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32 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1972–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Padilla v. Intel Corp.green2 sentences2013See Padilla, 1998-NMCA-125,¶ 24 (concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying the collateral estoppel doctrine to the findings of a workers’ compensation judge in a subsequent negligence action); Mascarenas v. City of Albuquerque, 2012-NMCA-031, ¶ 37 , 274 P.3d 781 (holding that the district court did not err in concluding that findings of the city personnel board resulting in termination of an employee precluded litigating the employee’s due process and Family Leave Act (FMLA) claims). 2013See Padilla, 1998-NMCA-125 ^ 24 (concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying the collateral estoppel doctrine to the findings of a workers’ compensation judge in a subsequent negligence action); Mascarenas v. City of Albuquerque, 2012-NMCA-031, ¶ 37 , 274 P.3d 781 (holding that the district court did not err in concluding that findings of the city personnel board resulting in termination of an employee precluded litigating the employee’s due process and Family Leave Act (FMLA) claims). | 3 | 3 |
Deflon v. Sawyersgreen2 sentences2022See Ullrich v. Blanchard, 2007-NMCA-145, ¶ 19 , 142 N.M. 835 , 171 P.3d 774 (outlining the four collateral estoppel elements). {14} The collateral estoppel doctrine “prevents a party from re-litigating ultimate facts or issues actually and necessarily decided in a prior suit,” Deflon v. Sawyers, 2006-NMSC-025, ¶ 13 , 139 N.M. 637 , 137 P.3d 577 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), provided the party has “had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior litigation.” Tunis, 2014-NMCA-025 , ¶ 24 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 2022See Ullrich v. Blanchard, 2007-NMCA-145, ¶ 19 , 142 N.M. 835 , 171 P.3d 774 (outlining the four collateral estoppel elements). {14} The collateral estoppel doctrine “prevents a party from re-litigating ultimate facts or issues actually and necessarily decided in a prior suit,” Deflon v. Sawyers, 2006-NMSC-025, ¶ 13 , 139 N.M. 637 , 137 P.3d 577 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), provided the party has “had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior litigation.” Tunis, 2014-NMCA-025 , ¶ 24 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Ullrich v. Blanchardgreen2 sentences2022See Ullrich v. Blanchard, 2007-NMCA-145, ¶ 19 , 142 N.M. 835 , 171 P.3d 774 (outlining the four collateral estoppel elements). {14} The collateral estoppel doctrine “prevents a party from re-litigating ultimate facts or issues actually and necessarily decided in a prior suit,” Deflon v. Sawyers, 2006-NMSC-025, ¶ 13 , 139 N.M. 637 , 137 P.3d 577 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), provided the party has “had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior litigation.” Tunis, 2014-NMCA-025 , ¶ 24 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 2022See Ullrich v. Blanchard, 2007-NMCA-145, ¶ 19 , 142 N.M. 835 , 171 P.3d 774 (outlining the four collateral estoppel elements). {14} The collateral estoppel doctrine “prevents a party from re-litigating ultimate facts or issues actually and necessarily decided in a prior suit,” Deflon v. Sawyers, 2006-NMSC-025, ¶ 13 , 139 N.M. 637 , 137 P.3d 577 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), provided the party has “had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior litigation.” Tunis, 2014-NMCA-025 , ¶ 24 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). | 2 | 2 |
State Ex Rel. Otto v. Fieldgreen2 sentences2011Bogle Farms, 1996-NMSC-051 , ¶¶ 23, 26; cf. Otto, 31 N.M. at 126 , 241 P. at 1030 (indicating that the case was “of great importance, not only to the litigant who seeks protection of the right he claims, but also it is of great public interest, because there is involved the policy and interest of the [S]tate as a trustee with respect to its school fund”). 2011Bogle Farms, 1996-NMSC-051 , ¶¶ 23, 26; cf. Otto, 31 N.M. at 126 , 241 P. at 1030 (indicating that the case was “of great importance, not only to the litigant who seeks protection of the right he claims, but also it is of great public interest, because there is involved the policy and interest of the [S]tate as a trustee with respect to its school fund”). | 2 | 2 |
Shovelin v. CENTRAL NM ELEC. CO-OP.green2 sentences2007Coop., 115 N.M. 293, 299 , 850 P.2d 996, 1002 (1993) (stating that whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel should be applied is within the trial court’s discretion, reviewed for an abuse of discretion on appeal); Hyden v. Law Firm of McCormick, Forbes, Caraway & Tabor, 115 N.M. 159, 164 , 848 P.2d 1086, 1091 (Ct.App.1993) (stating that even when all the elements of collateral estoppel are present, the trial court must consider whether countervailing equities militate against application of the doctrine); Reeves v. Wimberly, 107 N.M. 231, 234 , 755 P.2d 75, 78 (Ct.App.1988) (directing that 2007Coop., 115 N.M. 293, 299 , 850 P.2d 996, 1002 (1993) (stating that whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel should be applied is within the trial court’s discretion, reviewed for an abuse of discretion on appeal); Hyden v. Law Firm of McCormick, Forbes, Caraway & Tabor, 115 N.M. 159, 164 , 848 P.2d 1086, 1091 (Ct.App.1993) (stating that even when all the elements of collateral estoppel are present, the trial court must consider whether countervailing equities militate against application of the doctrine); Reeves v. Wimberly, 107 N.M. 231, 234 , 755 P.2d 75, 78 (Ct.App.1988) (directing that | 2 | 2 |
Silva v. Stategreen2 sentences2013In re Adoption of 6 Doe, 100 N.M. 764, 765 , 676 P.2d 1329, 1330 (1984). 7 {11} Our Supreme Court has recognized that “in deciding whether to apply the 8 doctrine of collateral estoppel, the trial judge may determine that its application would 9 be fundamentally unfair and would not further the aim of the doctrine, which is to 10 prevent endless relitigation of issues.” Silva v. State, 106 N.M. 472, 474 , 745 P.2d 11 380, 382 (1987). 1994Poorbaugh, 96 N.M. at 602 , 633 P.2d at 710 ; see also Silva, 106 N.M. at 476 , 745 P.2d at 384 (“In deciding whether to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the threshold issues of fact are for the [trial] court to resolve.”). | 1 | 3 |
Callison v. Naylorgreen2 sentences2010Cf. Callison v. Naylor, 108 N.M. 674, 676-77 , 777 P.2d 913, 915-16 (Ct.App.1989) (concluding that the party “had his day in court” and was thus barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel), limited on other grounds by Tedford v. Gregory, 1998-NMCA-067 , 125 N.M. 206 , 959 P.2d 540 . 2010Cf. Callison v. Naylor, 108 N.M. 674, 676-77 , 777 P.2d 913, 915-16 (Ct.App.1989) (concluding that the party “had his day in court” and was thus barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel), limited on other grounds by Tedford v. Gregory, 1998-NMCA-067 , 125 N.M. 206 , 959 P.2d 540 . | 1 | 2 |
Reeves v. Wimberlygreen2 sentences2007Coop., 115 N.M. 293, 299 , 850 P.2d 996, 1002 (1993) (stating that whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel should be applied is within the trial court’s discretion, reviewed for an abuse of discretion on appeal); Hyden v. Law Firm of McCormick, Forbes, Caraway & Tabor, 115 N.M. 159, 164 , 848 P.2d 1086, 1091 (Ct.App.1993) (stating that even when all the elements of collateral estoppel are present, the trial court must consider whether countervailing equities militate against application of the doctrine); Reeves v. Wimberly, 107 N.M. 231, 234 , 755 P.2d 75, 78 (Ct.App.1988) (directing that 2007Coop., 115 N.M. 293, 299 , 850 P.2d 996, 1002 (1993) (stating that whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel should be applied is within the trial court’s discretion, reviewed for an abuse of discretion on appeal); Hyden v. Law Firm of McCormick, Forbes, Caraway & Tabor, 115 N.M. 159, 164 , 848 P.2d 1086, 1091 (Ct.App.1993) (stating that even when all the elements of collateral estoppel are present, the trial court must consider whether countervailing equities militate against application of the doctrine); Reeves v. Wimberly, 107 N.M. 231, 234 , 755 P.2d 75, 78 (Ct.App.1988) (directing that | 1 | 2 |
Adams v. UNITED STEELWORKERS, ETC.green2 sentences1985Adams v. United Steelworkers of America, 97 N.M. 369, 373 , 640 P.2d 475 (1982) states: The purpose of collateral estoppel is to aid in the finality of judgments by preventing parties from endlessly relitigating the same issues under the guise of different causes of action. 1985Adams v. United Steelworkers of America, 97 N.M. 369, 373 , 640 P.2d 475 (1982) states: The purpose of collateral estoppel is to aid in the finality of judgments by preventing parties from endlessly relitigating the same issues under the guise of different causes of action. | 1 | 2 |
Ullrich v. Blanchardgreen1 sentence2022See Ullrich v. Blanchard, 2007-NMCA-145, ¶ 19 , 142 N.M. 835 , 171 P.3d 774 (outlining the four collateral estoppel elements). {14} The collateral estoppel doctrine “prevents a party from re-litigating ultimate facts or issues actually and necessarily decided in a prior suit,” Deflon v. Sawyers, 2006-NMSC-025, ¶ 13 , 139 N.M. 637 , 137 P.3d 577 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), provided the party has “had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior litigation.” Tunis, 2014-NMCA-025 , ¶ 24 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Tunis v. Country Club Estates Homeowners Ass'n, Inc.green1 sentence2022See Ullrich v. Blanchard, 2007-NMCA-145, ¶ 19 , 142 N.M. 835 , 171 P.3d 774 (outlining the four collateral estoppel elements). {14} The collateral estoppel doctrine “prevents a party from re-litigating ultimate facts or issues actually and necessarily decided in a prior suit,” Deflon v. Sawyers, 2006-NMSC-025, ¶ 13 , 139 N.M. 637 , 137 P.3d 577 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), provided the party has “had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior litigation.” Tunis, 2014-NMCA-025 , ¶ 24 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Matter of Lucio FTgreen2 sentences2020See In re Lucio F.T., 1994-NMCA-144 , ¶¶ 4-5, 119 N.M. 76 , 888 P.2d 958 . 2020See In re Lucio F.T., 1994-NMCA-144 , ¶¶ 4-5, 119 N.M. 76 , 888 P.2d 958 . | 1 | 1 |
Matter of Adoption of Doegreen2 sentences2013In re Adoption of 6 Doe, 100 N.M. 764, 765 , 676 P.2d 1329, 1330 (1984). 7 {11} Our Supreme Court has recognized that “in deciding whether to apply the 8 doctrine of collateral estoppel, the trial judge may determine that its application would 9 be fundamentally unfair and would not further the aim of the doctrine, which is to 10 prevent endless relitigation of issues.” Silva v. State, 106 N.M. 472, 474 , 745 P.2d 11 380, 382 (1987). 2013In re Adoption of 6 Doe, 100 N.M. 764, 765 , 676 P.2d 1329, 1330 (1984). 7 {11} Our Supreme Court has recognized that “in deciding whether to apply the 8 doctrine of collateral estoppel, the trial judge may determine that its application would 9 be fundamentally unfair and would not further the aim of the doctrine, which is to 10 prevent endless relitigation of issues.” Silva v. State, 106 N.M. 472, 474 , 745 P.2d 11 380, 382 (1987). | 1 | 1 |
Hyden v. LAW FIRM OF McCORMICK, ETC.green2 sentences2007Coop., 115 N.M. 293, 299 , 850 P.2d 996, 1002 (1993) (stating that whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel should be applied is within the trial court’s discretion, reviewed for an abuse of discretion on appeal); Hyden v. Law Firm of McCormick, Forbes, Caraway & Tabor, 115 N.M. 159, 164 , 848 P.2d 1086, 1091 (Ct.App.1993) (stating that even when all the elements of collateral estoppel are present, the trial court must consider whether countervailing equities militate against application of the doctrine); Reeves v. Wimberly, 107 N.M. 231, 234 , 755 P.2d 75, 78 (Ct.App.1988) (directing that 2007Coop., 115 N.M. 293, 299 , 850 P.2d 996, 1002 (1993) (stating that whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel should be applied is within the trial court’s discretion, reviewed for an abuse of discretion on appeal); Hyden v. Law Firm of McCormick, Forbes, Caraway & Tabor, 115 N.M. 159, 164 , 848 P.2d 1086, 1091 (Ct.App.1993) (stating that even when all the elements of collateral estoppel are present, the trial court must consider whether countervailing equities militate against application of the doctrine); Reeves v. Wimberly, 107 N.M. 231, 234 , 755 P.2d 75, 78 (Ct.App.1988) (directing that | 1 | 1 |
Rex, Inc. v. Manufactured Hous. Comm. of NMgreen2 sentences2007Comm., 119 N.M. 500, 509 , 892 P.2d 947, 956 (1995) (recognizing “that when an agency acts on behalf of an individual claimant and seeks individual relief, it is in privity with that claimant and may be barred under the doctrine of collateral estoppel”). 2007Comm., 119 N.M. 500, 509 , 892 P.2d 947, 956 (1995) (recognizing “that when an agency acts on behalf of an individual claimant and seeks individual relief, it is in privity with that claimant and may be barred under the doctrine of collateral estoppel”). | 1 | 1 |
DeLisle v. Avallonegreen2 sentences1998See DeLisle v. Avallone, 117 N.M. 602, 606 , 874 P.2d 1266, 1270 (Ct.App. 1994); cf. Shovelin v. Central N.M. 1998See DeLisle v. Avallone, 117 N.M. 602, 606 , 874 P.2d 1266, 1270 (Ct.App. 1994); cf. Shovelin v. Central N.M. | 1 | 1 |
Antillon v. New Mexico State Highway Departmentgreen2 sentences1994This Court has stated that “ordinarily the doctrine of collateral estoppel should not bar a state agency from arguing a point of law on the ground that it lost on that issue in prior litigation with a different party.” Antillon v. New Mexico State Highway Dep’t, 113 N.M. 2, 4 , 820 P.2d 436, 438 (Ct.App.1991) (citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 29(7) and cmt. i (1982)). 1994This Court has stated that “ordinarily the doctrine of collateral estoppel should not bar a state agency from arguing a point of law on the ground that it lost on that issue in prior litigation with a different party.” Antillon v. New Mexico State Highway Dep’t, 113 N.M. 2, 4 , 820 P.2d 436, 438 (Ct.App.1991) (citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 29(7) and cmt. i (1982)). | 1 | 1 |
Charles W. Stall, Jr. v. John E. Bourne, Jr., and Ross F. Walkergreen1 sentence1993See Comment, supra, at 791. [5] Citing Stall v. Bourne, 774 F.2d 657 (4th Cir.1985), withdrawn, 783 F.2d 476 (4th Cir.1986); and Leong v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 698 F. Supp. 1496, 1500 (D.Haw. 1988), the Cooperative maintains that, because the ESD decision was subject to judicial review, we should be "particularly inclined to conclude that collateral estoppel should bar re-litigation." While we agree that whether a party availed himself of the opportunity to appeal an administrative decision is an important factor to consider when determining whether collateral estoppel is applicable, we note th | 1 | 1 |
| Charles W. Stall, Jr. v. John E. Bourne, Jr., and Ross F. Walkergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Leong v. Hilton Hotels Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| In Re the Marriage of Hollandgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Butler v. Brownleegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Edwards v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'ngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Vaca v. Whitakergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ex Parte Johnsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mascarenas v. City of Albuquerque
green
2 sentences2013See Padilla, 1998-NMCA-125 ^ 24 (concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying the collateral estoppel doctrine to the findings of a workers’ compensation judge in a subsequent negligence action); Mascarenas v. City of Albuquerque, 2012-NMCA-031, ¶ 37 , 274 P.3d 781 (holding that the district court did not err in concluding that findings of the city personnel board resulting in termination of an employee precluded litigating the employee’s due process and Family Leave Act (FMLA) claims). 2013See Padilla, 1998-NMCA-125 ^ 24 (concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying the collateral estoppel doctrine to the findings of a workers’ compensation judge in a subsequent negligence action); Mascarenas v. City of Albuquerque, 2012-NMCA-031, ¶ 37 , 274 P.3d 781 (holding that the district court did not err in concluding that findings of the city personnel board resulting in termination of an employee precluded litigating the employee’s due process and Family Leave Act (FMLA) claims). | 3 | 2013–2013 |
Trujillo v. Acequia De Chamisal
green
2 sentences2016State Eng’r, 2005-NMCA- 4 002, ¶ 10, 136 N.M. 761 , 105 P.3d 314 (stating that a case that was dismissed for lack 5 of standing was not dismissed on the merits, “and therefore the denomination ‘with 6 prejudice’ in the order was incorrect”); Trujillo v. Acequia de Chamisal, 1968- 7 NMCA-015, ¶¶ 10-13, 79 N.M. 39 , 439 P.2d 557 (explaining that a case was not 8 dismissed on the merits when it was dismissed for lack of standing and stating that a 9 “dismissal . . . for want of capacity to sue . . . will not operate as a bar to the 10 subsequent suit where no disposition was had on the merits”). 2016State Eng’r, 2005-NMCA- 4 002, ¶ 10, 136 N.M. 761 , 105 P.3d 314 (stating that a case that was dismissed for lack 5 of standing was not dismissed on the merits, “and therefore the denomination ‘with 6 prejudice’ in the order was incorrect”); Trujillo v. Acequia de Chamisal, 1968- 7 NMCA-015, ¶¶ 10-13, 79 N.M. 39 , 439 P.2d 557 (explaining that a case was not 8 dismissed on the merits when it was dismissed for lack of standing and stating that a 9 “dismissal . . . for want of capacity to sue . . . will not operate as a bar to the 10 subsequent suit where no disposition was had on the merits”). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Hope Community Ditch Ass'n v. New Mexico State Engineer
green
2 sentences2016State Eng’r, 2005-NMCA- 4 002, ¶ 10, 136 N.M. 761 , 105 P.3d 314 (stating that a case that was dismissed for lack 5 of standing was not dismissed on the merits, “and therefore the denomination ‘with 6 prejudice’ in the order was incorrect”); Trujillo v. Acequia de Chamisal, 1968- 7 NMCA-015, ¶¶ 10-13, 79 N.M. 39 , 439 P.2d 557 (explaining that a case was not 8 dismissed on the merits when it was dismissed for lack of standing and stating that a 9 “dismissal . . . for want of capacity to sue . . . will not operate as a bar to the 10 subsequent suit where no disposition was had on the merits”). 2016State Eng’r, 2005-NMCA- 4 002, ¶ 10, 136 N.M. 761 , 105 P.3d 314 (stating that a case that was dismissed for lack 5 of standing was not dismissed on the merits, “and therefore the denomination ‘with 6 prejudice’ in the order was incorrect”); Trujillo v. Acequia de Chamisal, 1968- 7 NMCA-015, ¶¶ 10-13, 79 N.M. 39 , 439 P.2d 557 (explaining that a case was not 8 dismissed on the merits when it was dismissed for lack of standing and stating that a 9 “dismissal . . . for want of capacity to sue . . . will not operate as a bar to the 10 subsequent suit where no disposition was had on the merits”). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
City of Sunland Park v. MacIas
green
1 sentence2015See Shovelin, 1993-NMSC-015 , ¶ 10; City of Sunland Park, 2003-NMCA-098, ¶ 10 . {17} Furthermore, Defendants have failed to satisfy the third and fourth requirements needed to apply collateral estoppel-—that “the issue was actually litigated in the prior adjudication” and that the issue was “necessarily determined in the prior litigation.” Shovelin, 1993-NMSC-015 , ¶ 10. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Bogle Farms, Inc. v. Baca
green
2 sentences2011Bogle Farms, 1996-NMSC-051 , ¶¶ 23, 26, 122 N.M. 422 , 925 P.2d 1184 ; cf. Otto, 31 N.M. at 126 , 241 P. at 1030 (indicating that the case was "of great importance, not only to the litigant who seeks protection of the right he claims, but also it is of great public interest, because there is involved the policy and interest of the [S]tate as a trustee with respect to its school fund"). 2011Bogle Farms, 1996-NMSC-051 , ¶¶ 23, 26, 122 N.M. 422 , 925 P.2d 1184 ; cf. Otto, 31 N.M. at 126 , 241 P. at 1030 (indicating that the case was "of great importance, not only to the litigant who seeks protection of the right he claims, but also it is of great public interest, because there is involved the policy and interest of the [S]tate as a trustee with respect to its school fund"). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Forfeiture of $14,639 in US Currency
green
2 sentences2010The district court granted the motion, stating that “Plaintiff has had his day in court via the arbitration and there is no other relief he is entitled to.” “The purpose of the doctrine of collateral estoppel is to foster judicial economy by precluding the relitigation of ultimate facts or issues actually and necessarily decided in a prior suit.” In re Forfeiture of Fourteen Thousand Six Hundred Thirty Nine Dollars ($14,639), 120 N.M. 408, 414 , 902 P.2d 563 , 569 (Ct.App.1995) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 2010The district court granted the motion, stating that “Plaintiff has had his day in court via the arbitration and there is no other relief he is entitled to.” “The purpose of the doctrine of collateral estoppel is to foster judicial economy by precluding the relitigation of ultimate facts or issues actually and necessarily decided in a prior suit.” In re Forfeiture of Fourteen Thousand Six Hundred Thirty Nine Dollars ($14,639), 120 N.M. 408, 414 , 902 P.2d 563 , 569 (Ct.App.1995) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Tedford v. Gregory
green
2 sentences2010Cf. Callison v. Naylor, 108 N.M. 674, 676-77 , 777 P.2d 913, 915-16 (Ct.App.1989) (concluding that the party “had his day in court” and was thus barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel), limited on other grounds by Tedford v. Gregory, 1998-NMCA-067 , 125 N.M. 206 , 959 P.2d 540 . 2010Cf. Callison v. Naylor, 108 N.M. 674, 676-77 , 777 P.2d 913, 915-16 (Ct.App.1989) (concluding that the party “had his day in court” and was thus barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel), limited on other grounds by Tedford v. Gregory, 1998-NMCA-067 , 125 N.M. 206 , 959 P.2d 540 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Self v. United Parcel Service, Inc.
green
2 sentences2010We review the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment accordingly. {8} “Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Self v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 1998-NMSC-046, ¶ 6 , 126 N.M. 396 , 970 P.2d 582 (citation omitted). 2010We review the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment accordingly. {8} “Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Self v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 1998-NMSC-046, ¶ 6 , 126 N.M. 396 , 970 P.2d 582 (citation omitted). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie
green
2 sentences2007Coop., 115 N.M. 293, 299 , 850 P.2d 996, 1002 (1993) (stating that whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel should be applied is within the trial court’s discretion, reviewed for an abuse of discretion on appeal); Hyden v. Law Firm of McCormick, Forbes, Caraway & Tabor, 115 N.M. 159, 164 , 848 P.2d 1086, 1091 (Ct.App.1993) (stating that even when all the elements of collateral estoppel are present, the trial court must consider whether countervailing equities militate against application of the doctrine); Reeves v. Wimberly, 107 N.M. 231, 234 , 755 P.2d 75, 78 (Ct.App.1988) (directing that 2007Coop., 115 N.M. 293, 299 , 850 P.2d 996, 1002 (1993) (stating that whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel should be applied is within the trial court’s discretion, reviewed for an abuse of discretion on appeal); Hyden v. Law Firm of McCormick, Forbes, Caraway & Tabor, 115 N.M. 159, 164 , 848 P.2d 1086, 1091 (Ct.App.1993) (stating that even when all the elements of collateral estoppel are present, the trial court must consider whether countervailing equities militate against application of the doctrine); Reeves v. Wimberly, 107 N.M. 231, 234 , 755 P.2d 75, 78 (Ct.App.1988) (directing that | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Standefer v. United States
green
2 sentences2002That is, a defendant who was not placed in jeopardy cannot use the collateral estoppel doctrine to dismiss a ease against him. {12} In Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10 , 100 S.Ct. 1999 , 64 L.Ed.2d 689 (1980), the Supreme Court of the United States addressed the question whether the “contemporary doctrine of nonmutual collateral estoppel,” unknown at common law until 1942, could be applied to bar the government from relitigating the guilt of the principal in a subsequent trial against an accessory. 2002That is, a defendant who was not placed in jeopardy cannot use the collateral estoppel doctrine to dismiss a ease against him. {12} In Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10 , 100 S.Ct. 1999 , 64 L.Ed.2d 689 (1980), the Supreme Court of the United States addressed the question whether the “contemporary doctrine of nonmutual collateral estoppel,” unknown at common law until 1942, could be applied to bar the government from relitigating the guilt of the principal in a subsequent trial against an accessory. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Eldridge v. Circle K Corp.
green
2 sentences1998To support this assertion, Plaintiff cites our recent opinion in Eldridge v. Circle K Corp., 1997-NMCA-022, 1126 , 123 N.M. 145 , 934 P.2d 1074 , in which we stated a preference for the district court, rather than the WCJ, to determine first whether the worker was injured by intentional conduct of the employer. 1998To support this assertion, Plaintiff cites our recent opinion in Eldridge v. Circle K Corp., 1997-NMCA-022, 1126 , 123 N.M. 145 , 934 P.2d 1074 , in which we stated a preference for the district court, rather than the WCJ, to determine first whether the worker was injured by intentional conduct of the employer. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Poorbaugh v. Mullen
green
2 sentences1994Poorbaugh, 96 N.M. at 602 , 633 P.2d at 710 ; see also Silva, 106 N.M. at 476 , 745 P.2d at 384 (“In deciding whether to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the threshold issues of fact are for the [trial] court to resolve.”). 1994Poorbaugh, 96 N.M. at 602 , 633 P.2d at 710 ; see also Silva, 106 N.M. at 476 , 745 P.2d at 384 (“In deciding whether to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the threshold issues of fact are for the [trial] court to resolve.”). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| United States v. Frew green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| International Paper Co. v. Farrar green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Torres v. Village of Capitan green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| State v. James green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Meeker v. Walker green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| McDonald v. Padilla green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.