collateral estoppel doctrine in Nebraska

2001Id.: Farm Credit Bank v. Stute, 248 Neb, 573, 537 N.W.2d 496 (1995).

2000Stewart v. Hechtman, 254 Neb. 992 , 581 N.W.2d 416 (1998); Cunningham v. Prime Mover, Inc., 252 Neb. 899 , 567 N.W.2d 178 (1997); Torrison v. Overman, supra; Farm Credit Bank v. Stute, 248 Neb. 573 , 537 N.W.2d 496 (1995).

2005Woodward v. Andersen, 261 Neb. 980 , 627 N.W.2d 742 (2001); In re Estate of Wagner, 246 Neb. 625 , 522 N.W.2d 159 (1994).

2005Woodward v. Andersen, 261 Neb. 980 , 627 N.W.2d 742 (2001); In re Estate of Wagner, 246 Neb. 625 , 522 N.W.2d 159 (1994).

1995In re Estate of Wagner, supra ; How v. Mars, 245 Neb. 420 , 513 N.W.2d 511 (1994); Rosse v. Rosse, 244 Neb. 967 , 510 N.W.2d 73 (1994).

1995In re Estate of Wagner, supra ; How v. Mars, 245 Neb. 420 , 513 N.W.2d 511 (1994); Rosse v. Rosse, 244 Neb. 967 , 510 N.W.2d 73 (1994).

2016Relying on the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the Nebraska Supreme Court reasoned that the corporation had been mari- tal property and that “[in] order to equitably distribute the property, a necessary determination involved the value of the corporation.” Id. at 988 , 627 N.W.2d at 749 .

2016Relying on the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the Nebraska Supreme Court reasoned that the corporation had been mari- tal property and that “[in] order to equitably distribute the property, a necessary determination involved the value of the corporation.” Id. at 988 , 627 N.W.2d at 749 .

2002Torrison v. Overman, 250 Neb. 164 , 549 N.W.2d 124 (1996).

2002Torrison v. Overman, 250 Neb. 164 , 549 N.W.2d 124 (1996).

2000Stewart v. Hechtman, 254 Neb. 992 , 581 N.W.2d 416 (1998); Cunningham v. Prime Mover, Inc., 252 Neb. 899 , 567 N.W.2d 178 (1997); Torrison v. Overman, supra; Farm Credit Bank v. Stute, 248 Neb. 573 , 537 N.W.2d 496 (1995).

2000Stewart v. Hechtman, 254 Neb. 992 , 581 N.W.2d 416 (1998); Cunningham v. Prime Mover, Inc., 252 Neb. 899 , 567 N.W.2d 178 (1997); Torrison v. Overman, supra; Farm Credit Bank v. Stute, 248 Neb. 573 , 537 N.W.2d 496 (1995).

1995In re Estate of Wagner, supra ; How v. Mars, 245 Neb. 420 , 513 N.W.2d 511 (1994); Rosse v. Rosse, 244 Neb. 967 , 510 N.W.2d 73 (1994).

1995In re Estate of Wagner, supra ; How v. Mars, 245 Neb. 420 , 513 N.W.2d 511 (1994); Rosse v. Rosse, 244 Neb. 967 , 510 N.W.2d 73 (1994).

2016Corp., 270 Neb. 370 , 702 N.W.2d 792 (2005). - 334 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 294 Nebraska R eports RM CAMPBELL INDUS. v. MIDWEST RENEWABLE ENERGY Cite as 294 Neb. 326 relitigation not only of those matters actually litigated, but also of those matters which might have been litigated in the prior action.9 The doctrine rests on the necessity to terminate litiga- tion and on the belief that a person should not be vexed twice for the same cause.10 [10,11] Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, when an issue of ultimate fact has been deter- mined by a final j

2016Corp., 270 Neb. 370 , 702 N.W.2d 792 (2005). - 334 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 294 Nebraska R eports RM CAMPBELL INDUS. v. MIDWEST RENEWABLE ENERGY Cite as 294 Neb. 326 relitigation not only of those matters actually litigated, but also of those matters which might have been litigated in the prior action.9 The doctrine rests on the necessity to terminate litiga- tion and on the belief that a person should not be vexed twice for the same cause.10 [10,11] Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, when an issue of ultimate fact has been deter- mined by a final j

1995In re Estate of Wagner, 246 Neb. 625 , 522 N.W.2d 159 (1994); Petska v. Olson Gravel, Inc., 243 Neb. 568 , 500 N.W.2d 828 (1993).

1995In re Estate of Wagner, 246 Neb. 625 , 522 N.W.2d 159 (1994); Petska v. Olson Gravel, Inc., 243 Neb. 568 , 500 N.W.2d 828 (1993).

2016Corp., 270 Neb. 370 , 702 N.W.2d 792 (2005). - 334 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 294 Nebraska R eports RM CAMPBELL INDUS. v. MIDWEST RENEWABLE ENERGY Cite as 294 Neb. 326 relitigation not only of those matters actually litigated, but also of those matters which might have been litigated in the prior action.9 The doctrine rests on the necessity to terminate litiga- tion and on the belief that a person should not be vexed twice for the same cause.10 [10,11] Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, when an issue of ultimate fact has been deter- mined by a final j

2016Hara v. Reichert, 287 Neb. 577 , 843 N.W.2d 812 (2014).

2002Nesbitt v. Hopkins, 86 F.3d 118 (8th Cir. 1996).

2002In a criminal case, a fact previously determined is not an “ultimate fact” precluded by the collateral estoppel principle unless it was necessarily determined by the fact finder against the government and, in the second prosecution, that “ ‘same fact is required to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt in order to convict.’ ” Id. at 120 , quoting Prince v. Lockhart, 971 F.2d 118 (8th Cir. 1992).

2002Thomas Lakes Owners Assn. v. Riley, 9 Neb.

2002Id.

2002In a criminal case, a fact previously determined is not an “ultimate fact” precluded by the collateral estoppel principle unless it was necessarily determined by the fact finder against the government and, in the second prosecution, that “ ‘same fact is required to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt in order to convict.’ ” Id. at 120 , quoting Prince v. Lockhart, 971 F.2d 118 (8th Cir. 1992).

1998Kopecky v. National Farms, Inc., 244 Neb. 846 , 510 N.W.2d 41 (1994).

1998Kopecky v. National Farms, Inc., 244 Neb. 846 , 510 N.W.2d 41 (1994).

1995App. at 608, 513 N.W.2d at 553 , and found that Bartunek had obtained full recovery from Gentrup for purposes of determining whether Hormel was entitled to subrogation.

1994Hubbard v. Hatrak, 588 F.2d 414 (3d Cir.1978), cert. denied 440 U.S. 974 , 99 S.Ct. 1541 , 59 L.Ed.2d 792 (1979), which held that the federal Due Process Clause did not impose a collateral estoppel requirement in favor of a criminal defendant who was not a party to the first case.

1994Writing about issue preclusion in Krohn v. Gardner, 238 Neb. 460 , 471 N.W.2d 391 (1991), the court stated that the basis of the doctrine is that the party to be affected, or someone with whom he or she is in privity, has litigated or has had an opportunity to litigate the same matter in the prior action. “ ‘Due process requires that the rule of collateral estoppel operate only against persons who have had their day in court either as a party to a prior suit or as a privy.’ ” Id. at 463 , 471 N.W.2d at 394 , quoting Hickman v. Southwest Dairy Suppliers, Inc., supra. The doctrine of issue precl

1994Writing about issue preclusion in Krohn v. Gardner, 238 Neb. 460 , 471 N.W.2d 391 (1991), the court stated that the basis of the doctrine is that the party to be affected, or someone with whom he or she is in privity, has litigated or has had an opportunity to litigate the same matter in the prior action. “ ‘Due process requires that the rule of collateral estoppel operate only against persons who have had their day in court either as a party to a prior suit or as a privy.’ ” Id. at 463 , 471 N.W.2d at 394 , quoting Hickman v. Southwest Dairy Suppliers, Inc., supra. The doctrine of issue precl

1994Hubbard v. Hatrak, 588 F.2d 414 (3d Cir.1978), cert. denied 440 U.S. 974 , 99 S.Ct. 1541 , 59 L.Ed.2d 792 (1979), which held that the federal Due Process Clause did not impose a collateral estoppel requirement in favor of a criminal defendant who was not a party to the first case.

1994Hubbard v. Hatrak, 588 F.2d 414 (3d Cir.1978), cert. denied 440 U.S. 974 , 99 S.Ct. 1541 , 59 L.Ed.2d 792 (1979), which held that the federal Due Process Clause did not impose a collateral estoppel requirement in favor of a criminal defendant who was not a party to the first case.

1994Hubbard v. Hatrak, 588 F.2d 414 (3d Cir.1978), cert. denied 440 U.S. 974 , 99 S.Ct. 1541 , 59 L.Ed.2d 792 (1979), which held that the federal Due Process Clause did not impose a collateral estoppel requirement in favor of a criminal defendant who was not a party to the first case.

1990Soc. v. Peter Kiewit Sons’ Co., 196 Neb. 158 , 241 N.W.2d 674 (1976).

1990Soc. v. Peter Kiewit Sons’ Co., 196 Neb. 158 , 241 N.W.2d 674 (1976).

1990The doctrine of collateral estoppel “recognizes that limits on litigation are desirable, but a person should not be denied a day in court unfairly.” Vincent v. Peter Pan Bakers, Inc., 182 Neb. 206, 207 , 153 N.W.2d 849 (1967); Woodmen of the World Life Ins.

1990The doctrine of collateral estoppel “recognizes that limits on litigation are desirable, but a person should not be denied a day in court unfairly.” Vincent v. Peter Pan Bakers, Inc., 182 Neb. 206, 207 , 153 N.W.2d 849 (1967); Woodmen of the World Life Ins.

1981In Johnson v. Marsh, 146 Neb. 257 , 19 N.W.2d 366 (1945), we held that where cases are interwoven and interdependent and the controversy involved has already been considered and determined in a prior proceeding involving one of the parties now before the court, the court has the right to examine its own records and take judicial notice of its own proceedings and judgment in the prior action.

1981In Johnson v. Marsh, 146 Neb. 257 , 19 N.W.2d 366 (1945), we held that where cases are interwoven and interdependent and the controversy involved has already been considered and determined in a prior proceeding involving one of the parties now before the court, the court has the right to examine its own records and take judicial notice of its own proceedings and judgment in the prior action.