87 Missouri opinions name it 2 courts 1973–2025 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Oates v. Safeco Insurance Co. of Americagreen2 sentences1992Co. of America, 583 S.W.2d 713, 719 (Mo. banc 1979), the court listed three factors and a possible fourth factor which a court should consider in determining whether to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel. 1991In Oates , this Court considered whether "a prior judgment adverse to plaintiff-appellant in an action against an uninsured motorist now precludes appellant from maintaining an action against his `uninsured motorist' insurance carrier because of the doctrine of collateral estoppel." Id. at 714 . | 8 | 11 |
James v. Paulgreen2 sentences2019In 6 determining the applicability of collateral estoppel, “[f]airness is the overriding consideration.” Cox v. Steck, 992 S.W.2d 221, 224 (Mo. App. E.D. 1999); see also James, 49 S.W.3d at 683 (“The doctrine of collateral estoppel will not be applied where to do so would be inequitable.”). 2014While equitable considerations are properly considered in a collateral estoppel analysis, see James, 49 S.W.3d at 688 , we are aware of no Missouri case recognizing equitable principles as a basis for res judicata and Defendant cites to none. 11 Here, there is no dispute that the effect of the Policy‟s carriage-of-goods exclusion was an issue properly belonging to the prior garnishment action. | 4 | 8 |
Robin Farms, Inc. v. Beelergreen2 sentences2021“The doctrine of collateral estoppel, commonly known as issue preclusion, precludes the same parties from relitigating issues previously adjudicated between the same parties or those in privity with them.” Xiaoyan Gu v. Da Hua Hu, 447 S.W.3d 680, 686 (Mo. App. E.D. 2014) (quoting Robin Farms, Inc. v. Beeler, 991 S.W.2d 182, 185 (Mo. App. W.D. 1999)). 16 For collateral estoppel to apply, (1) the issue decided in the first action must be identical to the issue in the second; (2) the prior litigation must have resulted in a judgment on the merits; (3) the party to be estopped must have been a par 2014“The doctrine of collateral estoppel, commonly known as issue preclusion, precludes the same parties from relitigating issues previously adjudicated between the same parties or those in privity with them.” Robin Farms, Inc. v. Beeler, 991 S.W.2d 182, 185 (Mo. App. W.D. 1999). | 4 | 4 |
State v. Motongreen2 sentences2021“Collateral estoppel ‘does not even begin to come into play unless the defendant has been acquitted in the first trial.”’ Id. at 915 (quoting State v. Moton, 476 S.W.2d 785, 790 (Mo. banc 1972)). 2016“Since it is usually impossible to determine with any precision upon what basis the jury reached a verdict in a criminal case, it is a rare situation in which the collateral estoppel defense will be available to a defendant.” Id. (quotation omit,ted). *239 Collateral estoppel “does not even begin to come into play unless the defendant has been acquitted in the first trial.” State v. Moton, 476 S.W.2d 785, 790 (Mo.1972). | 4 | 4 |
Ashe v. Swensongreen2 sentences1989In Ashe , the Supreme Court stated that when the previous acquittal was based on a general verdict, the collateral estoppel inquiry “requires a court to examine the record of a prior proceeding, taking into account the pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matter, and conclude whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration.” Ashe, 397 U.S. at 444 , 90 S.Ct. at 1194 . 1989In Ashe , the Supreme Court stated that when the previous acquittal was based on a general verdict, the collateral estoppel inquiry “requires a court to examine the record of a prior proceeding, taking into account the pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matter, and conclude whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration.” Ashe, 397 U.S. at 444 , 90 S.Ct. at 1194 . | 2 | 7 |
King General Contractors, Inc. v. Reorganized Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saintsgreen2 sentences1998A significant consideration in deciding whether to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel “is whether the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior lawsuit.” Id. 1996The doctrine of collateral estoppel means “when an issue of ultimate fact has been determined by a valid judgment, it may not again be litigated between the same parties.” King General Contractors, Inc. v. Reorganized Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 821 S.W.2d 495, 500 (Mo. banc 1991). | 2 | 3 |
State v. Cusumanogreen2 sentences2021“The Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy embodies the doctrine of collateral estoppel.” State v. Cusumano, 399 S.W.3d 909, 914 (Mo. App. 2013). ‘“Collateral estoppel bars relitigation of a specific fact or issue that was unambiguously determined by a previous jury.”’ Id. (quoting 6 State v. Simmons, 955 S.W.2d 752, 760 (Mo. banc 1997)). 2021“The Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy embodies the doctrine of collateral estoppel.” State v. Cusumano, 399 S.W.3d 909, 914 (Mo. App. 2013). ‘“Collateral estoppel bars relitigation of a specific fact or issue that was unambiguously determined by a previous jury.”’ Id. (quoting 6 State v. Simmons, 955 S.W.2d 752, 760 (Mo. banc 1997)). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Simmonsgreen2 sentences2021“The Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy embodies the doctrine of collateral estoppel.” State v. Cusumano, 399 S.W.3d 909, 914 (Mo. App. 2013). ‘“Collateral estoppel bars relitigation of a specific fact or issue that was unambiguously determined by a previous jury.”’ Id. (quoting 6 State v. Simmons, 955 S.W.2d 752, 760 (Mo. banc 1997)). 2021“Collateral estoppel ‘does not even begin to come into play unless the defendant has been acquitted in the first trial.”’ Id. at 915 (quoting State v. Moton, 476 S.W.2d 785, 790 (Mo. banc 1972)). | 2 | 2 |
Xiaoyan Gu v. Da Hua Hu, and ACE INA Insurance Company Canada, Defendants/Respondents.green2 sentences2021“The doctrine of collateral estoppel, commonly known as issue preclusion, precludes the same parties from relitigating issues previously adjudicated between the same parties or those in privity with them.” Xiaoyan Gu v. Da Hua Hu, 447 S.W.3d 680, 686 (Mo. App. E.D. 2014) (quoting Robin Farms, Inc. v. Beeler, 991 S.W.2d 182, 185 (Mo. App. W.D. 1999)). 16 For collateral estoppel to apply, (1) the issue decided in the first action must be identical to the issue in the second; (2) the prior litigation must have resulted in a judgment on the merits; (3) the party to be estopped must have been a par 2017Xiaoyan Gu v. Da Hua Hu, 447 S.W.3d 680, 686 (Mo. App. E.D. 2014). . | 2 | 2 |
Shores v. Express Lending Services, Inc.green2 sentences2019Collateral estoppel “does not prevent a party from litigating issues that were never argued or decided as essential to the judgment in the previous proceeding.” Shores v. Express Lending Servs., Inc., 998 S.W.2d 122, 126 (Mo. App. E.D. 1999). 2001Shores v. Express Lending Services, Inc., 998 S.W.2d 122, 126 [7] (Mo.App.1999) (emphasis supplied). | 2 | 2 |
Cox v. Steckgreen2 sentences2019In 6 determining the applicability of collateral estoppel, “[f]airness is the overriding consideration.” Cox v. Steck, 992 S.W.2d 221, 224 (Mo. App. E.D. 1999); see also James, 49 S.W.3d at 683 (“The doctrine of collateral estoppel will not be applied where to do so would be inequitable.”). 1999Baldridge v. Lacks, 883 S.W.2d 947, 950 (Mo.App.1994); Cox v. Steck, 992 S.W.2d 221, 223-24 (Mo.App.1999). | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Carmine Tramuntigreen2 sentences2010“Recently our Supreme Court has expressed the view that collateral estoppel forecloses consideration of an issue only when that issue was unambiguously decided in the earlier case.” Coleman, 773 S.W.2d at 201 , citing State v. Rodden, 728 S.W.2d 212, 220 (Mo. banc 1987). “ ‘Since it is usually impossible to, determine with any precision upon what basis the jury reached a verdict in a criminal case, it is a rare situation in which the collateral estoppel defense will be available to a defendant.’ ” Booker, 540 S.W.2d at 93 , quoting United State v. Tramunti, 500 F.2d 1334, 1346 (2d Cir.1974). 1976In that case the court, referring to United States v. Cioffi, 487 F.2d 492, 498 (2d Cir. 1973), stated: “Since it is usually impossible to determine with any precision upon what basis the jury reached a verdict in a criminal case, it is a rare situation in which the collateral estoppel defense will be available to a defendant.” Tramunti, supra at 1346 [22]. | 2 | 2 |
Sexton v. Jenkins & Associates, Inc.green2 sentences2009A. “The court-made doctrine of collateral estoppel — known by its modern term, issue preclusion — precludes re-litigation of an issue previously decided and incorporated into an earlier judgment.” Sexton v. Jenkins & Assocs., Inc., 152 S.W.3d 270, 273 (Mo. banc 2004). 2009“The doctrine requires that the issue was fully and fairly litigated, that the issue was essential to the earlier judgment, and that the earlier judgment be final and binding on the party against whom it is asserted.” Id. | 2 | 2 |
Shahan v. Shahangreen2 sentences2001Shahan v. Shahan, 988 S.W.2d 529, 532 (Mo. banc 1999). . 2000Point I: Collateral Estoppel Appellant (Benjamin, by and through his next friend Elisabeth) alleges that the trial court erred in finding collateral estoppel applied to bar his claim because (1) Benjamin, the “true party in interest in the instant case,” was not a party to the earlier actions and did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claims against Mark and Bonnie; and (2) the issues were not the same in the first case involving Mark and Elisabeth as they were in the present action. 1 Also referred to as “issue preclusion,” the collateral estoppel doctrine “provides that an | 2 | 2 |
Missouri Insurance Guaranty Ass'n v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.green2 sentences1995“The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies when, once a court has determined an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that decision may preclude relitigation of the issue in a suit on a different cause of action involving a party to the first cause.” Missouri Insurance Guaranty Association v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 811 S.W.2d 28, 32 (Mo.App.E.D.1991). 1994Missouri Insurance Guaranty Association v. Wal- *951 Mart Stores, Inc., 811 S.W.2d 28, 32 (Mo.App.1991). | 2 | 2 |
Hudson v. Carrgreen2 sentences1992Patterson v. Null, 751 S.W.2d 381, 386 (Mo.App.1988) (citing Hudson v. Carr, 668 S.W.2d 68, 70 (Mo. banc 1984). 1992Patterson v. Null, 751 S.W.2d 381, 386 (Mo.App.1988) (citing Hudson v. Carr, 668 S.W.2d 68, 70 (Mo. banc 1984). | 2 | 2 |
State Ex Rel. O'Blennis v. Adolfgreen2 sentences2013See id. at 503; see also Costa v. Allen, 323 S.W.3d 383, 386-87 (Mo.App. 2013Id. at 501-04 . | 1 | 3 |
Kesler v. Curators of the University of Missourigreen2 sentences2017“Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, prohibits the relitigation of an issue that was necessary and unambiguously already decided in a different cause of action,” Kesler v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 516 S.W.3d 884, 896 (Mo. App. W.D. 2017) (citing Brown v. Carnahan, 370 S.W.3d 637, 658 (Mo. banc 2012); Gamble v. Browning, 379 S.W.3d 194, 198 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012)). 2017Cf. Kesler v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo. , 516 S.W.3d 884 , 896 (Mo. App. W.D. 2017) ("[c]ollateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, prohibits the relitigation of an *479 issue that was necessary and unambiguously already decided in a different cause of action"; and the first factor required in applying collateral estoppel is " 'the identity of the issues involved in the prior adjudication and the present action' ") (quoting In re Caranchini , 956 S.W.2d 910 , 912 (Mo. banc 1997) ). | 1 | 2 |
Johnson v. Rabangreen2 sentences2013The Court held that “it is beyond doubt that the present action is interdicted by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.” Id. at 136 . 2013The Court noted that “public policy dictates that a person convicted of a crime who has failed in his attack upon his conviction both directly and collaterally should not be permitted to recover against his attorney in a civil malpractice action for damages allegedly arising out of the attorney’s handling of his defense.” Id. at 138 . | 1 | 2 |
State v. Roddengreen2 sentences2010“Recently our Supreme Court has expressed the view that collateral estoppel forecloses consideration of an issue only when that issue was unambiguously decided in the earlier case.” Coleman, 773 S.W.2d at 201 , citing State v. Rodden, 728 S.W.2d 212, 220 (Mo. banc 1987). “ ‘Since it is usually impossible to, determine with any precision upon what basis the jury reached a verdict in a criminal case, it is a rare situation in which the collateral estoppel defense will be available to a defendant.’ ” Booker, 540 S.W.2d at 93 , quoting United State v. Tramunti, 500 F.2d 1334, 1346 (2d Cir.1974). 1997Id. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Cookseygreen2 sentences1984Accordingly, we are constrained to follow the apparent mandate of our Supreme Court in Cooksey, supra, and hold that the trial court did not err, based upon the doctrine of collateral estoppel, in admitting into evidence facts tending to show defendant’s use of a gun during the stealing. 1976A similar contention was considered in State v. Cooksey, 499 S.W.2d 485, 488 (Mo.1973), in which the Missouri Supreme Court held the collateral estoppel doctrine of Ashe “does not speak to the question of the admissibility of evidence; it speaks only to the question of double jeopardy.” Defendant’s point is without merit. | 1 | 2 |
Williams v. Southern Union Co.green1 sentence2021Kinsky v. 154 Land Co., LLC, 371 S.W.3d 108, 112 (Mo. App. E.D. 2012); see also Williams v. S. Union Co., 364 S.W.3d 228, 233 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011). | 1 | 1 |
Shelton v. City of Springfieldgreen2 sentences2021In re Contest of Primary Election Candidacy of Fletcher, 337 S.W.3d 137, 140 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, provides that when an issue has been judicially determined in one action, that same issue may not subsequently be relitigated in another action.” Shelton v. City of Springfield, 130 S.W.3d 30, 34 (Mo. App. S.D. 2004). 2021Collateral Estoppel “[T]he doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, provides that when an issue has been judicially determined in one action, that same issue may not subsequently be relitigated in another action.” Shelton, 130 S.W.3d at 34 . | 1 | 1 |
| Kinsky v. 154 Land Co.green | 1 | 1 |
Contest of the Primary Election Candidacy of Fletcher v. Fletchergreen1 sentence2021In re Contest of Primary Election Candidacy of Fletcher, 337 S.W.3d 137, 140 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, provides that when an issue has been judicially determined in one action, that same issue may not subsequently be relitigated in another action.” Shelton v. City of Springfield, 130 S.W.3d 30, 34 (Mo. App. S.D. 2004). | 1 | 1 |
| Kretsinger Real Estate Company and American Central Transport, Inc. v. Amerisure Insurance Companygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ginters v. Fraziergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commissioner v. Sunnengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Brown v. Missouri Secretary of Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gamble v. Browninggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hollida v. Hollidagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Boyd McGathey v. Matthew K. Davis Trustgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Newton v. Ford Motor Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Finley v. St. John's Mercy Medical Centergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Moore v. Swayne-Hunter Farms, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Costa v. Allengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Robert M. Levine v. Richard Klinggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Missouri Mexican Products, Inc. v. Dunafongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Drennen v. Wrengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kotini v. Century Surety Co.
green
2 sentences2017In regard to equitable garnishments, "[t]he underlying judgment is binding on the insurer by way of the doctrine of collateral estoppel." Kotini , 411 S.W.3d at 378 . 2015“The underlying judgment is binding on the insurer by way of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.” Id. at 378 . | 3 | 2015–2025 |
Bresnahan v. May Department Stores Co.
green
2 sentences1997Bresnahan v. May Department Stores Co., 726 S.W.2d 327 (Mo. banc 1987). 1988Id. at 330 . | 3 | 1988–1997 |
State v. Dowell
green
2 sentences2016“Since it is usually impossible to determine with any precision upon what basis the jury reached a verdict in a criminal case, it is a rare situation in which the collateral estoppel defense will be available to a defendant.” Id. (quotation omit,ted). *239 Collateral estoppel “does not even begin to come into play unless the defendant has been acquitted in the first trial.” State v. Moton, 476 S.W.2d 785, 790 (Mo.1972). 2013“Since it is usually impossible to determine with any precision upon what basis the jury reached a verdict in a criminal case, it is a rare situation in which the collateral estoppel defense will be available to a defendant.” Id. (quotation omitted). | 2 | 2013–2016 |
State v. Pippenger
green
2 sentences1994Similar contentions were raised and rejected in State v. Beezley, 752 S.W.2d 915 (Mo.App.1988) and State v. Pippenger, 741 S.W.2d 710 (Mo.App.1987). 1988State v. Pippenger, 741 S.W.2d 710 (Mo.App.1987). | 2 | 1988–1994 |
Abeles v. Wurdack
green
2 sentences1980Co., Inc., 485 S.W.2d 38, 43 (Mo. banc 1972), the court said: “The basic rule of collateral estoppel is stated in Abeles v. Wurdack (Mo.Sup.), 285 S.W.2d 544 , 546: ‘... 1979Collateral estoppel involves “a judgment between the same parties on a different cause of action [which] is binding as to facts actually decided, and necessarily determined in rendering the judgment . . . .” Id. | 2 | 1979–1980 |
Seifner v. Treasurer of the State-Custodian of the Second Injury Fund
green
2 sentences2021He appealed, claiming in part that “the Commission erred in denying his claim because … the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded the Fund from relitigating the percentage of permanent partial disability based on the last injury because the same issue was settled between [the employee] and his employer.” Id. 2021Id. at 64-65 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Rosenberg v. Shostak green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Kesterson v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Woods v. Mehlville Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Fielder v. Fielder green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State ex rel. Koster v. Cain green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| In Re Caranchini green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Asarco, Inc. v. McNeill green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Randel McDonald v. Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Booker green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| State v. Coleman green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Durfee v. Duke green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| State v. Beezley green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Warehousemen's Union Local No. 206 v. Continental Can Company green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| State v. Bradley green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| State v. Hall green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| State v. Couch green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| State v. Mantle green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| State v. Swearingin green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| State v. Fondren green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Aetna Casualty And Surety Company Of Hartford, Connecticut v. Kerr-Mcgee Chemical Corporation green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.