Johnson brief in Alabama

2016The trial court, relying on Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 , 126 S.Ct. 1204 , 163 L.Ed.2d 1038 (2006), held that because Johnson’s challenge was to the Mega-Sweeps contract as a whole, rather than to the arbitration clause in the contract, the issue of the validity of the contract was to be decided by the arbitrator. 1 So.3d at 962-63 .

2016The trial court, relying on Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 , 126 S.Ct. 1204 , 163 L.Ed.2d 1038 (2006), held that because Johnson’s challenge was to the Mega-Sweeps contract as a whole, rather than to the arbitration clause in the contract, the issue of the validity of the contract was to be decided by the arbitrator. 1 So.3d at 962-63 .

2016In addressing Johnson’s argument that there was no valid contract calling for arbitration, this Court stated: “Johnson argues that JCRA cannot meet its initial burden of demonstrating the existence of a contract calling for arbitration because, she argues, ‘under this Court’s unanimous decision in Barber [v. Jefferson County Racing Ass’n, Inc., 960 So.2d 599 (Ala. 2006) ], the MegaSweeps contracts relied on by the JCRA are void ab initio.’ Johnson’s brief at 15 (emphasis in the original).

2016Johnson emphasizes that in this case ‘there is no relevant determination to be made as to the validity of the MegaSweeps contracts under § 8-l-150(a) that has not already been finally established as a matter of Alabama law in Barber [v. Jefferson County Racing Ass’n, Inc., 960 So.2d 599 (Ala. 2006)].’ Johnson’s brief at 19.

2012Similarly, however, at the time Paragon asserted arbitration as a defense to litigation, it had ‘entered into a consent agreement with the Alabama Home Builders Licensure Board in which Paragon admitted that it had engaged in the construction of Boles’s residence without holding a required license.’ Paragon, 987 So.2d at 567 .

2008Similarly, however, at the time Paragon asserted arbitration as a defense to litigation, it had “entered into a consent agreement with the Aabama Home Builders Licensure Board in which Paragon admitted that it had engaged in the construction of Boles’s residence without holding a required license.” Paragon, 987 So.2d at 567 .

2010“Furthermore, in Ex parte Woodard, 631 So.2d 1065 (Ala.Crim.App.1993), cert. denied, 662 So.2d 929 (Ala.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 869 , 115 S.Ct. 190 , 130 L.Ed.2d 123 (1994), this Court, in determining whether § 13A-5-40(a)(15), Ala. Code 1975 (murder of a child under the age of 14 years), sufficiently narrowed the class of ‘death-eligible’ defendants, said: “ ‘ “A capital sentencing scheme must, in short, provide a ‘ “meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.” ’ [Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 , 96 S

2001Furthermore, in Ex parte Woodard, 631 So.2d 1065 (Ala.Crim.App.1993), cert. denied, 662 So.2d 929 (Ala.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 869 , 115 S.Ct. 190 , 130 L.Ed.2d 123 (1994), this Court, in determining whether § 13A-5-40(a)(15), Ala. Code 1975 (murder of a child under the age of 14 years), sufficiently narrowed the class of "death-eligible" defendants, said: "`A capital sentencing scheme must, in short, provide a "`meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.'" [ Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 , 96 S.Ct.

2010(Issue XVI in Johnson’s brief.) In Ex parte Harrell, 470 So.2d 1309 (Ala.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 935 , 106 S.Ct. 269 , 88 L.Ed.2d 276 (1985), superseded by statute as recognized in Gurley v. State, 639 So.2d 557 (Ala.Crim.App.1993), the Alabama Supreme Court held that § 13A-5-40(a)(5) is ‘a reasonable exercise of legislative authority which is neither arbitrary nor capricious in imposing capital punishment upon one who intentionally and knowingly takes the life of a police officer, while that officer is engaged in carrying out his appointed duties, protecting the health, welfare, and pro

2001(Issue XVI in Johnson's brief.) In Ex parte Harrell, 470 So.2d 1309 (Ala.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 935 , 106 S.Ct. 269 , 88 L.Ed.2d 276 (1985), superseded by statute as recognized in Gurley v. State, 639 So.2d 557 (Ala.Crim.App. 1993), the Alabama Supreme Court held that § 13A-5-40(a)(5) is "a reasonable exercise of legislative authority which is neither arbitrary nor capricious in imposing capital punishment upon one who intentionally and knowingly takes the life of a police officer, while that officer is engaged in carrying out his appointed duties, protecting the health, welfare, and pr

2010“Furthermore, in Ex parte Woodard, 631 So.2d 1065 (Ala.Crim.App.1993), cert. denied, 662 So.2d 929 (Ala.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 869 , 115 S.Ct. 190 , 130 L.Ed.2d 123 (1994), this Court, in determining whether § 13A-5-40(a)(15), Ala. Code 1975 (murder of a child under the age of 14 years), sufficiently narrowed the class of ‘death-eligible’ defendants, said: “ ‘ “A capital sentencing scheme must, in short, provide a ‘ “meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.” ’ [Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 , 96 S

2010“Furthermore, in Ex parte Woodard, 631 So.2d 1065 (Ala.Crim.App.1993), cert. denied, 662 So.2d 929 (Ala.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 869 , 115 S.Ct. 190 , 130 L.Ed.2d 123 (1994), this Court, in determining whether § 13A-5-40(a)(15), Ala. Code 1975 (murder of a child under the age of 14 years), sufficiently narrowed the class of ‘death-eligible’ defendants, said: “ ‘ “A capital sentencing scheme must, in short, provide a ‘ “meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.” ’ [Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 , 96 S

2010“Furthermore, in Ex parte Woodard, 631 So.2d 1065 (Ala.Crim.App.1993), cert. denied, 662 So.2d 929 (Ala.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 869 , 115 S.Ct. 190 , 130 L.Ed.2d 123 (1994), this Court, in determining whether § 13A-5-40(a)(15), Ala. Code 1975 (murder of a child under the age of 14 years), sufficiently narrowed the class of ‘death-eligible’ defendants, said: “ ‘ “A capital sentencing scheme must, in short, provide a ‘ “meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.” ’ [Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 , 96 S

2010“Furthermore, in Ex parte Woodard, 631 So.2d 1065 (Ala.Crim.App.1993), cert. denied, 662 So.2d 929 (Ala.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 869 , 115 S.Ct. 190 , 130 L.Ed.2d 123 (1994), this Court, in determining whether § 13A-5-40(a)(15), Ala. Code 1975 (murder of a child under the age of 14 years), sufficiently narrowed the class of ‘death-eligible’ defendants, said: “ ‘ “A capital sentencing scheme must, in short, provide a ‘ “meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.” ’ [Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 , 96 S

2010(Issue XVI in Johnson’s brief.) In Ex parte Harrell, 470 So.2d 1309 (Ala.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 935 , 106 S.Ct. 269 , 88 L.Ed.2d 276 (1985), superseded by statute as recognized in Gurley v. State, 639 So.2d 557 (Ala.Crim.App.1993), the Alabama Supreme Court held that § 13A-5-40(a)(5) is ‘a reasonable exercise of legislative authority which is neither arbitrary nor capricious in imposing capital punishment upon one who intentionally and knowingly takes the life of a police officer, while that officer is engaged in carrying out his appointed duties, protecting the health, welfare, and pro

2010(Issue XVI in Johnson’s brief.) In Ex parte Harrell, 470 So.2d 1309 (Ala.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 935 , 106 S.Ct. 269 , 88 L.Ed.2d 276 (1985), superseded by statute as recognized in Gurley v. State, 639 So.2d 557 (Ala.Crim.App.1993), the Alabama Supreme Court held that § 13A-5-40(a)(5) is ‘a reasonable exercise of legislative authority which is neither arbitrary nor capricious in imposing capital punishment upon one who intentionally and knowingly takes the life of a police officer, while that officer is engaged in carrying out his appointed duties, protecting the health, welfare, and pro

2010(Issue XVI in Johnson’s brief.) In Ex parte Harrell, 470 So.2d 1309 (Ala.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 935 , 106 S.Ct. 269 , 88 L.Ed.2d 276 (1985), superseded by statute as recognized in Gurley v. State, 639 So.2d 557 (Ala.Crim.App.1993), the Alabama Supreme Court held that § 13A-5-40(a)(5) is ‘a reasonable exercise of legislative authority which is neither arbitrary nor capricious in imposing capital punishment upon one who intentionally and knowingly takes the life of a police officer, while that officer is engaged in carrying out his appointed duties, protecting the health, welfare, and pro

2001(Issue XVI in Johnson's brief.) In Ex parte Harrell, 470 So.2d 1309 (Ala.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 935 , 106 S.Ct. 269 , 88 L.Ed.2d 276 (1985), superseded by statute as recognized in Gurley v. State, 639 So.2d 557 (Ala.Crim.App. 1993), the Alabama Supreme Court held that § 13A-5-40(a)(5) is "a reasonable exercise of legislative authority which is neither arbitrary nor capricious in imposing capital punishment upon one who intentionally and knowingly takes the life of a police officer, while that officer is engaged in carrying out his appointed duties, protecting the health, welfare, and pr

2010(Issue XVI in Johnson’s brief.) In Ex parte Harrell, 470 So.2d 1309 (Ala.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 935 , 106 S.Ct. 269 , 88 L.Ed.2d 276 (1985), superseded by statute as recognized in Gurley v. State, 639 So.2d 557 (Ala.Crim.App.1993), the Alabama Supreme Court held that § 13A-5-40(a)(5) is ‘a reasonable exercise of legislative authority which is neither arbitrary nor capricious in imposing capital punishment upon one who intentionally and knowingly takes the life of a police officer, while that officer is engaged in carrying out his appointed duties, protecting the health, welfare, and pro

2001(Issue XVI in Johnson's brief.) In Ex parte Harrell, 470 So.2d 1309 (Ala.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 935 , 106 S.Ct. 269 , 88 L.Ed.2d 276 (1985), superseded by statute as recognized in Gurley v. State, 639 So.2d 557 (Ala.Crim.App. 1993), the Alabama Supreme Court held that § 13A-5-40(a)(5) is "a reasonable exercise of legislative authority which is neither arbitrary nor capricious in imposing capital punishment upon one who intentionally and knowingly takes the life of a police officer, while that officer is engaged in carrying out his appointed duties, protecting the health, welfare, and pr

2010(Issue XVI in Johnson’s brief.) In Ex parte Harrell, 470 So.2d 1309 (Ala.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 935 , 106 S.Ct. 269 , 88 L.Ed.2d 276 (1985), superseded by statute as recognized in Gurley v. State, 639 So.2d 557 (Ala.Crim.App.1993), the Alabama Supreme Court held that § 13A-5-40(a)(5) is ‘a reasonable exercise of legislative authority which is neither arbitrary nor capricious in imposing capital punishment upon one who intentionally and knowingly takes the life of a police officer, while that officer is engaged in carrying out his appointed duties, protecting the health, welfare, and pro

2001(Issue XVI in Johnson's brief.) In Ex parte Harrell, 470 So.2d 1309 (Ala.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 935 , 106 S.Ct. 269 , 88 L.Ed.2d 276 (1985), superseded by statute as recognized in Gurley v. State, 639 So.2d 557 (Ala.Crim.App. 1993), the Alabama Supreme Court held that § 13A-5-40(a)(5) is "a reasonable exercise of legislative authority which is neither arbitrary nor capricious in imposing capital punishment upon one who intentionally and knowingly takes the life of a police officer, while that officer is engaged in carrying out his appointed duties, protecting the health, welfare, and pr

2010“Furthermore, in Ex parte Woodard, 631 So.2d 1065 (Ala.Crim.App.1993), cert. denied, 662 So.2d 929 (Ala.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 869 , 115 S.Ct. 190 , 130 L.Ed.2d 123 (1994), this Court, in determining whether § 13A-5-40(a)(15), Ala. Code 1975 (murder of a child under the age of 14 years), sufficiently narrowed the class of ‘death-eligible’ defendants, said: “ ‘ “A capital sentencing scheme must, in short, provide a ‘ “meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.” ’ [Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 , 96 S

2001Furthermore, in Ex parte Woodard, 631 So.2d 1065 (Ala.Crim.App.1993), cert. denied, 662 So.2d 929 (Ala.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 869 , 115 S.Ct. 190 , 130 L.Ed.2d 123 (1994), this Court, in determining whether § 13A-5-40(a)(15), Ala. Code 1975 (murder of a child under the age of 14 years), sufficiently narrowed the class of "death-eligible" defendants, said: "`A capital sentencing scheme must, in short, provide a "`meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.'" [ Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 , 96 S.Ct.

2010“Furthermore, in Ex parte Woodard, 631 So.2d 1065 (Ala.Crim.App.1993), cert. denied, 662 So.2d 929 (Ala.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 869 , 115 S.Ct. 190 , 130 L.Ed.2d 123 (1994), this Court, in determining whether § 13A-5-40(a)(15), Ala. Code 1975 (murder of a child under the age of 14 years), sufficiently narrowed the class of ‘death-eligible’ defendants, said: “ ‘ “A capital sentencing scheme must, in short, provide a ‘ “meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.” ’ [Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 , 96 S

2001Furthermore, in Ex parte Woodard, 631 So.2d 1065 (Ala.Crim.App.1993), cert. denied, 662 So.2d 929 (Ala.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 869 , 115 S.Ct. 190 , 130 L.Ed.2d 123 (1994), this Court, in determining whether § 13A-5-40(a)(15), Ala. Code 1975 (murder of a child under the age of 14 years), sufficiently narrowed the class of "death-eligible" defendants, said: "`A capital sentencing scheme must, in short, provide a "`meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.'" [ Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 , 96 S.Ct.

2010“Furthermore, in Ex parte Woodard, 631 So.2d 1065 (Ala.Crim.App.1993), cert. denied, 662 So.2d 929 (Ala.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 869 , 115 S.Ct. 190 , 130 L.Ed.2d 123 (1994), this Court, in determining whether § 13A-5-40(a)(15), Ala. Code 1975 (murder of a child under the age of 14 years), sufficiently narrowed the class of ‘death-eligible’ defendants, said: “ ‘ “A capital sentencing scheme must, in short, provide a ‘ “meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.” ’ [Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 , 96 S

2001Furthermore, in Ex parte Woodard, 631 So.2d 1065 (Ala.Crim.App.1993), cert. denied, 662 So.2d 929 (Ala.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 869 , 115 S.Ct. 190 , 130 L.Ed.2d 123 (1994), this Court, in determining whether § 13A-5-40(a)(15), Ala. Code 1975 (murder of a child under the age of 14 years), sufficiently narrowed the class of "death-eligible" defendants, said: "`A capital sentencing scheme must, in short, provide a "`meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.'" [ Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 , 96 S.Ct.

2004In support of this latter proposition, Johnson cites Ex parte State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 761 So.2d 1000 (Ala.2000)(" State Farm II "), [1] which she contends implicitly overruled State Farm *724 I.

2004In support of this latter proposition, Johnson cites Ex parte State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 761 So.2d 1000 (Ala.2000)(“State Farm II”), 1 which she contends implicitly overruled State Farm I.

1992In Norman v. Housing Authority of the City of Montgomery , 836 F.2d 1292 (11th Cir. 1988), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals discussed the application of the lodestar method where attorney fees were awarded pursuant to a federal statute.

1992In Norman v. Housing Authority of the City of Montgomery , 836 F.2d 1292 (11th Cir. 1988), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals discussed the application of the lodestar method where attorney fees were awarded pursuant to a federal statute.

1992The Supreme Court in Blum limited the factors that a trial court may consider in determining whether to make adjustments to the lodestar amount: "Expanding on our earlier finding in Hensley that many of the Johnson factors 'are subsumed within the initial calculation' of the lodestar, we specifically held in Blum that the 'novelty [and] complexity of the issues,' 'the special skill and experience of counsel,' the 'quality of representation,' and the 'results obtained' from the litigation are presumably fully reflected in the lodestar amount, and thus cannot serve as independent bases for incre

1992The Supreme Court in Blum limited the factors that a trial court may consider in determining whether to make adjustments to the lodestar amount: "Expanding on our earlier finding in Hensley that many of the Johnson factors 'are subsumed within the initial calculation' of the lodestar, we specifically held in Blum that the 'novelty [and] complexity of the issues,' 'the special skill and experience of counsel,' the 'quality of representation,' and the 'results obtained' from the litigation are presumably fully reflected in the lodestar amount, and thus cannot serve as independent bases for incre

2025(Johnson's brief at 114-15.) In support of his claim, Johnson cites Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. 83, 93 (2020), Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92 , 94 (2016), Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 584 , 589 (2000).

2025(Johnson's brief at 114-15.) In support of his claim, Johnson cites Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. 83, 93 (2020), Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92 , 94 (2016), Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 584 , 589 (2000).