that decision is conclusive in a subsequent suit based on a different cause of action involving a party to the prior litigation____ Collateral estoppel, like the related doctrine of res judicata, serves to “relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by pr	2	1987–1991
Andre v. Morrow green idaho · 1984 2 sentences 1992Id. at 458 n. 1, 680 P.2d at 1358 n. 1 (citations omitted); but cf. Anderson v. City of Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176, 182-84 , 731 P.2d 171, 177-79 (1986), aff'd on reh’g, (1987) (stating the elements of collateral estoppel, including whether the party against whom estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication and that lack of mutuality is not a bar to application of collateral estoppel). 1992Id. at 458 n. 1, 680 P.2d at 1358 n. 1 (citations omitted); but cf. Anderson v. City of Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176, 182-84 , 731 P.2d 171, 177-79 (1986), aff'd on reh’g, (1987) (stating the elements of collateral estoppel, including whether the party against whom estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication and that lack of mutuality is not a bar to application of collateral estoppel).	1	1992–1992
United States v. Mendoza green scotus · 1984 2 sentences 1991Before considering the application of collateral estoppel to this case, it is helpful to restate the doctrine and identify the values which it serves: Under the judicially-developed doctrine of collateral estoppel, once a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that decision is conclusive in a subsequent suit based on a different cause of action involving a party to the prior litigation____ Collateral estoppel, like the related doctrine of res judicata, serves to “relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by pr 1991Before considering the application of collateral estoppel to this case, it is helpful to restate the doctrine and identify the values which it serves: Under the judicially-developed doctrine of collateral estoppel, once a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that decision is conclusive in a subsequent suit based on a different cause of action involving a party to the prior litigation____ Collateral estoppel, like the related doctrine of res judicata, serves to “relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by pr	1	1991–1991
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation green scotus · 1971 2 sentences 1987This may be dependent on whether deciding the issue was "necessary to [the prior] judgment." Allen, supra, 449 U.S. at 94 , 101 S.Ct. at 414 ; citing Montana, supra, 440 U.S. at 153 , 99 S.Ct. at 973 ; Rajspic v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 104 Idaho 662, 665 , 662 179 P.2d 534, 537 (1983); Pocatello Industrial Park v. Steel West, Inc., 101 Idaho 783, 786 , 621 P.2d 399, 402 (1980) ("In order for the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply, the issue in question must have actually been litigated and resolved in the prior suit." (Emphasis in original; citations omitted.)). (4) "Was there 1987This may be dependent on whether deciding the issue was "necessary to [the prior] judgment." Allen, supra, 449 U.S. at 94 , 101 S.Ct. at 414 ; citing Montana, supra, 440 U.S. at 153 , 99 S.Ct. at 973 ; Rajspic v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 104 Idaho 662, 665 , 662 179 P.2d 534, 537 (1983); Pocatello Industrial Park v. Steel West, Inc., 101 Idaho 783, 786 , 621 P.2d 399, 402 (1980) ("In order for the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply, the issue in question must have actually been litigated and resolved in the prior suit." (Emphasis in original; citations omitted.)). (4) "Was there	1	1987–1987
Montana v. United States green scotus · 1979 2 sentences 1987This may be dependent on whether deciding the issue was "necessary to [the prior] judgment." Allen, supra, 449 U.S. at 94 , 101 S.Ct. at 414 ; citing Montana, supra, 440 U.S. at 153 , 99 S.Ct. at 973 ; Rajspic v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 104 Idaho 662, 665 , 662 179 P.2d 534, 537 (1983); Pocatello Industrial Park v. Steel West, Inc., 101 Idaho 783, 786 , 621 P.2d 399, 402 (1980) ("In order for the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply, the issue in question must have actually been litigated and resolved in the prior suit." (Emphasis in original; citations omitted.)). (4) "Was there 1987This may be dependent on whether deciding the issue was "necessary to [the prior] judgment." Allen, supra, 449 U.S. at 94 , 101 S.Ct. at 414 ; citing Montana, supra, 440 U.S. at 153 , 99 S.Ct. at 973 ; Rajspic v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 104 Idaho 662, 665 , 662 179 P.2d 534, 537 (1983); Pocatello Industrial Park v. Steel West, Inc., 101 Idaho 783, 786 , 621 P.2d 399, 402 (1980) ("In order for the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply, the issue in question must have actually been litigated and resolved in the prior suit." (Emphasis in original; citations omitted.)). (4) "Was there	1	1987–1987
Bernhard v. Bank of America National Trust & Saving Association green cal · 1942 2 sentences 1987This may be dependent on whether deciding the issue was "necessary to [the prior] judgment." Allen, supra, 449 U.S. at 94 , 101 S.Ct. at 414 ; citing Montana, supra, 440 U.S. at 153 , 99 S.Ct. at 973 ; Rajspic v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 104 Idaho 662, 665 , 662 179 P.2d 534, 537 (1983); Pocatello Industrial Park v. Steel West, Inc., 101 Idaho 783, 786 , 621 P.2d 399, 402 (1980) ("In order for the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply, the issue in question must have actually been litigated and resolved in the prior suit." (Emphasis in original; citations omitted.)). (4) "Was there 1987This may be dependent on whether deciding the issue was "necessary to [the prior] judgment." Allen, supra, 449 U.S. at 94 , 101 S.Ct. at 414 ; citing Montana, supra, 440 U.S. at 153 , 99 S.Ct. at 973 ; Rajspic v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 104 Idaho 662, 665 , 662 179 P.2d 534, 537 (1983); Pocatello Industrial Park v. Steel West, Inc., 101 Idaho 783, 786 , 621 P.2d 399, 402 (1980) ("In order for the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply, the issue in question must have actually been litigated and resolved in the prior suit." (Emphasis in original; citations omitted.)). (4) "Was there	1	1987–1987
King v. City of Seattle green wash · 1974 2 sentences 1984Shea v. Bader, 102 Idaho 697 , 638 P.2d 894 (1981); Pocatello Industrial Park Co. v. Steel West, Inc., supra ; Yavapai County v. Wilkinson, 111 Ariz. 530 , 534 P.2d 735 (1975); Pomeroy v. Waitkus, 183 Colo. 344 , 517 P.2d 396 (1973); Gessell v. Jones, 149 Mont. 418 , 427 P.2d 295 (1967); King v. City of Seattle, 84 Wash.2d 239 , 525 P.2d 228 (1974); 46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 415 (1969). 1984Shea v. Bader, 102 Idaho 697 , 638 P.2d 894 (1981); Pocatello Industrial Park Co. v. Steel West, Inc., supra ; Yavapai County v. Wilkinson, 111 Ariz. 530 , 534 P.2d 735 (1975); Pomeroy v. Waitkus, 183 Colo. 344 , 517 P.2d 396 (1973); Gessell v. Jones, 149 Mont. 418 , 427 P.2d 295 (1967); King v. City of Seattle, 84 Wash.2d 239 , 525 P.2d 228 (1974); 46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 415 (1969).	1	1984–1984
Pomeroy v. Waitkus green · 1973 2 sentences 1984Shea v. Bader, 102 Idaho 697 , 638 P.2d 894 (1981); Pocatello Industrial Park Co. v. Steel West, Inc., supra ; Yavapai County v. Wilkinson, 111 Ariz. 530 , 534 P.2d 735 (1975); Pomeroy v. Waitkus, 183 Colo. 344 , 517 P.2d 396 (1973); Gessell v. Jones, 149 Mont. 418 , 427 P.2d 295 (1967); King v. City of Seattle, 84 Wash.2d 239 , 525 P.2d 228 (1974); 46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 415 (1969). 1984Shea v. Bader, 102 Idaho 697 , 638 P.2d 894 (1981); Pocatello Industrial Park Co. v. Steel West, Inc., supra ; Yavapai County v. Wilkinson, 111 Ariz. 530 , 534 P.2d 735 (1975); Pomeroy v. Waitkus, 183 Colo. 344 , 517 P.2d 396 (1973); Gessell v. Jones, 149 Mont. 418 , 427 P.2d 295 (1967); King v. City of Seattle, 84 Wash.2d 239 , 525 P.2d 228 (1974); 46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 415 (1969).	1	1984–1984
Yavapai County v. Wilkinson green ariz · 1975 2 sentences 1984Shea v. Bader, 102 Idaho 697 , 638 P.2d 894 (1981); Pocatello Industrial Park Co. v. Steel West, Inc., supra ; Yavapai County v. Wilkinson, 111 Ariz. 530 , 534 P.2d 735 (1975); Pomeroy v. Waitkus, 183 Colo. 344 , 517 P.2d 396 (1973); Gessell v. Jones, 149 Mont. 418 , 427 P.2d 295 (1967); King v. City of Seattle, 84 Wash.2d 239 , 525 P.2d 228 (1974); 46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 415 (1969). 1984Shea v. Bader, 102 Idaho 697 , 638 P.2d 894 (1981); Pocatello Industrial Park Co. v. Steel West, Inc., supra ; Yavapai County v. Wilkinson, 111 Ariz. 530 , 534 P.2d 735 (1975); Pomeroy v. Waitkus, 183 Colo. 344 , 517 P.2d 396 (1973); Gessell v. Jones, 149 Mont. 418 , 427 P.2d 295 (1967); King v. City of Seattle, 84 Wash.2d 239 , 525 P.2d 228 (1974); 46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 415 (1969).	1	1984–1984
Gessell v. Jones green mont · 1967 2 sentences 1984Shea v. Bader, 102 Idaho 697 , 638 P.2d 894 (1981); Pocatello Industrial Park Co. v. Steel West, Inc., supra ; Yavapai County v. Wilkinson, 111 Ariz. 530 , 534 P.2d 735 (1975); Pomeroy v. Waitkus, 183 Colo. 344 , 517 P.2d 396 (1973); Gessell v. Jones, 149 Mont. 418 , 427 P.2d 295 (1967); King v. City of Seattle, 84 Wash.2d 239 , 525 P.2d 228 (1974); 46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 415 (1969). 1984Shea v. Bader, 102 Idaho 697 , 638 P.2d 894 (1981); Pocatello Industrial Park Co. v. Steel West, Inc., supra ; Yavapai County v. Wilkinson, 111 Ariz. 530 , 534 P.2d 735 (1975); Pomeroy v. Waitkus, 183 Colo. 344 , 517 P.2d 396 (1973); Gessell v. Jones, 149 Mont. 418 , 427 P.2d 295 (1967); King v. City of Seattle, 84 Wash.2d 239 , 525 P.2d 228 (1974); 46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 415 (1969).	1	1984–1984
Shea v. Bader green idaho · 1981 2 sentences 1984Shea v. Bader, 102 Idaho 697 , 638 P.2d 894 (1981); Pocatello Industrial Park Co. v. Steel West, Inc., supra ; Yavapai County v. Wilkinson, 111 Ariz. 530 , 534 P.2d 735 (1975); Pomeroy v. Waitkus, 183 Colo. 344 , 517 P.2d 396 (1973); Gessell v. Jones, 149 Mont. 418 , 427 P.2d 295 (1967); King v. City of Seattle, 84 Wash.2d 239 , 525 P.2d 228 (1974); 46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 415 (1969). 1984Shea v. Bader, 102 Idaho 697 , 638 P.2d 894 (1981); Pocatello Industrial Park Co. v. Steel West, Inc., supra ; Yavapai County v. Wilkinson, 111 Ariz. 530 , 534 P.2d 735 (1975); Pomeroy v. Waitkus, 183 Colo. 344 , 517 P.2d 396 (1973); Gessell v. Jones, 149 Mont. 418 , 427 P.2d 295 (1967); King v. City of Seattle, 84 Wash.2d 239 , 525 P.2d 228 (1974); 46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 415 (1969).	1	1984–1984
Roosma v. Moots green idaho · 1941 2 sentences 1976Respondent ISU further argues that the contractor Mitchell is bound by the judgment in favor of the architect because Mitchell is a "party aggrieved" by the judgment in favor of the architect, since its interests were "injuriously affected" by it and Mitchell thus had a right to appeal that decision under I.C. § 13-103 and Roosma v. Moots, 62 Idaho 450 , 112 P.2d 1000 (1941). 1976Respondent ISU further argues that the contractor Mitchell is bound by the judgment in favor of the architect because Mitchell is a "party aggrieved" by the judgment in favor of the architect, since its interests were "injuriously affected" by it and Mitchell thus had a right to appeal that decision under I.C. § 13-103 and Roosma v. Moots, 62 Idaho 450 , 112 P.2d 1000 (1941).	1	1976–1976
Goolsby v. Derby green iowa · 1971 2 sentences 1976Duff v. Draper, 96 Idaho 299 , 527 P.2d 1257 (1974); Goolsby v. Derby, supra; see Annot., Mutuality of Estoppel as Prerequisite of Availability of Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel to a Stranger to the Judgment, 31 A.L.R.3d 1044 (1970). 1976Duff v. Draper, 96 Idaho 299 , 527 P.2d 1257 (1974); Goolsby v. Derby, supra ; see Annot., Mutuality of Estoppel as Prerequisite of Availability of Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel to a Stranger to the Judgment, 31 A.L.R.3d 1044 (1970).	1	1976–1976

Statutes the citing opinions construe

ID § Idaho Code § 12-121 (5)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

NY 740 (1955–2026) CA 380 (1950–2026) TX 343 (1961–2026) IL 277 (1971–2026) PA 247 (1963–2026) CT 139 (1975–2026) WA 121 (1972–2024) OH 120 (1979–2025) NC 112 (1958–2026) NJ 111 (1955–2026) MI 109 (1971–2025) MD 97 (1968–2025) FL 93 (1971–2025) MO 87 (1973–2025) GA 86 (1970–2023) VA 65 (1976–2024) AL 62 (1971–2025) MA 55 (1980–2016) IN 53 (1974–2025) TN 52 (1963–2026) MS 48 (1965–2024) RI 41 (1972–2026) SC 41 (1983–2025) DC 41 (1965–2026) WV 39 (1983–2025) AZ 37 (1965–2023) DE 37 (1956–2026) VT 34 (1984–2026) LA 33 (1971–2020) NM 32 (1972–2022) MN 31 (1975–2023) WY 31 (1984–2020) HI 30 (1975–2022) NE 30 (1981–2023) KS 29 (1969–2022) MT 29 (1978–2025) CO 28 (1972–2013) NH 26 (1970–2025) AR 24 (1970–2017) AK 23 (1978–2023) WI 20 (1978–2019) OR 19 (1970–1993) ME 19 (1974–2018) OK 19 (1970–2024) UT 16 (1983–2024) IA 16 (1959–2021) SD 15 (1979–2026) ID 14 (1976–2019) KY 6 (1984–2024) NV 6 (1973–2013) ND 6 (1985–2022) VI 4 (1979–2016) PR 2 (1949–1971)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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