collateral estoppel doctrine in North Carolina

2024Collateral Estoppel Although Partner’s arguments primarily address the trial court’s conclusions of law and the interpretation of North Carolina General Statute Section 50-13.4, she first argues the trial court was prevented by collateral estoppel from finding she is a “lawful parent” of Alisa because the permanent custody order referred to her as “Non- parent.” Under the collateral estoppel doctrine, “parties and parties in privity with them . . . are precluded from retrying fully litigated issues that were decided in any - 10 - prior determination and were necessary to the prior determinatio

2024Collateral Estoppel Although Partner’s arguments primarily address the trial court’s conclusions of law and the interpretation of North Carolina General Statute Section 50-13.4, she first argues the trial court was prevented by collateral estoppel from finding she is a “lawful parent” of Alisa because the permanent custody order referred to her as “Non- parent.” Under the collateral estoppel doctrine, “parties and parties in privity with them . . . are precluded from retrying fully litigated issues that were decided in any - 10 - prior determination and were necessary to the prior determinatio

2009App. 547, 554 , 626 S.E.2d 845, 850 (2006) (where court rules on issue of domestic violence between parties, doctrine of collateral estoppel "renders [court's] findings of fact binding on the subsequent child custody proceeding regarding those events").

2008In order to bar re-litigation of issues under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the following elements must exist: "(1) The issues to be concluded must be the same as those involved in the prior action; (2) in the prior action, the issues must have been raised and actually litigated; (3) the issues must have been material and relevant to the disposition of the prior action; and (4) the determination made of those issues in the prior action must have been necessary and essential to the resulting judgment. " Doyle v. Doyle, 176 N.C.

2026Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, “the determination of an issue in a prior judicial or administrative proceeding precludes the relitigation of that issue in a later action, provided the party against whom the estoppel is asserted enjoyed a full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue in the earlier proceeding.” Whitacre P’ship v. Biosignia, Inc., 358 N.C. 1, 15 (2004) (citations omitted).

2025“Under the companion doctrine of collateral estoppel . . . or ‘issue preclusion,’ the determination of an issue” in a prior action “precludes the relitigation of that issue in a later action, provided the party against whom the estoppel is asserted enjoyed a full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue in the earlier proceeding.” Whitacre P’ship v. Biosignia, Inc., 358 N.C. 1, 15 , 591 S.E.2d 870, 880 (2004) (citations omitted).

2021Thus, “[i]t is well established that the denial of a motion for summary judgment ‘affects a substantial right when the motion . . . makes a colorable assertion that [a] claim is barred under the doctrine of collateral estoppel.’” Gray v. Fannie Mae, 264 N.C. App. 642, 645 , 830 S.E.2d 652, 655-56 (2019) (quoting Turner, 363 N.C. at 558 , 681 S.E.2d at 773 ); see also Fox v. Johnson, 243 N.C. App. 274 , 281, 777 S.E.2d 314, 321 (2015) (holding that appellants made a colorable assertion of collateral estoppel by including the defense in their answer and as a basis for their motion for judgment o

2021Thus, “[i]t is well established that the denial of a motion for summary judgment ‘affects a substantial right when the motion . . . makes a colorable assertion that [a] claim is barred under the doctrine of collateral estoppel.’” Gray v. Fannie Mae, 264 N.C. App. 642, 645 , 830 S.E.2d 652, 655-56 (2019) (quoting Turner, 363 N.C. at 558 , 681 S.E.2d at 773 ); see also Fox v. Johnson, 243 N.C. App. 274 , 281, 777 S.E.2d 314, 321 (2015) (holding that appellants made a colorable assertion of collateral estoppel by including the defense in their answer and as a basis for their motion for judgment o

2024“Moreover, the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies only to an issue of ultimate fact determined by a final judgment.” State v. Macon, 227 N.C. App. 152, 157 , disc. rev. denied, 367 N.C. 238 (2013); see also State v. Edwards, 310 N.C. 142, 145 (1984) (“Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, an issue of ultimate fact, once determined by a valid and final judgment, cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.”).

2017In Ashe , "[t]he doctrine of collateral estoppel was held to be a part of the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy[.]" State v. Edwards , 310 N.C. 142 , 145, 310 S.E.2d 610 , 613 (1984) (citing Ashe ).

2021Thus, “[i]t is well established that the denial of a motion for summary judgment ‘affects a substantial right when the motion . . . makes a colorable assertion that [a] claim is barred under the doctrine of collateral estoppel.’” Gray v. Fannie Mae, 264 N.C. App. 642, 645 , 830 S.E.2d 652, 655-56 (2019) (quoting Turner, 363 N.C. at 558 , 681 S.E.2d at 773 ); see also Fox v. Johnson, 243 N.C. App. 274 , 281, 777 S.E.2d 314, 321 (2015) (holding that appellants made a colorable assertion of collateral estoppel by including the defense in their answer and as a basis for their motion for judgment o

2021Thus, “[i]t is well established that the denial of a motion for summary judgment ‘affects a substantial right when the motion . . . makes a colorable assertion that [a] claim is barred under the doctrine of collateral estoppel.’” Gray v. Fannie Mae, 264 N.C. App. 642, 645 , 830 S.E.2d 652, 655-56 (2019) (quoting Turner, 363 N.C. at 558 , 681 S.E.2d at 773 ); see also Fox v. Johnson, 243 N.C. App. 274 , 281, 777 S.E.2d 314, 321 (2015) (holding that appellants made a colorable assertion of collateral estoppel by including the defense in their answer and as a basis for their motion for judgment o

2011App. 80, 84 , 609 S.E.2d 259, 262 (2005). *642 Under the companion doctrine of collateral estoppel (or “issue preclusion”), “a final judgment on the merits prevents relitigation of issues actually litigated and necessary to the outcome of the prior action in a later suit involving a different cause of action between the parties or their privies.” McInnis, 318 N.C. at 428 , 349 S.E.2d at 557 .

2011App. 80, 84 , 609 S.E.2d 259, 262 (2005). *642 Under the companion doctrine of collateral estoppel (or “issue preclusion”), “a final judgment on the merits prevents relitigation of issues actually litigated and necessary to the outcome of the prior action in a later suit involving a different cause of action between the parties or their privies.” McInnis, 318 N.C. at 428 , 349 S.E.2d at 557 .

2025State v. Summers, 351 N.C. 620, 622 (2000) (alteration in original) (quoting King v. Grindstaff, 284 N.C. 348, 355 (1973)); see also State ex rel.

2023On the other hand, “the rules for determining whether the parties in question are or were in privity with parties in the prior action are not as well defined.” State v. Summers, 351 N.C. 620, 623 , 528 S.E.2d 17, 20 (2000).

2021Thus, “[i]t is well established that the denial of a motion for summary judgment ‘affects a substantial right when the motion . . . makes a colorable assertion that [a] claim is barred under the doctrine of collateral estoppel.’” Gray v. Fannie Mae, 264 N.C. App. 642, 645 , 830 S.E.2d 652, 655-56 (2019) (quoting Turner, 363 N.C. at 558 , 681 S.E.2d at 773 ); see also Fox v. Johnson, 243 N.C. App. 274 , 281, 777 S.E.2d 314, 321 (2015) (holding that appellants made a colorable assertion of collateral estoppel by including the defense in their answer and as a basis for their motion for judgment o

2021Thus, “[i]t is well established that the denial of a motion for summary judgment ‘affects a substantial right when the motion . . . makes a colorable assertion that [a] claim is barred under the doctrine of collateral estoppel.’” Gray v. Fannie Mae, 264 N.C. App. 642, 645 , 830 S.E.2d 652, 655-56 (2019) (quoting Turner, 363 N.C. at 558 , 681 S.E.2d at 773 ); see also Fox v. Johnson, 243 N.C. App. 274 , 281, 777 S.E.2d 314, 321 (2015) (holding that appellants made a colorable assertion of collateral estoppel by including the defense in their answer and as a basis for their motion for judgment o

2021Thus, “[i]t is well established that the denial of a motion for summary judgment ‘affects a substantial right when the motion . . . makes a colorable assertion that [a] claim is barred under the doctrine of collateral estoppel.’” Gray v. Fannie Mae, 264 N.C. App. 642, 645 , 830 S.E.2d 652, 655-56 (2019) (quoting Turner, 363 N.C. at 558 , 681 S.E.2d at 773 ); see also Fox v. Johnson, 243 N.C. App. 274 , 281, 777 S.E.2d 314, 321 (2015) (holding that appellants made a colorable assertion of collateral estoppel by including the defense in their answer and as a basis for their motion for judgment o

2021Thus, “[i]t is well established that the denial of a motion for summary judgment ‘affects a substantial right when the motion . . . makes a colorable assertion that [a] claim is barred under the doctrine of collateral estoppel.’” Gray v. Fannie Mae, 264 N.C. App. 642, 645 , 830 S.E.2d 652, 655-56 (2019) (quoting Turner, 363 N.C. at 558 , 681 S.E.2d at 773 ); see also Fox v. Johnson, 243 N.C. App. 274 , 281, 777 S.E.2d 314, 321 (2015) (holding that appellants made a colorable assertion of collateral estoppel by including the defense in their answer and as a basis for their motion for judgment o

2021“The standard of review for summary judgment is de novo.” Forbis v. Neal, 361 N.C. 519, 524 , 649 S.E.2d 382, 385 (2007) (citation omitted). ¶ 25 “Under the collateral estoppel doctrine, parties and parties in privity with them are precluded from retrying fully litigated issues that were decided in any prior determination and were necessary to the prior determination.” Turner, 363 N.C. at 558 , 681 S.E.2d at 773 (alteration, citation, and quotation marks omitted).

2021“The standard of review for summary judgment is de novo.” Forbis v. Neal, 361 N.C. 519, 524 , 649 S.E.2d 382, 385 (2007) (citation omitted). ¶ 25 “Under the collateral estoppel doctrine, parties and parties in privity with them are precluded from retrying fully litigated issues that were decided in any prior determination and were necessary to the prior determination.” Turner, 363 N.C. at 558 , 681 S.E.2d at 773 (alteration, citation, and quotation marks omitted).

2023“A very close examination of matters actually litigated must be made in order to determine if the underlying issues are in fact identical[;] [i]f they are not identical, then the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

2018"Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, a final judgment on the merits prevents relitigation of issues actually litigated and necessary to the outcome of the prior action in a later suit involving a different cause of action between the parties[.]" Williams v. Peabody, 217 N.C.

2014Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, “a final judgment on the merits prevents relitigation of issues actually litigated and necessary to the outcome of the prior action in a later suit involving a different cause of action between the parties or their privies.” Frinzi, 344 N.C. at 414 , 474 S.E.2d at 128 .

2014Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, “a final judgment on the merits prevents relitigation of issues actually litigated and necessary to the outcome of the prior action in a later suit involving a different cause of action between the parties or their privies.” Frinzi, 344 N.C. at 414 , 474 S.E.2d at 128 .

2023Defendants concede this appeal as interlocutory, but contend a substantial right is affected as they “ma[k]e a colorable assertion of collateral estoppel” and “are facing a second trial on issues already resolved in [Semelka I][.]” Our case law establishes that a trial court’s order rejecting the affirmative defense of collateral estoppel can affect a substantial right, however, “incantation of the [doctrine of collateral estoppel] does not . . . automatically entitle a party to an interlocutory appeal[.]” Foster v. Crandell, 181 N.C. App. 152, 162 , 638 S.E.2d 526, 533-34 (citation omitted),

2023Defendants concede this appeal as interlocutory, but contend a substantial right is affected as they “ma[k]e a colorable assertion of collateral estoppel” and “are facing a second trial on issues already resolved in [Semelka I][.]” Our case law establishes that a trial court’s order rejecting the affirmative defense of collateral estoppel can affect a substantial right, however, “incantation of the [doctrine of collateral estoppel] does not . . . automatically entitle a party to an interlocutory appeal[.]” Foster v. Crandell, 181 N.C. App. 152, 162 , 638 S.E.2d 526, 533-34 (citation omitted),

2025Citing Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342 , 107 L. Ed. 2d 708 (1990), this Court stated evidence is inadmissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause only when it falls within the scope of the collateral estoppel doctrine.

2025Citing Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342 , 107 L. Ed. 2d 708 (1990), this Court stated evidence is inadmissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause only when it falls within the scope of the collateral estoppel doctrine.

2006Similarly, the doctrine of collateral estoppel “is designed to prevent repetitious lawsuits over matters which have once been decided and which have remained substantially static, factually and legally.” Scarvey v. First Federal Savings and Loan Ass’n of Charlotte, 146 N.C.

2004The doctrine of collateral estoppel "`is designed to prevent repetitious lawsuits over matters which have once been decided and which have remained substantially static, factually and legally.'" Scarvey v. First Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n of Charlotte, 146 N.C.

2000The doctrine of collateral estoppel, also referred to as “issue preclusion” or “estoppel by judgment,” precludes relitigation of a fact, question or right in issue “when there has been a final judgment or decree, necessarily determining [the] fact, question or right in issue, rendered by a court of record and of competent jurisdiction, and there is a later suit involving an issue as to the identical fact, question or right theretofore determined, and involving identical parties or parties in privity with a party or parties to the prior suit.” King v. Grindstaff, 284 N.C. 348, 355 , 200 S.E.2d

2000The doctrine of collateral estoppel, also referred to as “issue preclusion” or “estoppel by judgment,” precludes relitigation of a fact, question or right in issue “when there has been a final judgment or decree, necessarily determining [the] fact, question or right in issue, rendered by a court of record and of competent jurisdiction, and there is a later suit involving an issue as to the identical fact, question or right theretofore determined, and involving identical parties or parties in privity with a party or parties to the prior suit.” King v. Grindstaff, 284 N.C. 348, 355 , 200 S.E.2d

2026“A very close examination of matters actually litigated must be made in order to determine if the underlying issues are in fact identical[;] [i]f they are not identical, then the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply.” Id. (citation omitted).

2014To hold that a prior judgment is not preclusive on either ground on which it was based would undermine the entire purpose of the collateral estoppel doctrine, to “protect[] litigants from the burden of relitigating previously decided matters and promot[e] judicial economy by preventing needless litigation.” City of Asheville, 192 N.C.

2017The doctrine of collateral estoppel "means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final *270 judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit." Ashe v. Swenson , 397 U.S. 436 , 443, 90 S.Ct. 1189 , 1194, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 , 475 (1970).

2017The doctrine of collateral estoppel "means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final *270 judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit." Ashe v. Swenson , 397 U.S. 436 , 443, 90 S.Ct. 1189 , 1194, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 , 475 (1970).

2007"Collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of an issue decided previously in judicial or administrative proceedings provided the party against whom the prior decision was asserted enjoyed a full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue in an earlier proceeding." Bradley v. Hidden Valley Transp., Inc., 148 N.C.App. 163 , 166, 557 S.E.2d 610 , 613 (2001) (citations and quotations omitted). "[W]hen a fact has been agreed upon or decided in a court of record, neither of the parties shall be allowed to call it in question, and have it tried over again at any time thereafter, so long as the judg

2007“Collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of an issue decided previously in judicial or administrative proceedings provided the party against whom the prior decision was asserted enjoyed a full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue in an earlier proceeding.” Bradley v. Hidden Valley Transp., Inc., 148 N.C.

2025The primary difference between the two doctrines is res judicata precludes a party “from bringing a subsequent action based on the ‘same claim’ as that litigated in an earlier action,” while collateral estoppel “precludes the subsequent adjudication of a previously determined issue, even if the subsequent action is based on an entirely different claim.” Id. at 15 , 591 S.E.2d at 880 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). - 13 - Though distinct, both doctrines “advance the twin policy goals of ‘protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating previously decided matters and promoting judicial

2007Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, “also known as ‘estoppel by judgment’ or ‘issue preclusion,’ the determination of an issue in a prior judicial or administrative proceeding precludes the relitigation of that issue in a later action, provided the party against whom the estoppel is asserted enjoyed a full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue in the earlier proceeding.” Id. (quoting Whitacre P’ship v. Biosignia, Inc., 358 N.C. 1, 15 , 591 S.E.2d 870, 880 (2004)).

2025That doctrine provides that “when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.” - 17 - State v. Bell, 164 N.C. App. 83, 89 , 594 S.E.2d 824, 828 (2004) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

2025That doctrine provides that “when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.” - 17 - State v. Bell, 164 N.C. App. 83, 89 , 594 S.E.2d 824, 828 (2004) (citation and quotation marks omitted).