collateral estoppel doctrine in Vermont

2012See Scott v. City of Newport, 2004 VT 64, ¶ 8 , 177 Vt. 491 (2004).

2012See Scott v. City of Newport, 2004 VT 64, ¶ 8 , 177 Vt. 491 (2004).

2009In applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel, this Court follows the five-part test enunciated in Trepanier v. Getting Organized, Inc., 155 Vt. 259, 265 , 583 A.2d 583, 587 (1990).

2009In applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel, this Court follows the five-part test enunciated in Trepanier v. Getting Organized, Inc., 155 Vt. 259, 265 , 583 A.2d 583, 587 (1990).

2004See Berlin Convalescent Ctr., Inc. v. Stoneman, 159 Vt. 53, 56 , 615 A.2d 141, 144 (1992) (The doctrine of collateral estoppel “bars the subsequent relitigation of an issue which was actually litigated and decided in a prior case between the parties resulting in a final judgment on the merits, where that issue was necessary to the resolution of the action.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). ¶ 20.

2004See Berlin Convalescent Ctr., Inc. v. Stoneman, 159 Vt. 53, 56 , 615 A.2d 141, 144 (1992) (The doctrine of collateral estoppel “bars the subsequent relitigation of an issue which was actually litigated and decided in a prior case between the parties resulting in a final judgment on the merits, where that issue was necessary to the resolution of the action.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). ¶ 20.

2010See, e.g., Peterson v. Clark Leasing Corp., 451 F.2d 1291, 1292 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (stating that doctrine of collateral estoppel “applies only to issues that are identical in both actions,” and “[i]ssues are not identical if the second action involves application of a different legal standard, even though the factual setting of both suits be the same”).

2010See, e.g., Peterson v. Clark Leasing Corp., 451 F.2d 1291, 1292 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (stating that doctrine of collateral estoppel "applies only to issues that are identical in both actions," and "[i]ssues are not identical if the second action involves application of a different legal standard, even though the factual setting of both suits be the same.").

2008See, e.g., In re T.C., 2007 VT 115, ¶ 20 (citing Scott v. City of Newport, 2004 VT 64, ¶ 8 , 177 Vt. 491 (2004)).

2008See, e.g., In re T.C., 2007 VT 115, ¶ 20 (citing Scott v. City of Newport, 2004 VT 64, ¶ 8 , 177 Vt. 491 (2004)).

2020The collateral estoppel doctrine “applies to issues of fact as well as law.” Mellin v. Flood Brook Union School Dist., 173 Vt. 202, 209 (2001).

2010As stated above, before a court can apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel, it must find that the issue in the previous case was “necessary to the resolution of the dispute.” Id.

2008If, as reported to the Court in the pretrial conference, a reduced-size or alternate deck configuration has received a building permit that has become final without appeal, any issue regarding the lakeshore setback is therefore not before the Court. 5 The doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, “generally bars relitigation of an issue that was already litigated and decided.” In re Armitage, 2006 VT 113 ¶4 , 181 Vt. 241, 244 (internal quotation and citation omitted).

2008If, as reported to the Court in the pretrial conference, a reduced-size or alternate deck configuration has received a building permit that has become final without appeal, any issue regarding the lakeshore setback is therefore not before the Court. 5 The doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, “generally bars relitigation of an issue that was already litigated and decided.” In re Armitage, 2006 VT 113 ¶4 , 181 Vt. 241, 244 (internal quotation and citation omitted).

2012Res judicata “bars the litigation of a claim or defense if there exists a final judgment in former litigation in which the parties, subject matter and causes of action are identical or substantially identical.” Lamb, 165 Vt. at 379 , 683 A.2d at 734 (quotation omitted).

2012Res judicata “bars the litigation of a claim or defense if there exists a final judgment in former litigation in which the parties, subject matter and causes of action are identical or substantially identical.” Lamb, 165 Vt. at 379 , 683 A.2d at 734 (quotation omitted).

2010See Bridgestone/Firestone North America Tire, L.L.C. v. Naranjo, 79 P.3d 1206, 1211 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (holding collateral estoppel prevented plaintiffs from relitigating the issue of total damages where jury in previous litigation had assessed “full damages”); see also Greenleaf v. Garlock, 174 F.3d 352, 358-59 (3d Cir. 1999) (plaintiff’s prior state court jury verdict carried issue preclusive effect upon the issue of damages in subsequent action); Kathios v. General Motors Corp., 862 F.2d 944, 946-47 (1st Cir. 1988) (resolution of the issue of bodily damages in first case collaterally est

2010Cf. Sheehan v. Dep’t of Employment & Training, 169 Vt. 304, 308 , 733 A.2d 88, 91 (1999) (doctrine of collateral estoppel “bars the subsequent relitigation of an issue which was actually litigated and decided in a prior case between the parties resulting in a final judgment on the merits, where that issue was necessary to the resolution of the action” (quotation omitted)). ¶ 10.

2010Cf. Sheehan v. Dep’t of Employment & Training, 169 Vt. 304, 308 , 733 A.2d 88, 91 (1999) (doctrine of collateral estoppel “bars the subsequent relitigation of an issue which was actually litigated and decided in a prior case between the parties resulting in a final judgment on the merits, where that issue was necessary to the resolution of the action” (quotation omitted)). ¶ 10.

2010See Bridgestone/Firestone North America Tire, L.L.C. v. Naranjo, 79 P.3d 1206, 1211 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (holding collateral estoppel prevented plaintiffs from relitigating the issue of total damages where jury in previous litigation had assessed “full damages”); see also Greenleaf v. Garlock, 174 F.3d 352, 358-59 (3d Cir. 1999) (plaintiff’s prior state court jury verdict carried issue preclusive effect upon the issue of damages in subsequent action); Kathios v. General Motors Corp., 862 F.2d 944, 946-47 (1st Cir. 1988) (resolution of the issue of bodily damages in first case collaterally est

2010It is true, as claimant asserts, that the trial court’s jurisdiction in workers’ compensation proceedings is limited to a review of questions of fact or questions of fact and law certified to it by the commissioner. 21 V.S.A. § 671; Roethke v. Jake’s Original Bar & Grill, 172 Vt. 555, 556 , 772 A.2d 492, 493 (2001) (mem.).

2010It is true, as claimant asserts, that the trial court’s jurisdiction in workers’ compensation proceedings is limited to a review of questions of fact or questions of fact and law certified to it by the commissioner. 21 V.S.A. § 671; Roethke v. Jake’s Original Bar & Grill, 172 Vt. 555, 556 , 772 A.2d 492, 493 (2001) (mem.).

2010See Bridgestone/Firestone North America Tire, L.L.C. v. Naranjo, 79 P.3d 1206, 1211 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (holding collateral estoppel prevented plaintiffs from relitigating the issue of total damages where jury in previous litigation had assessed “full damages”); see also Greenleaf v. Garlock, 174 F.3d 352, 358-59 (3d Cir. 1999) (plaintiff’s prior state court jury verdict carried issue preclusive effect upon the issue of damages in subsequent action); Kathios v. General Motors Corp., 862 F.2d 944, 946-47 (1st Cir. 1988) (resolution of the issue of bodily damages in first case collaterally est

2010See Bridgestone/Firestone North America Tire, L.L.C. v. Naranjo, 79 P.3d 1206, 1211 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (holding collateral estoppel prevented plaintiffs from relitigating the issue of total damages where jury in previous litigation had assessed “full damages”); see also Greenleaf v. Garlock, 174 F.3d 352, 358-59 (3d Cir. 1999) (plaintiff’s prior state court jury verdict carried issue preclusive effect upon the issue of damages in subsequent action); Kathios v. General Motors Corp., 862 F.2d 944, 946-47 (1st Cir. 1988) (resolution of the issue of bodily damages in first case collaterally est

2007DuPage Forklift Serv., Inc. v. Material Handling Serv., Inc., 744 N.E.2d 845, 850 (2nd Cir. 2001) (citing Restatement 2d of Judgments §28(2) (collateral estoppel doctrine does not apply when intervening change in “applicable legal context” occurs)).

2003Bruce, 762 N.E.2d 1227, 1230-31 (Ind. 2002) (insurer who elects not to defend under a reservation of rights agreement in the underlying tort action, or does not file a declaratory judgment action, proceeds “at the insurer’s peril” because that insurer is bound by the matters determined in the lawsuit under the doctrine of collateral estoppel).

2002Trepanier v. Getting Organized, Inc., 155 Vt. 259, 265 , 583 A.2d 583, 587 (1990); see also State v. Dann, 167 Vt. 119, 127-28 , 702 A.2d 105, 110-11 (1997) (applying Trepanier elements in criminal case); State v. Stearns, 159 Vt. 266, 268 , 617 A.2d 140, 141 (1992) (considering whether “cross-over” estoppel, i.e., principle that issue decided in civil case is determinative in later criminal case, bars DUI prosecution following judgment for defendant in civil suspension proceeding).

2002Trepanier v. Getting Organized, Inc., 155 Vt. 259, 265 , 583 A.2d 583, 587 (1990); see also State v. Dann, 167 Vt. 119, 127-28 , 702 A.2d 105, 110-11 (1997) (applying Trepanier elements in criminal case); State v. Stearns, 159 Vt. 266, 268 , 617 A.2d 140, 141 (1992) (considering whether “cross-over” estoppel, i.e., principle that issue decided in civil case is determinative in later criminal case, bars DUI prosecution following judgment for defendant in civil suspension proceeding).

2002Trepanier v. Getting Organized, Inc., 155 Vt. 259, 265 , 583 A.2d 583, 587 (1990); see also State v. Dann, 167 Vt. 119, 127-28 , 702 A.2d 105, 110-11 (1997) (applying Trepanier elements in criminal case); State v. Stearns, 159 Vt. 266, 268 , 617 A.2d 140, 141 (1992) (considering whether “cross-over” estoppel, i.e., principle that issue decided in civil case is determinative in later criminal case, bars DUI prosecution following judgment for defendant in civil suspension proceeding).

2002Trepanier v. Getting Organized, Inc., 155 Vt. 259, 265 , 583 A.2d 583, 587 (1990); see also State v. Dann, 167 Vt. 119, 127-28 , 702 A.2d 105, 110-11 (1997) (applying Trepanier elements in criminal case); State v. Stearns, 159 Vt. 266, 268 , 617 A.2d 140, 141 (1992) (considering whether “cross-over” estoppel, i.e., principle that issue decided in civil case is determinative in later criminal case, bars DUI prosecution following judgment for defendant in civil suspension proceeding).

2000See Bull v. Pinkham Eng’g Assocs., 170 Vt. 450, 461 , 752 A.2d 26, 34-35 (2000) (“Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, bars the subsequent relitigation of an issue that was actually litigated and decided in a prior case between the parties, so long as there was a final judgment on the merits and the issue was necessary to the resolution of the action.”).

2000See Bull v. Pinkham Eng’g Assocs., 170 Vt. 450, 461 , 752 A.2d 26, 34-35 (2000) (“Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, bars the subsequent relitigation of an issue that was actually litigated and decided in a prior case between the parties, so long as there was a final judgment on the merits and the issue was necessary to the resolution of the action.”).

1999Cumberbatch, 438 F. Supp. at 979 (citations omitted).

1999Similar in effect but more narrow in scope than res judicata, the doctrine of collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, “bars ‘the subsequent relitigation of an issue which was actually litigated and decided in a prior case between the parties resulting in a final judgment on the merits, where that issue was necessary to the resolution of the action.’” Berlin Convalescent Center, Inc. v. Stoneman, 159 Vt. 53, 56 , 615 A.2d 141, 144 (1992) (quoting American Trucking Ass’ns v. Conway, 152 Vt. 363, 369 , 566 A.2d 1323, 1327 (1989)).

1999Similar in effect but more narrow in scope than res judicata, the doctrine of collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, “bars ‘the subsequent relitigation of an issue which was actually litigated and decided in a prior case between the parties resulting in a final judgment on the merits, where that issue was necessary to the resolution of the action.’” Berlin Convalescent Center, Inc. v. Stoneman, 159 Vt. 53, 56 , 615 A.2d 141, 144 (1992) (quoting American Trucking Ass’ns v. Conway, 152 Vt. 363, 369 , 566 A.2d 1323, 1327 (1989)).

1984Land Investment, Inc. v. Battleground Associates, 138 Vt. 316, 326 , 415 A.2d 753, 759 (1980).

1984Land Investment, Inc. v. Battleground Associates, 138 Vt. 316, 326 , 415 A.2d 753, 759 (1980).