53 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1974–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Coleman v. Stategreen2 sentences2021We have recognized that the doctrine of collateral estoppel (also referred to as issue preclusion) is not the same as double jeopardy, “but rather is embodied within the protection against double jeopardy.” Harris v. State, 9 N.E.3d 679, 683 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Coleman v. State, 946 N.E.2d 1160, 1165 (Ind. 2011)), trans. denied. “[T]he traditional bar of jeopardy prohibits the prosecution of the crime itself, whereas collateral estoppel, in a more modest fashion, simply forbids the government from relitigating certain facts in order to establish the fact of the crime.” Id. (internal 2021We have recognized that the doctrine of collateral estoppel (also referred to as issue preclusion) is not the same as double jeopardy, “but rather is embodied within the protection against double jeopardy.” Harris v. State, 9 N.E.3d 679, 683 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Coleman v. State, 946 N.E.2d 1160, 1165 (Ind. 2011)), trans. denied. “[T]he traditional bar of jeopardy prohibits the prosecution of the crime itself, whereas collateral estoppel, in a more modest fashion, simply forbids the government from relitigating certain facts in order to establish the fact of the crime.” Id. (internal | 4 | 6 |
Bojrab v. John Carr Agencygreen2 sentences2014Bojrab v. John Carr Agency, 597 N.E.2d 376, 379 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992). 1997Bojrab v. John Carr Agency, 597 N.E.2d 376, 379 (Ind.Ct.App.1992). | 3 | 3 |
Webb v. Stategreen2 sentences2010"In order to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the court must engage in a two-step analysis: '(1) determine what the first judgment decided; and (2) examine how that determination bears on the second case"" Segovia, 666 N.E.2d at 107 (quoting Webb v. State, 453 N.E.2d 180, 183 (Ind.1983) (citations omitted)). 2010"In order to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the court must engage in a two-step analysis: `(1) determine what the first judgment decided; and (2) examine how that determination bears on the second case.'" Segovia, 666 N.E.2d at 107 (quoting Webb v. State, 453 N.E.2d 180, 183 (Ind.1983) (citations omitted)). | 3 | 3 |
Yeager v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2021Essentially the doctrine of collateral estoppel “precludes the Government from relitigating any issue that was necessarily decided by a jury’s acquittal in a prior trial.” Id. (quoting Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110, 119 (2009)). 2013Essentially the doctrine of collateral estoppel “precludes the Government from relitigating any issue that was necessarily decided by a jury’s acquittal in a prior trial.” Id. (quoting Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110, 119 , 129 S.Ct. 2360 , 174 L.Ed.2d 78 (2009)). | 2 | 6 |
In re Gambillgreen2 sentences2025Three elements must be satisfied for the doctrine to apply: “(1) a final judgment on the merits in a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) identity of the issues; and (3) the party to be estopped was a party or the privity of the party in the prior action.” Nat’l Wine & Spirits v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 976 N.E.2d 699, 704 (Ind. 2012), reh’g denied, cert. denied. 2020See, e.g., Nat’l Wine & Spirits, Inc. v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 976 N.E.2d 699, 704 (Ind. 2012) (explaining that the doctrine of collateral estoppel—also known as issue preclusion—(1) bars a party from relitigating a fully adjudicated issue and (2) applies only where the party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue). | 2 | 5 |
Sullivan v. American Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa.green2 sentences1999With the doctrine of collateral estoppel, "the prime consideration is whether the party against whom the prior judgment is pled had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue and whether it would be otherwise unfair under the circumstances to permit the use of collateral estoppel." Bonham, 644 N.E.2d at 1226 (quoting Sullivan, 605 N.E.2d at 138 ). 1999With the doctrine of collateral estoppel, “the prime consideration is whether the party against whom the prior judgment is pled had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue and whether it would be otherwise unfair under the circumstances to permit the use of collateral estoppel.” Bonham, 644 N.E.2d at 1226 (quoting Sullivan, 605 N.E.2d at 138 ). | 2 | 4 |
Segovia v. Stategreen2 sentences2010"In order to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the court must engage in a two-step analysis: '(1) determine what the first judgment decided; and (2) examine how that determination bears on the second case"" Segovia, 666 N.E.2d at 107 (quoting Webb v. State, 453 N.E.2d 180, 183 (Ind.1983) (citations omitted)). 2010"In order to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the court must engage in a two-step analysis: `(1) determine what the first judgment decided; and (2) examine how that determination bears on the second case.'" Segovia, 666 N.E.2d at 107 (quoting Webb v. State, 453 N.E.2d 180, 183 (Ind.1983) (citations omitted)). | 2 | 4 |
Small v. Centocor, Inc.green2 sentences2019Nat'l Wine & Spirits, Inc. v. Ernst & Young, LLP , 976 N.E.2d 699 , 704 (Ind. 2012) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Small v. Centocor, Inc. , 731 N.E.2d 22 , 28 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), reh'g denied, trans. denied ), reh'g denied , cert. denied 569 U.S. 1018 , 133 S.Ct. 2780 , 186 L.Ed.2d 219 (2013). 2006"In order to bar relitigation of an issue, the doctrine of collateral estoppel requires: 1) a final judgment on the merits in a court of competent jurisdiction; 2) identity of the issues; and 3) the party to be estopped was a party or the privity of a party in the prior action." Small v. Centocor, Inc., 731 N.E.2d 22, 28 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trans. denied. | 1 | 6 |
United States v. Patrice Mespoulede, A/K/A \Patrice Fabre\""green2 sentences1999We have also noted: “We agree that ‘once a defendant has satisfied one jury that he is not guilty of a crime, constitutionally-rooted considerations of fairness preclude the Government from injecting any issues necessarily decided in his favor into a second trial for another offense.’ ” Little, 501 N.E.2d at 415 (quoting United States v. Mespoulede, 597 F.2d 329, 330 (2d Cir.1979)). 1996In order to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the court must engage in a two step analysis: “(1) determine what the first judgment decided; and (2) examine how that determination bears on the second case.” Webb v. State, 453 N.E.2d 180, 183 (Ind.1983), reh. denied, cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1081 , 104 S.Ct. 1449 , 79 L.Ed.2d 767 (1984) (citing United States v. Mespoulede, 597 F.2d 329 (2d Cir.1979)). | 1 | 2 |
Christapher Batchelor v. State of Indianagreen1 sentence2024In essence the doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes the Government from relitigating any issue that was necessarily decided by a jury’s acquittal in a prior trial. 3 We agree with the State that Bush I’s invocation of the invited-error doctrine with respect to Bush’s double- jeopardy argument in that case cannot be read as a conclusion that any reference to a firearm would amount to a double-jeopardy violation as “invited error typically forecloses appellate review altogether.” Batchelor v. State, 119 N.E.3d 550, 556 (Ind. 2019). | 1 | 1 |
Andrew McWhorter v. State of Indianagreen1 sentence2024Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-2591 | September 12, 2024 Page 10 of 17 McWhorter v. State, 993 N.E.2d 1141, 1147 (Ind. 2013) (internal quotations and brackets omitted, emphasis in original). | 1 | 1 |
Gregory A. Harris v. State of Indianagreen1 sentence2021We have recognized that the doctrine of collateral estoppel (also referred to as issue preclusion) is not the same as double jeopardy, “but rather is embodied within the protection against double jeopardy.” Harris v. State, 9 N.E.3d 679, 683 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Coleman v. State, 946 N.E.2d 1160, 1165 (Ind. 2011)), trans. denied. “[T]he traditional bar of jeopardy prohibits the prosecution of the crime itself, whereas collateral estoppel, in a more modest fashion, simply forbids the government from relitigating certain facts in order to establish the fact of the crime.” Id. (internal | 1 | 1 |
Wilkes v. Stategreen1 sentence2013As the trial court and parties discussed the procedure by which the State would try Wood for the possession of a handgun while an SVF charge, the court and the State referred to the form that was to be sent to the jury after the first phase of the trial as a “special verdict form.” (See, e.g., Tr. at 212, 216, 245.) We note, however, that “[s]pecial verdicts and interrogatories to the jury [were] abolished,” Indiana Trial Rule 49, “to eliminate the confusion and lack of finality generated by a maze of potentially confusing subsidiary questions.” Wilkes v. State, 917 N.E.2d 675, 687 (Ind.2009). | 1 | 1 |
Edwards v. Stategreen1 sentence2012“Issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, bars the subsequent litigation of a fact or issue that was necessarily adjudicated in a former lawsuit if the same fact or issue is presented in the subsequent lawsuit.” Edwards v. State, 862 N.E.2d 1254, 1259 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. | 1 | 1 |
Wilcox v. Stategreen1 sentence2004"Collateral estoppel operates to bar a subsequent relitigation of the same fact or issue where that fact or issue was necessarily adjudicated in a former suit and the same fact or issue is presented in the subsequent lawsuit." Wilcox v. State, 664 N.E.2d 379, 381 (Ind.Ct.App.1996) (emphases supplied) (father proved his inability to pay child support in the civil contempt proceedings and, in later criminal proceeding for nonsupport, (unsuccessfully) maintained that the first adjudication conclusively established an affirmative defense of inability to pay child support). | 1 | 1 |
Adams v. Marion County Office of Family & Childrengreen1 sentence2000Adams v. Marion County Office of Family and Children, 659 N.E.2d 202, 205 (Ind.Ct.App.1995). | 1 | 1 |
Reid v. Stategreen1 sentence2000Reid v. State, 719 N.E.2d 451, 456 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), cert. denied - U.S. -, 121 S.Ct. 489 , 148 LEd.2d 461 (2000). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Richardson v. Stategreen1 sentence2013But see Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 68 n.23 (Boehm, J., concurring in result) (noting that the doctrine of collateral estoppel is of limited practical value “particularly if the first result is an acquittal, [because] the basis of the jury’s ruling is often unascertainable”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ashe v. Swenson
green
2 sentences1980Ashe v. Swenson (1970) 397 U.S. 436 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 , 25 L.Ed.2d 469 .” The doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply in this case because there are no conflicting findings of fact by the jury on the two counts. 1980Ashe v. Swenson (1970) 397 U.S. 436 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 , 25 L.Ed.2d 469 .” The doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply in this case because there are no conflicting findings of fact by the jury on the two counts. | 7 | 1974–2012 |
Microvote General Corp. v. Indiana Election Commission
green
2 sentences2019“The principal behind this doctrine, as well as the doctrine of collateral estoppel, is the prevention of repetitive litigation of the same dispute.” Id. 2016Id. | 3 | 2015–2019 |
Buggs v. State
green
2 sentences2013Because of the availability of the doctrine of collateral estoppel, we choose not to extend the Richardson actual evidence test to this situation.” Buggs, 844 N.E.2d at 201-02 . 2013Because of the availability of the doctrine of collateral estoppel, we choose not to extend the Richardson actual evidence test to this situation.” Buggs, 844 N.E.2d at 201-02 . | 2 | 2013–2013 |
Garrett v. State
green
2 sentences2013In this case the Court of Appeals applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel and concluded it “did not bar relitigation of the second count of rape.” Garrett, 965 N.E.2d at 123 . 2013Essentially the doctrine of collateral estoppel “precludes the Government from relitigating any issue that was necessarily decided by a jury’s acquittal in a prior trial.” Id. (quoting Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110, 119 (2009)). 11 In this case the Court of Appeals applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel and concluded it “did not bar relitigation of the second count of rape.” Garrett, 965 N.E.2d at 123 . | 2 | 2013–2013 |
Little v. State
green
2 sentences1999We have also noted: "We agree that `once a defendant has satisfied one jury that he is not guilty of a crime, constitutionally-rooted considerations of fairness preclude the Government from injecting any issues necessarily decided in his favor into a second trial for another offense.'" Little, 501 N.E.2d at 415 (quoting United States v. Mespoulede, 597 F.2d 329, 330 (2d Cir.1979)). 1999We have also noted: “We agree that ‘once a defendant has satisfied one jury that he is not guilty of a crime, constitutionally-rooted considerations of fairness preclude the Government from injecting any issues necessarily decided in his favor into a second trial for another offense.’ ” Little, 501 N.E.2d at 415 (quoting United States v. Mespoulede, 597 F.2d 329, 330 (2d Cir.1979)). | 2 | 1995–1999 |
Hutcherson v. State
green
2 sentences1980As we explained in Hutcherson v. State (1978) Ind., 380 N.E.2d 1219 , 1222: “The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies only if an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined and there are no other issues present upon which a rational jury could have grounded its verdict. 1980As we explained in Hutcherson v. State (1978) Ind., 380 N.E.2d 1219 , 1222: “The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies only if an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined and there are no other issues present upon which a rational jury could have grounded its verdict. | 2 | 1979–1980 |
Clements v. Ray
neutral
1 sentence2019Nat'l Wine & Spirits, Inc. v. Ernst & Young, LLP , 976 N.E.2d 699 , 704 (Ind. 2012) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Small v. Centocor, Inc. , 731 N.E.2d 22 , 28 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), reh'g denied, trans. denied ), reh'g denied , cert. denied 569 U.S. 1018 , 133 S.Ct. 2780 , 186 L.Ed.2d 219 (2013). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Nat'l Wine & Spirits, Inc. v. Ernst & Young, LLP.
green
2 sentences2019Nat'l Wine & Spirits, Inc. v. Ernst & Young, LLP , 976 N.E.2d 699 , 704 (Ind. 2012) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Small v. Centocor, Inc. , 731 N.E.2d 22 , 28 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), reh'g denied, trans. denied ), reh'g denied , cert. denied 569 U.S. 1018 , 133 S.Ct. 2780 , 186 L.Ed.2d 219 (2013). 2019Nat'l Wine & Spirits, Inc. v. Ernst & Young, LLP , 976 N.E.2d 699 , 704 (Ind. 2012) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Small v. Centocor, Inc. , 731 N.E.2d 22 , 28 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), reh'g denied, trans. denied ), reh'g denied , cert. denied 569 U.S. 1018 , 133 S.Ct. 2780 , 186 L.Ed.2d 219 (2013). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Commissioner, Indiana Department of Environmental Management v. Bourbon Mini-Mart, Inc.
green
2 sentences2003First, it affirmed the trial court's ruling that Mini-Mart's claim against Dealership was barred by application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel. 1 Bourbon Mini-Mart, 741 N.E.2d at 369 . 2003Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, Mini-Mart [is] precluded from asserting that [it was]) without fault in the contamination." 741 N.E.2d at 369 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Bennett v. Lake Havasu City
green
1 sentence2000Reid v. State, 719 N.E.2d 451, 456 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), cert. denied - U.S. -, 121 S.Ct. 489 , 148 LEd.2d 461 (2000). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Indiana Ins. Co. v. AMERICAN COMMUNITY SVCS., INC.
green
1 sentence2000Id. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Bonham v. State
green
2 sentences1999With the doctrine of collateral estoppel, "the prime consideration is whether the party against whom the prior judgment is pled had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue and whether it would be otherwise unfair under the circumstances to permit the use of collateral estoppel." Bonham, 644 N.E.2d at 1226 (quoting Sullivan, 605 N.E.2d at 138 ). 1999With the doctrine of collateral estoppel, “the prime consideration is whether the party against whom the prior judgment is pled had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue and whether it would be otherwise unfair under the circumstances to permit the use of collateral estoppel.” Bonham, 644 N.E.2d at 1226 (quoting Sullivan, 605 N.E.2d at 138 ). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Tom v. Voida green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| English v. McKaskle green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Wood v. Santa Barbara Chamber of Commerce, Inc. green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| North Carolina v. Pearce red | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Indiana Department of Environmental Management v. Conard green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| White v. Allstate Insurance Co. green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Bender v. Peay green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Glasgow green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Metzler green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Miller v. Spokane green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Overlakes Freight Corp. v. Murphy green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Beverage v. Farm Bureau Mutual Automobile Insurance green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Snodgrass v. Baize green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Cox v. Indiana Subcontractors Ass'n, Inc. green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| State v. Johnson green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Hall v. State green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Bullington v. Missouri green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Harris v. Washington green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.