collateral estoppel doctrine in California

2026An insufficient record of a court proceeding in this state is a solvable problem, which does not justify the unnecessary time and expense of a remand.9 On our own motion, this court takes judicial notice of the Superior Court for the County of San Bernardino’s minutes reflecting the December 7, 2016 court trial on the first recommitment petition 9 Courts are advised to consider the public policies underlying the collateral estoppel doctrine to determine “whether its application in a particular circumstance would be fair to the parties and constitute sound judicial policy.” ( Lucido, supra, 51

2022We agree with the People. 4 “Collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of issues argued and decided in prior proceedings.” (Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341 .) The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies when “(1) [a] claim or issue raised in the present action is identical to a claim or issue litigated in a prior proceeding; (2) the prior proceeding resulted in a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the party against whom the doctrine is being asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior proceeding.” (People v. Barragan (2004) 32 Cal.4th 236, 253 .) In shor

2016P. v. City and County of San Francisco (2005) 545 U.S. 323 , 336 fn. 16.) The purposes of the doctrine are “to promote judicial economy by minimizing repetitive litigation, to prevent inconsistent judgments which undermine the integrity of the judicial system, [and] to protect against vexatious litigation.” (Clemmer v. Hartford Insurance Co. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 865, 875 .) The application of the collateral estoppel doctrine requires that: (1) the issues in the two matters be identical; (2) the previous proceeding resulted in a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the party against whom collatera

2015“The concept of privity for the purposes of res judicata or collateral estoppel refers ‘to a mutual or successive relationship to the same rights of property, or to such an identification in interest of one person with another as to represent the same legal rights [citations] and, more recently, to a relationship between the party to be estopped and the unsuccessful party in the prior litigation which is “sufficiently close” so as to justify application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel. [Citations.]’ ” (Citizens for Open Access etc. Tide, Inc. v. Seadrift Assn (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1053,

2025As numerous courts have held, “[g]iving preclusive effect to prior administrative findings in appropriate cases furthers the policies underlying the collateral estoppel doctrine, in that it ‘promote[s] judicial economy by minimizing repetitive litigation,’ prevents ‘the possibility of inconsistent judgments which may undermine the integrity of the judicial system,’ and protects parties ‘from being harassed by repeated litigation.’ ” (Basurto, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 878 ; citing People v. Sims (1982) 32 Cal.3d 468, 488-489 ; see also Johnson, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 75 [“the value of ‘enf

2021Our conclusion comports with the California Supreme Court’s guidance that “the primary public policy goal underlying the doctrine of collateral estoppel [is] ‘ “limiting litigation by preventing a party who has had one fair trial on an issue from again drawing it into controversy.” ’ ” ( Garcia, supra, 39 Cal.4th 1070, 1077 , quoting People v. Sims (1982) 32 Cal.3d 468 , 479 italics added.) We conclude the application of collateral estoppel does not violate public policy. 15 DISPOSITION The order dismissing the action is affirmed.

2022The prior judgment is not a complete bar, but it ‘operates as an estoppel or conclusive adjudication as to such issues in the second action as were actually litigated and determined in the first action.’ (Todhunter v. Smith [(1934)] 219 Cal. 690, 695 [ 28 P.2d 916 ].) This aspect of the doctrine of res judicata, now commonly referred to as the doctrine of collateral estoppel, is confined to issues actually litigated.” (Clark v. Lesher (1956) 46 Cal.2d 874, 880 ; see also Sutphin v. Speik, supra, 15 Cal.2d at pp. 201-202.) “First, the issue sought to be precluded from relitigation must be ident

2022The prior judgment is not a complete bar, but it ‘operates as an estoppel or conclusive adjudication as to such issues in the second action as were actually litigated and determined in the first action.’ (Todhunter v. Smith [(1934)] 219 Cal. 690, 695 [ 28 P.2d 916 ].) This aspect of the doctrine of res judicata, now commonly referred to as the doctrine of collateral estoppel, is confined to issues actually litigated.” (Clark v. Lesher (1956) 46 Cal.2d 874, 880 ; see also Sutphin v. Speik, supra, 15 Cal.2d at pp. 201-202.) “First, the issue sought to be precluded from relitigation must be ident

2022(See People v. Arroyo (2016) 62 Cal.4th 589, 593 ; People v. Esmaili (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1449, 1462 .) Cooper relies on the doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, which “precludes relitigation of issues argued and decided in prior proceedings.” (Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341 ; Ashe v. Swenson (1970) 397 U.S. 436, 443 .) When applicable in criminal cases, the doctrine “is a component of the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment” and article I, section 15, of the California Constitution, which both “provide that no person may be tried more than once

2022Defendant asserts that, under Ashe v. Swenson (1970) 397 U.S. 436 (Ashe) and the doctrine of collateral estoppel, he could not be retried on count one because the jury in his first trial “had considered and rejected [the victim’s] credibility as to the events on January 19, 2015.” According to defendant, there “is no other way to explain the unanimous not guilty verdict other than the first jury reached a finding that [the victim] was not credible.” Thus, according to defendant, he “could not be retried as to the alleged events on January 19, 2015, involving [the victim] because the first ‘jur

2022The prior judgment is not a complete bar, but it ‘operates as an estoppel or conclusive adjudication as to such issues in the second action as were actually litigated and determined in the first action.’ (Todhunter v. Smith [(1934)] 219 Cal. 690, 695 [ 28 P.2d 916 ].) This aspect of the doctrine of res judicata, now commonly referred to as the doctrine of collateral estoppel, is confined to issues actually litigated.” (Clark v. Lesher (1956) 46 Cal.2d 874, 880 ; see also Sutphin v. Speik, supra, 15 Cal.2d at pp. 201-202.) “First, the issue sought to be precluded from relitigation must be ident

2021The prior judgment is not a complete bar, but it ‘operates as an estoppel or conclusive adjudication as to such issues in the second action as were actually litigated and determined in the first action.’ (Todhunter v. Smith [(1934)] 219 Cal. 690, 695 [ 28 P.2d 916 ].) This aspect of the doctrine of res judicata, now commonly referred to as the doctrine of collateral estoppel, is confined to issues actually litigated.” (Clark v. Lesher (1956) 46 Cal.2d 874, 880 ; see also Sutphin v. Speik, supra, 15 Cal.2d at pp. 201-202.) “First, the issue sought to be precluded from relitigation must be ident

2010In support of applying collateral estoppel even when there is no identity of defendants, Taylor cited some out-of-state and federal cases applying the defense of collateral estoppel. ( Taylor, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 693 .) It also relied in part on cases that "have applied the doctrine to preclude the conviction of an alleged conspirator when all other alleged coconspirators have been acquitted [citation] or the charges against all the other coconspirators have been dismissed because of insufficient evidence [citation]." ( Id. at pp. 694-695.) In addition to citing supporting cases, Taylor ide

2010In support of applying collateral estoppel even when there is no identity of defendants, Taylor cited some out-of-state and federal cases applying the defense of collateral estoppel. ( Taylor, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 693 .) It also relied in part on cases that "have applied the doctrine to preclude the conviction of an alleged conspirator when all other alleged coconspirators have been acquitted [citation] or the charges against all the other coconspirators have been dismissed because of insufficient evidence [citation]." ( Id. at pp. 694-695.) In addition to citing supporting cases, Taylor ide

2006Co. (1966) 384 U.S. 394, 422 , 86 S.Ct. 1545 , 16 L.Ed.2d 642 , italics omitted; see also Pacific Lumber Co. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2006) 37 Cal.4th 921, 944 , 38 Cal.Rptr.3d 220 , 126 P.3d 1040 ( Pacific Lumber ).) We noted that the standard formulated in Utah Construction supports the primary public policy goal underlying the doctrine of collateral estoppel: "`limiting litigation by preventing a party who has had one fair trial on an issue from again drawing it into controversy.'" ( Sims, supra, at p. 479 , 186 Cal.Rptr. 77 , 651 P.2d 321 , quoting Bernhard v. Bank of America

2006Co. (1966) 384 U.S. 394, 422 , 86 S.Ct. 1545 , 16 L.Ed.2d 642 , italics omitted; see also Pacific Lumber Co. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2006) 37 Cal.4th 921, 944 , 38 Cal.Rptr.3d 220 , 126 P.3d 1040 ( Pacific Lumber ).) We noted that the standard formulated in Utah Construction supports the primary public policy goal underlying the doctrine of collateral estoppel: "`limiting litigation by preventing a party who has had one fair trial on an issue from again drawing it into controversy.'" ( Sims, supra, at p. 479 , 186 Cal.Rptr. 77 , 651 P.2d 321 , quoting Bernhard v. Bank of America

2024Issue Preclusion/Collateral Estoppel The doctrine of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion “ ‘precludes relitigation of issues argued and decided in prior proceedings.’ ” (Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 888, 896 ; see Kaur v. Foster Poultry Farms LLC (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 320 , 348.) In order for issue preclusion to apply, the following elements must be met: (1) the issue sought to be precluded from relitigation must be identical to that decided in a former proceeding; (2) the issue must have been actually litigated in the former proceeding; (3) the issue must have been nece

2024Issue Preclusion/Collateral Estoppel The doctrine of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion “ ‘precludes relitigation of issues argued and decided in prior proceedings.’ ” (Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 888, 896 ; see Kaur v. Foster Poultry Farms LLC (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 320 , 348.) In order for issue preclusion to apply, the following elements must be met: (1) the issue sought to be precluded from relitigation must be identical to that decided in a former proceeding; (2) the issue must have been actually litigated in the former proceeding; (3) the issue must have been nece

2006Although there is "`no universally applicable definition of privity,'" ( Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 486 , 186 Cal.Rptr. 77 , 651 P.2d 321 , quoting Lynch v. Glass (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 943, 947 , 119 Cal.Rptr. 139 ), we explained that whether *80 privity exists depends upon whether the "`relationship between the party to be estopped and the unsuccessful party in the prior litigation . . . is "sufficiently close" so as to justify application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.'" ( Id. at pp. 486-487, 186 Cal.Rptr. 77 , 651 P.2d 321 , quoting Clemmer v. Hartford Insurance Co. (1978) 22 Cal.

2006Although there is "`no universally applicable definition of privity,'" ( Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 486 , 186 Cal.Rptr. 77 , 651 P.2d 321 , quoting Lynch v. Glass (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 943, 947 , 119 Cal.Rptr. 139 ), we explained that whether *80 privity exists depends upon whether the "`relationship between the party to be estopped and the unsuccessful party in the prior litigation . . . is "sufficiently close" so as to justify application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.'" ( Id. at pp. 486-487, 186 Cal.Rptr. 77 , 651 P.2d 321 , quoting Clemmer v. Hartford Insurance Co. (1978) 22 Cal.

2020(Murphy v. Murphy (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 376, 402 (Murphy).) We need not acknowledge or discuss them 2 further.

2014Like the Board, the court concluded the LOI did not create a leasehold interest that triggered a reassessment of property tax and found the doctrine of collateral estoppel did not apply. 6 DISCUSSION On appeal, ECDS and M&M contend the trial court erred by failing to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel to find a change in ownership occurred at the time the LOI was executed.2 The issue of whether collateral estoppel applies is "a question of law, which question we review de novo." (Jenkins v. County of Riverside (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 593, 618 ; see Murphy v. Murphy (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th

2021Co. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 601, 604 .) In Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335 , the court set forth five requirements for application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel, stating: “First, the issue sought to be precluded from relitigation must be identical to that decided in a former proceeding.

1999Only the party against whom the doctrine is invoked must be *375 bound by the prior proceeding. ( Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341 , 272 Cal.Rptr. 767 , 795 P.2d 1223 ( Lucido) ; Teitelbaum Furs, supra, 58 Cal.2d 601, 604 , 25 Cal.Rptr. 559 , 375 P.2d 439 ; Bernhard, supra, 19 Cal.2d 807, 810-813 , 122 P.2d 892 .) Accordingly, the collateral estoppel doctrine may allow one who was not a party to prior litigation to take advantage, in a later unrelated matter, of findings made against his current adversary in the earlier proceeding.

2021“The concept of privity for the purposes of res judicata or collateral estoppel refers ‘to a mutual or successive relationship to the same rights of property, or to such an identification in interest of one person with another as to represent the same legal rights [citations] and, more recently, to a relationship between the party to be estopped and the unsuccessful party in the prior litigation which is “sufficiently close” so as to justify application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel. [Citations.]’ ” (Citizens for Open Access etc. Tide, Inc. v. Seadrift Assn. (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1053

2018Plaintiffs argue that res judicata "cannot be applied as to IOC and CREED-21 because they are not in privity with [HOA]." (Some capitalization omitted.) Again, we disagree. *463 "The concept of privity for the purposes of res judicata or collateral estoppel refers 'to a mutual or successive relationship to the same rights of property, or to such an identification of interest of one person with another as to represent the same legal rights [citations] and, more recently, to a relationship between the party to be estopped and the unsuccessful party in the prior litigation which is "sufficiently

2016A. Collateral estoppel The Department first argues that the trial court erred in granting the writ petition because Ridgecrest’s current administrative appeal is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. 8 Collateral estoppel “precludes relitigation of issues argued and decided in prior proceedings.” (Hernandez v. City of Pomona (2009) 46 Cal.4th 501, 511 (Hernandez).) The doctrine applies if five elements are met: (1) the issue sought to be precluded from relitigation is identical to that decided in a former proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the former proceeding; (3) t

2015“For purposes of collateral estoppel, an issue was actually litigated *1089 in a prior proceeding if it was properly raised, submitted for determination, and determined in that proceeding. [Citation.] . . . ‘The “identical issue” requirement addresses whether “identical factual allegations” are at stake in the two proceedings, not whether the ultimate issues or dispositions are the same. [Citation.]’ ” (Hernandez v. City of Pomona (2009) 46 Cal.4th 501, 511-512 [ 94 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 207 P.3d 506 ].) To apply the collateral estoppel bar, the issue must have been raised and decided in the prior p

2025As numerous courts have held, “[g]iving preclusive effect to prior administrative findings in appropriate cases furthers the policies underlying the collateral estoppel doctrine, in that it ‘promote[s] judicial economy by minimizing repetitive litigation,’ prevents ‘the possibility of inconsistent judgments which may undermine the integrity of the judicial system,’ and protects parties ‘from being harassed by repeated litigation.’ ” (Basurto, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 878 ; citing People v. Sims (1982) 32 Cal.3d 468, 488-489 ; see also Johnson, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 75 [“the value of ‘enf

2025As numerous courts have held, “[g]iving preclusive effect to prior administrative findings in appropriate cases furthers the policies underlying the collateral estoppel doctrine, in that it ‘promote[s] judicial economy by minimizing repetitive litigation,’ prevents ‘the possibility of inconsistent judgments which may undermine the integrity of the judicial system,’ and protects parties ‘from being harassed by repeated litigation.’ ” (Basurto, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 878 ; citing People v. Sims (1982) 32 Cal.3d 468, 488-489 ; see also Johnson, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 75 [“the value of ‘enf

2016“The doctrine of collateral estoppel, ‘or issue preclusion, “precludes relitigation of issues argued and decided in prior proceedings.”’ (Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 888, 896 [ 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 432 , 51 P.3d 297 ].) ‘“A prior determination 16 by a tribunal will be given collateral estoppel effect when (1) the issue is identical to that decided in a former proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated and (3) necessarily decided; (4) the doctrine is asserted against a party to the former action or one who was in privity with such a party; and (5) the former decision is fin

2016“The doctrine of collateral estoppel, ‘or issue preclusion, “precludes relitigation of issues argued and decided in prior proceedings.”’ (Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 888, 896 [ 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 432 , 51 P.3d 297 ].) ‘“A prior determination 16 by a tribunal will be given collateral estoppel effect when (1) the issue is identical to that decided in a former proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated and (3) necessarily decided; (4) the doctrine is asserted against a party to the former action or one who was in privity with such a party; and (5) the former decision is fin

2021(See, e.g., Vandenberg v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 815, 829 (Vandenberg); Basurto v. Imperial Irrigation Dist. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 866, 878 (Basurto) [“Giving preclusive effect to prior administrative findings in appropriate cases furthers the policies underlying the collateral estoppel doctrine, in that it ‘promote[s] judicial economy by minimizing repetitive litigation,’ prevents ‘the possibility of inconsistent judgments which may undermine the integrity of the judicial system,’ and protects parties ‘from being harassed by repeated litigation’”].) We review de novo a trial court’

2015But these cases involved not motions for new trial on a claim of newly discovered evidence, but application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel, in which the court looks merely to whether identical issues were decided in successive actions (Vandenberg v. Superior 21 Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 815, 828 ), not whether a different result in the same trial would be reached upon new and different evidence.

2025Issue Preclusion “In general, whether a prior finding will be given conclusive effect in a later proceeding is governed by the doctrine of issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel.” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 715.) “The doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion,[] is firmly embedded in both federal and California common law.

2024Issue Preclusion Although not necessarily clear, it appears the trial court denied the petition on preclusion grounds when the court stated, “This request was already litigated, appealed, and affirmed.” We conclude the petition was barred under the doctrine of issue preclusion.6 “ ‘In general, whether a prior finding will be given conclusive effect in a later proceeding is governed by the doctrine of issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel.’ ” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 451 , quoting People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 715 (Strong).) “ ‘The doctrine of collateral estoppel

2025(Id. at p. 910.) The Supreme Court reversed, finding two requirements of the collateral estoppel doctrine had not been met. 15 ( Santamaria, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 917-923, 927.) The People rely on Santamaria’s analysis and holding that the issue to be determined at retrial was not identical to any issue necessarily decided by the jury’s verdict of acquittal on the knife use enhancement.

2023(Santamaria, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 909 .) The defendant argued that the original jury’s not true finding on a personal knife use allegation required the retrying prosecution to “prove some basis for liability, such as that [the] defendant aided and abetted the actual perpetrator, that did not involve personal knife use,” and required “the trial court [to] . . . instruct the [second] jury that [the defendant] did not use [a] knife.” (Id. at p. 910.) Our Supreme Court disagreed; applying the collateral estoppel doctrine, it held that the prior not true finding “show[ed] only that there was a re

2014(Citizens for Open Access, at p. 1065.) The second element of privity refers “ ‘to a relationship between the party to be estopped and the unsuccessful party in the prior litigation which is “sufficiently close” so as to justify application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Sims (1982) 32 Cal.3d 468, 486-487 , superseded by statute as stated in Gikas v. Zolin (1993) 6 Cal.4th 841, 851 ; see also Citizens for Open Access, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1069-1070.) Courts have held “that the agents of the same government are in privity with each other, since they re

2008(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.751(c).) [5] Res judicata is also known as "claim preclusion." (See Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341, fn. 3 , 272 Cal.Rptr. 767 , 795 P.2d 1223 .) In contrast, the doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, bars parties from relitigating, in a second lawsuit on a different cause of action, issues that were litigated and determined in the first action. ( Mycogen, supra, 28 Cal.4th at 896, fn. 7 , 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 43 .2, 51 P.3d 297 ; Gikas v. Zoliu (1993) 6 Cal.4th 841, 848-849 , 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 500 , 863 P.2d 745 ; Lucido v. Superior Cour

2021Co. (1986) 41 Cal.3d 903, 911 (Producers Dairy) [following Sandoval, holding that a settlement reached after affirmance on appeal but before the time to petition for review expired did not disturb the finality of the judgment, and explaining 36 that “settlement of a prior adjudication during the pendency of an appeal may render the judgment sufficiently final to support the doctrine of collateral estoppel, provided other factors of certainty and finality are satisfied”].) And while Sandoval involved a post-judgment settlement and dismissal, courts have also given preclusive effect to judgments

2021Co. (1986) 41 Cal.3d 903, 911 (Producers Dairy) [following Sandoval, holding that a settlement reached after affirmance on appeal but before the time to petition for review expired did not disturb the finality of the judgment, and explaining 36 that “settlement of a prior adjudication during the pendency of an appeal may render the judgment sufficiently final to support the doctrine of collateral estoppel, provided other factors of certainty and finality are satisfied”].) And while Sandoval involved a post-judgment settlement and dismissal, courts have also given preclusive effect to judgments

2026Finally, the party against whom preclusion is sought must be the same as, or in privity with, the party to the former proceeding.” ’ ” ( Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 451–452.) While satisfaction of these elements is necessary to invoke the equitable doctrine of collateral estoppel, it is not always sufficient.

2025“Summary denials do not constitute law of the case, and do not establish any legal precedents.” (Frisk v. Superior Court (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 402, 415 .) “The denial without opinion of a petition for a writ of mandate or prohibition is not res judicata. [Citations.] Our summary denial of the previous writ 7 petition was not a decision on the merits.” (Hoversten v. Superior Court (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 636, 640 .) The Trial Court Erred in Not Giving Preclusive Effect to the Jury’s Finding of Reckless Indifference to Human Life “‘In general, whether a prior finding will be given conclusive effe

2023Collateral estoppel has five threshold requirements: “1) the issue to be precluded must be identical to that decided in the prior proceeding; 2) the issue must have been actually litigated at that time; 3) the issue must have been necessarily decided; 4) the decision in the prior proceeding must be final and on the merits; and 5) the party against whom preclusion is sought must be in privity with the party to the former proceeding.” (People v. Garcia (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1070, 1077 .) Privity is “a relationship between the party to be estopped and the unsuccessful party in the prior litigation wh

2021Our conclusion comports with the California Supreme Court’s guidance that “the primary public policy goal underlying the doctrine of collateral estoppel [is] ‘ “limiting litigation by preventing a party who has had one fair trial on an issue from again drawing it into controversy.” ’ ” ( Garcia, supra, 39 Cal.4th 1070, 1077 , quoting People v. Sims (1982) 32 Cal.3d 468 , 479 italics added.) We conclude the application of collateral estoppel does not violate public policy. 15 DISPOSITION The order dismissing the action is affirmed.

2021Thus, “ ‘[i]n addition to these factors, . . . the courts consider whether the party against whom the earlier decision is asserted had a “full and fair” opportunity to litigate the issue.’ (Roos v. Red (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 870, 880 .) Collateral estoppel will not be applied ‘if injustice would result or if the public interest requires that relitigation not be foreclosed.’ (Consumers Lobby Against Monopolies v. Public Utilities Com. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 891, 902 .) To determine whether to preclude relitigation on collateral estoppel grounds, judicial notice may be taken of a prior judgment and ot

2016(Roos, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 879 .) As noted, res judicata “precludes parties or their privies from relitigating a cause of action,” and in this sense “has traditionally been referred to as ‘res judicata’ or ‘claim preclusion.’ ” (Ibid., original italics.) In addition to claim preclusion, “[r]es judicata also includes a broader principle . . . commonly referred to as ‘collateral estoppel’ or ‘issue preclusion.’ Under this principle an issue necessarily decided in prior litigation may be conclusively determined as against the parties or their privies in a subsequent lawsuit on a differen

2023“Privity ‘ “refers ‘to a mutual or successive relationship to the same rights of property, or to such an identification in interest of one person with another as to represent the same legal rights [citations] and, more recently, to a relationship between the party to be estopped and the unsuccessful party in the prior litigation which is “sufficiently close” so as to justify application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel. [Citations.]’ [Citations.] ‘ “This requirement of identity of parties or privity is a requirement of due process of law.” [Citation.] . . .’ [Citations.]” ’ ” (Mooney v.

2022Pittsburgh Glass held that retirees are not employees within 11 same rights of property, or to such an identification in interest of one person with another as to represent the same legal rights [citations] and, more recently, to a relationship between the party to be estopped and the unsuccessful party in the prior litigation which is “sufficiently close” so as to justify application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel. [Citations.]’ ” ’ ” (Mooney v. Caspari (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 704, 718 (Mooney).) The privity requirement is a requirement of due process of law.

2010(Id. at p. 76.)” (McDonald, supra, at p. 113 .) This court has further explained that “[i]ndicia of [administrative] proceedings undertaken in a judicial capacity include a hearing before an impartial decision maker; testimony given under oath or affirmation; a party’s ability to subpoena, call, examine, and cross-examine witnesses, to introduce documentary evidence, and to make oral and written argument; the taking of a record of the proceeding; and a written statement of reasons for the decision.” (Pacific Lumber Co. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2006) 37 Cal.4th 921, 944 [ 38 Cal.Rp

2010(Id. at p. 76.)” (McDonald, supra, at p. 113 .) This court has further explained that “[i]ndicia of [administrative] proceedings undertaken in a judicial capacity include a hearing before an impartial decision maker; testimony given under oath or affirmation; a party’s ability to subpoena, call, examine, and cross-examine witnesses, to introduce documentary evidence, and to make oral and written argument; the taking of a record of the proceeding; and a written statement of reasons for the decision.” (Pacific Lumber Co. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2006) 37 Cal.4th 921, 944 [ 38 Cal.Rp