Johnson test in California

2024Hinsdale agreed to waive 100 days of credit in the vehicle theft case (Johnson waiver).3 In both cases, the court authorized Hinsdale’s release to probation 3 “A Johnson waiver is a waiver of a statutory right to credit for time served against a subsequent county jail or state prison sentence pursuant to section 2900.5.” (People v. Arnold (2004) 33 Cal.4th 294, 307 ; People v. Johnson (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 183 (Johnson).

2021Nor does the record reveal that this apparent misconception was somehow cleared up by the time 3 “A Johnson waiver is a waiver of a statutory right to credit for time served against a subsequent county jail or prison sentence pursuant to section 2900.5.” (People v. Arnold, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 307 .) 13. defendant entered his subsequent Johnson waiver in 2007.

2004(See, e.g., People v. Salazar (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1550, 1554 , 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 221 ; People v. Ambrose (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1917, 1923 , 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 812 .) A sentencing court's failure to include such an explicit advisement will not, however, invalidate a Johnson waiver by which the defendant is otherwise found to have knowingly and intelligently relinquished his or her right to custody credits under section 2900.5.

2004(See, e.g., People v. Salazar (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1550, 1554 , 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 221 ; People v. Ambrose (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1917, 1923 , 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 812 .) A sentencing court's failure to include such an explicit advisement will not, however, invalidate a Johnson waiver by which the defendant is otherwise found to have knowingly and intelligently relinquished his or her right to custody credits under section 2900.5.

2022After an arrest warrant 3 “[A] defendant can expressly waive entitlement to credits for time served.” (People v. Johnson (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1050, 1052 .) This so-called Johnson waiver “enables a sentencing court to reinstate a defendant on probation after he or she has violated probation one or more times, conditioned on service of an additional county jail term, as an alternative to imposing a state prison sentence.” (People v. Jeffrey (2004) 33 Cal.4th 312, 315 .) The waiver “applies to any future use of such credits should probation ultimately be terminated and a state prison sentence impose

2015“A Johnson waiver is a waiver of a statutory right to credit for time served against a subsequent county jail or state prison sentence pursuant to section 2900.5.” (People v. Arnold (2004) 33 Cal.4th 294, 307 (Arnold).) “ ‘To determine whether a waiver is knowing and intelligent, the inquiry should begin and end with deciding whether the defendant understood he was giving up custody credits to which he was otherwise entitled.’. . .” (People v. Jeffrey (2004) 33 Cal.4th 312, 320 (Jeffrey), quoting People v. Burks (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 232, 236, fn. 3 .) In Arnold, the Supreme Court held that wh

2020(Hansen, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 919, fn. 3 [observing the Johnson test “appears tailored to procedural, and not substantive, changes in criminal law”].) The court declined to apply the retroactivity test established in People v. Mutch (1971) 4 Cal.3d 389 , applicable to substantive changes in the law, because the parties did not brief the issue.

2020(Hansen, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 919, fn. 3 [observing the Johnson test “appears tailored to procedural, and not substantive, changes in criminal law”].) The court declined to apply the retroactivity test established in People v. Mutch (1971) 4 Cal.3d 389 , applicable to substantive changes in the law, because the parties did not brief the issue.

2019(See § 667, subd. (b) ["It is the intent of the Legislature ... to ensure longer prison sentences and greater *53 punishment for those who commit a felony and have been previously convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felony offenses."]; People v. Superior Court (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1007 , 1016, 171 Cal.Rptr.3d 86 [The purpose of the Three Strikes law is " ' "to ensure longer prison sentences and greater punishment for those who commit a felony and have been previously convicted of serious and/or violent felony offenses" ' [citation] and 'to promote the state's compelling interest

2019(See § 667, subd. (b) ["It is the intent of the Legislature ... to ensure longer prison sentences and greater *53 punishment for those who commit a felony and have been previously convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felony offenses."]; People v. Superior Court (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1007 , 1016, 171 Cal.Rptr.3d 86 [The purpose of the Three Strikes law is " ' "to ensure longer prison sentences and greater punishment for those who commit a felony and have been previously convicted of serious and/or violent felony offenses" ' [citation] and 'to promote the state's compelling interest

2022In light of Edwards, which was decided six months after petitioner filed his reply brief, petitioner withdrew his argument that Gallardo announced a watershed rule. 14 In re MILTON Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. legitimate interest in having judgments remain final, and collateral review “ ‘is not designed as a substitute for direct review’ ”].) Some California courts have applied the federal retroactivity test in deciding the retroactivity of new procedural rules (e.g., In re Moore (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 68, 77 [new procedural rule not retroactive under Teague]), while others have applied

2022In light of Edwards, which was decided six months after petitioner filed his reply brief, petitioner withdrew his argument that Gallardo announced a watershed rule. 14 In re MILTON Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. legitimate interest in having judgments remain final, and collateral review “ ‘is not designed as a substitute for direct review’ ”].) Some California courts have applied the federal retroactivity test in deciding the retroactivity of new procedural rules (e.g., In re Moore (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 68, 77 [new procedural rule not retroactive under Teague]), while others have applied

2004(See, e.g., People v. Salazar (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1550, 1554 , 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 221 ; People v. Ambrose (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1917, 1923 , 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 812 .) A sentencing court's failure to include such an explicit advisement will not, however, invalidate a Johnson waiver by which the defendant is otherwise found to have knowingly and intelligently relinquished his or her right to custody credits under section 2900.5.

2004(See, e.g., People v. Salazar (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1550, 1554 , 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 221 ; People v. Ambrose (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1917, 1923 , 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 812 .) A sentencing court's failure to include such an explicit advisement will not, however, invalidate a Johnson waiver by which the defendant is otherwise found to have knowingly and intelligently relinquished his or her right to custody credits under section 2900.5.

2024In Kinsman v. Unocal Corp., our Supreme Court held a landowner can be liable for an injury to a contractor’s employee where (1) “the landowner knew, or should have known, of a latent or concealed preexisting hazardous condition on its property;” (2) “the contractor did not know and could not have reasonably discovered this hazardous condition;” and (3) “the landowner failed to warn the contractor about this condition.” (Kinsman v. Unocal Corp. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 659, 664 (Kinsman).) 12 As the Kinsman test is conjunctive, we focus on Johnson’s claim that triable issues of fact exist as to whethe

2024In Kinsman v. Unocal Corp., our Supreme Court held a landowner can be liable for an injury to a contractor’s employee where (1) “the landowner knew, or should have known, of a latent or concealed preexisting hazardous condition on its property;” (2) “the contractor did not know and could not have reasonably discovered this hazardous condition;” and (3) “the landowner failed to warn the contractor about this condition.” (Kinsman v. Unocal Corp. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 659, 664 (Kinsman).) 12 As the Kinsman test is conjunctive, we focus on Johnson’s claim that triable issues of fact exist as to whethe

2022We do not find reversible error by considering the claims cumulatively.” (Chism, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1309 ; see Scully, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 613 [“the cumulative effect of the three assumed errors and one harmless error does not warrant reversal”].) We therefore reject Johnson’s claim that her trial was fundamentally unfair.

2022We do not find reversible error by considering the claims cumulatively.” (Chism, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1309 ; see Scully, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 613 [“the cumulative effect of the three assumed errors and one harmless error does not warrant reversal”].) We therefore reject Johnson’s claim that her trial was fundamentally unfair.

2022After an arrest warrant 3 “[A] defendant can expressly waive entitlement to credits for time served.” (People v. Johnson (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1050, 1052 .) This so-called Johnson waiver “enables a sentencing court to reinstate a defendant on probation after he or she has violated probation one or more times, conditioned on service of an additional county jail term, as an alternative to imposing a state prison sentence.” (People v. Jeffrey (2004) 33 Cal.4th 312, 315 .) The waiver “applies to any future use of such credits should probation ultimately be terminated and a state prison sentence impose

2018Arevalo Is Not Entitled to Relief Even if His Johnson Waiver Was Not Fully Knowing and Intelligent. " 'As with the waiver of any significant right by a criminal defendant, a defendant's waiver of entitlement to section 2900.5 custody credits must, of course, be knowing and intelligent.' " ( Arnold, supra , 33 Cal.4th at p. 308 , 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 840 , 92 P.3d 335 .) " 'To determine whether a waiver is knowing and intelligent, the inquiry should begin and end with deciding whether the defendant understood he [or she] was giving up custody credits to which he [or she] was otherwise entitled.' " (

2022The point is that two defendants who actually did commit identical conduct would necessarily be treated differently under our state’s recidivist statutes unless courts were, pre-Gallardo, permitted to look beyond the elements of each state’s definition of robbery when determining whether each defendant’s offense qualified as a strike. 38 In re MILTON Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. retroactivity is a close one after the purpose of the new rule is considered.” (Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 410 .) We conclude the first Johnson factor’s effect on the issue of retroactivity is determinative

2020(Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 410 .) That is, we weigh the new rule’s importance and impact against the disruption that would be caused by applying the new rule to final cases where law enforcement, including prosecutors, relied on the old rule in investigating and prosecuting those cases originally.” (Thomas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 763 .) The Johnson standard is somewhat vague and difficult to apply.

2022(People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 389 ; Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 687-688, 694.) Johnson’s claim of ineffective counsel arises from his trial counsel’s failure to make certain objections to Oplinger’s testimony during trial.

2020(People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 389 ; Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 687-688, 694.) Johnson’s claim of ineffective counsel arises from his trial counsel’s failure to make certain objections to Oplinger’s testimony during trial.

2016This count had not been read to the jury. 12 These findings are not reflected in the minutes of the court. 13 At the hearing on Johnson’s motion for a new trial, on the day of sentencing, Johnson’s trial counsel explained that he had not served the prosecutor with a copy of his motion until earlier that day because he had just finished his last trial of a “non-stop” series of trials that had consumed the entire previous six months, the prior week and he had been “backed up” and had a “heavy calendar” since then, comprised of preliminary hearings. 14 To avoid such an argument, we will not rely

2016This count had not been read to the jury. 12 These findings are not reflected in the minutes of the court. 13 At the hearing on Johnson’s motion for a new trial, on the day of sentencing, Johnson’s trial counsel explained that he had not served the prosecutor with a copy of his motion until earlier that day because he had just finished his last trial of a “non-stop” series of trials that had consumed the entire previous six months, the prior week and he had been “backed up” and had a “heavy calendar” since then, comprised of preliminary hearings. 14 To avoid such an argument, we will not rely

2025(Johnson, at p. 720; accord, City of Los Angeles, at p. 14.)6 However, “in some ways the Pitchess statutory scheme is potentially narrower than Brady’s requirements.” (Johnson, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 720 .) For instance, the statutory exceptions to disclosure under section 1045, subdivisions (b) and (c), that apply to a classic Pitchess motion are inapplicable to a Brady/Johnson motion. 7 (Johnson, at p. 720 [“all information 6 On the other hand, during an in camera review on a classic Pitchess motion, the scope of the discoverable information is limited to possible instances of misconduct re

2020He appeals, contending that the trial court erred in denying his Brady/Johnson motion (Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 (Brady); People v. Superior Court (Johnson) (2015) 61 Cal.4th 696 ) for an in camera review and discovery of the arresting officer’s confidential personnel file.