collateral estoppel doctrine in Virginia

2015See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445 (1970) (holding that the collateral estoppel rule of federal law is embodied in the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy); Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 33 (1978) (noting that a primary purpose of the Fifth Amendment guarantee against -9- III.

2003It is well established that the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply if it appears that the prior judgment could have been grounded “upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration.” Ashe, 397 U.S. at 444 .

2003The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies "in a subsequent action based upon a collateral and different cause of action." Bates v. Devers, 214 Va. 667, 671 , 202 S.E.2d 917, 921 (1974).

2003The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies "in a subsequent action based upon a collateral and different cause of action." Bates v. Devers, 214 Va. 667, 671 , 202 S.E.2d 917, 921 (1974).

2018“Since it is usually impossible to determine with any precision upon what basis the [fact finder] reached a verdict in a criminal case, it is a rare situation in which the collateral estoppel defense will be available to a defendant.” Jones v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 231, 233 , 228 S.E.2d 127, 128-29 (1976) (quoting United States v. Tramunti, 500 F.2d 1334, 1346 (2d Cir. 1974)).

2018“Since it is usually impossible to determine with any precision upon what basis the [fact finder] reached a verdict in a criminal case, it is a rare situation in which the collateral estoppel defense will be available to a defendant.” Jones v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 231, 233 , 228 S.E.2d 127, 128-29 (1976) (quoting United States v. Tramunti, 500 F.2d 1334, 1346 (2d Cir. 1974)).

2007"The doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes the same parties to a prior proceeding from litigating in a subsequent proceeding any issue of fact that was actually litigated and essential to a final judgment in the first proceeding." Glasco v. Ballard, 249 Va. 61, 64 , 452 S.E.2d 854, 855 (1995). [B]efore the doctrine of collateral estoppel may be applied, four requirements must be met: (1) the parties to the two proceedings must be the same; (2) the factual issue sought to be litigated must have been actually litigated in the prior proceeding; (3) the factual issue must have been essential t

2007"The doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes the same parties to a prior proceeding from litigating in a subsequent proceeding any issue of fact that was actually litigated and essential to a final judgment in the first proceeding." Glasco v. Ballard, 249 Va. 61, 64 , 452 S.E.2d 854, 855 (1995). [B]efore the doctrine of collateral estoppel may be applied, four requirements must be met: (1) the parties to the two proceedings must be the same; (2) the factual issue sought to be litigated must have been actually litigated in the prior proceeding; (3) the factual issue must have been essential t

2014This was no surprise, as Ashe “was the rare case where it was possible to determine with certainty what the jury in the earlier prosecution had decided.” Id. (quoting United States v. Cioffi, 487 F.2d 492, 498 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 995 (1974)). 3 The only requirements at issue on appeal are (2) and (3). -4- “An acquittal, ‘standing alone, does not permit a conclusion with respect’ to a court’s findings or rationale.” Rice, 57 Va. App. at 433 , 703 S.E.2d at 257 (quoting Copeland v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 450, 453 , 412 S.E.2d 468, 470 (1991)). “‘Since it is usually impossible to de

2014This was no surprise, as Ashe “was the rare case where it was possible to determine with certainty what the jury in the earlier prosecution had decided.” Id. (quoting United States v. Cioffi, 487 F.2d 492, 498 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 995 (1974)). 3 The only requirements at issue on appeal are (2) and (3). -4- “An acquittal, ‘standing alone, does not permit a conclusion with respect’ to a court’s findings or rationale.” Rice, 57 Va. App. at 433 , 703 S.E.2d at 257 (quoting Copeland v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 450, 453 , 412 S.E.2d 468, 470 (1991)). “‘Since it is usually impossible to de

2014In doing so we note, “‘[I]t is well established that the choice of offenses for which a criminal defendant will be charged is within the discretion of the Commonwealth’s Attorney.’ Indeed, ‘the institution of criminal charges, as well as their order and timing, are matters of prosecutorial discretion.’” Barrett v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 170, 178 , 597 S.E.2d 104, 107-08 (2004) (citations omitted) (quoting Barrett v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 377, 391 , 585 S.E.2d 355, 362 (2003)).

2014In doing so we note, “‘[I]t is well established that the choice of offenses for which a criminal defendant will be charged is within the discretion of the Commonwealth’s Attorney.’ Indeed, ‘the institution of criminal charges, as well as their order and timing, are matters of prosecutorial discretion.’” Barrett v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 170, 178 , 597 S.E.2d 104, 107-08 (2004) (citations omitted) (quoting Barrett v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 377, 391 , 585 S.E.2d 355, 362 (2003)).

2014In doing so we note, “‘[I]t is well established that the choice of offenses for which a criminal defendant will be charged is within the discretion of the Commonwealth’s Attorney.’ Indeed, ‘the institution of criminal charges, as well as their order and timing, are matters of prosecutorial discretion.’” Barrett v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 170, 178 , 597 S.E.2d 104, 107-08 (2004) (citations omitted) (quoting Barrett v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 377, 391 , 585 S.E.2d 355, 362 (2003)).

2014In doing so we note, “‘[I]t is well established that the choice of offenses for which a criminal defendant will be charged is within the discretion of the Commonwealth’s Attorney.’ Indeed, ‘the institution of criminal charges, as well as their order and timing, are matters of prosecutorial discretion.’” Barrett v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 170, 178 , 597 S.E.2d 104, 107-08 (2004) (citations omitted) (quoting Barrett v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 377, 391 , 585 S.E.2d 355, 362 (2003)).

2015“When grounds for a dismissal are not assigned and do not otherwise appear of record, the doctrine of collateral estoppel will not be applied.” Id.

2015"When grounds for a dismissal are not assigned and do not otherwise appear of record, the doctrine of collateral estoppel will not be applied." Id.

2017However, before the doctrine of collateral estoppel may be applied, four requirements must be met: (1) the parties to the two proceedings must be the same; (2) the factual issue sought to be litigated must have been actually litigated in the prior proceeding; (3) the factual issue must have been essential to the judgment rendered in the prior proceeding; and (4) the prior proceeding must have resulted in a valid, final judgment against the party to whom the doctrine is sought to be applied. **509 Whitley v. Commonwealth , 260 Va. 482 , 489, 538 S.E.2d 296 , 299 (2000).

2017However, before the doctrine of collateral estoppel may be applied, four requirements must be met: (1) the parties to the two proceedings must be the same; (2) the factual issue sought to be litigated must have been actually litigated in the prior proceeding; (3) the factual issue must have been essential to the judgment rendered in the prior proceeding; and (4) the prior proceeding must have resulted in a valid, final judgment against the party to whom the doctrine is sought to be applied. **509 Whitley v. Commonwealth , 260 Va. 482 , 489, 538 S.E.2d 296 , 299 (2000).

2018“Since it is usually impossible to determine with any precision upon what basis the [fact finder] reached a verdict in a criminal case, it is a rare situation in which the collateral estoppel defense will be available to a defendant.” Jones v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 231, 233 , 228 S.E.2d 127, 128-29 (1976) (quoting United States v. Tramunti, 500 F.2d 1334, 1346 (2d Cir. 1974)).

2014This was no surprise, as Ashe “was the rare case where it was possible to determine with certainty what the jury in the earlier prosecution had decided.” Id. (quoting United States v. Cioffi, 487 F.2d 492, 498 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 995 (1974)). 3 The only requirements at issue on appeal are (2) and (3). -4- “An acquittal, ‘standing alone, does not permit a conclusion with respect’ to a court’s findings or rationale.” Rice, 57 Va. App. at 433 , 703 S.E.2d at 257 (quoting Copeland v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 450, 453 , 412 S.E.2d 468, 470 (1991)). “‘Since it is usually impossible to de

2014When grounds for a dismissal are not assigned and do not otherwise appear of record, the doctrine of collateral estoppel will not be applied, because the defendant, “the party seeking the protection of collateral estoppel[,] bears the burden of proving that the precise issue or question he seeks to preclude was raised and determined in the first action.” Clodfelter v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 98, 106 , 235 S.E.2d 340, 345 (1977).

2014When grounds for a dismissal are not assigned and do not otherwise appear of record, the doctrine of collateral estoppel will not be applied, because the defendant, “the party seeking the protection of collateral estoppel[,] bears the burden of proving that the precise issue or question he seeks to preclude was raised and determined in the first action.” Clodfelter v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 98, 106 , 235 S.E.2d 340, 345 (1977).

2003See, e.g., Scales v. Lewis, 261 Va. 379, 382 , 541 S.E.2d 899 (2001) (“For the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply ... the parties to the prior and subsequent proceedings, or their privies, must be the same”); Angstadt v. Atlantic Mutual Ins.

2003See, e.g., Scales v. Lewis, 261 Va. 379, 382 , 541 S.E.2d 899 (2001) (“For the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply ... the parties to the prior and subsequent proceedings, or their privies, must be the same”); Angstadt v. Atlantic Mutual Ins.

2000The Supreme Court of Virginia has stated, “the doctrine of collateral estoppel is a Constitutional requirement embodied in the fifth amendment right against double jeopardy and is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.” Simon v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 412, 415 , 258 S.E.2d 567, 569 (1979).

2000The Supreme Court of Virginia has stated, “the doctrine of collateral estoppel is a Constitutional requirement embodied in the fifth amendment right against double jeopardy and is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.” Simon v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 412, 415 , 258 S.E.2d 567, 569 (1979).

1990Co. v. Bailey, 221 Va. 638, 640 (1980).

1984Nero v. Ferris, 222 Va. 807, 812 , 284 S.E.2d 828 (1981); Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Bailey, 221 Va. 638, 640 , 272 S.E.2d 217 (1980).

2014This was no surprise, as Ashe “was the rare case where it was possible to determine with certainty what the jury in the earlier prosecution had decided.” Id. (quoting United States v. Cioffi, 487 F.2d 492, 498 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 995 (1974)). 3 The only requirements at issue on appeal are (2) and (3). -4- “An acquittal, ‘standing alone, does not permit a conclusion with respect’ to a court’s findings or rationale.” Rice, 57 Va. App. at 433 , 703 S.E.2d at 257 (quoting Copeland v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 450, 453 , 412 S.E.2d 468, 470 (1991)). “‘Since it is usually impossible to de

2014This was no surprise, as Ashe “was the rare case where it was possible to determine with certainty what the jury in the earlier prosecution had decided.” Id. (quoting United States v. Cioffi, 487 F.2d 492, 498 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 995 (1974)). 3 The only requirements at issue on appeal are (2) and (3). -4- “An acquittal, ‘standing alone, does not permit a conclusion with respect’ to a court’s findings or rationale.” Rice, 57 Va. App. at 433 , 703 S.E.2d at 257 (quoting Copeland v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 450, 453 , 412 S.E.2d 468, 470 (1991)). “‘Since it is usually impossible to de

2003"Under the principle of collateral estoppel, 'the parties to the first action and their privies are precluded from litigating [in a subsequent action] any issue of fact actually litigated and essential to a valid and final personal judgment in the first action.'" Slagle v. Slagle, 11 Va. App. 341, 344 , 398 S.E.2d 346, 348 (1990) (quoting Norfolk & W.

2003"Under the principle of collateral estoppel, 'the parties to the first action and their privies are precluded from litigating [in a subsequent action] any issue of fact actually litigated and essential to a valid and final personal judgment in the first action.'" Slagle v. Slagle, 11 Va. App. 341, 344 , 398 S.E.2d 346, 348 (1990) (quoting Norfolk & W.

2001See United States v. Carter, 60 F.3d 1532 (11th Cir.1995); United States v. Haines, 485 F.2d 564 (7th Cir.1973); Adams v. United States, 287 F.2d 701 (5th Cir.1961); State v. Hutchins, 144 N.H. 669 , 746 A.2d 447 (2000); People v. Briddle, 84 Ill.App.3d 523 , 40 Ill.Dec. 265 , 405 N.E.2d 1357 (1980).

2001See United States v. Carter, 60 F.3d 1532 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v. Haines, 485 F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1973); Adams v. United States, 287 F.2d 701 (5th Cir. 1961); State v. Hutchins, 746 A.2d 447 (N.H. 2000); People v. Briddle, 405 N.E.2d 1357 (Ill.

2000The doctrine of collateral estoppel “means ‘that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.’ ” Rogers v. Commonwealth, 5 Va.App. 337, 341 , 362 S.E.2d 752, 754 (1987) (quoting Ashe, 397 U.S. at 443 , 90 S.Ct. at 1194 ).

2000The doctrine of collateral estoppel “means ‘that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.’ ” Rogers v. Commonwealth, 5 Va.App. 337, 341 , 362 S.E.2d 752, 754 (1987) (quoting Ashe, 397 U.S. at 443 , 90 S.Ct. at 1194 ).

2016However, given the double jeopardy concerns that inform the application of collateral estoppel in criminal cases, see Davis, 290 Va. at 368 , 777 S.E.2d at 558 , the collateral estoppel bar may be asserted against the Commonwealth regarding the factual issue necessarily determined by the general district court in its implicit acquittal of appellant for DUI, second offense. 8 .

2016However, given the double jeopardy concerns that inform the application of collateral estoppel in criminal cases, see Davis, 290 Va. at 368 , 777 S.E.2d at 558 , the collateral estoppel bar may be asserted against the Commonwealth regarding the factual issue necessarily determined by the general district court in its implicit acquittal of appellant for DUI, second offense. 8 .

2017We held that because Rhodes was unable to prove that "the precise issue of fact," i.e., the presence of PCP in his vehicle, was determined in his favor, that issue of fact remained "unfettered by the doctrine of collateral estoppel." Rhodes , 223 Va. at 749 -50 , 292 S.E.2d at 377 .

2017We held that because Rhodes was unable to prove that "the precise issue of fact," i.e., the presence of PCP in his vehicle, was determined in his favor, that issue of fact remained "unfettered by the doctrine of collateral estoppel." Rhodes , 223 Va. at 749 -50 , 292 S.E.2d at 377 .

2003See also Sevachko v. Commonwealth, 35 Va. App. 346, 352 , 544 S.E.2d 898, 901 (2001) (holding that "[c]ollateral estoppel is a doctrine of fact preclusion").

2002The defendant has now moved to dismiss the pending indictment and/or to bar its prosecution on the grounds of the doctrine of collateral estoppel or “issue preclusion” as set forth in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970), and Sevachko v. Commonwealth, 35 Va. App. 346 (2001).

2024“Collateral estoppel . . . prevents the same parties from ‘[re]litigating in a subsequent suit any issue of fact actually litigated and essential to a valid and final personal judgment in the first action.’” Plofchan v. Plofchan, 299 Va. 534 , 543 (2021) (quoting Funny Guy, LLC v. Lecego, LLC, 293 Va. 135, 142 (2017)).